1805.
Rapidity of Napoleon's victories--Murat at Wertingen--Conquest of
Ney's duchy--The French army before Ulm--The Prince of Liechtenstein
at the Imperial headquarters--His interview with Napoleon described
by Rapp--Capitulation of Ulm signed by Berthier and Mack--Napoleon
before and after a victory--His address to the captive generals--
The Emperor's proclamation--Ten thousand prisoners taken by Murat--
Battle of Caldiero in Italy--Letter from Duroc--Attempts to retard
the Emperor's progress--Fruitless mission of M. de Giulay--The first
French eagles taken by the Russians--Bold adventure of Lannes and
Murat--The French enter Vienna--Savary's mission to the Emperor
Alexander.
To convey an idea of the brilliant campaign of 1805 from an abstract of
the reports and letters I received at Hamburg I should, like the almanac-
makers, be obliged to note down a victory for every day. Was not the
rapidity of the Emperor's first operations a thing hitherto
unprecedented? He departed from Paris on the 24th of September, and
hostilities commenced on the 2d of October. On the 6th and 7th the
French passed the Danube, and turned the enemy's army. On the 8th Murat,
at the battle of Wertingen, on the Danube, took 2000 Austrian prisoners,
amongst whom, besides other general officers, was Count Auffemberg.
Next day the Austrians fell back upon Gunsburg, retreating before our
victorious legions, who, pursuing their triumphal course, entered
Augsburg on the 10th, and Munich on the 12th. When I received my
despatches I could have fancied I was reading a fabulous narrative. Two
days after the French entered Munich--that is to say, on the 14th--an
Austrian corps of 6000 men surrendered to Marshal Soult at Memingen,
whilst Ney conquered, sword in hand, his future Duchy of Elchingen.
Finally, on the 17th of October, came the famous capitulation of General
Mack at Ulm,' and on the same day hostilities commenced in Italy between
the French and Austrians, the former commanded by Massena and the latter
by Prince Charles.
--[Prince Maurice Liechtenstein was sent by General Mack as a flag
of truce to the Imperial headquarters before Ulm. He was, according
to custom, led blindfold on horseback. Rapp, who was present,
together with several of Napoleon's aides de camp, afterwards spoke
to me of the Prince's interview with the Emperor. I think he told
me that Berthier was present likewise. "Picture to yourself," said
Rapp, "the astonishment, or rather confusion, of the poor Prince
when the bandage was removed from his eyes. He knew nothing of what
had been going on, and did not even suspect that the Emperor had yet
joined the army. When he understood that he was in the presence of
Napoleon he could not suppress an exclamation of surprise, which did
not escape the Emperor, and he ingenuously acknowledged that General
Mack had no idea he was before the walls of Ulm." Prince
Liechtenstein proposed to capitulate on condition that the garrison
of Ulm should be allowed to return into Austria. This proposal, in
the situation in which the garrison stood, Rapp said, made the
Emperor smile. "How can you expect," said Napoleon, "that I can
accede to such a proposition? What shall I gain by it? Eight days.
In eight days you will be in my power without any condition. Do you
suppose I am not acquainted with everything? . . You expect the
Russians? . . . At the nearest they are in Bohemia. Were I to
allow you to march out, what security can I have that you will not
join them, and afterwards fight against me? Your generals have
deceived me often enough, and I will no longer be duped. At Marengo
I was weak enough to allow the troops of Melas to march out of
Alessandria. He promised to treat for peace. What happened? Two
months after Moreau had to fight with the garrison of Alessandria.
Besides, this war is not an ordinary war. After the conduct of your
Government I am not bound to keep any terms with it. I have no
faith in its promises. You have attacked me. If I should agree to
what you ask, Mack would pledge his word, I know. But, even relying
on his good faith, would be he able to keep his promise? As far as
regards himself--yes; but as regards his army--no. If the Archduke
Ferdinand were still with you I could rely upon his word, because he
would be responsible for the conditions, and he would not disgrace
himself; but I know he has quitted Ulm and passed the Danube. I
know how to reach him, however."
