REVIEW OF PRODUCTION
Critical Importance of Production.--Our analysis of the struggle
for the initiative reveals the critical importance of production.
In the chemical more than in any other form of warfare,
production has a tactical and strategic importance and functions
as an organic part of the offensive scheme. A tendency in modern
war is to displace the incidence of initiative towards the rear.
Staffs cannot leave the discoveries of the technical
workshop or scientific laboratory out of their calculations,
for their sudden introduction into a campaign may have
more influence on its result than the massing of a million
men with their arms and equipment for a surprise assault.
The use of a new war device may shake the opposing formations
more than the most cunningly devised attack of this sort.
When, after the first brilliant assault on the Somme on July 1st, we began to
lose men, material, and the initiative, in an endless series of local attacks,
we were even then regaining it by the home development of the tank.
Even before the colossal German effort was frustrated by the first Marne
battle and the development of trench warfare, the German laboratories
were within an ace of regaining the initiative by their work on cloud gas.
After the lull in their gas attacks, when the Germans sought to gain
the initiative and a decision by the use of phosgene, the quiet work
of our defensive organisations at home had completely countered
the move weeks before.
But in all these cases the counter idea could not become effective
without large-scale production. This was absolutely fundamental.
Had we taken six years to produce the first type of tank, had the Germans
failed to manufacture mustard gas within a period of years instead of
succeeding in weeks, and had the box respirator taken longer to produce,
all the brilliant thinking and research underlying these developments
would have had practically no influence on the campaign, for they would
have had no incidence upon it. We could go on multiplying examples.
But what is the conclusion?
From this rapid development of methods a new principle emerges.
The initiative no longer remains the sole property of the staffs,
unless we enlarge the staff conception. Vital moves can be
engineered from a point very remote in organisation and distance
from the G.H.Q. of armies in the field. But there is a critical
step between the invention and its effect on military initiative.
This is production, which for these newer methods becomes an organic
part of the campaign.
But the future is our chief preoccupation. What would be
the supreme characteristics of the early stages of a future war?
It would be distinguished by attempts of belligerents to win immediate
and decisive success by large scale use of various types of surprise.
Three factors would be pre-eminent, the nature of the idea or invention,
the magnitude on which it is employed, and its actual time of incidence,
that is, the delay between the actual declaration of war and its use.
Now the invention is of no use whatever without the last two factors,
which are entirely dependent on production. When, in 1917,
the Allied staffs pressed repeatedly for gases with which to
reply to German Yellow Cross, their urgent representations met
with no satisfactory response until nearly a year had elapsed.
This was not due to lack of invention, for we had simply to copy
the German discovery. Failure to meet the crying demands of the Front
was due to delay in production.
Any eventual chemical surprise will, under genuine conditions
of disarmament, depend on peace industry, for no such conditions
will tolerate the existence of huge military arensals.
We have already indicated the type of peace-time industry
_par excellence_, which can rapidly and silently mobilise for war.
It is the organic chemical industry. Therefore, whatever the war may
have taught us as to the value of chemical industry, its importance
from the point of view of a future war is magnified many times.
The surprise factor is responsible. The next war will only
commence once, however long it may drag on, and it is to the start
that all efforts of a nation planning war will be directed.
It is, therefore, of importance to examine in detail the development
of chemical production during the recent war.
A close examination is of more than historical significance, and should
provide answers to certain vital questions. German chemical industry was the
critical factor in this new method of war which almost led to our downfall.
How did the activities of this industry compare with our own production?
To this an answer is attempted below, but graver questions follow.
Was our inferior position due to more than a combination of normal
economic conditions, and were we the victims of a considered policy?
If so, who directed it, and when did it first give evidence of activity?
An answer to these questions will be attempted in a later chapter.
Significance of the German Dye Industry.--At the end of 1914 the nation began
to realise what it meant to be at the mercy of the German dye monopoly.
Apart from the immediate economic war disadvantages, the variety and sinister
peace ramifications of this monopoly had not been clearly revealed.
Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, stated with regard
to the dye industry: "The inquiries of the Government have led them
to the conclusion that the excessive dependence of this country on a single
foreign country for materials of such vital importance to the industry
in which millions of our workpeople were employed, constitutes a permanent
danger which can only be remedied by a combined national effort on a scale
which requires and justifies an exceptional measure of State encouragement."
Measures were defined later.
In the debate in the House of Commons in February, 1915, on the
aniline dye industry, a member prominent in the discussion,
referring to "taking sides on the question of Free Trade," stated that,
"It was a great pity that this should occur when the attention of
the House is occupied with regard to MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR,"
and proceeded to draw a comparison between the national
importance of the manufacture of dyes and that of lead pencils.
Fortunately he prefaced his remarks by explaining his ignorance
of the "technical matters involved in this aniline dye industry."
These are two out of many references to the pressure due to
the absence of German dyes, which illustrate the purely economic
grounds on which the issue was being discussed, on the one hand,
and reveal the prevailing ignorance of its importance on the other.
