THE SERVICES OF NATIVE CONTINGENTS—LORD CHELMSFORD AND SIR H.
BULWER—REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN—DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT—IMMENSE
DELAY—BURYING THE DEAD AT ISANDHLWANA.
The Native Contingent, composed of loyal Zulus, although a large
force, turned out a comparatively useless one. After the battle
of Isandhlwana, Colonel Glynn reports (on the 24th of January),
"The whole of the Native Contingent walked off this morning." The
reasons for this conduct are furnished elaborately in a minute
of Sir H. Bulwer, Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, dated the 29th
of January. These men had numerous complaints. On the night of
the 23rd of January, whilst the European force at Rorke's Drift
was entrenched, the Native Contingent had no such protection.
The general and his staff leaving camp exercised a depressing
influence. Uncertainty existed regarding their wives and families.
These reasons, and reasons such as these, were furnished as
explanations for their desertion. Sir Henry Bulwer had been always
of opinion that to do away with the native system of organization
for the purpose of substituting a regimental system was one of very
doubtful advisableness. Nevertheless, he consented to give the men
required, and no fewer than 7050 were sent into the field. Lord
Chelmsford declared that he had never been able to understand what
the tribal system was, and that as often as he had endeavoured to
obtain information he had been baffled by vague generalities and
oft-repeated laudations. So anxious, however, were the commandants
to carry out what they considered the tribal system, that the
companies were organized with uneven strength, in order that men
of different tribes should be kept distinct. Sir Henry Bulwer
believed that each column should have had a Native Contingent, and
that these should have been led by officers who represented the
Lieutenant-Governor, or Supreme Chief. They would have then moved
and fought in accordance with their customs. The general could
not agree to this. The natives must be divided into battalions
1000 strong, and into companies 100 strong. They were not to fight
in their own fashion, and European officers, who did not know
their language, were given commands among them. Dissatisfaction,
discontent, and inefficiency resulted in such a manner that in all
respects the large Native Contingent, numbering more than 7000 men,
was a failure.
[Sidenote: _Bulwer and Chelmsford._]
Later on, very serious differences of opinion arose between Lord
Chelmsford and Sir Henry Bulwer. In reply to suggestions from the
general, the Executive Council of Natal decided, on the 1st of
March, that—
"(_a._) In the opinion of this Council the proposition that raiding
expeditions should be made into the Zulu country by the natives
of this colony is unadvisable of adoption, as being an impolitic
and undesirable system of war, as being calculated to provoke
retaliation, and as tending to demoralize the people engaged in it.
"(_b._) 1. That the proposition to call out every available native
in the colony is open to serious objections.
"2. That a large proportion of the able-bodied male population
has already been called out, and that this Council considers it
undesirable to press the power of the Supreme Chief to a point that
would probably cause serious discontent amongst the natives.
"3. That all trading, commercial, and farming operations would be
thereby disorganized and ruinous consequences would ensue, the
natives forming practically the only labouring portion of the
population in the upper districts of the colony.
"4. That the calling out of the whole able-bodied male population
would, in all probability, induce a panic, and be attended with
serious inconveniences."
It will thus be seen that very unfortunate differences of opinion
existed between the supreme military power and the civil government
of Natal. It certainly must be admitted that, as a rule, the
friendly Zulus of the colony were of little good as fighting men
in the campaign. Whether or not the opposite would have been the
case if the dangerous experiment had been tried of allowing them to
fight with their own weapons and in their own fashion is extremely
doubtful. The tribal system, root and branch, is a failure in
Natal, and a constant source of danger and anxiety. So soon,
therefore, as by means of enlightened statesmanship it can be
completely broken up and destroyed, the better for the protection
and defence of the colony, as well as for the cause of civilization
and the nation we are trying to civilize.