Rapp said it was impossible to imagine the embarrassment of Prince
Liechtenstein whilst the Emperor was speaking. He, however,
somewhat regained his self-possession, and observed that, unless the
conditions which he proposed were granted the army would not
capitulate. "If that be the case," said Napoleon. "you may as well
go back to Mack, for I will never grant such conditions. Are you
jesting with me? Stay; here is the capitulation of Memingen--show
it to your General--let him surrender on the same conditions--I will
consent to no others. Your officers may return to Austria, but the
soldiers must be prisoners. Tell him to be speedy, for I have no
time to lose. The more he delays the worse he will render his own
condition and yours. To-morrow I shall have here the corps to which
Memingen capitulated, and then we shall see what is to be done.
Make Mack clearly understand that he has no alternative but to
conform to my will."
The imperious tones which Napoleon employed towards his enemies
almost always succeeded, and it produced the accustomed effect upon
Mack. On the same day that Prince Liechtenstein had been at our
headquarters Mack wrote to the Emperor, stating that he would not
have treated with any other on such terms; but that he yielded to
the ascendency of Napoleon's fortune; and on the following day
Berthier was sent into Ulm, from whence he returned with the
capitulation signed. Thus Napoleon was not mistaken respecting the
Caudine Forks of the Austrian army. The garrison of Ulm marched out
with what are called the honours of war, and were led prisoners into
France.--Bourrienne.]--
Napoleon, who was so violently irritated by any obstacle which opposed
him, and who treated with so much hauteur everybody who ventured to
resist his inflexible will, was no longer the same man when, as a
conqueror, he received the vanquished generals at Ulm. He condoled with
them on their misfortune; and this, I can affirm, was not the result of a
feeling of pride concealed beneath a feigned generosity. Although he
profited by their defeat he pitied them sincerely. How frequently has he
observed to me, "How much to be pitied is a general on the day after a
lost battle." He had himself experienced this misfortune when he was
obliged to raise the siege of St. Jean d'Acre. At that moment he would,
I believe, have strangled Djezzar; but if Djezzar had surrendered, he
would have treated him with the same attention which he showed to Mack
and the other generals of the garrison of Ulm. These generals were
seventeen in number, and among them was Prince Liechtenstein. There were
also General Klenau (Baron de Giulay), who had acquired considerable
military reputation in the preceding wars, and General Fresnel, who stood
in a more critical situation than his companions in misfortune, for he
was a Frenchman, and an emigrant.
Rapp told me that it was really painful to see these generals. They
bowed respectfully to the Emperor, having Mack at their head. They
preserved a mournful silence, and Napoleon was the first to speak, which
he did in the following terms: "Gentlemen, I feel sorry that such brave
men as you are should be the victims of the follies of a Cabinet which
cherishes insane projects, and which does not hesitate to commit the
dignity of the Austrian nation by trafficking with the services of its
generals. Your names are known to me--they are honourably known wherever
you have fought. Examine the conduct of those who have committed you.
What could be more iniquitous than to attack me without a declaration of
war? Is it not criminal to bring foreign invasion upon a country? Is it
not betraying Europe to introduce Asiatic barbarities into her disputes?
If good policy had been followed the Aulic Council, instead of attacking
me, would have sought my alliance in order to drive back the Russians to
the north. The alliance which your Cabinet has formed will appear
monstrous in history. It is the alliance of dogs, shepherds, and wolves
against sheep--such a scheme could never have been planned in the mind of
a statesman. It is fortunate for you that I have not been defeated in
the unjust struggle to which I have been provoked; if I had, the Cabinet
of Vienna would have soon perceived its error, for which, perhaps, it
will yet one day pay dearly."