Exactly one month later came the first German gas shock.
Such statements as the above tempt us to ask who, at this time,
realised the common source of the direct military
and indirect economic attack. It can hardly be doubted
that the existence of the German dye factories was largely
responsible for the first German use of gas on the front.
We have already seen how, from the first month of the war,
the chemical weapon was the subject of definite research.
Falkenhayn leaves us in no doubt as to the chief factor
which finally determined its use. Referring to difficulties
of production, he says, "Only those who held responsible posts
in the German G.H.Q. in the winter of 1914-15 . . . can form any
estimate of the difficulty which had to be overcome at that time.
The adjustment of science and engineering . . . took place
almost noiselessly, so that they were accomplished before
the enemy quite knew what was happening. Particular stress
was laid upon the promotion of the production of munitions . . .
as well as the development of gas as a means of warfare."
Referring to protective methods of trench warfare, he continues,
"Where one party had gained time . . . the ordinary methods of attack
often failed completely. A weapon had, therefore, to be found
which was superior to them but which would not excessively tax
the limited capacity of German war industry in its production.
Such a weapon existed in gas."
The Germans had themselves shown us where this production occurred,
and Ludendorff supplements our information by telling us how he discussed
the supply of war material with Herr Duisburg and Herr Krupp von Bohlen
in Halbach, "whom I had asked to join the train" in the autumn of 1916.
The former was the Chairman of the I.G., the great dye combine.
Those producing a new weapon of war must always consider the
possibilities possessed by their opponents to exploit the same weapon
after the first shock. For the Germans the answer was obvious.
The Allies would be held at a material disadvantage for months,
if not years. Without the means of production available in Germany,
we are not at all, convinced that the gas experiment would have been made,
and had it not been made, and its formidable success revealed,
Germany's hesitation to use this new weapon would probably have
carried the day. This, at least, is the most generous point of view.
In other words, the German poison gas experiment owed a large part
of its initial momentum to ease of production by a monopoly.
The combination of this factor with the willingness to use gas led
to the great experiment. The future may again provide this combination,
unless the monopoly is removed.
Following up this line of thought, we can see how tempting was the German
course of action. Falkenhayn has told us what a violent strain was imposed
upon Germany by the stabilisation of the Western Front early in 1915.
The tension between the Great General Headquarters and the Home Government
was already in evidence, and would have caused difficulty in attaining
suitable home and liaison organisations, in particular with regard
to supply. We can well understand this when we remember the drastic
changes which occurred in our own ministries and departments.
But what organisation was required for chemical warfare supply?
Very little! Quoting from the report of the Hartley Mission to the chemical
factories in the occupied zone, we know that when the Government wished
to produce a new gas "a conference with the various firms was held
at Berlin to determine how manufacture should be subdivided in order
to use the existing plant to the best advantage." The firms referred
to were the constituent members of the highly organised I.G. There
was no need to create a clumsy and complicated organisation with an
efficient one existing in the I.G. ready to meet the Government demands.
The path could not have been smoother. Ludendorff states in his memoirs
that the Hindenburg programme made a special feature of gas production.
Increased supply of explosives was also provided for. He says:
"We aimed at approximately doubling the previous production." And again:
"Gas production, too, had to keep pace with the increased output
of ammunition. The discharge of gas from cylinders was used less and less.
The use of gas shells increased correspondingly." This programme represented
a determined effort to speed up munitions production in the autumn of 1916.
It included not only gas but explosives, both of which could be supplied
by the I.G. Explosives demanded oleum, nitric acid, and nitrating plants,
which already existed, standardised, in the factories of the dye combine.
The unusual speed with which standard dye-producing plant was converted
for the production of explosives is instanced in the operation
of a T.N.T. plant at Leverkusen, producing 250 tons per month.
The conversion only took six weeks. The factories of the I.G. supplied
a considerable proportion of the high explosives used by Germany.
In the field of chemical warfare the relationship between war and peace
production was even more intimate. Chemical warfare products are
closely allied and in some cases almost identical with the finished
organic chemicals and intermediates produced by the dye industry.
Therefore, in most cases, even when the suggestion of the new chemical
may come from a research organisation entirely apart from the dye
research laboratories, the products fall automatically into the class
handled by the dye industry.
Is there any doubt that the I.G. was a terribly effective arsenal for the mass
production of the older war chemicals, explosives, and the newer types,
poison gases? Is there even a shadow of exaggeration in our claims?
There may be those who would see a speedy resumption of friendship with
Germany at all costs, regardless of the honourable settling of her debts,
regardless of her disarmament and due reparation for wrongs committed.
Can even such concoct material to whitewash the military front of the I.G.? If
they would, they must explain away these facts.
The plants of the I.G. produced more than two thousand tons
of explosives per week, at their average pre-war rate.
This is an enormous quantity. How can we best visualise it?
In view of the chapters on Disarmament which follow,
we will use the following comparison. The Treaty of Versailles
allows Germany to hold a stock of about half a million shell
of different stated calibres. How much explosive will these
shell require? They could be filled by less than two days'
explosives production of the I.G. at its average war rate.
