Meanwhile minnie balls continued to pass in the same close proximity
to us. My attention was attracted to the colonel. He had been struck
and was slowly turning and sinking. I quickly put my arm about him
and assisted him to the ground. I saw he was seriously hurt and had
him borne from the field. He requested me to say to the regiment
that he had every confidence that it would do its duty, that he did
not want it to be affected because of his condition. At the field
hospital, despite every effort of our able surgeons, Henkle and Butler,
he died of his wounds the following day. Thus passed a good soldier
and valuable man to his country. His death cast a gloom, not only
over his regiment, but over all who knew him. Our former lieutenant
colonel, Carson, a splendid officer, had, because of complete physical
disability reluctantly left the service some time before, and our
lieutenant colonel, Titus V. Williams, now became colonel, Capt. John
F. Terry, lieutenant colonel, and Capt. Henry Clinton Wood, major;
all were brave and efficient officers, in and for whose courage and
ability the regiment had confidence and respect. I was now promoted
to the captaincy of Company "D," being one of the youngest in the
army. To accept this promotion, I resigned the office of adjutant
theretofore held by me, and Lieut. James L. White, Jr., an efficient
and accomplished officer, succeeded to the position.
After burying our dead on the 29th, pursuit of the enemy was resumed.
Our course was down the east side of the Chickahominy through deep,
tangled undergrowth, marshes and pine thickets. The heat of a burning
sun, deadness of the atmosphere in this wilderness of low ground, an
afternoon rainstorm of great intensity which covered the already marshy
ground with water, then mud, in consequence, making the trackless way
still more difficult than before, then the sun reappearing superheating
the humid atmosphere, causing prostrations of many and great discomfort
to all. Then added to these troubles, water fit for man or beast was
difficult to find, and when found was either bitter or brackish. These
made up this day of trials. That night we crossed at Grapevine Bridge
to the south side of the Chickahominy, thence on to White Oak Swamp.
Here we found the enemy in strong force on the opposite side with
no way of approach, except by the road and bridge over which he had
retreated. The bridge, and much of the corduroy road, however, had
been destroyed, and we were at a halt in this deep, tangled wilderness.
An artillery duel was opened and continued until night.
The next morning a furious battle opened at Frazier's farm on the
opposite side of the swamp, and raged with great fury. Our way was
still blocked, and hence we were unable to give the needed aid to
Longstreet, who, from the sound of battle, was being sorely pressed.
The next morning the way was opened; we captured some pieces of
artillery and pushed on to the battlefield at Frazier's farm. The enemy
now retreated to Malvern Hill and here made a determined stand. This
was a most formidable position commanding the open, level ground for
a mile in front, and protected by a sluggish and difficult stream on
our left. Our command took position on a neighboring ridge on the left
where we suffered much from the enemy's artillery which dominated our
position, from which, however, we could see the entire field. We saw
the charge of D. H. Hill, Huger and Magruder across this open field.
The formidable position of the Federals with his hundred pieces of
artillery and heavy lines of infantry made such an advance appear as a
forlorn hope, but the gallantry displayed was splendid. Shot, shell,
grape and cannister poured into these brave troops was horrible to
behold; but they never flinched nor wavered, but pressed forward until
recalled. Many dead and wounded were on the field.
Well posted sharpshooters with guns of longer range than ours were very
annoying and damaging. Our men were thus picked off here and there with
remarkable regularity. In places of such danger good fortune seemed
to follow some and bad fortune others. While shells from the enemy's
guns were flying thick and fast about us, occasionally exploding in
our ranks with direful effect, four men for relief from the nervous
tension by the engagement of their attention in something other than
the dangers of shells and minnie balls, sat down to a game of cards. A
shell soon passed so close that they moved a few feet away to get out
of range. A moment later a shell struck and exploded at the spot thus
abandoned, tearing a deep gash in the earth, scattering dirt and debris
in all directions. Fate, luck or possibly that instinct that perceives
pending danger, saved these men from complete destruction. Then, too,
it is said and oft times really seemed to be so, "that fortune favors
the brave" and these soldiers were brave. A moment later a minnie ball
well spent in its force struck a soldier in the forehead, but did not
penetrate the skin. He jestingly remarked that they came near getting
him that time, and while thus joking, he fell and expired, concussion
caused death.
