THE REFORMATION AND THE CIVIL WARS IN FRANCE
Francis and the Reformers--Massacre of the Vaudois--Henry II.
and the Reformers--Parties at Accession of Francis II.--Tumult
of Amboise--Accession of Charles IX.--States-General and
Colloquy of Poissy--Massacre of Vassy--First Civil
War--Dreux--Assassination of Francis of Guise--Pacification of
Amboise--Second Civil War--St. Denis--Edict of Longjumeau--Third
Civil War--Jarnac and Moncontour--Peace of St. Germain--Massacre
of St. Bartholomew--Fourth Civil War--Treaty of La
Rochelle--Change in Views of Huguenots--Fifth Civil
War--Accession of Henry III.--Peace of Monsieur--Guise and the
Catholic Leagues--Sixth and Seventh Civil Wars--Treaties of
Bergerac and Fleix--France and the Netherlands--The Catholic
League--Treaty of Joinville--Eighth Civil War--Courtras--The
Barricades--Assassination of Henry of Guise and Henry
III.--Henry IV. and the League--Ninth Civil War--Arques and
Ivry--Henry ‘receives instruction’ and enters Paris--War with
Spain--Edict of Nantes--Peace of Vervins--Conclusion.
§ 1. _The Rise of the Huguenots during the Reign of Francis I._
| The first French Reformers.
While France, in pursuit of her policy of opposition to the House of
Hapsburg, had been allying herself with the Protestants of Germany,
heresy had been growing apace within her own borders. Jacques
Lefèvre of Étaples may fairly claim the title of father of
French Protestantism. A lecturer on theology at Paris, he had in a
commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul (1512) taught the Doctrine
of Justification by Faith five years before Luther had denounced
indulgences. In 1521, he had, under the patronage of Briçonnet, the
Bishop, collected a small band of men at Meaux in Champagne, of whom
Farel of Dauphiné was the most important, and had also influenced
Louis de Berquin, the friend of Erasmus, who was a nobleman and a
courtier.
| Francis at first inclined to toleration.
| Persecution begins in absence of Francis. 1525.
| Francis adopts a policy of persecution. 1529.
The rise of these new opinions had at once excited the fears of the
Sorbonne or theological faculty in the University of Paris, and of
the ‘Parlement’ of Paris. But Francis had no love for either of these
institutions. The ‘Parlement’ had opposed him in the matter of the
Concordat (cf. p. 81), the Sorbonne had viewed with jealousy his
new foundation, the ‘Collège de France’ (cf. p. 218). Moreover, he
disliked the monks and friars, while his sympathy with literature and
culture, the redeeming traits of his otherwise worthless character,
as well as the influence of his sister, Margaret of Navarre, led him
to tolerate the new opinions; indeed, he is said to have entertained
the idea of founding a literary and philosophic institution in France
with Erasmus at its head. Accordingly in 1523, he saved de Berquin
from the ‘Parlement,’ and had he been victorious at Pavia he might
have continued this policy of toleration. His defeat and imprisonment,
however, altered the condition of the Protestants for the worse, for
his mother, Louise of Savoy, took advantage of his absence to crush
out heresy. Leclerc, a wool-carder of Meaux, was burnt, July, 1525;
Briçonnet was ordered to disperse the brotherhood of Meaux (October
1525); and de Berquin was again arrested (January, 1526). He was,
indeed, once more saved from his enemies by Francis, who, on his
return to France, even appointed Lefèvre tutor to his children. But
a change soon came over the policy of the fickle King. His political
necessities demanded an alliance with the Pope, who was forming the
Holy League against the Emperor (cf. p. 184), and with the clergy
at home, who could supply him with money wherewith to continue
the war. He had never sympathised with the religious views of the
reformers, but only with the literary side of the movement; while the
iconoclastic and other extravagances of some of the more hot-headed
reformers gave colour to the suggestion that the movement had a
political significance. De Berquin, although in no way responsible for
these extravagances, refused to listen to the timid caution of Erasmus
‘not to disturb the hornets,’ and in consequence was seized again and
executed (April, 1529).
| Massacre of the Vaudois. 1545.
In 1534, an intemperate placard on the abuses of the Mass not
unnaturally increased the indignation of the King; in 1535, the
outbreak of the Anabaptists in Münster still further frightened
him; and in January 1545, convinced by the misrepresentations of the
‘Parlement’ of Aix that the Vaudois of Provence were attempting to
set up a republic, he gave the fatal order which, whether he intended
it or no, led to a massacre. More than twenty towns and villages were
destroyed, and some three thousand Protestants in the valley of the
Durance perished. The reign of Francis closed in the following year
with the execution of the ‘fourteen’ poor artisans at Meaux, the
cradle of French Protestantism.
§ 2. _The Reign of Henry II._, 1547-1559.
| French Protestantism becomes Calvinistic and
| aggressive.
| Increased persecution under Henry II.
Meanwhile, the French Protestants had come under the influence of
Calvin. In 1535, he had dedicated his _Institutes_ to Francis I., in
the hope, it is said, of convincing the King that his doctrines were
not dangerous, and from that moment the French rapidly assimilated the
teaching of their great countryman. French Protestantism now became
dissociated from the literary movement with which it had hitherto been
connected, its churches were organised on the democratic system of
Geneva, and the movement soon became for the first time political and
aggressive. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that persecution
increased after the death of Francis I., especially when we remember
that the young King (he was twenty-nine) had not the literary
sympathies of his father, and that the Constable de Montmorenci and
the Guises, who had been out of favour during the later years of
Francis, were again recalled. Accordingly, at the beginning of the
reign of Henry II., a special chamber of the ‘Parlement’ was erected
to try cases of heresy, which gained the name of ‘La Chambre Ardente,’
from the number of victims it sent to the flames. In 1551, the Edict
of Châteaubriant gave to the ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction in
matters of heresy without appeal to the ‘Parlement,’ and in 1557,
an attempt was made to introduce the Inquisition into France; Paul
IV. published a Bull appointing a commission consisting of the three
cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon, and Châtillon, with the power of
delegating their authority.
