the 14th of Rabiʿ I. 549 (May, 1154), and took charge of the government.
Guided by the young eunuch who had been present at the murder of az-Zafir
he went to Nasir’s house and lifted up the stone under which lay the
body of the late Khalif. This he removed and buried in the midst of a
whole city in mourning. Az-Zafir’s sister wrote a letter to the Franks
at Ascalon, a town which they had captured in 548 when the army setting
out from Egypt under ʿAbbas failed to appear, and offered them a reward
of 60,000 dinars for ʿAbbas and his son. This reward induced the knights
Templars to go out and stop ʿAbbas on his way to take refuge with the
Turks in the north: an engagement ensued in which ʿAbbas was killed and
Nasir taken prisoner. The prisoner was put into an iron cage and sent
with an escort and an accredited envoy to Cairo, and the promised reward
was at once paid. Nasir’s ears and nose were cut off and he was paraded
through the city and then crucified at the Bab Zawila, after which his
body was burned (on the 10th Muharram 551 = March, 1156 A.D.). Osama who
really was the prime instigator of the mischief escaped any punishment.
In the year of Faʿiz’s accession (549) the Turks under Nur ad-Din took
Damascus and thus began pressing on the Franks from the north. The
Egyptian wazir was very anxious to enter into alliance with Nur ad-Din
and employed Osama as an intermediary, sending to the Turkish Sultan
flattering messages, volumes of his own poetry, and the promise of
substantial assistance. But in spite of all these efforts Nur ad-Din
was extremely cautious and deeply suspicious of the Egyptians, as well,
no doubt, as unsympathetic towards the Shiʿite sect. The Egyptian
advances received their best endorsement from a victory gained by the
Fatimid general Dirgham over the Franks in 553, but even then Nur ad-Din
hesitated and would not enter into any definite engagement. This was
undoubtedly a mistake, for united action between the Turks and Egyptians
would probably have definitely cleared out the Frank settlers, and any
further effectual Frankish invasion was impossible in the face of the
Turkish power now firmly established in the north.
In 555 the Khalif al-Faʿiz died (on Friday, 17th Rajab = July, 1160)
whilst in an epileptic fit.
XVIII
THE FOURTEENTH FATIMID KHALIF, AL-ʿADID
(A.H. 556-567 = A.D. 1160-1171)
At the death of al-Faʿiz at the age of eleven years his cousin Abu
Muhammad ʿAbdullah al-ʿAdid, son of Jibril, one of the murdered brothers
of az-Zafir, and then a child of nine, was proclaimed Khalif. He was
treated simply as a prisoner of state, as indeed had been the case
with his predecessor, and the government was entirely in the hands of
the wazir as-Salih. But as-Salih was not a good ruler; he forestalled
provisions and artificially raised prices, levied frequent fines, and
managed to contrive the execution of various of the great officers of
state whose property was forthwith confiscated. Indeed his besetting sin
was avarice, and the resources of the country were greatly exhausted
by his constant speculations. At length, in 559, “seduced by long
prosperity, he neglected the precautions of prudence” (Ibn Khall. 336),
and plots were formed against him. These plots received the support of
the Khalif, which means in plain words that they were the result of harim
intrigue as is the case with the majority of plots in oriental courts,
and the Khalif’s guard was told off to act as executioners. One day an
attempt was made, but one of the guard accidentally locked a door he
was trying to open, and so the attempt failed. A few days later another
attempt was made, this time with more success, and the wazir was severely
wounded. His attendants managed to kill the attackers and carried the
wounded wazir to his palace, where he died on Monday, the 19th Ramadan,
559 (Sept., 1161). The Khalif visited him on his death-bed, and he gave
the sovereign the final messages of his office: he regretted most that he
had not succeeded in taking Jerusalem and expelling the Franks, as they
formed the most serious problem before the country: and he warned his son
to beware of Shawar, the governor of Upper Egypt, for he was the most
dangerous and unscrupulous rival to the wazir.
