established. As he marched towards that town Ibrahim tried to intercept
him, and for this purpose left al-Arbes where he was encamped, and
occupied Derdemin, which lay near the route which Abu ʿAbdullah would
have to take. On his way the Shiʿites sent a detachment to take Derdemin,
without apparently being aware that this was now Ibrahim’s headquarters.
The detachment was repulsed and put to flight. Abu ʿAbdullah was unable
to understand why the detachment did not return, and went after them with
reinforcements to find out. On the way they met their comrades in full
flight from Derdemin, but at their arrival the fugitives stopped, turned
back, and with the help of the new-comers inflicted a severe defeat on
Ibrahim. This was followed by the submission of Qafra and Qastilia,
the latter place being a general depot for Ziadat Allah’s munitions,
provisions, and money, all of which fell into the Shiʿites’ hands. For
the moment, however, Abu ʿAbdullah refrained from further advance: he
settled at Bagaya and established his headquarters there, and then
retired for a time on his own account to Mount Ankijan.
Ibrahim then decided to take the offensive and laid siege to Bagaya, news
of which quickly brought Abu ʿAbdullah back from his retirement, bringing
12,000 newly enrolled tribesmen with him. But Bagaya was offering such a
sturdy resistance to Ibrahim that the besieger was both astonished and
discouraged, and, hearing of Abu ʿAbdullah’s approach, retired again to
al-Arbes.
In the spring of the following year, A.H. 296, the two armies of Ziadat
Allah and Abu ʿAbdullah both took the field. The historians state that
the former numbered 200,000 men, the latter many more. It must, of
course, be remembered that figures of this sort by oriental writers are
hardly deserving of the least attention. An engagement took place with
results unfavourable to Ibrahim, who forthwith retired to Kairawan,
the strongest military stronghold in Africa. As a consequence of this
Abu ʿAbdullah was enabled to enter al-Arbes, and a great massacre of
the inhabitants took place, some 3,000 it is said being killed in the
principal mosque. The following morning Abu ʿAbdullah retired to Bagaya.
Next day the news reached Ziadat Allah. For some time ʿAbdullah b.
Essaig endeavoured to conceal it from the citizens, but when he offered
20 dinars to each volunteer willing to serve in the cavalry, and 10
dinars to each recruit for the infantry, the citizens perceived that
the state was reduced to the last extremities and a panic ensued, many
of the nobles and their dependents leaving for Raqada. Ziadat Allah
himself packed up his valuables, and with the favourite ladies of his
harim set out for Egypt. ʿAbdullah b. Essaig was put in charge of the
prince’s goods, and these were loaded on thirty camels, but unfortunately
they missed their way as they started in the dark, and arrived at Susa
where the governor impounded them, and they finally fell a prey to Abu
ʿAbdullah. ʿAbdullah b. Essaig himself tried to escape by sea, but a
storm drove his ship ashore at Tripoli just as Ziadat Allah, angry at
missing his goods, was stopping there. The unfortunate minister was
brought before the prince as a deserter, but made so good a defence that
Ziadat Allah decided to pardon him; the courtiers, however, intervened,
and he was beheaded.
After reaching Egypt, Ziadat Allah passed on to Rakka and sent forward
messengers to the Khalif asking permission to present himself at
Baghdad. A reply came forbidding him to attend at court and ordering him
to await further instructions at Rakka. He stayed there a whole year
which he spent in pleasure, and then received instructions to return
to Africa, the governor of Egypt being directed to prepare supplies to
equip him for an expedition against the Shiʿites. In accordance with
these orders he travelled back to Egypt, where the governor told him to
wait for the supplies at Dhatu l-Hammam. He waited there a long time
in vain, and then, as he was now in broken health he started out for
Palestine, but was taken worse on the way and died at Ramla. With him the
Aghlabid dynasty of hereditary governors of Ifrikiya, under the ʿAbbasid
Khalifate, came to an end.
When Abu ʿAbdullah heard of the Emir’s flight he went at once to Wady
an-Namal, and sent forward 1,000 men under Arunaba b. Yusus and Hasan
b. Jarir to Raqada. The news soon reached Kairawan, and a deputation
was sent out to congratulate the Shiʿites. These emissaries thought to
ingratiate themselves by making contemptuous and hostile reflections upon
the late ruler, but Abu ʿAbdullah rebuked them, stating that Ziadat
Allah had lacked neither courage nor intelligence, but that defeat had
overtaken him because it was the will of God. His gracious reception of
the envoys from Kairawan caused great annoyance to the Katama tribesmen,
to whom he had made a promise that they would be allowed to plunder the
city.