What a change fifteen days of success, crowned by the capture of Ulm, had
made in affairs! At Hamburg I knew through my agents to what a degree of
folly the hopes of Napoleon's enemies had risen before he began the
campaign. The security of the Cabinet of Vienna was really inexplicable;
not only did they not dream of the series of victories which made
Napoleon master of all the Austrian monarchy, but the assistants of Drake
and all the intriguers of that sort treated France already as a conquered
country, and disposed of some of our provinces. In the excess of their
folly, to only give one instance, they promised the town of Lyons to the
King of Sardinia, to recompense him for the temporary occupation of
Piedmont.
--[In the treaties and declarations (see Martens and Thiers, tome v.
p. 355) there is rather a tendency to sell the skin of the bear
before killing him.]--
While Napoleon flattered his prisoners at the expense of their Government
he wished to express satisfaction at the conduct of his own army, and
with this view he published a remarkable proclamation, which in some
measure presented an abstract of all that had taken place since the
opening of the campaign.
This proclamation was as follows:--
SOLDIERS OF THE GRAND ARMY--In a fortnight we have finished an
entire campaign. What we proposed to do has been done. We have
driven the Austrian troops from Bavaria, and restored our ally to
the sovereignty of his dominions.
That army, which, with equal presumption and imprudence, marched
upon our frontiers, is annihilated.
But what does this signify to England? She has gained her object.
We are no longer at Boulogne, and her subsidy will be neither more
nor less.
Of a hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are
prisoners. They will replace our conscripts in the labours of
agriculture.
Two hundred pieces of cannon, the whole park of artillery, ninety
flags, and all their generals are in our power. Fifteen thousand
men only have escaped.
Soldiers! I announced to you the result of a great battle; but,
thanks to the ill-devised schemes of the enemy, I was enabled to
secure the wished-for result without incurring any danger, and, what
is unexampled in the history of nations, that result has been gained
at the sacrifice of scarcely fifteen hundred men killed and wounded.
Soldiers! this success is due to your unlimited confidence in your
Emperor, to your patience in enduring fatigues and privations of
every kind, and to your singular courage and intrepidity.
But we will not stop here. You are impatient to commence another
campaign!
The Russian army, which English gold has brought from the
extremities of the universe, shall experience the same fate as that
which we have just defeated.
In the conflict in which we are about to engage the honour of the
French infantry is especially concerned. We shall now see another
decision of the question which has already been determined in
Switzerland and Holland; namely, whether the French infantry is the
first or the second in Europe.
Among the Russians there are no generals in contending against whom
I can acquire any glory. All I wish is to obtain the victory with
the least possible bloodshed. My soldiers are, my children.
This proclamation always appeared to me a masterpiece of military
eloquence. While he lavished praises on his troops, he excited their
emulation by hinting that the Russians were capable of disputing with
them the first rank among the infantry of Europe, and he concluded his
address by calling them his children.
The second campaign, to which Napoleon alleged they so eagerly looked
forward, speedily ensued, and hostilities were carried on with a degree
of vigour which fired the enthusiasm of the army. Heaven knows what
accounts were circulated of the Russians, who, as Bonaparte solemnly
stated in his proclamation, had come from the extremity of the world.
They were represented as half-naked savages, pillaging, destroying and
burning wherever they went. It was even asserted that they were
cannibals, and had been seen to eat children. In short, at that period
was introduced the denomination of northern barbarians which has since
been so generally applied to the Russians. Two days after the
capitulation of Ulm Murat obtained the capitulation of Trochtelfingen
from General Yarneck, and made 10,000 prisoners, so that, without
counting killed and wounded, the Austrian army had sustained a diminution
of 50,000 men after a campaign of twenty days. On the 27th of October
the French army crossed the Inn, and thus penetrated into the Austrian
territory. Salzburg and Brannan were immediately taken. The army of
Italy, under the command of Massena, was also obtaining great advantages.
On the 30th of October, that is to say, the very day on which the Grand
Army took the above-mentioned fortresses, the army of Italy, having
crossed the Adige, fought a sanguinary battle at Caldiero, and took 5000
Austrian prisoners.