[Sidenote: _Correspondence._]
On the 11th of April, the general, writing to the Secretary of
State for War, says, "My orders regarding demonstrations were
fully carried out, but the fullness of the Tugela would have
prevented any general raid being made, even if the Natal natives
had not been forbidden to cross the border by his Excellency the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal." In order to enable my readers to
understand the entire question fully, I subjoin that portion of
Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch to the Secretary of State (April 16)
which refers to the subject. He says, "I have placed under the
command of the lieutenant-general, for service in the Zulu country,
the Natal Mounted Police, most of the Natal Mounted Volunteers,
a number of natives who have been formed into what is called the
Natal Native Contingent, and a number of natives for pioneer,
transport, and hospital service, and that I have never interfered
with them, nor have I expected that the lieutenant-general's orders
to them should be referred to me before being complied with; but
with regard to the native levies, which have been called out
for the defence of the colony, and placed under the command of
colonial district commanders to protect the border and the colony,
I have never placed them in any way, directly or indirectly,
under the command of the lieutenant-general for service in the
Zulu country, nor have I authorized, directly or indirectly, in
any way, their being taken across the border, or their being
employed in making raids into the Zulu country. These levies were
called out expressly and solely for service in the colony and for
the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial
district commanders for that purpose only. The colonial district
commanders were, of course, made subject, so far as regarded the
defence of their districts, and the movement and disposition of
any forces under them in their districts, to the military command;
but no authority has been given, either to these colonial district
commanders or to the lieutenant-general, to employ the native
levies, which were exclusively called out for the defence of the
colony, on any service in the Zulu country, and I submit that the
lieutenant-general in issuing any instructions for these native
levies to cross the border to make raids into Zulu country, in
issuing these instructions as he has done, without my authority,
without my concurrence, and positively without any reference to
me, has exceeded his powers and acted without a due regard for the
authority of this Government.
"I pass by the question of the expediency or policy of making
raids into the Zulu country. In a letter addressed by me to the
High Commissioner, I have ventured to put before his Excellency
for his consideration the question of the expediency of such a
policy, and the risks involved in such a course, namely, the
risk of retaliation, and the risk of irritating and alienating
unnecessarily those of the Zulu people who might otherwise be
disposed to come to friendly terms with us, and through whose
friendly disposition towards us a satisfactory solution of the
difficulties between us and the Zulu people might eventually be
more easily arrived at. But I do not claim to have any authority in
respect of this question, and I have done no more than venture to
lay my suggestion before the High Commissioner, and to forward a
copy of my letter to the lieutenant-general.
[Sidenote: _Native levies._]
"With regard to the employment of the native levies who had
been called up for the defence of the border on service beyond
the border and in making raids, I have already shown that the
levies to which I refer were never in any way placed under the
lieutenant-general for employment across the border; and I have
also shown that they were levies which have nothing whatsoever
to do with the Native Contingent battalions to which the
lieutenant-general refers as having been hitherto associated
with the British troops, and which were placed under his command
for service across the border. The question, therefore, put by
the lieutenant-general, in the way that it is put before the
Secretary of State for War, by not distinguishing between the two
descriptions of native forces, but, as is actually done in the
last paragraph but one, by naming and associating the two together
as if there were no distinction between them, fails, I think, to
represent the real state of the case."
The general in command had felt extremely what he considered the
absence of co-operation on the part of Sir Henry Bulwer. Writing
to the Secretary of State for War on the 11th of April, Lord
Chelmsford mentions that when he had determined to move up to
Ekowe, secret instructions were sent to the different commanders
along the border from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula hill,
requesting them to make strong demonstrations all along the line,
and, if possible, to raid into Zululand. At this juncture the
Lieutenant-Governor forbade the Natal natives to cross. A general
raid into Zululand effected by a large body of native troops would,
in the opinion of Lord Chelmsford, have produced very important
results, and the general strongly resents the interference of Sir
H. Bulwer with his plans. The quarrel—for it was nothing less—to
which allusion has now been made, was very probably one of the
reasons for the appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who in his own
person united both supreme civil and supreme military power.
In the Zulu war there were two campaigns—the first ended in
Isandhlwana, the second at Ulundi. Between these battles there was
an immense interval, chiefly occupied in moving great masses of
men and greater masses of supplies to the front. Lord Chelmsford
is blamed for want of foresight and care in the first campaign,
want of energy and judgment in the second campaign, and want of
generalship in both. There are two sides to the case, and it is
necessary to advert to both. Great difficulties were in the way;
but until the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley and the joyful day
of Ulundi, it must be admitted that the general did not conquer
obstacles, but obstacles conquered him.