In Rajab I. 296 Abu ʿAbdullah, at the head of 300,000 men, entered Raqada
to find the town entirely deserted by its inhabitants. He established
himself in one of the empty mansions, and the leaders of the Katama
occupied others (Maq. ii. 11). He then sent to Tripoli to fetch his
brother Abu l-ʿAbbas and Abu Jaʿfar, as well as ʿUbayd Allah’s mother,
who had apparently accompanied her son, though we hear no more about her.
Abu ʿAbdullah was a fervent Shiʿite and established a strict puritan
rule in Kairawan, death being the penalty for drinking wine or bringing
it into the city. The Shiʿite formula was used in the call to prayer,
which implied the addition of the words “come to the excellent work”
to the orthodox call, and the names of ʿAli, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn
were inserted in the _Khutba_ or public prayer at the Friday service. As
in modern Persia the supreme authority was attributed to the concealed
Imam, and the civil government based its rights on the claim to act as
his deputy until the day of his revealing. In Kairawan the proper deputy
would naturally be the Mahdi ʿUbayd Allah, but no public announcement
was made of this as yet. The Khatibs of Kairawan and Raqada were ordered
to omit the name of the ʿAbbasid Khalif from the _khutba_, but no other
ruler’s name was inserted in its place. A new coinage was prepared, and
this similarly bore no prince’s name; simply it had the inscription on
one side, “I have borne my witness to God,” and on the other “May the
enemies of God be scattered.”
During these events ʿUbayd Allah remained still imprisoned at Sijalmasa,
but now the time had arrived for his supporters to rescue him. Abu
ʿAbdullah’s two brothers, Abu l-ʿAbbas and Abu Zakir, who had hitherto
taken no very prominent position, were left as deputies at Raqada, and
Abu ʿAbdullah with a large body of followers marched towards Sijalmasa.
The object most desired was of course the liberation of ʿUbayd Allah,
and the danger was that the governor might put him and his son to death
before the Shiʿites could rescue them. It was necessary, therefore, to
avoid irritating al-Yasa the governor. Abu ʿAbdullah halted his army at
some distance from the city, and sent forward envoys bearing a letter in
which he assured al-Yasa that he desired no conflict, but only asked that
ʿUbayd Allah and his son might be set free. Al-Yasa only threw the letter
on the ground and had the envoys put to death. A second letter produced a
similar result, and then Abu ʿAbdullah advanced and camped his men before
the city, intending to make an attack on the following day. During the
night al-Yasa escaped with all his portable goods and relatives. Next
morning the inhabitants sent out and informed Abu ʿAbdullah, who went at
once to the prison whence he liberated ʿUbayd Allah and his son. Leading
the Mahdi out he showed him to the people, saying: “This is the Mahdi to
whose obedience I invited men.” He then set him and his son on horses and
paraded them through the streets, crying, “This is your lord,” frequently
interrupting his cry with tears of joy. He conducted them to a tent
which had been made ready for them, and sent a body of men in pursuit of
al-Yasa (Maq. ii. 11-12). The fugitive governor was overtaken, brought
back, and executed.
Ibn Khallikan gives another account of the taking of Sijalmasa, in
which it is related that, before leaving the city al-Yasa executed
ʿUbayd Allah, and when Abu ʿAbdullah entered his cell he found only the
dead body and a faithful Jewish slave. Knowing that the absence of the
Mahdi would be fatal to the whole Shiʿite scheme, he seized the slave,
compelled him to silent acquiescence, and leading him out declared, “This
is the Mahdi” (Ibn Khall. ii. 78). This is another form of the “Jewish
legend,” to which we have already referred (cf. p. 47, above).