In the extraordinary campaign, which has been distinguished by the name
of "the Campaign of Austerlitz," the exploits of our troops succeeded
each other with the rapidity of thought. I confess I was equally
astonished and delighted when I received a note from Duroc, sent by an
extraordinary courier, and commencing laconically with the words, "We are
in Vienna; the Emperor is well."
Duroc's letter was dated the 13th November, and the words, "We are in
Vienna," seemed to me the result of a dream. The capital of Austria,
which from time immemorial had not been occupied by foreigners--the city
which Sobieski had saved from Ottoman violence, had become the prey of
the Imperial eagle of France, which, after a lapse of three centuries,
avenged the humiliations formerly imposed upon Francis I. by the 'Aquila
Grifagna' of Charles V. Duroc had left the Emperor before the camp of
Boulogne was raised; his mission to Berlin being terminated, he rejoined
the Emperor at Lintz.
--[As soon as Bonaparte became Emperor he constituted himself the
avenger of all the insults given to the sovereigns, whom he styled
his predecessors. All that related to the honour of France was
sacred to him. Thus he removed the column of Rosbach from the
Prussian territory.--Bourrienne.]--
Before I noticed the singular mission of M. Haugwitz to the Emperor
Napoleon, and the result of that mission, which circumstances rendered
diametrically the reverse of its object, I will relate what came to my
knowledge respecting some other negotiations on the part of Austria, the
evident intent of which was to retard Napoleon's progress, and thereby to
dupe him. M. de Giulay, one of the generals included in the capitulation
of Ulm, had returned home to acquaint his sovereign with the disastrous
event. He did not conceal, either from the Emperor Francis or the
Cabinet of Vienna, the destruction of the Austrian army, and the
impossibility of arresting the rapid advance of the French. M. de Giulay
was sent with a flag of truce to the headquarters of Napoleon, to assure
him of the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Austria, and to solicit
an armistice. The snare was too clumsy not to be immediately discovered
by so crafty a man as Napoleon.
--[Metternich (tome ii. p. 346, compare French edition, tome ii.
p. 287) says, "Let us hold always the sword in one hand and the
olive branch in the other; always ready to negotiate, but only
negotiating while advancing." Here is Napoleons system.]--
He had always pretended a love for peace, though be was overjoyed at the
idea of continuing a war so successfully commenced, and he directed
General Giulay to assure the Emperor of Austria that he was not less
anxious for peace than he, and that he was ready to treat for it, but
without suspending the course of his operations. Bonaparte, indeed,
could not, without a degree of imprudence of which he was incapable,
consent to an armistice; for M. de Giulay, though entrusted with powers
from Austria, had received none from Russia. Russia, therefore, might
disavow the armistice and arrive in time to defend Vienna, the occupation
of which was so important to the French army. The Russians, indeed, were
advancing to oppose us, and the corps of our army, commanded by Mortier
on the left bank of the Danube, experienced in the first engagement a
check at Dirnstein, which not a little vexed the Emperor. This was the
first reverse of fortune we had sustained throughout the campaign. It
was trivial, to be sure, but the capture by the Russians of three French
eagles, the first that had fallen into the hands of the enemy, was very
mortifying to Napoleon, and caused him to prolong for some days his staff
at St. Folten, where he then was.
The rapid occupation of Vienna was due to the successful temerity of
Lannes and Murat, two men alike distinguished for courage and daring
spirit. A bold artifice of these generals prevented the destruction of
the Thabor bridge at Vienna, without which our army would have
experienced considerable difficulty in penetrating into the Austrian
capital. This act of courage and presence of mind, which had so great an
influence on the events of the campaign, was described to me by Lannes,
who told the story with an air of gaiety, unaccompanied by any self-
complacency, and seemed rather pleased with the trick played upon the
Austrians than proud of the brilliant action which had been performed.
Bold enterprises were so natural to Lannes that he was frequently the
only person who saw nothing extraordinary in his own exploits. Alas!
what men were sacrificed to Napoleon's ambition!
