and helped by Ikhshid partisans, spread far and wide through Egypt.
Al-Moʿizz sent his son ʿAbdullah with some 4,000 men into Lower Egypt and
he gained several minor advantages over some of the marauding bands of
Qarmatians, but this did not prevent the main body from assembling before
Jawhar’s trench which they prepared to assault. By means of spies the
Khalif managed to bribe the Arab tribe of B. Tayy, the strongest factor
in Hasan’s army, allies but not themselves of the Qarmatian sect, to
desert, the price being 100,000 dinars. As the treasury did not contain
sufficient gold these coins were specially struck of lead and gilt. In
the next attack the B. Tayy rode away and Hasan was routed, his camp
plundered, and some 1,500 of his irregular followers slain. The advantage
was pressed home by the Egyptians who advanced into Syria, but after this
defeat the Qarmatians began to fall to pieces as the result of internal
disputes.
The defeat of the Qarmatians was followed by the appearance of a new
danger in the person of the Turkish leader Haftakin. This man had been a
slave in the service of the Buwayhid prince, Moʿizz ad-Dawla, and rose to
a leading position in command of the Turkish mercenaries under his son
Azz ad-Dawla Bakhtiar (Maq. ii. 9). In the course of a battle which took
place outside Baghdad between the Turks and the Daylamites, Haftakin,
though himself acting with exemplary courage, was deserted by most of his
men and compelled to flee with a small body of some 400 followers. At
first he took refuge at Rabha on the Euphrates, but afterwards moved to
Syria. The Syrian Arabs were alarmed at his approach, and appealed for
help to Ibn Jaʿfar, the Fatimite governor of Damascus, who was easily
convinced that Haftakin was acting on behalf of the ʿAbbasid Khalif of
Baghdad, and so took the field against him. But the Emir of Aleppo sent
a force under the eunuch Bashara to the help of Haftakin, and as soon as
this became known the Arabs deserted Jaʿfar and went home. Bashara then
escorted Haftakin to Aleppo (Abu l-Feda) or Emessa (Maqrizi), where the
Emir received him well and bestowed on him many presents.
At Damascus Jaʿfar was faced with a discontented group of citizens, and
they even formed themselves into armed bands under the leadership of one
Ibn Maward. As soon as these men heard of Haftakin’s arrival in Syria,
they opened negotiations with him and invited him to Damascus, promising
to join him in expelling the Fatimid garrison and to recognise him as
emir. Damascus, it must be remembered, was fanatical in its hatred of
the Shiʿites. Haftakin agreed to these proposals, and towards the end of
Shaban 364 proceeded as far as Thaniyyat al-Okab on the road to Damascus.
At this juncture Ibn Jaʿfar heard that the Greeks were intending to
make an attack upon Tripoli in Syria, and so marched his forces out of
Damascus to intercept them. This gave Haftakin his opportunity, and he
was able to enter Damascus without opposition. After a brief stay there
he went down to Baʿalbak to chastise the Arabs who had taken up arms to
assist Jaʿfar against him, but was surprised by a large Greek force,
which was pillaging Baʿalbak and laying waste the surrounding country:
he was only just able to escape before them and seek safety in Damascus
whither the Greeks soon followed him. The citizens sent out an embassy
to ask for terms, and were informed that the city would be spared in
return for a substantial fine. Soon Haftakin went out to the Greek camp
and explained that he was unable to raise the promised fine because
of the obstacles put in his way by Ibn Maward and his partisans, the
free militia of Damascus. As a result of this the Greek Emperor, John
Tzimisces, sent officers into the city, who arrested Ibn Maward and
brought him out a prisoner. By this means the city was cleared of its
irregular forces and Haftakin took full possession, raising the sum of
30,000 pieces of gold as a fine with great rigour. He paid the sum to
the Greeks, who forthwith retired to Beirut and thence to Tripoli.
Thus Haftakin became absolute master of Damascus, and formally recognised
the suzerainty of the ʿAbbasid Khalif of Baghdad. He was afraid, however,
that the Fatimid Khalif would before long take steps to recover his hold
over Syria, and so wrote to the Qarmatians at Lahsa, their headquarters
in the Bahrayn, asking them to ally themselves with him against
al-Moʿizz. They accepted these proposals and a large body of them arrived
before Damascus in 365, where they encamped for a few days; after resting
and conferring with Haftakin they passed on to Ramla, where the Fatimid
general Ibn Jaʿfar was in command, and at their approach he retired to
Jaffa, and they occupied Ramla. Meanwhile Haftakin, as agreed with the
Qarmatians, marched along the coast, and at Saʿida (Sidon) engaged two
subordinate Fatimite generals, Dhalim b. Marhub and Ibn ash-Sheikh, whom
he defeated. Dhalim then withdrew to Tyre, and Haftakin had the hands of
the slain of the Fatimite army cut off and sent as a trophy to Damascus
(Maq. ii. 9).