[Sidenote: _Review of the campaign._]
Let us endeavour to view the general conduct of the first campaign
in the light of facts about which there can be no question. Early
in January Lord Chelmsford was at the head of an army sufficiently
numerous and powerful for the conquest of Zululand. We shall see
that at Ulundi 4000 soldiers, properly handled, were adequate to
the complete defeat of 20,000 Zulus, comprising the flower of
Cetywayo's army; therefore it is absurd to imagine that, if good
generalship had been used, any defeat could have been sustained
in the first advance. Colonel Pearson was thoroughly victorious
at Inyezane, and Colonel Wood was also successful. Disastrous
failure, however, overtook the column of the general-in-chief.
Lord Chelmsford, conducting a large force with enormous stores,
made Rorke's Drift on the Tugela his base of operations, and
subsequently was forced to trust to the extraordinary efforts of
a young Engineer officer for the safety of Natal. All experience
of Zulu warfare had shown the absolute necessity of entrenchments,
yet the central column marched into Zululand without constructing
a single breastwork. The personal safety of the commander-in-chief
and that of half his column became really due to a sudden
inspiration and to a happy accident. Young subalterns conceived and
carried a plan of defence where mealie-bags formed the breastworks
and biscuit-boxes the entrenchments. It was providential that such
officers as Chard and Bromhead were there to do the work.
Lord Chelmsford was woefully deficient in knowledge of the enemy's
movements. An immense army lay in wait to destroy his camp while
he, with scattered forces, pursued a Will-o'-the-wisp foe which
found no difficulty in luring him on to destruction. He had
mounted men, but does not seem to have used them efficiently as
scouts. Colonel Buller, the able head of his intelligence branch,
was in quite another part of the country. Lord Chelmsford either
completely despised the enemy, which was a blunder in itself, or
he was incapable of appreciating his real position, and of taking
the evident means of preserving the column under his charge. He
evidently wanted that genius or instinct so absolutely necessary to
constitute a great military leader. A really great general, like a
poet, is born, not made; and it was the misfortune of the British
army not to have secured one on this important occasion.
No entrenchment or laager was either made or ordered to be made at
Isandhlwana, although it must be admitted that if the general had
been as lucky in subordinates there as at Rorke's Drift, a very
different issue of the day would have been the result. Nothing
could surpass the madness of Colonel Durnford in scattering his
troops at the very moment when, by means of laagering, or at least
forming a hollow square, it would have been possible to resist
the attack of the enemy. It is a libel on our soldiers to hint
that they did not behave well. The short service system is in no
way responsible for the disaster. The gallant 24th, as well as
the other troops, fought with the utmost bravery, and, if they
had been commanded by such a man as Wood or Pearson, undoubtedly
would have gained a brilliant victory. A few hundred Dutchmen,
without breech-loading guns, had behind a rough fortification of
waggons defied an entire Zulu army. Chard and Bromhead, with 100
infantry soldiers, at the back of mealie-bags and biscuit-boxes,
were able to drive back immensely superior forces. It is therefore
preposterous to imagine that our troops at Isandhlwana, assisted by
well-served large guns, could not easily, if properly commanded,
have been able to hold their own, at least until the rest of the
column arrived.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford criticised._]
In ten days' time Lord Chelmsford was so unfortunate as to sustain
a most signal defeat, in which half his force was literally
butchered, and his large quantity of ammunition and stores captured
by the enemy. His flank was turned and his column surprised by an
army of naked savages, without artillery, about whose movements his
ignorance was as profound as it was surprising. A similar success
to that gained by Colonel Pearson would have virtually concluded
the war. A march to Ulundi by a strong flying column would have
been possible, and Great Britain might then have saved the blood of
many of her best soldiers, and fully three million pounds sterling
of her treasure.
The opinions now expressed are those of the majority of military
correspondents and military men, but the thorough novelty and
difficulty of operations do not seem sufficiently taken into
account. Besides, in judging Lord Chelmsford, it must be specially
remembered that his instructions about concentrating at Isandhlwana
camp were not attended to, and to this fact many attributed the
disaster that ensued. Certainly no one deserved sympathy more than
this general, whose misfortunes were quite as great as his faults.
Subsequently, he did everything in his power to make the campaign
successful. Reinforcements poured in, and were pushed forward
to the front. It is true that delays occurred, but these, it is
argued, were thoroughly unsurmountable. We shall find at last that
Lord Chelmsford finished the campaign with glory and success at the
great battle of Ulundi. The people of Natal and the Cape Colony,
who had sympathized with his reverses, thoroughly recognized the
greatness of this victory and rejoiced in his triumph. It is only
fair, when furnishing opinions full of condemnation, to refer at
the same time to the fact that contrary views are held by numerous
men of intelligence, who have had every opportunity of studying the
subject.