At the risk of prolixity, I mention another incident as the converse of
the above,--that misfortune attends the timid. On moving to position,
we passed a soldier sitting behind a black oak tree about four feet in
diameter. A shell had passed through the tree and had taken off the
top of his skull, then passed into a large pile of rails, exploded
and scattered the rails in all directions. No one could have imagined
danger when thus protected. Truly in the midst of life we are in death.
On July 2d, we moved from our position at Malvern Hill to Harrison's
Landing, to which point the Federals had retreated to the shelter
of their gun boats; on the 3d some skirmishing occurred, as also
on the following days. We remained in his front for four or five
days. The storm and downpour of rain the day after Malvern Hill in
its discomforts and injury to the army, ammunition and stores was
distressing. Preceding and following this storm the beaming sun heated
the humid atmosphere and made the army as miserable as well could be,
but relief soon came in our removal to the Mechanicsville road near
Richmond. Here we were free from mosquito ridden marshes and poison
laden atmosphere, endured for half a month, in daily battle, the march
and duties of soldiers in active war.
The seven days' battles were ended and had resulted in freeing the
Capital City of immediate menace. McClellan at the head of his splendid
army of over 110,000 well-equipped soldiers at its gates for many
months perfecting plans for entrance over the opposition of 63,000
Confederates under Johnston, had been beaten, swept back and left in no
condition to renew the effort. This relief of Richmond was contributed
to by the battle of Seven Pines of May 23. Before that time--as
stated in accounts and reports--"McClellan had advanced his left wing
consisting of two of his five corps from his position on the north
of the Chickahominy to the south of that stream, heavy spring rains
had converted the streams into torrents, his military bridges across
the Chickahominy into trembling and swaying structures, and the mud
and mire made the movement and use of his heavy artillery practically
impossible. The astute Johnston saw McClellan's faulty position, and
availed himself of the opportunity to attack his left wing on May 23d.
He drove it from the field and back more than a mile, capturing many
prisoners, a number of pieces of artillery, small arms and a number of
tents."
Unfortunately Johnston was struck by a fragment of shell late in
the afternoon of the first day, knocked from his horse, and carried
from the field in an insensible condition. Major-General G. W. Smith
succeeded to command. McClellan had gotten Sumner's Corps to his left
wing, and thus reinforced the Federals entrenched their position,
and the battles of the succeeding days amounted to little more
than skirmishes and were without material results. The treacherous
Chickahominy now intervened between McClellan's two corps on the north
and his three corps on the south of that stream. This position was so
held June 26, at the time of the advance of Lee who had been assigned
to the command of the army on the first day of that month.
There can be no question but that Johnston's attack was wise and
successful, not only because he won the day, but because he drew a
large part of McClellan's right wing from the north to the south of the
Chickahominy, thus leaving much less than half of the Federal army on
the north of the river, and contributing to Lee's success against this
isolated right wing. At this time McClellan's entire army must have
aggregated 110,000 to 115,000. In the early part of May his force was
placed at 110,000. Lee's entire army, including Jackson, was 80,000
to 85,000. With this inferior force in numbers much was accomplished,
yet with the attending advantages greater results might have been
attained. There does not seem to have been any fault in Lee's plans
or leadership; but fault, if such existed, must have been lack of
cooperation by the separate commands.
Yet unforeseen conditions may have prevented this. Lee risked much
when he withdrew his main army from Richmond to the north of the
Chickahominy, leaving but 25,000 men under Magruder to defend the
city against more than twice to three times their number of the best
of McClellan's army; but this, of course, was considered by Lee, and
results justified his course. The victories of the seven days were
substantial, except Malvern Hill, which, except for the freeing of
Richmond, nearly offset the previous six days. The attack on such a
position so manned and garrisoned was a mistake.
[Illustration]