Just about this time the Khalif al-Moʿizz died, his son ʿAbdullah having
pre-deceased him. He had spent only two years in Egypt but, besides the
decisive repulse of the Qarmatians, he had established a government,
which on the whole was a fair one and kept good order in the land. To
avoid racial disputes, such as had disturbed Kairawan, he settled his
African troops at al-Khandaq near ʿAyn Shams and, although they were
allowed to visit Fustat freely during the day, all were required to leave
the city before nightfall. In dealing with the inhabitants of Egypt
both al-Moʿizz and Jawhar put aside all prejudices, whether of race
or religion, and took a simply practical attitude, at heart no doubt
regarding all religions as equally worthless. The Copts were as a rule
far more efficient as clerks, accountants, and scribes, than their Muslim
fellow countrymen, and they, as well as some Greek Christians, were
largely employed in all the subordinate branches of the administration,
and even to rise to some of the higher offices. As a practical measure
this was thoroughly satisfactory, but the fact that the tax collectors
and practically all the finance officials were Christians or Jews, caused
the gradual evolution of a strong feeling of dislike against members of
these two religions. Undoubtedly also the methods of oriental finance
gave opportunity for much oppression and dishonesty, and the Copts
and Jews were unable to avoid these temptations, so that much of the
prejudice felt against them was justified. Although the employment of
Christians and Jews in the civil service is more or less an established
tradition in Muslim lands, it was carried much further by the Fatimids
than had been usually the case.
Al-Moʿizz entrusted the task of organising a new system of taxation to
the converted Jew, Ibn Killis, who had had experience of administrative
work under Kafur, and to ʿAsluj. The old system of farming out the
taxes was abolished and the whole was centralised, whilst at the same
time a new assessment of land and taxable sources was made. All arrears
were rigorously called up, but very careful consideration was given to
every appeal and complaint. The whole system of taxation was strictly
enforced, but efforts were made to protect the tax-paying community from
unjust exactions. As a result the revenue of the state was considerably
increased, the daily takings in the city of Fustat alone ranging between
50,000 and 120,000 dinars. At the same time, however, al-Moʿizz commenced
an extravagant expenditure on the erection of the royal suburb of
Kahira, and this was followed by ostentatious and luxurious outlay on
an unprecedented scale, so that the actual financial position of the
government was not much improved on the whole. A taste for display became
a characteristic of the Fatimid dynasty, and this tended to exert a
demoralising influence on the community generally by raising the general
standard of expenditure.
IX
THE FIFTH FATIMID KHALIF, AL-ʿAZIZ
(A.H. 365-386 = A.D. 975-996)
Al-Moʿizz was succeeded by his son Nizar, who took the name _al-Imam
Nizar Abu Mansur al-ʿAziz bi-llah_, and so is generally known as
al-ʿAziz. Although his father’s death took place in the early part of
365, it was concealed for some time until it seemed that the succession
was secure, and the formal proclamation was deferred until the Feast of
Sacrifice on Thursday, the 4th of Rabiʿ II. 365. The traditional picture
of al-ʿAziz represents him as humane, generous, a fearless hunter, and a
successful general. Like his father he had a strong taste for building,
and erected a great mosque in Kahira, generally known as the Mosque of
al-Hakim, as it was finished by his son Hakim, near the Bab al-Futuh:
besides this he built the “Palace of gold” facing his father’s palace
across the great square in the midst of Kahira, also a mosque in the
cemetery of al-Karafa, and a palace at ʿAyn Shams (Ibn Khall. iii. 525).
These can hardly be called public buildings in the true sense as they
were all connected with the royal court, and as such were within the
precincts of the “guarded city” and inaccessible to the public generally.
In person al-ʿAziz was tall, broad shouldered, with reddish hair, and
eyes large and of a dark blue colour: in Arab opinion there is something
sinister in such hair and eyes. He was not only fond of sport, but
had also a marked taste for literature, and was particularly adept at
composing epigrams. According to Ibn Khallikan, who, as a partisan of
the ʿAbbasids, delights in reporting anecdotes to the detriment of the
Fatimid Khalifs, he once addressed a derisive and sarcastic letter to
al-Hakim, the Umayyad of Spain, who replied, “You satirize us because
you have heard of us; had we ever heard of you we should reply” (Ibn
Khall. iii. 525).