The disaster of Isandhlwana was pregnant with results almost too
awful to contemplate. Natal was panic-stricken. Twenty thousand
white people were threatened, not only with the victorious army,
but with hundreds of thousands of natives, kept heathen and alien
from motives of policy, who would have, out of fear of Cetywayo,
quickly joined any army of massacre which that tyrant could
have sent to devastate Natal. Fortunately, in spite of their
much-vaunted strategy, the Zulus proved unequal to the task of
taking advantage of their victory. Had they, in the first instance,
only allowed the general to move forward into his new camp, the
destruction of the column could have been made complete. It was
by a miracle that Lord Chelmsford and the men with him escaped.
If they had been attacked when, exhausted and dispirited, they
flung themselves down on the reeking plain of Isandhlwana, it is
extremely likely that the general and every man with him would
have been killed. The gross absurdity of blaming Lord Chelmsford
for not burying the dead on the field is only equalled by its
injustice. The general and the remnant of his column were really
fugitives, and it was not until they found that, by the heroic
defence of Rorke's Drift, the base of operations was still held,
that they were able to breathe with any degree of safety. It was
hoping against hope to imagine that a place really left unfortified
could have been held against a victorious army; and it is well to
recognize the fact that not only Natal and its people, but Lord
Chelmsford and the remnant of his column, were saved by the heroes
of this colonial Thermopylæ.
[Sidenote: _Panic in Natal._]
The awful pause of suspense, which lasted many weeks, passed by.
The Tugela river and the indecision of the Zulu king saved the
colony. Reinforcements which had been telegraphed for poured in
with amazing celerity, and both Natal and British honour were
saved. For nine weeks the beleaguered column under General Pearson
had to suffer privations, and the Zulus, who had experienced what
British soldiers could do behind biscuit-boxes at Rorke's Drift,
hesitated to attack them when behind regular entrenchments at
Ekowe. At last, as we had seen, relief was sent. Then another
period of delay set in. Masses of troops continued to arrive, and
early in May our strength in Natal comprised more than 22,000 men,
divided as follows:—
First division (General Crealock's) 9,215
Second division (General Newdigate's) 10,238
General Wood's[32] flying column 3,092
——————
Effective and non-effective 22,545
[Sidenote: _The transport difficulty._]
This was a large army, the most powerful force of Europeans ever
engaged in war within South Africa. The occasion was supreme,
as the greatest power of the native races had challenged the
white man to a combat _à l'outrance_, and the question simply
was whether the Queen or Cetywayo should rule supreme in the
southern portion of this continent. Reinforcements were sent out
with immense celerity, and landed with the utmost despatch and
with neither casualty nor danger. But the delay in moving them
was most disappointing. It must have puzzled the Zulus immensely
to understand why we were so extraordinarily slow. Five weeks had
elapsed since the battle of Ginghelovo without any set engagement
with the enemy taking place, and the Press began to grumble.
Transport rose to unprecedented rates. Twenty shillings per cwt.,
or £20 per ton, was charged for the carriage of provisions a
distance of fifty-four miles, from D'Urban to Pietermaritzburg.
Oxen died in hundreds, and the progress of the battalions of
infantry which were marching against an enemy famous for their
celerity was most disheartening. The plan of Lord Chelmsford
was that of sending on masses of troops, whose _impedimenta_ in
the shape of baggage and means of supply was so enormous as to
completely cripple their movements. At a subsequent period, after
the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley, we shall find that officer
successfully employing more than 2000 Zulu carriers; but this
method, cheap and efficient, does not seem to have been tried by
Lord Chelmsford.
To lessen the enormous difficulties of transport, which crushed the
efforts of our soldiers, a successful attempt was made to find a
landing-place on the Zululand coast. H.M. gunboat _Forester_ was
sent on this quest, which was ultimately successful, and Port
Durnford was established as a place for landing supplies. This
cut off more than a hundred miles of difficult road, and was of
immense service to the advancing columns. During May, 1879, the
_Forester_[33] performed important duties in this service, and more
than once fired at bands of the enemy near the seashore.