Between two and three million shell could be filled by
the result of a week's production in this organisation.
Further, the average rate of poison gas production within
the I.G. was at least three thousand tons per month,
sufficient to fill more than two million shell of Treaty calibres.
Unless drastic action has been taken, the bulk of this
capacity will remain, and Germany will be able to produce
enough poison gas in a week to fill the Treaty stock of shell;
this in a country where the manufacture and use of such substances
are specially prohibited.
It is appropriate at this stage to describe as briefly as possible
the origin and composition of this great German combination,
the Interessen Gemeinschaft, known as the I.G. There is no need
to go into the gradual self-neglect, and the eventual rooting
out by Germany, of the dye-producing industry in other countries,
notably England, France, and America.
The Interessen Gemeinschaft.--By the end of the nineteenth century
the manufacture of dyes on a large scale was concentrated almost
exclusively in six great firms. These were the Badische Anilin
und Soda Fabrik, Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, known as the Badische;
the Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedr. Bayer, & Co., in Leverkusen,
known as Bayer; Aktien-Gesellschaft fur Anilin-Fabrikation
in Berlin; Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Bruning in Hochst am Main,
referred to as Hochst; Leopold Cassella G.m.b.H. in Frankfort;
and Kalle & Co., Aktien-Gesellschaft in Biebrich.
Each of these six great companies had attained enormous
proportions long before the war. Only two other concerns
had carried on manufacture on a comparable scale. These were
the Chemische Fabrik Greisheim-Elektron of Frankfort A.M.,
a company which has absorbed a number of smaller manufacturers,
and the Chemische Fabriken vormals Weiler-ter Meer, Uerdingen.
The position of all these establishments, with one single exception,
along the Rhine and its tributaries is well known.
Their growth has been illustrated in their own prospectuses.
Hochst was organised in 1863 and started with five workmen.
In 1912 it employed 7680 workmen, 374 foremen, 307 academically
trained chemists, and 74 highly qualified engineers.
The works of the Badische, which was organised in 1865, covered,
in 1914, 500 acres, with a water front of a mile and half on
the Rhine. There were 100 acres of buildings, 11,000 workmen,
and the company was capitalised at fifty-four million marks.
The establishment of Bayer was on a scale entirely comparable.
Quoting from an official American report,[1] "Griesheim Elektron,
prior to the war, had enormous works chiefly devoted to the
manufacture of electrolytic chemicals and became an important
factor in the dyestuff business only within recent years, when by
absorption of the Oehler Works and the Chemikalien Werke Griesheim,
its colour production reached a scale approaching that of the
larger houses." This move on the part of the Griesheim Elektron
is interesting as an example of the general tendency which has
characterised the development of the German dye industry.
This firm, producing inorganic materials and intermediates,
absorbed the Oehler Works in order to find an independent outlet
for its intermediate products, thus becoming directly interested
in dyestuffs production. This move towards independence in
the whole range of products involved is referred to elsewhere,
owing to the manner in which it simplified German production
for chemical warfare.
Combination, however, did not cease in the creation
of these enormous establishments. The cartel fever raged
here as in other German industries. By 1904 two immense
combinations had been formed in the dyestuff industry.
One of these comprised Bayer, Badische, and Berlin;
the other Hochst, Cassella, and Kalle. "By pooling profits,
by so arranging capitalisation that each company held stock in
the other companies of its own cartel, and by other familiar means,
the risks incident to the enormous expansion of the business
and the immense increases of export trade were minimised.
The centripetal tendency, however, did not stop here.
In 1916, the two pre-existing cartels were combined with
Griesheim Elektron, Weilerter Meer, and various smaller
companies in one gigantic cartel, representing a nationalisation
of the entire German dye and pharmaceutical industry."
The combination was extremely close. Profits of the companies
were pooled, and after being ascertained each year on common
principles were divided according to agreed percentages.
Each factory maintained an independent administration, but they
kept each other informed as to processes and experiences.
"There was also an agreement that in order to circumvent tariff
obstacles in other countries materials were to he produced
outside of Germany by common action and at common expense
whenever and wherever desirable.
[1] Alien Property Custodian's Report, 1919.
"At the time of the formation of this enormous organisation
the capitalisation of each of the principal component
companies was largely increased. Hochst, Badische, and Bayer
each increased their capitalisation by 36,000,000 marks,
bringing the capital of each up to 90,000,000 marks."
"Berlin increased its capital from 19,800,000 to 33,000,000 marks.
Other increases brought the total nominal capital of the group
to over 383,000,000 marks. For many years a large part of
the enormous profits of these concerns has been put back into
the works with the result indicated by the stock quotations.
The real capitalisation is thus much greater than this nominal figure.
In fact, it is estimated that the actual investment in the works
comprising the cartel is not less than $400,000,000. It cannot
be doubted that this enormous engine of commercial warfare has
been created expressly for the expected war after the war,
and that it is intended to undertake still more efficiently
and on a larger scale the various methods by which German
attacks upon all competition were carried on."