As-Salih was succeeded in office by his son Abu Shuja al-ʿAdil Ruzzik,
but within a year he was deposed and executed by Shawar, whose ambition
had been rightly gauged by as-Salih. But Shawar, who was an Arab by
birth, was distinctly unpopular, and within a few months he was driven
out by Dirgham, who was the favourite of the soldiery and commanded the
Barqiya brigade. Expelled from Egypt Shawar went to Damascus and opened
negotiations with Nur ad-Din: he represented to him that Egypt was
inadequately defended, that it would be an easy conquest, and that the
union of the Muslim world would be the best means of effectually getting
rid of the Franks, all the arguments already urged by as-Salih with the
added attractive detail of conquest instead of alliance. But Nur ad-Din
was ever extremely cautious, and moreover he distrusted what he saw of
Shawar, who was very evidently a wily and treacherous man, but the ideas
suggested seem to have sunk into his mind. Meanwhile circumstances began
to force the Egyptian question on Nur ad-Din’s attention by making it
more or less inevitable that Egypt must fall into the hands either of
the Nur ad-Din, or else into those of the Frankish king of Jerusalem. It
seems that a subsidy had been paid by the Fatimids to the Franks, though
when this began is not recorded. Lane-Poole says that it “must have
been recently instituted, for Ibn-Ruzzik, who died in 1161, assuredly
would have paid no such subsidy to the ‘infidels.’ Probably Shawar began
the payment in 1162, but the fact cannot be proved” (_Egypt in the
Mid. Ages_, p. 177, note). At any rate Dirgham, seeking for increased
popularity and confident in the military resources of his country and
in the decadence of the Franks, stopped this payment to Amalric, who
was at this time king of Jerusalem. As a result Amalric invaded Egypt
in the following year (560). Dirgham went out to meet the invaders and
was severely defeated at Bilbays. But it was then the time of the Nile
inundation, and Dirgham had the dykes cut so that the whole country
was very soon under water. This made the Franks ready to listen to some
sort of compromise, and they accepted such payment as Dirgham offered
and withdrew to Palestine. Shortly after their retirement Dirgham was
informed of Shawar’s intrigues at Damascus, and he at once perceived that
his wisest plan was to conclude an alliance with Amalric so that he could
count on Frankish help against a Turkish invasion. No doubt this project
was known to Nur ad-Din, although Amalric’s recent attempt was enough
to force his hand, and he decided to take Shawar’s advice and send an
expedition into Egypt. At the head of the army despatched by Nur ad-Din
was the Turkish general Shirkuh, with his nephew Salah ad-Din (Saladin),
as his lieutenant, and with him was Shawar as guide and adviser.
Dirgham held Bilbays against the Turks, but was defeated, though able to
re-assemble his forces for the defence of Cairo. Shirkuh was able to gain
possession of Fustat, but the fortified Kahira was held by Dirgham and he
was able to resist all the Turkish attacks made upon it. Then Dirgham,
who relied most on the popularity he enjoyed amongst the soldiers,
sorely pressed for funds, laid hands on the _waqf_ or “pious bequests,”
a comprehensive term which in a Muslim land includes all property left
in trust for religious and allied purposes, the salaries of the mosque
officials, the alms bequeathed for distribution amongst the widows and
orphans and pilgrims, the lands left for the upkeep of the mosques and
schools, even the copies of Qurʾans presented to a mosque for the use of
worshippers and teachers contain on the fly-leaf an inscription declaring
them _waqf_ for such and such a mosque; indeed the term includes
everything held in trust for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes, and in a country like Egypt this implies a very vast total,
to-day administered under the supervision of an important department of
the state. The actual seizure of this property by Dirgham, an act almost
without precedent in Islam, caused a general revulsion of feeling amongst
soldiers and people and practically ruined Dirgham’s cause at once. The
army deserted him and the Khalif followed their lead; only a bodyguard
of 500 men was left to the wazir. Conscious of his mistake Dirgham sought
too late to try to repair it. For hours he stood in the great square
before the Khalif’s palace with his faithful bodyguard and called out
like a petitioner for the Khalif’s pardon and help, but without any reply
being sent out to him. Then he noticed that even as he stood there his
men were gradually stealing away from him, until at last only thirty were
left. Suddenly a cry was raised that the besiegers had broken through the
fortifications and had entered the royal city, which indeed was the case,
the Turkish host riding in by the Bab al-Qantara leading from Jawhar’s
bridge over the canal into Kafur’s garden, and at this news Dirgham
turned away and rode out through the Bab az-Zuwila on the south. But
this road took him through part of the old city and he was recognised by
the citizens, pulled from his horse, and beheaded. His head was paraded
through the streets and reviled by all, for the mediaeval Muslim had no
sympathy with ecclesiastical disendowment, whilst the body was left lying
on the ground until it was eaten by the city dogs.