The following is the story of the Bridge of Thabor as I heard it from
Lannes:--
--[I was one day walking with Murat, on the right bank of the
Danube, and we observed on the left bank, which was occupied by the
Austrians, some works going on, the evident object of which was to
blow up the bridge on the approach of our troops. The fools had the
impudence to make these preparations under our very noses; but we
gave them a good lesson. Having arranged our plan, we returned to
give orders, and I entrusted the command of my column of grenadiers
to an officer on whose courage and intelligence I could rely. I
then returned to the bridge, accompanied by Murat and two or three
other officers. We advanced, unconcernedly, and entered into
conversation with the commander of a post in the middle of the
bridge. We spoke to him about an armistice which was to be speedily
concluded: While conversing with the Austrian officers we contrived
to make them turn their eyes towards the left bank, and then,
agreeably to the orders we had given, my column of grenadiers
advanced on the bridge. The Austrian cannoneers, on the left bank,
seeing their officers in the midst of us, did not dare to fire, and
my column advanced at a quick step. Murat and I, at the head of it,
gained the left bank. All the combustibles prepared for blowing up
the bridge were thrown into the river, and my men took possession of
the batteries erected for the defence of the bridge head. The poor
devils of Austrian officers were perfectly astounded when I told
them they were my prisoners.]--
Such, as well as I can recollect, was the account given by Lannes, who
laughed immoderately in describing the consternation of the Austrian
officers when they discovered the trick that had been played upon them.
When Lannes performed this exploit he had little idea of the, important
consequences which would attend, it. He had not only secured to the
remainder of the French army a sure and easy entrance to Vienna, but,
without being aware of it, he created an insurmountable impediment to the
junction of the Russian army with the Austrian corps, commanded by Prince
Charles, who, being pressed by Massena, hastily advanced into the heart
of the Hereditary States, where he fully expected a great battle would
take place.
As soon as the corps of Murat and Lannes had taken possession of Vienna
the Emperor ordered all the divisions of the army to march upon that
capital.
--[The story to told in much the same way in Theirs (tome vi, p.
260), Rupp (p. 57), and Savory (tome ii. p. 162), but as Erreurs
(tome i. p. 814) points out, Bourrienne makes an odd mistake in
believing the Thabor Bridge gave the French access to Vienna. The
capital is on the right bank, and was already in their power. The
possession of the bridge enabled them to pass over to the left bank,
and to advance towards Austerlitz before the Archduke Charles,
coming from Italy, could make his junction with the allied army.
See plan 48 of Thiers' Atlas, or 58 of Alison's. The immediate
result of the success of this rather doubtful artifice would have
been the destruction of the corps of Kutusoff; but Murat in his turn
was deceived by Bagration into belief in an armistice. In fact,
both sides at this time fell into curious errors.]--
Napoleon established his headquarters at Schoenbrunn, where he planned
his operations for compelling the corps of Prince Charles to retire to
Hungary, and also for advancing his own forces to meet the Russians.
Murat and Lannes always commanded the advanced guard during the forced
marches ordered by Napoleon, which were executed in a way truly
miraculous.
To keep up the appearance of wishing to conclude peace as soon as
reasonable propositions should be made to him, Napoleon sent for his
Minister for foreign Affairs, who speedily arrived at Vienna, and General
Savary was sent on a mission to the Emperor Alexander. The details of
this mission I have learned only from the account of it given by the Duc
de Rovigo in his apologetic Memoirs. In spite of the Duke's eagerness to
induce a belief in Napoleon's pacific disposition, the very facts on
which he supports his argument lead to the contrary conclusion. Napoleon
wished to dictate his conditions before the issue of a battle the success
of which might appear doubtful to the young Emperor of Russia, and these
conditions were such as he might impose when victory should be declared
in favour of our eagles. It must be clear to every reflecting person
that by always proposing what he knew could not be honourably acceded to,
he kept up the appearance of being a pacificator, while at the same time
he ensured to himself the pleasure of carrying on the war.