it is hard to believe we shall ever set aside. Whatever we may have
come to think experience means, those who have once entered into the
spirit of these clear thinkers will not lightly abandon the idea that
_experience is one_. There is not for most of us one kind of experience
that confirms the law of falling stones and revolving planets,
another unrelated kind that gives us a sympathetic but inarticulate
insight into life and its ways, and yet another which in incomparable
theophanies reveals to us another world. In a word, empiricism has
taught us to accept the postulate that whatever the nature of our
beliefs, their meaning must be communicable, their evidence must be
demonstrable by one to another.
What has happened to change things since Hume’s day is, first of all,
just a deeper searching into the meaning of experience itself, with
perhaps this finding: that the reality our empirical science reveals
to us is not merely a thing found and received but also _a thing
willed and made_. Kantian criticism it was that suggested the part
played by the knower in the formation of the thing known. This knower
was not merely informed by experience as to the world he had chanced
on, but of himself he informed his world. Imperfect, disconnected
and unconvincing as were Kant’s efforts to state and illustrate this
conception, it is nevertheless to him that one turns for the first
suggestion of that idealism whose more recent expressions have been
illustrated in the chapter on Pragmatism.
Meanwhile, really unaffected by this development of method are
Schopenhauer’s gloomy findings and Nietzsche’s exaltation of the
might of man. Just as the facts of life as he observed it left Hume
unable to point to anything in experience that could guide life
religiously, so these facts as Schopenhauer more fully took them in
left life irreligious and blind. Again, it was but what he took to be
a broader experience that led Nietzsche to conceive the destiny and
perfectability of life to lie within the control of life itself, and it
is only a still broader view of experience that robs this philosophy
for us of what inspiration it had and leaves it but a gospel of
gritting-the-teeth.
Yet we may not lay aside these two “findings” regarding life without
noting how deeply each has seen into the human heart. If the insight
of each is directly contradictory to the insight of the other, it is
because the human heart is in contradiction with itself.
It can listen, this heart of man, to the voice of Schopenhauer crying
for peace. It can understand this voice even to the point of feeling
that the peace of those who have ceased to be is happier than the being
of those who have lost hope of peace. Not indeed for us is the “melius
est ipsum esse quam non esse” of older simpler times.
But on the other hand, Nietzsche would not make the appeal he does
if man did not shrink from every vision of peace that has ever been
offered to him, as from something worse than nonentity. Indeed we “envy
not the dead that rest....
“What peace could ever be to me
The joy that strives with strife?”
* * * * *
Thus it would seem that the philosophy which alone can bring to pass
that gladness of the moment which comes not from its content, but from
what there is mixed in it of fulfilment and of promise--that philosophy
must give validity to two theses:
(1) Reality must in all its aspects be shown to be such a thing as
human effort may make and mould.
(2) This effort must set before itself an ideal in which are
consistently included all that is genuine in the old ideals calling
themselves Peace and War.
If the first of these theses was the topic of the chapter on
Pragmatism, the second was that which inspired the conception of
Progress. Only if to each moment of life there is vividly present
the sense that it is a moment of creation, and equally present a
satisfaction in the vision of what is to be created, can the moment be
a joyous one. Not joyous in a way to wring from us a “Verweile doch! du
bist so schön!” But joyous with that quality which would let our _Ave_
be a welcome to the hoped for, our _Vale_ a benediction on a promise
left behind.
* * * * *
If our Modern Thinkers have done aught to help us so to pass a moment,
why, so, let them pass.
Finis
INDEX
à Kempis, Schopenhauer and, 167.
Amiel, 217.
amoralist, 274, 276.
Antigone, 264.
_a posteriori_, 105.
_a priori_, 105, 137.
Aquinas, 24, 308.
Aristotle, 24, 25, 89, 289, 290.
art, and the universal, 170-172;
individuates, 294-296.
asceticism, Schopenhauer on, 176-178.
assent, Newman’s “Grammar of,” 242.
_aviditas vitae_, Huxley’s, 205.
Bacon, Francis, 57, 104, 247, 248.
Balfour, 246, 247.
beautiful, Schopenhauer’s theory of the, 170-172.
Berti, _Vita di Giordano Bruno_, 11.
body, and mind, 45, 46.
Bourdeau, J., 241, 242.
Bourdeau, L., 223-226.
Bourget, “Le Disciple,” 68-95.
Brahminism, Schopenhauer and, 167.
Browning, 203.
Bruno, iii,
Mocenigo’s denunciation of, 3-8;
trial at Venice, 9-18;
recantation, 18;
new astronomy, 18-21;
ethical and religious consequences, 21-26;
“new philosophy,” pantheism, 29-31;
Schoppius on sentence and execution of, 33-34;
and Spinoza, 39, 40; 197.
Buddhism, Schopenhauer and, 167, 178, 179, 189.
cannibals, Melville on, 251-253;
Montaigne on, 253-256.
categorical, good, _ought_, see imperative.
Christianity, Kant and, 146, 147;
Schopenhauer and, 167;
Nietzsche and, 187, 206;
its intellectual task, 300.
civilization, a decadence, 257, 258.
