Strength of Federal position. Three Days Battle. Retired to Hagerstown.
Remained there eight days. Return to Virginia.
Lee, as plainly appears, was at great disadvantage in respect to
position. He held the arc and his lines were about four miles long,
while Meade held the chord of the arc and his lines were but little
over one mile long. The difference in distances enabled Meade to reach
with reinforcements any part of his lines in less than a third of
the time necessary for Lee. Looking at conditions as then existing
there would seem to be much in the claim that Meade should have been
maneuvered out of this stronghold, and especially so after he had
taken Little Round Top, the key to the field; the possession of which
alone by the Confederates would have rendered the Federal position
untenable.
This could have been captured without material opposition had the
attack been made against the Federal left at dawn on the 2d, instead
of at 2 p. m. One hour earlier than 2 would have sufficed for this
important capture. At about 3 o'clock Hood, with Benning's and
Anderson's brigades, flanked the Federal left and fought his way to it
and ascended its rugged, western side; but Vincent's Federal Brigade
had reached its summit just in time to meet the assault, and being
rapidly reinforced held the position. Delay lost it. This gained would
have won the battle for the Confederates.
During Longstreet's fight, in which he met relay after relay of fresh
troops and accomplished many brilliant feats, driving back in the end
the Federals to their final line on the ridge, the corps of Ewell
and Hill, facing the Federal right, stood by without firing a gun.
This left Meade free to hurl his fresh reserves against Longstreet and
beat him to exhaustion. Then Ewell and Hill moved against the Federal
right at Culps and Cemetery Hills, Meade again being left free to
concentrate his reinforcements against them. The fight at Culps Hill
continued until about noon of the 3d. After this Pickett's division,
being the only fresh Confederates, made the famous charge already
mentioned. Thus the great "Army of Northern Virginia" had been beaten
in detail. The concentration of the Federals by reason of position
gave them the advantage, while distance prevented Lee from reinforcing
his wings in time. Then, too, there was lack of simultaneous advance
and cooperation; time and distance prevented the necessary quick
communication and movement of troops. It is difficult, if not
impossible, for large, separate bodies of troops to move at the same
time from the circumference to a central point, as was necessary here.
Looking back it is quite plausible that the best hope was in an attack
at dawn against Meade's left, which at that time could have been easily
turned and his position won, as it would have threatened his rear and
communications with Washington, and would also have protected Lee's
communications as well.
This battle and campaign was the crucial period of the Confederacy.
It was an open secret, gained from rumor, that success would bring
recognition of her independence by England, and later by France. Other
nations would doubtless fall in line, and the blockade of her ports
would soon have been raised. Credit and trade relations with other
nations, the enlargement of her armies and munitions of war, would
follow; and permanent independence would be established. The high tide
of Confederate hopes and prospects were now passed, and on the night of
the 4th Lee retired toward Hagerstown. His army was much weakened and
in great need of rest. The Federals made one or two feeble attacks on
our rear guard which were promptly repulsed.
On the afternoon of the fifth I was placed in command of a detail of
men and wagons and directed to make a detour to the left of the column
to gather food supplies. I was provided with Confederate currency
with which to pay for such supplies. My route was over a mile out
and parallel with the course of the column. The well supplied homes
enabled me to soon load the wagons and get them under way on a country
road that converged toward the column. I now discovered a battalion of
Federal cavalry in the distance, bearing down upon us. I ordered the
teamsters to move forward with all speed. We quickly reached the outer
edge of the open lands and entered the thickly wooded course of the
narrow road, so closely pursued that I was compelled to give battle.
I had time to place my men and deliver fire at close range with signal
effect on men and horses. This sudden, and perhaps unexpected attack,
threw them into great confusion, necessitating a reformation further
back. They had, however, discovered the inadequacy of my force and
were rapidly reforming. I saw the wagons some distance to my front,
curving to the right, the road evidently entering the little valley
to my right about three hundred yards to the front. The valley thus
formed the chord of the circle, and hence was shorter than the road
which formed the circle, but my advanced position gave advantage in
distance. I now started with all possible speed with my little force
toward this junction of road and valley, and almost immediately the
charge up the valley began as anticipated. It was an exciting struggle.
My men were strung out quite a distance along the way; and as we neared
the junction the race was about even, with forces moving on parallel
lines a short distance apart. My men now opened fire and luckily shot
some of the foremost horses just as they were entering a narrow pass
in their front. This blocked the way, impeded the charge and threw the
cavalry into confusion which was increased by the continual firing of
my command. Farther on we took an advantageous position, but were soon
relieved by Confederate cavalry and rejoined the passing column.
The column reached the vicinity of Hagerstown on the evening of the
6th. The Potomac River by reason of recent rains was much swollen and
intervened between Lee's army and Virginia from whence ammunition,
now practically exhausted, had to be procured. The army was placed in
position and entrenched itself against the approaching Federal army
which did not appear in its front until the 12th, but failed to attack
or to show an intention of so doing. Tired of waiting longer, Lee
withdrew his army on the early morning of the 15th to Virginia. Ewell's
Corps now remained in the valley for some time, then moved to the east
side of the Blue Ridge. Nothing of importance transpired with this
corps during the remaining season. On the approach of winter, camp was
pitched in Orange County in rear of the Rapidan River. Thus ended the
campaigns of 1863.
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