The expedition, though led by Shirkuh, had professedly been to restore
Shawar to the wazirate, and now established in office Shawar only
desired to get rid of the Turks. He kept Shirkuh out of the royal city,
entirely refused to allow him any share in the results of the conquest,
and declined to pay the expected indemnity. He felt, no doubt, that the
decisive factor had been the revolt against Dirgham rather than the help
of the Turks. But Shirkuh was not a likely person to suffer this conduct
with impunity, and sent his nephew Saladin to occupy Bilbays and thus
hold the Sharqiya or eastern province, one of the four great divisions
of Egypt, the other three being Gharbiya or the western province, Qus
or Upper Egypt, and Alexandria or Lower Egypt. This move on the part
of Shirkuh moved Shawar to appeal to Amalric, and an army of Franks
marched down to besiege Bilbays. The siege lasted three months and then
Amalric was obliged to retire and call an armistice as the Turkish hosts
of Nur ad-Din were proceeding south to the relief of Saladin. It was
agreed that the body of Syrians occupying Bilbays should be allowed
to evacuate without interference, and they marched out between the
armies of the Egyptians and the Franks. For the moment matters had
produced a stale-mate, but Shirkuh was fully convinced that Egypt could
be conquered without much difficulty, and that this would be the right
way to check the Franks effectually. Nur ad-Din, with characteristic
caution, hesitated over so great an undertaking which would necessitate
the employment of his forces in the far south and leave the Frankish
kingdom of Jerusalem between his capital and the bulk of his army, but
the project was warmly espoused by the Khalif of Baghdad, and at length
Nur ad-Din acquiesced and a new expedition started from Damascus in the
early part of 562.
This new force was under the command of Shirkuh who had his nephew
Saladin with him as before, but this time he was free from the presence
of the treacherous Shawar. They took the desert route so as to avoid the
Franks by a long detour and thus reached the Nile at Atfih some forty
miles south of Cairo, the ancient Aphroditopolis just north of Wasta,
and there crossed the river and commenced the journey down along the
west side. Hardly had Shirkuh crossed than the Franks who had heard of
the expedition and followed close after appeared on the other side of
the Nile and, not venturing to cross in face of the enemy marched along
the east side, the two armies keeping pace one with the other, the river
between. Both pushed on to Cairo where Amalric encamped near Fustat,
Shirkuh at Gizeh. The Frankish king took advantage of these circumstances
to insist on a clearer understanding with Shawar, and to see that the
terms of the agreement made with him were duly ratified by the Khalif.
It was contrary to all precedent for a foreign and non-Muslim prince to
pay a personal visit to the Imam, but Amalric insisted, and at length
the wazir assented. William of Tyre has left a graphic description of
that visit, and of the astonishing splendours of the palace to which
Amalric and his companions were admitted. There he had an interview with
the Khalif, a young Egyptian of dark colour, the terms of the treaty
were recited, that Egypt was to pay 200,000 pieces of gold at once,
and 200,000 pieces later, whilst Amalric on his side was to expel the
Syrians. Both parties assented and then Amalric held out his right hand
to grasp that of the Khalif whilst a shudder passed round the court at
this apparent profanity. After a brief hesitation the Khalif also held
out his hand covered with a glove. But Amalric exclaimed that as an
honest man he preferred to take the prince’s bare hand; at this again the
court suffered a shock of horror, but the Khalif drew off his glove and
grasped the rough hand of the Frankish king.