It is impossible to write any chronicle of the movements of General
Crealock's column which would be of interest. It crawled along
among hundreds of dead oxen killed in dragging its heavy baggage
and supplies over bad roads. Enormous expenditure for commissariat
and transport services went on, and it was very evident that this
war would be waged at frightful cost. The British lion growled in
England, and there was an undoubted echo in the colonies.
[Sidenote: _Position of the forces._]
On the 15th of May, the head-quarters of the South African field
force, under Major-General Newdigate, was situated on the Buffalo
river, near Doornberg. The force comprised:—Right wing of the 17th
Lancers; three companies 1-21st Regiment; six companies 58th; N
battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, with six 7-pounders, under
Colonel Harness; N Battery, 6th Brigade, with six 9-pounders;
Army Service Corps, Army Hospital Corps, Bengaugh's Native
Battalion, Natal Pioneers, and Natal Carbineers. Colonel Tatton
Browne commanded the Royal Artillery, and Captain Anstey the Royal
Engineers. Twelve miles further on, at Conference Hill, was
the most advanced post, where Colonel Davies, Grenadier Guards,
commanded. The garrison was composed of six companies of the 94th
Regiment, Bettington's troop of Natal Horse, a detachment of the
Royal Engineers, and Shepstone's Mounted Basutos. Another fort
and laager had been erected for their defence, while eight miles
further on towards the north-east was Brigadier-General Wood's new
camp at Magwechana, close to the Sand Spruit, one of the sources
of the White Umvolosi. General Marshall was with the cavalry camp.
The experience of Isandhlwana was thoroughly sufficient, and the
most complete precautions on all occasions were taken to prevent
the possibility of disaster. Forts and fortified positions covered
the country, but, nevertheless, there is excellent authority for
saying that if a Zulu impi had been ordered to invade, there would
have been no difficulty in driving back the weak border guard which
lined the Tugela, getting behind the regular forces, and making a
rapid destructive raid and an equally rapid retreat.[34] Cetywayo's
neglect of his opportunities was more useful in protecting Natal
than the immense armed force which, with infinite toil and a
slowness almost passing description, moved on towards Ulundi.
Loud were the public outcries at the transport break-down and the
tardiness of operations. General Newdigate's magnificent force
seemed paralyzed, and the difficulties of grass for horses and
supplies for troops _en route_ was the theme of every journal and
the excuse for a delay which was as costly as it was disappointing.
On the 17th of May, a road was made in the direction of Landman's
Drift, and a few days afterwards all the cavalry proceeded to
Rorke's Drift, and thence to Isandhlwana, for the purpose of
burying the dead. It was certainly full time to perform this duty.
One of the disgraceful occurrences or sad consequences of the Zulu
war is the fact, which cannot be slurred over without comment,
that the bodies of our brave men who fell at Isandhlwana remained
unburied for more than four months. Two regiments of Dragoon
Guards, with the Lancers and numerous other troops, moved on with
alacrity to perform the honourable task. The force advanced in
line, _échelon_, or column of squadrons, with extensive advance
and rear guards, as well as flankers. At night the men bivouacked
in groups of twelve, with their saddles turned inwards and placed
in a circle. At last they looked down from the Biggarsberg upon
Rorke's Drift and the Isandhlwana mountain in the distance. One
regiment of the Lancers and one of the Dragoon Guards, as well as
half the Natal Carbineers, swept the country in the neighbourhood.
The smoke of blazing huts rose up like burnt-offerings from the
hill-altars of Zululand. The signal-fires of the savages helped
to light up the country at night, and the British were again on
the field where Cetywayo had gained his first and last victory.