Two additional features must be indicated. A policy to
which we have referred was most actively followed, aiming at
complete independence and self-sufficiency in all matters
relevant to production, especially regarding raw materials.
We mention later how the war has strengthened the strong prewar
position of the I.G. in heavy chemicals needed as raw materials
for the intermediates and finished dyes.
Recent information reveals a further widening of their basis of operation,
including a strong hold on the electro-chemical industry and on the new
synthetic processes from carbide, for acetic acid and the other products
normally obtained by wood distillation. Again, the policy of the I.G.
appears to have moved towards more complete unity since the war.
Exchanges of directing personnel and of capital amongst the branches have
been recorded for which the term "cartel" is no longer a fair description.
In addition, considerable increases in capital have occurred which not only
reveal the vision and activity of the I.G. but which indicate its close
contact with the German Government. With such an organisation in existence
and with the complete liaison which had developed between the directors
and the German Government for other purposes than chemical warfare,
and in agreement with the paternal policy adopted by the latter towards
this chemical industry, production became simplicity itself.
War Production by the I.G.--Let us, therefore, examine in some detail
the actual production of war gases and chemicals by the I.G. In order
to obtain an idea regarding case of production, we will later make
a comparison with the magnitude and rapidity of that of the Allies.
From the point of view of this statement, there are two main classes
of production, that in which the majority of the steps involved
were actual processes employed for the manufacture of some dye,
pharmaceutical or other chemical product, and, in the second place,
that in which no such coincidence occurred, but in which the general
technique developed, and the varieties of existing plant covered
the needs of the case. Without stretching the point, every war
chemical employed came easily under one of these two categories.
In order to assist the less technical reader, we will consider
the production of the chief war chemicals in the order in which they
appeared against us on the front.
_Chlorine_.--This important raw material, used in a variety
of operations, notably for the production of indigo and sulphur black,
two highly important dyes, was produced along the Rhine
before the war to the extent of nearly forty tons a day.
The only serious expansion required for war was an increase of already
existing plant at the large factory of Ludwigshaven. The following
table of production illustrates the point:
CHLORINE (METRIC TONS PER DAY)
1914 1918
Leverkusen 20 20
Hochst 4 8
Ludwigshafen 13 35
---- ----
Total 37 63
Chlorine was important, nor only as a raw material for most of the known
chemical warfare products, but also, in the liquid form, for cloud attack.
Owing to the development of protection, the use of liquid chlorine
for the latter purpose became obsolete.
_Phosgene_.--This was produced in considerable quantity
before the war at Leverkusen and Ludwigshafen, leading to many
exceedingly important dyes, amongst the most commonly used at
present being the brilliant acid fast cotton scarlets so largely
used in England. More expansion of plant was necessitated.
At Leverkusen the existing plant can produce at least thirty tons
a month, and we learn "the plant remains intact ready for use."
At Ludwigshafen the capacity was considerably higher, amounting to
600 tons per month. As production was commenced before the war,
there were no difficulties in developing the process,
expansion alone being necessary.
_Xylyl Bromide_.--This was one of the early lachrymators, and was produced
at Leverkusen in a plant with a maximum monthly output of sixty tons.
Production began, according to a statement on the works, in March, 1915.
Its case can be judged from the fact that this compound was used almost
as soon as the first chlorine cloud attack at Ypres.
The Germans undoubtedly attached considerable importance to their
brominated lachrymators. In this connection their persistent
efforts to retain the bromine monopoly with their Stassfurt product
and to crush the American industry before the war are significant.
The success of these efforts certainly placed us in a difficult
situation during the war, both with regard to production of
drugs and lachrymators.
German bromine was associated with potash in the Stassfurt mineral deposits,
whereas the American product was produced from numerous salt springs
and rock salt mines. Although Germany had not succeeded in crushing
the American industry, yet the outbreak of war found her in a
predominant position, for her two chief opponents, France and England,
were cut off from their supplies, which were German; and American production
was of little use, owing to the great excess of demand over supply,
and the manipulation of output by German agents in America. A possible
source of bromine existed in the French Tunisian salt lagoons,
whose pre-war exploitation had been considered by an Austrian combination.
The French wisely developed a Tunisian bromine industry sufficient for their
own needs, and, on different occasions, supplied us with small quantities.
But the development of such an enterprise in time of war was
a severe handicap.
_Diphosgene or Trichlormethyl Chloroformate_.--This substance was toxic,
a lachrymator, and slightly persistent. It attained a maximum
monthly Output Of 300 tons at Leverkusen, and about 250 tons
at Hochst. This was not a simple compound to make, and had no direct
relationship with the stable product of the peace-time industry.
At the same time, it provides an example of the way in which general technique
developed by the industry was rapidly used to master the new process.
In particular their method of lining reaction vessels was of value here.