Amalric desired now to come to grips with the Syrians immediately and
began constructing a bridge of boats across the Nile, but this was easily
prevented by the Syrians. Amalric then marched his men by night down the
river to where it divided at the commencement of the Delta, and there he
managed to cross without great difficulty, appearing next morning on the
west or left side. At once Shirkuh began retreating southwards towards
Upper Egypt closely followed by the Franks. Amalric overtook the enemy
at al-Babayn near Oshmunayn about ten miles south of Minia, and there
Shirkuh halted and made ready for battle. In the middle he placed his
baggage and on the flank he stationed Salah ad-Din with orders to retreat
as soon as the Franks commenced the attack, so that they might be drawn
off and the Egyptians dealt with alone whilst the Franks were separated
from them. These tactics were followed, and whilst Saladin was leading
away the Franks and skilfully evading them, the Egyptians were completely
routed by the main body of Syrians. As soon as the Franks perceived that
their allies were defeated they began to retreat and abandoned their
baggage to the Syrians, so this was a definite victory for Shirkuh.
The Syrian leader now began marching back along the left bank of the
river but did not continue to follow that route, breaking westwards along
the desert route to Alexandria which in due time he reached and took,
appointing Saladin governor and leaving an adequate body to support him
whilst he retired towards Upper Egypt which he began to lay waste. The
Franks had followed as soon as they could, and the allied Franks and
Egyptians laid siege to Alexandria. For some time Saladin defended the
city with vigour, but the citizens of Alexandria were very soon in revolt
against the military occupation and the inconveniences inevitable from a
state of siege. Alexandria was then, as now, a cosmopolitan town, largely
Levantine in population, and essentially a community of merchants, the
type least likely to be patient in enduring the restrictions and dangers
of a siege. When their discontent broke out in open revolt Salah ad-Din
sent to his uncle Shirkuh for relief, and in response he laid siege to
Cairo. The news of this counter move induced Amalric to raise the siege
of Alexandria and march to the relief of Cairo, first making terms with
Salah ad-Din. It is very difficult to discover the real nature of the
terms under which Alexandria was abandoned by the Franks as both sides
claimed that the operations ended in a victory for themselves. It seems
clear that Alexandria was handed over to Shawar which was a score for
the Franks: at the same time Amalric paid 50,000 pieces of gold. So far
it probably was a bargain struck between the two forces in which we may
regard the city as ransomed for 50,000 pieces of gold. But it seems that
the Franks left a garrison there and increased the subsidy paid by the
Egyptians to 100,000 pieces of gold. No doubt the right interpretation is
that, after the bargain had been made between Amalric and Saladin, the
Syrians made these new terms with Shawar to his disadvantage.
After this, in the latter part of the year, Shirkuh retired to Damascus.
This seems to suggest that the Turks and Syrians had abandoned the
projected conquest of Egypt. But Amalric saw quite clearly that the
possession of Egypt was the crucial point in the struggle between the
Franks and the Muslims, and himself planned to steal a march on Nur
ad-Din and conquer Egypt for himself. With this end in view he raised new
forces and again entered Egypt in 564, taking Bilbays and slaughtering
the inhabitants. This was a more serious danger to the Egyptians than
anything which had happened before, and at once the grouping of parties
was changed by new alliances. Now Shawar made alliance with Nur ad-Din
and invited the Turkish-Syrian army to come to the rescue. Before any
result could be arranged the Franks had pressed on and were threatening
Cairo. To save the city from falling into the hands of the enemy the
Egyptians determined to set fire to the ancient Fustat and abandon it,
the newer Kahira was strongly fortified and could hold out on its own
account. This plan was carried out. For fifty-four days the fire raged
in Fustat abandoned by all its population, and nothing lay before the
invaders but charred ruins and the Old Mosque, and a few other buildings
which more or less resisted the conflagration.