Clifford, 312.
Clough, 228.
Coleridge, Mary, 314.
Copernicus, 20, 21.
Croce, 288, 290.
Cusanus, Nicolaus, 288, 291.
Dante, his world, 22.
Darwin, influence on Nietzsche, 193-195.
Decalogue, 137.
Descartes, and Spinoza, 41-45; 104, 267.
determinism, Spinoza’s, 40, 45, 46, 53-55, 67, 69-78, 310, 311;
of mechanical ideal, 82-84.
disciple, Bourget’s “Le Disciple,” 68;
problem and plot in relation to Spinoza, 69-78;
discussion of problem, mechanism, purpose, and freedom, 81-92;
outcome, 92-95.
empiricism, 104-107, 311, 312.
Epictetus, 280.
Epicurus, “Garden of,” 22; 99, 112.
Ethica, _ordine geometrico demonstrata_, 39, 310.
evolution, Nietzsche and doctrine of organic, 193-195.
Fichte, 67, 149, 154, 159.
Flaubert, 168, 294, 295.
France, Anatole, contrasts ancient and modern worlds, 22, 23, 168;
on realism in history, 223-226; 266, 294, 295.
freedom, consistent with mechanism, 53-55, 84-92;
Kant on, 140.
Fourlians, morality of, 120-123.
geometry, ethics after manner of, 39; 42, 43, 45, 310.
Gierke, 291.
God, ontological proof of, 43, 44;
Kant, 131, 142-146, 148-149;
“is dead,” 185-187.
Goethe, 315.
good, the, see imperative; 261-273.
_Gottrunkener_, Spinoza _ein_, 52.
Gourmont, Remy de, 275.
group, mind of, 288-292, 301.
Hardy, 168, 169.
Hegel, 149, 159.
Heine, 215.
Hobbes, 104, 268-272.
humanity, Hume on, 126.
Hume, personality, 100-104;
inheritance of empiricism, 104-107;
on experience _vs._ miracles, 107-112;
on Providence and Future State, 112-115;
on Natural Religion, reasons for vacillation, 115-119;
on problem of morals and definition of virtue, 119-125;
on virtue and happiness, 125-127; 227, 228, 266, 267, 311, 312.
Huxley, his “_aviditas vitae_,” 205; 312.
hypothetical, good, _ought_, see imperative.
ideal, mechanical, 82-84;
teleological, 89;
of progress, 281.
idealism, German, 29; 219.
immortality, Kant on, 140, 141.
imperative, Kant on hypothetical and categorical, 131-137; 261-263.
individuation, effected by love, 143-145, 293, 294, 296-299;
effected by art, 294-296.
Inquisition, Bruno before the Holy, 3-18, 33.
Jesus, Nietzsche’s conception of, 189, 197-200.
James, see Pragmatism.
John Scotus, 310.
Kant, iv, 67;
attitude toward religion, 131;
on imperatives, 131-137;
on presuppositions of morality, 137-146;
postulates freedom, immortality, God, 146-150;
moral law, first formulation, 151-152;
second formulation, 152, 153;
on harmony of wills, 153, 154; 187, 261-263, 312.
law, mechanical and teleological, 86-92, 117-119.
Leconte de Lisle, 229.
Leibnitz, 29, 233.
Leviathan, Hobbes’s, 268-272.
Locke, 104.
logic, and ethics, 42, 43;
and love, 297-300.
Loisy, l’Abbé, 242.
Louÿs, Pierre, 153.
love, individuates, 143-145, 293, 294, 296-299;
and logic, 297-300.
loyalty, defines morality, 268, 274;
defined, 288-290.
Lucretius, 99, 165, 186.
Mach, Ernst, 216.
Marcus Aurelius, 212.
Maupassant, 168, 294, 295.
mechanism, Spinoza on, 40, 45, 46, 53-55, 67, 69-78, 310, 311;
ideal of, 82-84;
consistent with purpose and freedom, 53-55, 84-92.
Melville, Herman, on Typees, 251-253.
mind, and body, 45, 46;
group, 288-292, 301.
miracles, Hume’s treatment in “Enquiry,” 107-110.
Mocenigo, his denunciation of Bruno, 3-8.
modernism, and pragmatism, 241-244.
Montaigne, v, 253-256.
morality, Kant’s law of, 151-153;
proposed as absolute good, 263-268;
questioned as absolute good, 268-272;
reformed, 274, 275;
discarded, 275, 276.
nature, man in state of, 251-258, 269-271;
conquest of, 279-281.
Newman, 242.
New Testament, Kant and, 146.
Nicolaus, of Cusa, 291.
Nietzsche, iv;
key-note of, 185;
historic comparisons with, 185-188;
and Schopenhauer, 188-193;
and Darwin, 193-195;
on superman as goal, 195;
on transvaluation, 195-199;
on genealogy of morals, 199-204;
on anarchy, 204-205;
on will to power, 205-207;
on eternal returning, 208-211;
vanishing goal, 211, 212;
on courage, 212;
on scientific spirit, 231-233; 276, 313, 314.
ought, see imperative.