For forty days ʿUbayd Allah remained at Sijalmasa, and then, towards the
end of Rabiʿ II. 297 he was conducted by Abu ʿAbdullah to Raqada. Here
he assumed the title of “al-Mahdi, Commander of the Faithful,” and on
the following Friday was prayed for under that title in the mosques of
Raqada and Kairawan. On the same day the Sherif and the _duʿat_ held
a public meeting, at which they tried to persuade the people of Raqada
to become professed members of the Ismaʿilian sect. In this, however,
they were only partially successful, although lavish rewards were
offered to those who joined, and many of those who definitely refused
were imprisoned, some even put to death. In fact we are now in quite
different surroundings: the Mahdi was a successful adventurer, and had
every prospect of establishing a principality quite as stable, and more
independent than that of the Aghlabids: the religious pretensions of
the Shiʿite party were only an embarrassment. From this time forward
the Ismaʿilian sectaries form a privileged class, on the whole disliked
and despised by the people generally, who were quite ready to submit to
the Mahdi’s government, though deriding its spiritual claims; and the
tendency is for the ruler rather to disembarrass himself of the sectaries.
Ziadat Allah’s harim was then presented to the Mahdi who, after selecting
such women as met with his approval for himself and his son, distributed
the remainder amongst the chief men of the Katama.
As soon as ʿUbayd Allah had entered Raqada the citizens had waited on
him to obtain the renewal of the amnesty accorded by Abu ʿAbdullah. He
replied to them, “Your lives and your children are safe.” They asked him
if he would give them a similar assurance as to their property, but this
he refused. This caused great anxiety amongst the citizens, who gathered
that their property was regarded as at the disposal of the Shiʿites. At
first ʿUbayd Allah showed a much more violent Shiʿism than Abu ʿAbdullah,
although we seem justified in supposing that he was merely an adventurer
who was entirely without religious convictions, whilst Abu ʿAbdullah
seems to have been a devout Shiʿite: but this is by no means the only
instance in history where religious persecution was carried out most
severely by unbelievers. He caused the “Companions,” _i.e._, the three
Khalifs preceding ʿAli, to be reviled openly, just as ʿAli himself had
formerly been cursed publicly every Friday in the mosque of Damascus; and
he strictly prohibited the canonists from teaching or using any system of
jurisprudence other than that attributed to Jaʿfar as-Sadiq.
Year 298 (= A.D. 910). Abu ʿAbdullah had proved himself a loyal and
efficient helper, and had done more than any other to establish the Mahdi
in Africa. It seems that he was a sincere Shiʿite, and acted throughout
in perfect good faith and in attachment to the Mahdi with whom he had
corresponded, but probably had never seen before he entered the prison
at Sijilmasa. In 298 these feelings changed. One account is that Abu
ʿAbdullah and the chiefs of the Katama began to feel doubts about the
Mahdi’s claim because he proved unable to work any miracles, and ability
to perform miracles had always been assumed as one of the evidences of a
Mahdi’s claims. Working miracles always has been and still is the primary
essential of a _murabit_ (marabout) in North Africa, and there need be
no reason to doubt that the non-fulfilment of the probably extravagant
Berber expectations must have caused serious disappointment amongst the
Katama. Then again, the Berbers, like the Arabs, are naturally fickle
and insubordinate; in the ordinary course of things they would be sure
to murmur before long against any ruler, especially against one near
at hand. Did Abu ʿAbdullah share their feelings? or did he excite them
for his own ends? Ibn Khallikan states that when the Mahdi was firmly
established at Kairawan, Abu l-ʿAbbas reproached his brother that “You
were master of the country and uncontrolled arbiter of its affairs,
yet you have delivered it over to another and consent to remain in the
position of an inferior,” and at this Abu ʿAbdullah began to regret that
he had handed everything over to the Mahdi and commenced plotting against
him (Ibn Khall. i. 465). But it must be remembered that Ibn Khallikan
shows a very marked anti-Fatimid bias. It seems more likely that both
Abu ʿAbdullah and the Berbers were really disappointed to find the Mahdi
an ordinary mortal. The matter was debated in the presence of the chief
sheikh of the Katama, and Abu ʿAbdullah expressed his doubts, saying:
“His actions are not like those of the Mahdi to whom I used to try to
win you: I am afraid I have been mistaken in him, and have suffered a
delusion similar to that of Ibrahim al-Khalit when the night closed over
him and he saw a star and said, ‘This is my lord’ (Qur. vi. 76). It is