The Fatimid Khalifs were not able to maintain their somewhat dubious
pedigree above the reach of criticism. In Egypt there were many undoubted
descendants of ʿAli, and some of these, as well as other people, were
strongly inclined to resent the Khalifs’ pretensions. No serious credence
can be given to the story that al-Moʿizz was examined on this subject
at his first entry into Egypt, and simply displayed his sword as his
title to the throne (cf. 49, above), but no doubt many criticisms were
passed in private. One day, when al-ʿAziz ascended the pulpit in the Old
Mosque he found before him a paper on which was written: “We have heard
a doubtful genealogy proclaimed from the pulpit of the mosque: if what
you say be true, name your ancestors to the fifth degree. If you wish to
prove your assertion, give us your genealogy, one that is as certain as
that of at-Taʿi. If not, leave your pedigree in the shade and enter with
us in the great family which includes all mankind. The most ambitious
vainly strive to have a genealogy like that of the sons of Hashim” (Ibn
Khall. iii. 525). The “sons of Hashim” means the ʿAbbasids, of whom
at-Taʿi was then the reigning Khalif. The incident seems probable enough
as the Egyptians generally were not at all in sympathy with Shiʿite
claims; it seems, however, that there was a growing feeling even amongst
Fatimid supporters that the Khalif would do well to discard the Shiʿite
religious theories which were now of no assistance to the dynasty, and
that he would do better if he posed frankly as a secular ruler. Probably
this feeling had commenced to form soon after the execution of Abu
ʿAbdullah in the time of the first Fatimid: we shall see it gathering
force under the son of al-ʿAziz, and finally deciding the Fatimids to
cast aside all the quasi religious and mystical pretensions which had
been adopted at the formation of the sect by ʿAbdullah, the son of Maymun.
Like his father, al-ʿAziz was favourably disposed towards the Copts and
other Christians, but in his case a pro Christian attitude was emphasized
by the fact that he had a Christian wife whose two brothers were, by
the Khalif’s influence, appointed Malkite patriarchs,—that is to say,
patriarchs of the church in communion with the orthodox Greek Church as
distinguished from the Jacobite body to which the Copts belonged,—the one
at Alexandria, the other in Jerusalem. The Khalif’s favour was extended
to the Coptic Church as well as to the Malkite body to which his wife
belonged, and permission was given to the Coptic patriarch Efraim to
rebuild the ruinous church of Abu s-Seyfeyn in Fustat. Al-ʿAziz exceeded
his predecessors in the ostentatious display of wealth, introducing
new fashions of Persian origin, such as turbans of cloth of gold, gold
inlain armour, and other splendours which were copied by the courtiers
and nobles. At one time he spent a sum nearly equivalent to £12,000 on a
magnificent silk curtain from Persia.
Al-Moʿizz had left his successor a difficult problem in Syria. From the
first Syria was the hardest burden which the Fatimids had to assume by
their entry into the heritage of Egypt, and it is worth remembering
that, of the three pieces of advice which Ibn Killis gave to the Khalif
as the great wazir was on his death bed, the two first were, try to
keep peace with the Greeks, and “be content if the Hamdanids of Aleppo
mention your name in the Friday prayer and put it on their coinage.” The
ambition to control Syria has always been the fatal temptation of the
sovereigns of Egypt, in the days of the ancient Pharaohs as at every
period of subsequent history, and the great minister was undoubtedly
wise in advising the Khalif not to seek more than a formal recognition
of suzerainty. At this moment, however, it was no matter of choice. The
Qarmatians had threatened the gates of Cairo, and were now in alliance
with Haftakin, who had ejected the Fatimid governor from Damascus: it
seemed that the prestige, and perhaps the existence of the Fatimids,
depended on their dealing with Haftakin.