Old Testament, world of, 139, 146.
parallelism, 45, 46.
Pascal, 27, 149, 242.
_Pascendi_, Encyclical, 241.
philosophers, Nietzsche’s estimate of, 199.
pietism, influence on Kant, 146.
pity, a vice, 187-189.
Plato, 89, 288, 293, 294.
pragmatism, v;
relation to realism and idealism, 215-219;
James’s first presentation of, 219, 220;
reaction of realists against, 220-230;
Nietzsche and, 231-234;
“Will to Believe,” 234-239;
and modernism, 240-244, and ‘human’ religion, 244-245;
physical science and ideals of, 245, 246, 315.
progress, v;
skeptics of, 251-261;
conditional and absolute, 261-262;
toward moral good held absolute, 263-268;
morality proves conditional good, 268-273;
as viewed by reformed morality and by amorality, 273-276;
and conflicting ideals of peace and war, 277;
final definition of, 277-281.
Providence, Hume on “Particular,” 112-115.
purpose, consistent with mechanism, 53-55, 84-92.
quakerism, German, 146.
Rabelais, 153.
rationalism, of Descartes, 41-45, 104.
realism, 218;
in science, 221;
in history, 222-226;
in ethics, 227;
in religion, 228, 240-242;
in art, 228, 229.
religion, “Natural History of,” 110;
Kant’s attitude toward, 131;
identified with philosophy, 310.
Rousseau, 258.
Royce, 157, 267, 285, 287, 289, 293.
Schelling, 149, 159.
Scherer, on Amiel, 217.
Schopenhauer, iv, 154;
“World as Will,” 158-161;
on universal strife, 162-167;
forerunners, 167, 168;
followers, 168, 169;
on suicide, 169, 170;
on the beautiful, 170-172;
on civil law, 172-173;
on moral intuition, 173-175;
on denial of will, 175-178;
on Nirvana, 178-181;
and Nietzsche, 186-193; 313, 314.
Schopp, letter describing Bruno’s trial and execution, 31-34.
Spinoza, iv;
family, life, death, 39;
and Bruno, 39, 40;
and Descartes, 40-46;
on popular theology, 46-51;
_ein Gottrunkener_, 52;
purpose and freedom, 53-55;
knowledge goodness, happiness, 55-63; 104, 187, 310, 311.
suicide, Schopenhauer on, 169-170.
superman, iv, 195, 196, 205, 208.
super-superman, iv, 208.
sympathy, Hume on, 126;
Schopenhauer on, 173-175;
Nietzsche on, see pity.
Tasso, 259, 263.
teleology, see purpose.
Tennant, 300.
tragedy, Schopenhauer’s conception of, 158, 168, 169.
Typees, of Melville, 251-253.
Ulysses, morality of, 265.
utility, Hume on, 125;
“Why Pleases,” 126.
Van den Ende, Francis, 41.
Venice, Bruno before tribunal at, 9-18.
will, to live, see Schopenhauer;
to power, see Nietzsche;
to believe, see pragmatism.
Xenophanes, 186, 309.
FOOTNOTES
[1] This would be Saturday afternoon.
[2] A curious ignorance of the content of the “Spaccio!” There are
numerous other faults of detail in this account.
[3] Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, XII.
[4] This image of the Old Testament World is not of course supposed to
be that of the ancient Hebrews. Rather does it represent this world as
reflected in the thought of a modern Christian community.
[5] The individuating quality of love is again discussed in Chap. X, on
“Love and Loyalty.”
[6] The exact wording: “Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens
jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten
könne.” K. d. p. V., 1, 1, 1.
[7] Cf: “In der ganzen Schöpfung kann alles was man will, und vorüber
man etwas vermag, auch _bloss als Mittel_ gebraucht werden; nur der
Mensch ... _Ist Zweck an sich selbst_.... Eben um dieser willen ist
jeder Wille ... auf die Bedingung der Einstimmung mit der _Autonomie_
des vernünftigen Wesens eingeschränkt, es nämlich keiner Absicht zu
unterwerfen, die nicht nach einem Gesetze, welches aus dem Willen des
leidenden Subjects selbst entspringen könnte, möglich ist....” K. d. p.
V., 1, 1, 3.
[8] Pierre Louÿs.
[9] Royce.
[10] Abridged.
[11] Abridged.
[12] Gesammelte Briefe, p. 61.
[13] Ibid., p. 170.
[14] Pragmatism, p. 104.
[15] Anatole France.
[16] The meaning and value of “loyalty” is more fully discussed in
Chap. X, on “Love and Loyalty.”
[17] The paper on “Love and Loyalty” was written for the American
Philosophical Association at its Philadelphia meeting in 1915. The
occasion was peculiarly dedicated to Royce in honor of his sixtieth
birthday. The author’s thanks are due to Professor J. E. Creighton for
his courteous permission to reprint from the Philosophical Review, XXV,
3, and from the volume “Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce, etc.,” 1922.
[Transcriber’s note: German, French and Latin text is transcribed as
is, without correction of possible printing errors. Repeated chapter
titles have been removed (those on the same page as the chapter start).]