therefore incumbent on me and you to examine him, and to make him show
those proofs which are known to the genealogists as those to be found
in the Imam” (Arib b. Saʿid, _Nicholson_, pp. 120-121). As a result
the Sheikh of the Katama waited upon ʿUbayd Allah and asked for the
performance of a miracle as a proof of his claim to be the Mahdi. The
reply was the immediate execution of the Sheikh. This gave serious alarm
to Abu ʿAbdullah and his brothers, who held a meeting by night in the
house of the youngest brother Abu Zakir. This night meeting may have been
merely a conference to discuss changed conditions, or it may have been in
the nature of a conspiracy. Such meetings continued for some time, and
very probably treasonable plans were suggested, even if not seriously
adopted: at any rate suspicion was aroused, the brothers were watched,
and full information of their proceedings was carried to the Mahdi. One
morning Abu ʿAbdullah appeared at court with his garment turned inside
out, the Mahdi took no notice. Next day the same thing happened, and so
on the third. On the last of these occasions the Mahdi asked him why he
wore his garment so. He replied that it was an oversight; he had not
noticed that it was turned the wrong way. The Mahdi continued, “Did you
not pass the night at the house of Abu Zakir?”—he replied, “Yes,”—“Why
did you do so?”—Abu ʿAbdullah answered that he did so because he was
afraid. The Mahdi remarked that one only feared when there was cause
to believe that there was an enemy. He then showed that he was fully
aware of the meetings, that he knew the names of those present, and the
subject of their conversation. As a punishment he declared that the three
brothers should be expelled from Kairawan, and that Abu Zakir, who seems
to have been the moving spirit, should be sent to Tripoli as governor.
There had been a revolt of the Hawarite tribe in Tripoli, and so it
seemed that Abu Zakir was to be sent on military service as a punishment,
replacing the governor who was his uncle. At Kairawan this seemed a just
and proper measure, for conspiracy could hardly be passed over, but the
penalty involved no disgrace or apparent severity. So Abu Zakir set
out for Tripoli bearing a letter to the governor. But unknown to him
the letter contained orders for his instant execution. As soon as the
governor read the letter he sent for Abu Zakir and showed it to him; the
nephew admitted that it was the will of God and submitted to be beheaded.
News of this was sent by carrier pigeon to the Mahdi, who perceived that
it was now time to get rid of the other two brothers before they took
the alarm. He invited them to a repast, but sends two officers, Garwaih
al-Mulusi and Jaʿbar al-Mili, to conceal themselves behind the castle of
as-Sachu and way-lay them as they passed. They did so and killed them
with pikes. The bodies laid uncared for at the brink of a cistern until
after the following noon, then the Mahdi orders them to be taken up and
given a public funeral at which he himself officiated. In explanation of
his action the Mahdi wrote a letter to the Shiʿites of Asia in which he
said: “Ye know the position in which Abu ʿAbdullah and Abu ʿAbbas stood
with regard to Islam; but Satan hath caused them to stumble, and they
have been punished with the sword. Farewell” (Arib b. Saʿid, _Nicholson_,
p. 128).
But the murder of Abu ʿAbdullah was not taken easily by all the Katama
tribe, and a riot followed the funeral. At this the Mahdi showed the
personal courage which, equally with a total absence of scruple or
gratitude, became characteristic of his dynasty. Mounting his horse he
rode out into the streets, and declared that now justice was satisfied,
and that no further enquiry would be made or punishments inflicted. He
was so far successful that the people dispersed quietly.
We may take the murder of Abu ʿAbdullah as marking the establishment of
the Khalifate at Kairawan. Hitherto it had been more or less surrounded
with a religious atmosphere; it had been essentially connected with a
particular religious sect. Now, with the death of Abu ʿAbdullah it is
established frankly as a secular power, although the religious claims
are still maintained in the background. The Shiʿite position, however,
now appears rather as political than sectarian. The orthodox Khalif was
ruling at Baghdad, but the Mahdi’s followers regarded him simply as a
usurper. The same view was taken by the Umayyad rulers in Spain, although
at this time they had not yet ventured to assume the title of Khalif.
Amongst the Shiʿites proper the Khalif exists only as the “concealed”
Imam, and the visible ruler on earth is merely his viceroy: but the Mahdi
claimed to be not only Mahdi, but the heir of the Imams, and thus assumed
the Khalifate as the legitimate heir of ʿAli.