Al-ʿAziz entrusted the problem of Syria to the general Jawhar who was
put at the head of a large army. The news of his approach found the
Qarmatians at Ramla, and Haftakin encamped before Acca. The Qarmatians
fell into panic when they heard of Jawhar’s coming, fled from Ramla
and allowed him to take possession of the town. Some of the Qarmatians
retired to their own territory of al-ʾAhsa in the Bahrayn, whilst others
dispersed in all directions. Haftakin heard of this and saw himself
deprived of his allies, and so retired to Tiberias where he rallied round
him some of the scattered Qarmatians and then, helped by his own Turkish
levies, prepared to give battle to Jawhar. First he raised supplies
from the Hauran and from Bathniyya, one of the districts near Damascus
and then, having provisioned the city for a siege, determined to wait
the Egyptian general there. Towards the end of the month of Dhu l-Kaada
Jawhar arrived and pitched camp before Damascus, surrounding his camp
with a deep trench and making regular openings for his men to pass in
and out. Haftakin entrusted one Qassam Sharrab a leader of the local
irregular force which had evidently been revived in the city, with the
task of arranging sorties and attacks on Jawhar’s camp, and these went
on until the 11th of Rabiʿ II. of 366, when the local captain became
disheartened as these sorties did not produce any favourable results, and
Haftakin himself was beginning to consider the expediency of attempting
to escape from the city. Before abandoning Damascus, however, he made
every effort to obtain assistance, and at last was cheered by the news
that the Qarmatian Hasan b. Ahmad was marching to his relief. When Jawhar
heard this he thought it prudent to propose terms to Haftakin, the more
so because his own supplies were running short and, to Haftakin’s great
delight, proposed to retire if he would refrain from pursuit. As this
offer was at once assented to, Jawhar withdrew on the 3rd of Jumada
I. and went to Tiberias. As soon as the Qarmatians heard of this they
followed to Tiberias, but found that Jawhar had passed on to Ramla.
They pursued as fast as they could, and a small engagement took place.
The Qarmatian leader Hasan b. Ahmad died at Ramla, and the office of
_kabir_ passed to his cousin Jaʿfar, the army being under the command of
Yusuf, the last survivor of the six sons of Abu Saʿid (Abu l-Feda: _Ann.
Moslem_, ii. 535). After this it became the custom for the Qarmatians
to put their forces under the control of six _saʿids_, who formed a
kind of elective military council. Very soon after Hasan’s death they
quarrelled with Haftakin and deserted him. Although the retirement of
the Qarmatians left Haftakin in a less favourable position he decided to
give battle to Jawhar, with the result that he defeated him, and Jawhar
was obliged to flee to Ascalon, leaving a vast booty in the victor’s
hands (Maqrizi, ii. 9-10).
Elated by this success Haftakin advanced to besiege Ascalon, but the
Khalif al-ʿAziz had heard of the late reverse and prepared to march to
his general’s relief. The preparations in Egypt seem to have been delayed
for some reason, and so Jawhar sent to Haftakin proposing terms of peace.
It was agreed that Jawhar should pay a compensation to Haftakin and then
both he and his men should be allowed to go away in peace, but should
pass under Haftakin’s sword. This was agreed and Haftakin’s sword was
suspended over one of the gates of Ascalon, and the Egyptian army moved
out through this gate and marched homewards by the road through Ramla. On
the way they met al-ʿAziz marching to their relief, and the two forces
joined together and turned back upon Haftakin. He was at Tiberias when
he heard of this meeting and at once set out, and before long came into
contact with the Fatimite army, with the result that the Turks were put
to flight after an engagement lasting only a few minutes. This took place
on Thursday, seven days before the end of the month of Muharram 368.
Haftakin’s body was sought amongst the many slain but was not found:
later on he was brought in a prisoner by some Arabs who had taken him in
flight. He was led before al-ʿAziz, who ordered him to be paraded through
the troops, during which he had his beard pulled, and had to endure blows
and insults of all sorts. The Fatimite then returned to Egypt carrying
with it Haftakin and many other prisoners.
When the Khalif reached Cairo he treated Haftakin with every
consideration, supplying him with garments and presents, and assigned
him a residence. In after times Haftakin, admitted to the Fatimid court
as an honoured guest, used to say: “I blush to mount my horse in the
presence of our lord ʿAziz bi-llah, and dare not look at him because of
the gifts and favours with which he overwhelms me.” When al-ʿAziz heard
this he said to his uncle Haydara: “By God, my uncle. I love to see men
covered with favours, shining with gold and silver and precious stones,
and to think that all their fortune comes from me.” The Khalif heard that
some people found fault with his conduct towards Haftakin, and ordered
him to be escorted through the city in magnificent apparel, and on his
return presented him with a large sum of money, a number of robes of
state, and ordered the chief men of the court to show him hospitality.