General Marshall, with Dragoons, Lancers, irregular horse, police,
and artillery, crossed the river at daybreak, and advanced in open
order. But my readers will prefer to read an account of what was
seen and done at Isandhlwana from the pen of a soldier who was
there. The correspondent of the _Times_ of Natal writes:—
[Sidenote: _Troops marching._]
"We pushed on very steadily and carefully, and at half-past nine
our advance-guard was on the ridge overlooking the valley beyond
Isandhlwana. There it lay, a magnificent stretch of country, with
undulating plains for miles, only broken by dongas and small rises,
and bordered by high hills on each side. Who would have thought,
looking down on the quiet scene, that it had witnessed one of the
most terrific fights and disasters of modern times? The grass had
grown up over the whole site of what had once been our camp, and
was thickly intermixed with mealie stalks and oat hay, green and
growing yet. Among these lay the bodies of our poor soldiers,
scattered about in all postures, and in all stages of decay; while
the positions of our tents were indicated by the broken remains
of boxes, trunks, tins of preserved meats, remnants of the tents
themselves, and masses of disordered papers, books, and letters,
etc., etc. The only thing, however, that at once drew the attention
of a casual observer was the broken remains of waggons and the
skeletons of horses and oxen. Everything else was hidden at first
sight, and required searching for to be noticed. One thing we had
observed coming along the road was the fresh spoor of a waggon or
two, and we conjectured that it had been recently used in conveying
crops from Sirayo's valley away into the strongholds further
inland. The spoor of two mounted Kafirs, and one on foot, was also
traced by the scouts fresh that morning; one of the horses was shod
all round, and these men were evidently of the party left by the
enemy to watch the coming of our troops. For some time after our
arrival, and while preparations were being actively carried out to
harness the horses to the best waggons, all the men except those
on vedette or other duty were allowed to wander over the scene
of the disaster. The Carbineers, under Captain Shepstone, made
immediately for their camp, and tried to find any relics of their
dead brethren. Nothing of any consequence was, however, found near
their lines; but upon searching over the ground where the bodies
of some of them had been seen on the night after Isandhlwana,
Captain Shepstone came upon the bodies of Colonel Durnford,
Lieutenant Scott, and nearly all the Carbineers, except London
and Bullock, and those few who were killed along the fugitive
path. Poor Durnford was easily recognizable, and he had on his
mess waistcoat, from the pocket of which Shepstone took a small
pocket-knife with his name on it. Two rings were also taken, and
are with the knife to be sent home _in memoriam_ to the colonel's
father. Durrant Scott lay partially hidden under a broken piece of
a waggon, and had evidently not been mutilated or touched after his
death. He had his patrol jacket on, buttoned across, and although
the rest of the body was only a skeleton, yet, strange to say,
the face was like in life, all the hair being still on, and the
skin strangely parched and dried up, although perfect. Both these
bodies lay right in the midst of the rest of the young colonists
who fell gallantly in defence of their country; and, judging from
the position in which they all were, they must have made one last
gallant stand, and have been killed altogether. None of these so
found had attempted to run, but had stuck together in life as we
found them in death. Knowing all of them well, and how they did
their duty, I felt it almost impossible to examine any, and had to
leave the scene for another one. I can only add that Durnford's
body was wrapped in canvas and buried in a kind of waterwash, while
all the others were covered over with stones, etc., and their names
written in pencil on wood or a stone close by them.
[Sidenote: _Isandhlwana revisited._]
"The bodies of the Royal Artillery and Natal Mounted Police were
also buried, the only ones left untouched being those of the 24th
Regiment, which was done at the express desire of Colonel Glyn
and the officers, in the hope of their being able some day to do
it themselves. This appeared, however, very strange to us, and
many remarks were made about the seeming dishonour to part of our
brave dead. However, let us hope that some day, not far distant,
we may be able to return to that once blood-red field and bury all
the bodies, bones, and relics that may be left. Great numbers of
waggons have undoubtedly been taken away, as also everything of
value in the camp, and many bodies have been, through one cause or
another, either wholly or partially removed or disturbed, so as
to effectually prevent recognition. I myself did not move far out
of camp, and, therefore, may be a bad judge, but from what I saw
there cannot have been more than 200 bodies in the camp itself, and
out of these not 25 Kafirs. Doubtless, had I gone out to where the
fighting first commenced, I should have found many more bodies, but
I am glad for my own sake that I did not do so. Others, who had not
perhaps so many bitter feelings or sorrowful remembrances of those
lying around us, went further and saw more, although I cannot hear
of any one having recognized any more bodies of officers, except
those of the Hon. S. Vereker and young Gibson, both lieutenants
in the Native Contingent. Many interesting relics were found and
brought away by others, and I know of a few cases where letters
addressed to relatives at home from those among the killed were
found complete, and will be sent home, to be held in loving regard
by the living, but will cause many sores scarce healed to be
reopened. The general was anxious, for more reasons than one, to
get away, and therefore, as soon as the waggons were ready, we made
a start back at twelve, and reached Rorke's Drift at half-past
three without any hitch whatever. Immediately on getting back
I went inquiring among the different parties who had been over
that day, and gleaned some other interesting facts from them. One
officer in the Dragoon Guards, while out with his squadron burning
kraals, found in one signs of very recent occupation, and the
staff of the Queen's colour of the 1-24th. He also later on came
across a kraal full of skeletons of Zulus; and this fact, taken in
conjunction with the finding of large graves on the left of our
camp containing bodies of the enemy, goes far to prove that the
Zulus did move their dead bodies, and as the kraal was some two
miles off where skeletons were found, they probably also moved them
in our waggons. The forty waggons we brought away included two
water carts in good preservation, one gun limber, a rocket battery
cart, and three Scotch carts. All that we left behind, in number
not more than twenty, were in a partially or entirely disabled
condition. Counting all these, therefore, there are still sixty or
seventy waggons missing, which have been taken away at different
times."