V
THE FATIMID KHALIFS OF KAIRAWAN
Led by religious enthusiasms, the Berber tribes had succeeded in sweeping
away the Arab government of the province of Ifrikiya. To a very large
extent, however, this was as much a racial and anti-Arab movement of
the Berbers as a religious one: of course, very much the same has been
true of every Mahdist movement in Africa. The history of Islam is full
of similar revolts, for the most part either with a religious motive,
or at least a religious pretext. Now the destructive work was finished
and the Mahdi settled at Kairawan, having damped or perhaps quenched the
religious fervour of his followers by the execution of Abu ʿAbdullah and
the implied shelving of the miraculous powers which his earlier followers
had associated with him, was faced with the task of constructing an
orderly and stable principality out of what must be confessed to have
been rather unpromising materials. More than once the Semitic and Berber
tribes have shewn themselves quite capable of nation-building, and their
work has not always been short-lived. The religious motive was effective
in arousing the enthusiasm of fighting men, the task of framing political
institutions demanded different qualities. At this time, no doubt, we
must regard the Mahdi as primarily a political adventurer: that he had
any serious regard for Shiʿite principles is incredible; that he was the
missionary of an enlightened philosophy which would deliver men from the
fetters of religion,—a position which may have been true of his ancestor
ʿAbdullah,—is extremely improbable in his case. Unexpected circumstances
had given him an exceptional opportunity as the founder of a dynasty, and
we have now to see how he used this opportunity.
Towards religion the Mahdi’s attitude had been at first one of rabid
Shiʿism, though he, as one of the fully initiated, could not have been
sincere: no doubt he was acting up to what he expected to be the feelings
of his subjects so far as he had observed the Katama and the immediate
followers of Abu ʿAbdullah: closer acquaintance with the people of
Kairawan showed him that he had been mistaken, the people generally were
quite ready for a Mahdi, or anyone else, who could establish and maintain
an orderly government, but as Muslims they were orthodox by a large
majority, and by no means willing to accept the rather fantastic theories
of incarnation and transmigration which appealed to the Persian mind.
As soon as this was made clear the Mahdi formulated a definite policy
in religion, enforcing strictly all the outward observances of Islam,
rigidly punctilious in the prohibition of forbidden food and drink, and
punishing severely those of the Ismaʿilian sect, who tried to practice
the freedom of the higher grades of the initiated. It was no doubt
possible for the initiate to disregard the rites of religion in their
private life, but any external neglect, likely to cause scandal amongst
the populace at large, was treated as a criminal offence: there was none
of the open lawlessness of the Qarmatians tolerated in Ifrikiya: the
inner grades of the sect were distinguished from other Muslims only by
their reverence for the family of ʿAli, whom all revered to some extent,
by their repudiation of the first three Khalifs, which was offensive to
the orthodox but not intolerable, and by a few minor differences in the
ritual of prayer, and in the treatment of the problems of the canon law.
The most difficult problem demanding the new ruler’s immediate attention
lay in the lands to the west, for the Mahdi claimed to control all the
territory to the Atlantic, over which the Aghlabid princes had pretended
to rule. The first difficult task came in the revolt of Tiharet.
For long past the Berber lands of North Africa had afforded a refuge
for every persecuted sect and dynasty of Islam. The earliest sect, the
Kharijites, the wild men of the desert who adhered to the oldest form of
purely Arab Islam, had entered Africa after they had been hunted down and
slaughtered in Asia by the Umayyad Khalifs. In the days of the Mahdi
they still held their own in the district of Tiharet in the mountainous
country of Central Maghrab. They threw off all allegiance to the ruler at
Kairawan and invited Muhammad b. Khazar to be their Emir. The Mahdi sent
the Katami Aruba b. Yusuf against them: after three days siege the city
was taken, plundered, and some 8,000 of the inhabitants slain.
The Umayyads who had put down the Kharijites in Asia had been compelled
by the course of events to seek a refuge in Africa for themselves, and
thence had passed over to Spain which was regarded as the remotest of
the western parts. At this time they were ruling at Cordova (they did
not assume the title of Khalif until A.H. 317), and held also some
possessions in Africa about Oran. The same Karmati leader who had taken
Tiharet was able to seize Oran.
The Idrisid dynasty, descendants of ʿAli by Hasan, expelled from Madina
in 169, had founded a state in the remoter part of Morocco where they
were still ruling. This state also was attacked by Aruba and reduced, so
that all the western lands to the Atlantic coast was brought under the
control of the Mahdi (Ibn Khald. i. 244-5, 267-8, etc.).