The reaction occurs in two stages by the production of methyl formate
and its subsequent chlorination. The methyl-formate plant was part
of an existing installation, but the chlorination and distillation
plant were specially installed.
_Chlorpicrin_.--This was mixed with diphosgene and used
in the familiar Green Cross shell. The production was very
readily mastered and attained the rate of 200 tons per month.
Picric acid, chlorine, and lime were required, all three
being normal raw materials or products of the industry.
At Hochst no new plant was installed, the manufacture being
carried out in the synthetic indigo plant.
_Phenylcarbylamine Chloride_.--This was used in German chemical shell,
and was not particularly effective against us, although produced in large
quantities by the Germans, in vessels used in peace time for a very
common intermediate, monochlorbenzene. The ease of production of this
substance may account for its use in large quantities by the Germans,
in order to increase their gas shell programme.
_Mustard Gas or Dichlordiethyl Sulphide_.--This was prepared
in four stages:
(1) Preparation of Ethylene--by heating alcohol with an aluminium
oxide catalyst at 400'0 C.
(2) Preparation of Ethylene-chlor-hydrin, by passing ethylene
and carbon dioxide into a 10 per cent. solution of bleaching
powder at a temperature below zero centigrade, and subsequent
concentration of the product to a 20 per cent. solution.
(3) Conversion of the chlor-hydrin into thiodiglycol by treatment
with sodium sulphide.
(4) Conversion of the thiodiglycol into mustard gas
(dichlordiethyl-sulphide), using gaseous hydrochloric acid.
The thiodiglycol was produced at Ludwigshafen and provides one
of the best examples of the adaptation of the German dye works
for the purpose of producing war chemical. Technically, ethylene is
a fairly difficult gas to produce in large quantities, but, for the
Ludwigshafen works, these difficulties were a thing of the past.
There were twelve big units before the war, and, by the time
of the Armistice, these had been increased to seventy-two
in connection with mustard gas manufacture. In a similar way,
the number of the units for chlorhydrin, the next step, was increased
from three to eighteen. These two processes had all been worked
out very thoroughly in connection with the production of indigo.
These new plants were identical with the peace-time units.
The expansion was a mere question of repetition requiring no
new designs or experiments and risking no failure or delay.
Success was assured. The last step, the production of thiodiglycol,
occurred in the causticising house, to which no substantial
alterations or additions appear to have been made for the purpose.
As sodium sulphide is used in large quantities as a raw material
in the dye industry, and was already produced within the I.G.,
no difficulty was presented in connection with its supply.
The thiodiglycol was forwarded to two other factories, one of which
was Leverkusen, where 300 tons of mustard gas were produced monthly.
The reaction between thiodiglycol and hydrochloric acid was one which
required very considerable care. At one stage of the war the Allies viewed
with much misgiving the possibility of having to adopt this method.
But the technique of the German dye industry solved this as satisfactorily
and as steadily as other chemical warfare problems, bringing its technical
experience to bear on the different difficulties involved.
_Diphenychlorarsine_.--This was the earliest and main constituent
of the familiar Blue Cross shell. It was prepared in four stages:
(1) The preparation of phenyl arsinic acid.
(2) The conversion of the above to phenyl arsenious oxide.
(3) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl arsinic acid.
(4) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl-chlor-arsine.
This is another example of a highly complicated product
which might have presented great difficulties of production,
but the problem of whose manufacture was solved, almost automatically,
by the German organisation.
The first step, that of the manufacture of phenyl arsinic acid,
was carried out at Ludwigshafen in one of the existing azo dye
sheds without any alteration of plant, just as a new azo dye
might have been produced in the same shed. It is believed
that another dye factory also produced this substance.
At Ludwigshafen the conversion to diphenyl arsinic acid occurred.
This was again carried out in the azo colour shed, with no
more modification than that involved in passing, from one azo
dye to another.
This chemical mobilisation of a huge dye unit was, and could still be,
practically invisible in operation. Not only was the process practically
the same as azo dye production, but, as the compounds were not particularly
poisonous in the intermediate stages, there was no risk to the workers,
and no need to violate secrecy by indicating special precautions.
The final stage, the preparation of diphenylchlorarsine,
the actual Blue Cross shell constituent, occurred at Hochst,
which also carried out the first three stages, already outlined
as occurring at Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen. The last stage
was a simple one and was carried out in plant and buildings
previously used for peace purposes.
The other substances employed provide further examples of this ease
of production. Ethyl-dichlor-arsine was produced in homogeneously
lead-lined vessels, identical with those used for diphosgene.
Dichlor-methyl-ether presented difficulties which were solved
by applying the German method of using tiled vessels.
The part played by the I.G. in the German chemical warfare organisation
has already been outlined, and we have seen how the German Government was
content simply to place its demands before the directors of the dye combine.
The latter were left to choose the process and exploit it by making the best
use of their organisation, which was done after reviewing the plant at their
disposal in the different branches. An interesting feature of the production
of war chemicals by the I.G. is thus revealed by examining the actual locality
of the separate operations leading to any one of the individual poison gases.