Meanwhile Amalric obtained possession of the country and encamped before
Cairo. The crafty Shawar managed to deceive him and induced him to
consider suggested terms which served to delay operations whilst Shirkuh
was collecting a new force and preparing to come to the relief of the
Egyptians, nor was Amalric undeceived until Shirkuh arrived and joined
the Egyptians. At this the Franks retired and Shirkuh entered Cairo and
then made camp outside. Day by day visits of compliment were exchanged
between Shawar and the Turkish leader, but Shawar constantly postponed
the payment of the money expected and promised for Shirkuh’s help and,
judging from his knowledge of the man Shirkuh was convinced that he was
trying to play off the Frank and the Syrian against one another. At a
conference of his generals Shirkuh announced that it was of primary
importance to put an end to this state of affairs and recommended that
Shawar should be seized and held prisoner. No one was ready to take the
first step in the execution of this proposal until Saladin volunteered to
do it with his own hands. Soon afterwards Shawar was seen coming with a
train of attendants to pay one of his customary visits. Salah ad-Din with
his guard rode out to meet him, and as they rode side by side he suddenly
grasped Shawar’s collar and pulled him off his horse, at the same time
ordering his men to fall on the attendants of the wazir. Shawar was then
taken to a tent and held prisoner. For some time Shirkuh was doubtful
what the result of this measure would be, then an embassy came from the
Khalif bringing the official pelisse, the outward badge of the wazirate,
to Shirkuh and asking for the head of Shawar. This was equivalent to
appointing Shirkuh as ruler of Egypt, and was a final and definite
step in ending the independent existence of the Fatimid Khalifate and
establishing the suzerainty of Nur ad-Din, whose servant Shirkuh was. On
Wednesday, the 17th of Rabiʿ II. 565, Shirkuh was formally invested as
wazir, and aroused popular enthusiasm by permitting a general looting of
Shawar’s palace. Shirkuh, however, held office only two months and died
on Saturday, 28th of Jumada II., being succeeded in his office by his
nephew Saladin. Soon afterwards Aiyub, Saladin’s father arrived in Egypt,
and his son offered to resign his appointment to his father, but Aiyub
refused to accept this sacrifice and urged his son to continue in the
exercise of the functions which he had received as the most trusty and
efficient lieutenant of his uncle Shirkuh.
Two years later (567) a message was received from Nur ad-Din ordering the
_khutba_ in Egypt to be changed and the name of the ʿAbbasid Khalif to be
used in place of the Fatimid. Saladin hesitated fearing a revolt of the
people at this termination of the Egyptian Khalifate and proclamation of
their being incorporated in the Khalifate of Baghdad. But fresh orders
from Damascus insisted. In Cairo there was much reluctance amongst
Saladin’s officers to venture on this change, but at length a Persian
visitor named al-Amir al-Aahin offered to ascend the pulpit next Friday
and pronounce the new _khutba_, and this was accepted. On the following
Friday the Persian did so, and no single word of protest was uttered:
the Fatimid dynasty fell without being the object of more than private
comment, and Egypt acquiesced in the change without discussion or even
taking any particular notice. At the moment the Khalif al-ʿAdid was
ill and confined to his rooms. The members of Saladin’s suite debated
whether he ought to be informed of the change, but it was agreed that if
he recovered it would then be time enough to tell him, and if he did not
recover he might as well die in peace without knowing that his dynasty
had fallen. Shortly afterwards he died in this peaceful ignorance.
This surprisingly commonplace end of the Fatimids is a striking comment
on their history. As organised by ʿAbdullah b. Maymun the Ismaʿilian sect
was a secret society, and this society had established an empire in which
it ruled over subjects who, though loyal to their rulers as political
sovereigns, were totally out of sympathy with the society’s known or
supposed aims. So far as these had become prominent from time to time
they had only produced difficulties and friction, most pronounced in
the incidents connected with al-Hakim; the wiser and saner advisers of
the throne undoubtedly made it their aim to push the sectarian element
into the background, or get rid of it altogether. Yet all through the
history of Egypt, at least up to the time of al-Mustansir, that sectarian
element was very distinctly present and the Fatimid Khalif as the
pontiff of the Ismaʿilians was visited by pilgrims from Persia, Arabia,
and other parts. As a sectarian movement the Fatimid adventure had two
off-shoots which are still to some extent living forces. The Druses of
the Lebanon still form a vigorous and flourishing community of no small
political importance. Their religious tenets have been long a secret,
though many details have leaked forth; but now there is a “modernist”
party, chiefly of the younger men, amongst the Druses, and these desire
to reveal their religious beliefs more fully feeling that secrecy has
only tended to misrepresentation of their community, and believing that
the moral ideals which they hold together with their combination of
agnostic and pantheistic doctrine furnishes a religious system likely to
gain many converts at the present time. How far these modernists will
succeed in divulging their beliefs, and how far their movement will
receive the sympathy of the heads of the sect remains to be seen. It is
understood that Dr. Bliss of Beirut will be the probable intermediary of
communication with the western world if this disclosure takes place.