[Sidenote: _Kaffrarian riflemen._]
The irregular horse recruited in the Cape Colony and Natal deserve
special mention. Their services during the war were of a most
important and valuable character. Most of them were attached to
General Wood's column, and in the many daring raids in which their
services were used proved excellent soldiers. Among the most
prominent of these corps was that of the Kaffrarian Riflemen, under
Commandant Schermbrucker. On the 30th of April, at Utrecht, on
the occasion of the expiry of their engagement, that officer bade
farewell to his officers and men in an eloquent address in which
he recalled their principal services. Six months previously, on a
public parade at Pietermaritzburg, they had been selected by Lord
Chelmsford for a post of danger, in consequence of the manner in
which they had fought on the borders of the Cape Colony during
the Gaika rebellion. For nearly three months the important and
dangerous post of Luneberg had been held, and the handful of white
men had inflicted serious losses on the enemy, and secured safe
communication _viâ_ Intombe to Derby. They had been attached to
"that glorious column" commanded by Evelyn Wood, and formed part
of the forces under Buller engaged in the rescue of Oham's people
at his surrender. They were also in the disastrous storming of the
Zlobane and the glorious battle of Kambula. Admirable obedience and
cheerful discipline were maintained in the face of 20,000 enemies.
Their last duties were the harassing ones of escorting convoys _en
route_ from Batlee Spruit to Kambula.[35] What was said, and said
truly, of Schermbrucker's Irregular Horse might be said with little
variation of the other corps—Baker's, Whalley's, etc. Colonial men,
such as Schermbrucker, Nettleton, Shepstone, Lonsdale, Blaine,
Pickering, Wilson, and many others, distinguished themselves in the
field, and it can be said with equal truth and justice that the
volunteer force and levies, officers and men, proved most valuable
auxiliaries.
[Sidenote: _The Transvaal again._]
The Transvaal Republic had dragged along a sad existence for many
years, troubled constantly by native incursions from without,
and debt, quarrelling, and discontent from within, when the
Rev. Thomas F. Burgers was elected President in the year 1872.
He was to revolutionize the entire country, and to make a new
and improved Holland in Southern Africa. Gifted with certain
talents, among which that of oratory was conspicuous, Burgers
was deplorably deficient in a knowledge of men and business. His
plans were utopian, visionary, and unsound. He caused hundreds of
Boers to leave their adopted country, by forcing on them a system
of education from which the teachings of religion were excluded;
contracted a loan of £300,000 for a railway from Delagoa Bay, which
would have cost millions; designed a fanciful coat of arms and
flag; caused gold coins to be issued with his own likeness stamped
upon them, and played such "fantastic tricks before high heaven" as
to help forward that crisis of bankruptcy and ruin from which it
would have been very difficult, even by an exactly opposite course,
to have saved the country.
During the absence of the President in Europe, in 1875, Sekukuni,
the principal chief of the Bapedi people, broke out in rebellion.
In April, 1876, he was called upon to submit, but in place of doing
so boldly claimed the larger portion of the Lydenburg and Pretoria
districts. A commando then marched against him, and succeeded
in taking "Mathebi's Kop," which was grandiloquently styled the
Gibraltar of South Africa. A subsequent attack upon Sekukuni's
head kraal was a failure. The prosecution of the war was then
entrusted to volunteers, and after a short time an inglorious peace
was concluded. This treaty was only made to be broken, as it was
repudiated and treated with contempt by Sekukuni.