The attached table shows us how the production of any particular war chemical
involved a number of stages, each of which occurred in a different factory.
The directors of the I.G. simply chose a particular plant in a particular
factory which was most suited for the operation concerned. They
{The table (spread over pages 162-163) are "raw OCR" feed! NEEDS FIXED!!!}
FIRST STAGE
RAW
WAR CHEMICAL MATERIALS FROM THE I.G. PROCESS FACTORY
Phenyl Carbylamine 1. Aniline Condensation of aniline Kalle Chloride 2.
Chlorine with carbon bisul 3. Caustic phide to phenyldithio soda carbamic
acid Mustard Gas 1. Carbon Preparation of Ethyl-Ludwigs dioxide lene
from Alcohol hafen 2. Bleaching
powder 3. Sodium
sulphide 4. Hydro chloric
acid Diphenylchlorarsine I. Aniline Conversion of Diazo- Ludwigs 2.
Sodium benzene to Phenylar- hafen
nitrite sinic acid Kalle 3. Sodium Hochst
bisulphite 4. Sodium
hydrate 5. Sulphur
dioxide 6. Hydro chloric acid Ethyl -dichl or a rsine 1.
Ethyl Production of Ethylar-Ludwigs chloride sinic acid from
Ethyl hafen 2. Caustic chloride
soda 3. Sulphur
dioxide 4. Hydro chloric
acid gas 5. Iodine Sym-dichlor-methyl- I. Chlorsul- Production
of Formal- Mainz
ether phonic dehyde from Methyl116chst
acid alcohol
Z. Sulphuric
acid 162
Review of Production
SECOND STAGE THIRD STAGE FOURTH STAGE
PROCESS FACTORI PROCESS FACTORi PROCESS FACTORY
Conversion of Kalle Chlorination of Hochst
Phenyidithio- Phenyl Mus carbamic acid tard Oil giving
to Phenyl Mus- Phenyl Carby tard Oil by lamine Chlo zinc chloride ride
Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lever Ethylene
into wigs- Chlorhydrin wigs- Thiodiglycol kusen
Ethylene hafen to Thio-di- hafen to Mustard
Chlorhydrin glycol Gas
Reduction of Lever- Conversion to Lever- Reduction of A.G.F.A. Phenyl arjinic
kusen Diphenylar- kusen Diphenylar- Hochst acid to Phenyl and sinic acid
by and sinic acid to arsenious oxide Hochst treatment Hijchst Diphenyl:
with Diazo chlor-arsine
benzene by Sulphur
dioxide in
HCl solution
Reduction of Lud- Conversion of W)chst
Ethyl arsinic wigs- Ethyl arseni acid to Ethyl hafen ous Oxide to
arsenious oxide Ethyl dichlor by sulphur arsine by
dioxide HCl and iodine Conversion of H8chst
paraformalde hyde to sym
dichlor methyl
ether by means
of chlorsul phonic acid {END OF TABLE NEEDING FIXED!} aimed at
the minimum conversion, and in a number of cases none was required.
The above analysis can leave us with no doubt in our minds that
the organic chemical industry is the logical place for efficient
chemical warfare production. It cannot leave us unconvinced as to
the vital importance of the dye industry in national defence.
Allied Difficulties.--Our own production was nothing but a
series of slow and relatively inefficient improvisations.
We have already referred to the fluctuations in chemical
warfare organisation for research and supply during the war.
These added to the difficulties of the supply department,
just as they did to its complement, the research department.
Only great patriotic endeavour could have made possible
the relative success achieved, not only by the departments,
but in particular by the firms with whom they were called
upon to co-ordinate.
We wanted mustard gas, and realised its need in July, 1917.
Research work began almost from that date, yet successful large scale
production did not materialise in England until more than a year later.
We must admit, however, that the French were in a position to use
their product on the front in July, 1918. Let us examine some
of our difficulties.
The first efforts were directed towards the process by which,
as we eventually ascertained, the Germans produced the whole
of their mustard gas. The actual chemical laboratory details
of the process presented no serious obstacle, but difficulties
multiplied as soon as we attempted large scale work.
We wanted ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Some work had been done on this
during the war for the National Health Insurance Commissioners
in connection with the production of novocain. Half scale
work had occurred at the works of a Midland chemical firm,
and experience so gained was freely offered and used
in a scheme for the large scale production of mustard gas
by the co-operation of a number of big chemical manufacturers.
Pressing requests for the material were continually coming from
G.H.Q., the programmes outlined being more and more ambitious.
We had to reproduce the result of years of German effort spent
in developing their monochlor-hydrin process for indigo.
As a consequence, large sums of money were expended on the process,
although it never eventually operated. Its difficulties,
and other reasons, led us to research on other and more
direct methods which the French were also investigating.
The successful outcome of this early research was due, in particular,
to Sir William Pope and those associated with him in the work.
The process was so promising that the long and cumbersome chlor-hydrin
method was abandoned. As a result our five or six months'
work on the German method meant so much time lost.