After the courtiers had feasted him the Khalif asked him how he approved
of their banquets, and Haftakin replied that they were magnificent and
that his hosts had loaded him with presents and compliments. It was the
Khalif’s project to form a Turkish faction of military capacity which
would counterpoise the weight of the Berber element which he regarded
with some distrust. He put the Turks and Daylamites who were in Cairo as
prisoners under Haftakin’s command, and thus formed a bodyguard which
was independent of the Berbers, on whom he and his predecessors had
hitherto relied. Haftakin enjoyed the Khalif’s favour until his death in
372. Al-ʿAziz suspected the wazir Ibn Killis of having caused him to be
poisoned, as it was said that Haftakin had behaved scornfully towards
him, and cast the wazir into prison, but after a short confinement the
wazir was set at liberty as the Khalif found that he could not dispense
with his services.
Ibn Killis served as wazir in all for fifteen years (d. 368), and it
was largely due to him that the country enjoyed internal peace and that
the public revenue was largely increased. For the next two years the
wazir was the Christian ʿIsa b. Nestorius, who was supported by harim
influence. In fact the only efficient administrators were to be found
amongst the non-Muslims and renegades: the Turks and Berbers were all
right as fighting men, but could never learn to act efficiently as civil
servants. But these appointments were not popular, and evidences of
resentment appear from time to time. When, towards the end of the reign,
preparations were being made against the Greeks, and a fleet of 600
ships lay ready at Maqs to support the army in an expedition to Syria,
eleven of these ships were set on fire, and popular feeling ascribed
this disaster to the Greek inhabitants living in the neighbourhood, with
the result that there was a riot in which many Greeks were murdered and
their houses pillaged. It is not fair, however, to represent this as an
anti-Christian movement, although no doubt most of those who suffered
were Christians. The riot was soon put down, for al-ʿAziz brought out his
bodyguard of Turks and Berbers, and within six months the energy of Ibn
Nestorius produced six new vessels of the newest type.
Al-ʿAziz shared the besetting weakness of all the Fatimids in his
uncontrolled love of ostentatious display. In his case this not only took
the form of magnificent dresses and lavish generosity, but he showed a
marked passion for rarities of every sort. At his table there were the
most curious and foreign dainties, strange animals were imported to
grace his public processions, and robes of costly and hitherto unknown
materials were procured from the most distant lands. At the same time
al-ʿAziz was an expert in precious stones and articles of _vertu_, and
formed a collection of such things in his palace. On the other hand he
was a strict reformer in matters of finance, putting down the taking of
bribes and presents with severity, and introducing the custom of paying
every official and household servant a fixed salary.
Syria still remained subject to Fatimid rule, but was held only by force
of arms. In 368 al-ʿAziz judged it expedient to visit the country where
hostile movements were taking place on the part both of the Turks and of
the Greeks. At the beginning of the journey, however, he was taken ill at
Bilbays. For some time he lay in a dubious state, then rallied, and then
became worse again. On Sunday, the 23rd of Ramadan, he rode to the bath,
and thence to the lodgings of Barjawan his treasurer with whom he stayed,
but next morning was very seriously worse. The complaint was stone with
pains in the bowels. On the following Tuesday he felt that his end was
near and sent for the Qadi Muhammad b. an-Numan, and the general Abu
Muhammad al-Hasan Ibn ʿAmmar, to whom he commended the care of his son,
then only eleven years old. After this he sent for his son, al-Hakim,
and of that interview al-Musabbihi said: “In a conversation I had with
al-Hakim, we happened to speak of the death of al-ʿAziz, on which he said
to me: ‘O Mukhtar, my father sent for me before he breathed his last, and
I found him with nothing on his body but rags and bandages.’ I kissed
him, and he pressed me to his bosom, exclaiming: ‘How I grieve for thee,
beloved of my heart,’ and tears flowed from his eyes. He then said: ‘Go,
my master, and play, for I am very well.’ I obeyed and began to amuse
myself with sports such as are usual with boys, and soon after God took
him to himself. Barjawan then hastened to me, and seeing me on the top of
a sycamore tree, exclaimed: ‘Come down, my boy; may God protect you and
us all.’ When I descended he placed on my head the turban adorned with
jewels, kissed the ground before me, and said: ‘Hail to the Commander of
the faithful, with the mercy of God and his blessing.’ He then led me out
in that attire and showed me to all the people, who kissed the ground
before me and saluted me with the title of Khalif” (Ibn Khali, iii. 529).