[Sidenote: _Annexation, history of._]
The peace of all British South Africa was seriously jeopardized
by the weakness and fatuity of the Government of the Transvaal
Republic. They were unable to conquer Sekukuni, and were so
threatened by Cetywayo as to make an incursion by that potentate
exceedingly probable. If the outworks of civilization were not
looked after there would soon be serious danger to the fortress.
Sir Theophilus Shepstone was therefore appointed special
Commissioner. He arrived at Pretoria in January, 1877, and an
extraordinary session of the Volksraad was held in February.
A radical reform, legislative, executive, and judicial, or the
British flag, was the alternative laid before them. They chose the
former, but remedies then came too late. The patient was incurable.
President Burgers declared that a new constitution could not save
them. On the 8th of March the Raad broke up, and on the 12th of
April Sir Theophilus Shepstone formally annexed the Transvaal
territory to the British crown. It was, without doubt, incomparably
the best course for a bankrupt country, perfectly unable to
cope either with its debts or its foes, but it is very doubtful
whether it was the wisest course for the British Government. An
immense burden was at once placed upon our shoulders, and the
people furnished with a grievance easily fanned into discontent,
and perhaps even into rebellion, by Hollanders and others who
could make capital out of factious opposition and a trade out
of revolution. If Sir Theophilus Shepstone had only waited
long enough, the people would have begged upon their knees for
protection and assistance when attacked by the enormous armies of
the Zulu king. If we had intervened in such a crisis, we would have
obtained the assistance—valuable assistance—of thousands of mounted
burghers; whereas, when we did fight really for the Transvaal,
its inhabitants were so disgusted with what had transpired, as to
render almost no assistance. There is no doubt that we managed the
annexation of this country badly, and have been compelled to suffer
for it. By a policy of delay, which would certainly have been
less kind but incomparably more wise, the people would have been
forced to come as suppliants for protection and annexation. Their
lives and property when threatened by Cetywayo, could have alone
been saved by British intervention. It can certainly be argued, on
the other side, that delay was particularly dangerous, and that
if we had not at once established ourselves in the Transvaal, the
Zulus would have lighted a fire which would have spread quickly
throughout every native tribe, and have endangered the peace of
all our settlements. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was in an excellent
position to judge of the necessity, and her Majesty's Government
has uniformly upheld the policy adopted by him in annexing the
Transvaal.
Sekukuni had proved a thorn in the side of the Republic which they
had really been unable to get rid of. The peace with this chief
was quite illusory, and only betrayed weakness on the part of the
Dutch. We cannot be surprised, therefore, that he soon resumed
hostilities. Under British rule an expedition was, in 1878, sent
against him, consisting of volunteers and native police, under the
command of Captain Clark. This force was not strong enough, and
portions of the 13th and 80th Regiments, together with mounted
infantry and volunteers, were despatched under Colonel Rowland.
An unprecedented drought rendered operations almost impossible,
and the expedition had to return, after leaving a portion of the
80th Regiment to guard the passes. The great war with Cetywayo
soon absorbed all our attention and efforts, therefore the attack
on Sekukuni in his stronghold was postponed. It was reserved
for Sir Garnet Wolseley to complete, late in 1879, that which
had been commenced previous to the close of 1878. The rebellion
of this native chief was specially one against the Republic of
the Transvaal, and we had to take it over among the other heavy
liabilities of that State.
[Sidenote: _Discontent of the Boers._]
Sir Bartle Frere found it desirable to proceed to Natal early in
1879, and remained there during the crisis which resulted from the
Isandhlwana disaster. On his return the High Commissioner passed
through the Transvaal, and found that grumbling and discontent
had been fomented into incipient rebellion. Mass meetings of the
farmers were held, a people's committee was appointed, and a
determination to recover their independence was freely expressed.
With perfect firmness and straightforwardness, accompanied by
admirable tact and patience, Sir Bartle Frere pointed out the real
position of affairs. Another petition to the Imperial Government
for restoration of their independence was sent through the High
Commissioner, and in this way the outbreak of feeling was calmed
for the time. Special envoys had been previously sent in vain
to gain this object, and it really seemed hoping against hope
to imagine that the Imperial Government could again allow the
re-establishment of such a republic as that which had been found
unable either to defend or govern the people whom it was supposed
to rule.