The new direct, sulphur monochloride method was taken up
actively and several private firms attempted to develop
the small scale manufacture. The work was dangerous.
Lack of that highly developed organic chemical technique,
which was practically a German monopoly, rendered the task much
more dangerous than it would have been if undertaken by one
of the I.G. factories.
The French, realising the importance of the new methods,
spared nothing in their attempts to develop them.
Their casualties multiplied at the works, but the only reply was
to put the factories concerned under the same regime as the front,
and the staffs were strengthened by well-chosen military personnel.
The French realised the nature of their task, and organised
for it. When the difficulties of production were pointed
out in August, 1917, in the British Ministry of Munitions,
reports were instanced that the Germans had used forced labour.
The French in their production at Rousillon, on the Rhone,
employed volunteer German prisoners. It was a curious
contrast to see mingling together amongst the producing plants
representatives of the American, Italian, and British Missions,
with French officers, French technical men, and German prisoners.
The latter appeared to be perfectly satisfied in their work.
They were used for certain limited purposes, such as handling
raw materials, and were not, as a rule, exposed to the dangerous
operations against which the French struggled so heroically
and successfully. It was as though a small section of the front
had been transferred to the heart of France. We saw the minister
visiting a factory and pinning the Legion of Honour on to
the breast of a worker blinded by yperite. We saw messages
of congratulation from the front to the factories themselves.
The morale was wonderful. As a result, the French mastered
the technical difficulties of mustard gas production and shell
filling by June, 1918. They shared information with us, but the race
had started neck and neck, and it was impossible to discard
completely the large plants to which we were already committed.
Without disparaging our own efforts, we must pay a tribute to the
achievement of the French yperite producing and filling factories.
It is impossible to give personal credit in this matter without
going beyond our scope, and we can only draw general comparisons.
But we must draw attention to the following. The German factories
passed with ease to mustard gas production by a process which,
compared with the final Allied method, was clumsy and complicated,
but which suited their pre-war plant. Their policy was,
therefore, sound from the point of view of the campaign.
The Allies experienced great difficulty and danger in attaining
large scale manufacture with a simpler process.
The same self-sacrificing zeal and patriotic endeavour was
shown in this country, but we were handicapped in mustard gas
production by the energetic way in which we had pressed forward
the industrial realisation of the monochlor-hydrin method.
The French, less committed in terms of plant and finance, could more
readily adjust their energy, materials, and money to the new method.
It must not be forgotten, also, that, at this period,
chemical warfare supply organisation was experiencing certain
critical changes which could not but reflect upon our efficiency.
Here again the earlier centralisation of research and production
by France was a great factor in her favour.
Our difficulties with phosgene, and in particular with the arsenic compounds
described above, were of the same nature, involving us in casualties,
great expenditure, and little success, when compared with German production.
The great need for these arsenic compounds was realised as early as February,
1918, and investigations began even at that date, but they had not appeared
in the field by the time of the Armistice. Whatever mistakes we may have made
locally during the war, they are small compared with the big mistake which
was responsible for our comparative failure in chemical warfare production.
We were almost completely lacking in organic chemical industrial experience.
It is interesting to note that the activities of those elements
of organic chemical industry which did exist in France and England
fully justified the conclusions we have drawn. Thus, although
entering late into the field of chemical warfare production,
Doctor Herbert Levinstein, Professor A. G. Green, and their
collaborators of the firm of Levinstein Limited were able to develop
rapidly a successful industrial mustard gas process which was
of considerable assistance to England and America. This work,
both in research and production, deserves the greatest credit.
Again, the dye factories were called upon much earlier to assist
in French production and were of considerable assistance.
It would be well at this juncture to review very briefly the other
war activities of our own dye industries. The outbreak of war found
them by no means inactive. In this country, for example, our own dye
factories were able to keep pace with the increasing demand for dyes
created by the rapid mobilisation of military and naval equipment.
In particular the rapid large-scale production of indigo by the
Levinstein firm, at Ellesmere Port, was a considerable achievement.
In addition, the new State-aided enterprise at Huddersfield was largely
diverted to explosives production, and rendered very valuable services
in the supply of Tetryl, T.N.T., synthetic phenol, picric acid, and oleum.
For such reasons, the need for essential dyes, and the use of dye capacity
for explosives, the important part which the rapidly expanding industry
could have played in chemical warfare production was not recognised
quickly enough by the relevant authorities. This is not surprising,
for the war significance of the German dye industry was not fully
realised until the Armistice. It required the Hartley Mission
to drive this fact home. When, however, the brilliant researches,
referred to above, on the mustard gas method had decided our policy,
the dye factory of Levinstein Limited vigorously converted the process
into a technical success, and what was still a laboratory reaction
in the spring of 1917 became a successful manufacturing process in July
of that year.
Released from its war responsibilities at the time of the Armistice,
the British industry developed so rapidly that Lord Moulton, in a speech
to the Colour Users Association on November 28th, 1919, stated:
"A few months before the war broke out England produced only one-tenth
of the dyes she needed, but the amount which I am informed we shall
be able to turn out at the end of this year would, in weight,
be within one-fifth of the amount which England used before the war."
But the Allies were not only in difficulties with regard to the lack
of suitable peace-time plant, and industrial organic chemical experience--
they were hindered at almost every turn by difficulties with regard to raw
materials and intermediates, the products of other chemical manufacture.
They had to create a liquid chlorine industry. In April, 1915, the only
liquid chlorine plant in England was in the hands of the firm of
Castner Kellner, whose maximum output was not more than a few tons per day.
Increase in capacity was rendered necessary by chemical warfare developments.
Chlorine was a raw material for mustard gas and--practically every important
substance employed in chemical warfare including bleaching powder.
Tremendous tonnages of bleach were involved in the manufacture of
chlorpicrin and for use as an antidote against mustard gas on the front.
We refer elsewhere to the developing use of bleach in order to create
lanes for troops and transport through areas infected by mustard gas.
A very simple calculation will show what quantities would be required
for such an operation. It is true that, as regards chlorine, we were
more favourably situated than France, and forwarded her considerable
supplies in exchange for phosgene. This chlorine was essential for
phosgene production. New plants were brought into being at different places,
largely through the energy and experience of the above-mentioned firm,
but so great was the demand that it finally became necessary, in order
to protect the trade users and war interests at the same time, to institute
a control of chlorine. More than 20,000 tons of liquid chlorine were
produced under the administration of the supply department concerned.
When we consider the effort which such an increase in production must
have involved, and the fact that expansions occurring did not do so under
the steady and well-regulated influence of a simple demand, but were
continually being modified to meet expansions or diminutions of programme,
we can realise what a great advantage was possessed by the Germans owing
to their large initial experience and production.
We have no hesitation in stating that great credit is due to the old
Trench Warfare Supply Department and the firms with which it was in contact,
notably the one referred to above, in connection with the Loos attack.
But for them, we would not have been in a position to retaliate,
even at that date.
The Allied lachrymator campaign was terribly handicapped by lack of bromine.
The French performed the phenomenal task of creating a bromine
industry in Tunis, the development of which reads like a romance.
Apparently this industry is dying out, and German predominance in bromine
is again asserted.
French mustard gas production, for which they made such huge sacrifices,
was threatened by the lack of carbon-tetra-chloride, and examples
can be multiplied. The Germans were in a very different position.
The development of their dye industry had followed the policy
of absolute independence of external chemical industry.
This independence was acquired either by the absorption of other
enterprises or by the definite development of processes and plant
for raw materials and intermediates. In every case the war has
strengthened these factories for the manufacture of these products.
In 1918 they produced nearly thirty times as much ammonia
as in 1914, three times as much nitric acid, fifty per cent.
as much again of sulphuric acid, and twice as much
liquid chlorine. This was not purely a commercial question.
Our lack of such products was due to the fact that the Allies,
in pre-war times, possessed few or feeble industries whose
consumption would stimulate the production of these raw materials.
They lacked these industries because of a blameworthy disregard
for the fundamental importance of science, and particularly
chemical science, in industry.
Conclusion.--We have shown how, during the war, chemical warfare proved its
surprise value and how manufacture figured repeatedly as a critical factor.
We have also shown how the importance of production is magnified from
the point of view of the future. The only logical conclusion is that
the country which does not possess a strong dye industry, or enormously
comprehensive and expensive chemical arsenals, cannot hope to escape
serious military results, possibly defeat, from enemy chemical surprises.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that this critical producing capacity
exists as a monopoly in the hands of Germany. No patriotic and thinking
person can, therefore, conclude otherwise than to encourage the creation
of dye industries in countries other than Germany, particularly in our own.
It is true, however, that patriotic sentiment and political views do
not always lead to the same solution. But we must insist that there
can be no two opinions on the national defence aspect of this question,
and any political forces opposing the logical outcome of patriotic sentiment
in this case are incurring an exceedingly grave responsibility.
Further, there is a definite tendency to obscure the whole issue
by inaccurate thinking. When we find a Member of Parliament seriously
discussing disarmament, endeavouring to deal with the matter
in detail, and yet classing gas as one of those methods of warfare
in connection with which production can he easily prevented,[1]
we can only stand in amazement before our traditional fault,
deliberate sidetracking of expert guidance. When we realise that it
was not until after the Armistice that the Hartley Commission
opened our eyes to the war importance of the German dye industry,
we see how blind a nation may be in matters vital to its defence.
[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_, Major David Davies, M.P.
From the point of view of results on the front, for which all were working,
the German dye factories, when considered as a war weapon, were as much
in advance of Allied improvised plants as a military quick-firing gun
is ahead of the old muzzle-loader.
Further, for progressive and flexible organic chemical production,
some such difference will always exist between the modern dye
industry and factories or arsenals improvised or maintained
to meet specific emergencies.