In spite of these severe measures the number of converts grew apace,
and this was the chief motive which induced Henry II. to conclude the
treaty of Cateau Cambrésis in April, 1559. Although there appears to
be no foundation for the assertion that the Kings of France and Spain
bound themselves by a secret clause of that treaty to unite against
the heretics, yet negotiations to that effect certainly followed.
| Opposition of the ‘Parlement’ of Paris.
In June, Philip proposed to aid the French King in exterminating the
Protestants; and Henry, while declining the offer, suggested a joint
expedition against Geneva. The political rivalry, however, of the two
countries was too deep to permit of joint action at present, and Henry
pursued his course alone. Here he met with unlooked-for opposition
on the part of the ‘Parlement.’ Heresy in France had hitherto been
within the cognisance of the civil courts, and the ‘Parlement’ had
therefore protested as well against the Edict of Châteaubriant as
against the Bull of Paul IV. On the latter point the King had given
way, but the other cause of dispute remained, and was aggravated by
the appearance of a moderate party in the ‘Chambre de la Tournelle,’
or criminal session of the ‘Parlement,’ who declared that persecution
was ineffective, and that they would not punish heresy with death. The
King was most indignant, and was on the point of proceeding against
the leaders, Du Faur and Anne de Bourg, when, at the tournament held
to commemorate the Peace, the lance of Montgomery laid him in the dust
and transferred the crown to his son, Francis II., a youth of sixteen
(July, 1559).
§ 3. _The Reign of Francis II., July, 1559--December, 1560_
| Condition of Huguenots at accession of Francis II.
| Disorganised condition of France.
The Protestants, or Huguenots,[80] as they began to be called,
were now too powerful to be put down by such persecution as was
possible. They numbered some 400,000, of whom the largest proportion
were either burghers and tradesmen of some substance, or belonged to
the smaller nobility, a military class who were only too ready to
appeal to arms. Nor were they destitute of leaders from the higher
nobility and from those of influence at court, notably Condé and
Coligny. And yet, had a strong and popular King succeeded, or had
there existed in France a well-knit and healthy constitution, some
compromise might have been effected, or, failing that, the new
opinions might have been at once suppressed by a vigorous use of
force. But France was suffering from the evil results of the prolonged
foreign war, and from the misguided policy of her Kings since Louis
XI. The financial distress, the heavy and unequal taxation, which
fell almost exclusively on the lower classes, caused widespread
discontent against the government. The bureaucracy and the judicature,
largely owing to the system of purchase, were hopelessly corrupt,
and had lost respect. The Church, though exceedingly wealthy (its
revenues amounted to two-fifths of the total revenue of the country),
was suffering from the effects of the Concordat; its benefices
were monopolised by the nobility and the courtiers, and absorbed
in a few hands; thus John, the Cardinal of Lorraine, held three
archbishoprics, seven bishoprics, and four abbeys. Its leaders were
for the most part men of secular interests, swayed by the factions
of the court, and caring little for the spiritual needs of their
dioceses. The States-General had been rarely called of late, and had
lost all constitutional life. The towns, with no real share in the
government of the country, were inclined to stand apart, and depend
upon themselves. The greater nobility aimed either at controlling the
crown, or, failing that, at establishing themselves as hereditary
governors of their provinces. The smaller nobility, excluded from
trade and from all professions except those of the army and the
Church, now that the war was over, either crowded into the Church, to
secularise it more completely, or formed a turbulent military class
who welcomed the chance of renewed war. France, in short, nominally
under the control of a closely centralised monarchy, was suffering
from that worst form of anarchy which comes of a bureaucracy when
it has become disorganised. To complete the misfortunes of France,
the House of Valois was represented by four boys of no character,
intellect, or physique, who were the victims of court intrigue and
factions, which were to make the crown still more unpopular, and soon
to hurry the country into civil war.
| The Bourbons.
The three most influential parties among the nobles were led by the
Bourbons, the Constable Anne de Montmorenci, and the Guises. Of
these the Bourbons stood nearest the throne. The eldest, Antony
of Bourbon, was King of Navarre, in right of his wife Jeanne of
Navarre, the daughter of Margaret, the tolerant sister of Francis
I. But, although he adopted the Calvinistic views of his wife, and
was popular and a good soldier, his weaknesses and irresolution
unfitted him for the leadership, which fell to his youngest brother
Louis de Condé, who also leaned to the new opinions, and was a
man of far more character. The second brother Charles, Cardinal of
Bourbon, remained a Catholic, dissociated himself from the policy
of his family, and subsequently strove for a brief season to be
called Charles X. of France. Closely connected with the Bourbons
stood the two nephews of the Constable--Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral
of France, and D’Andelot, Colonel-General of the infantry, both
strenuous Huguenots. The eldest Odet, Cardinal of Châtillon, although
sympathising with the reformers, was never of much weight.
| The Constable Anne de Montmorenci.
The Constable Anne de Montmorenci, who headed the second party, was a
devoted Catholic, and a stern soldier, whose severity and devotions
in time of war had led men to say, ‘Beware of the Constable’s Pater
Nosters.’ His policy had ever been that of alliance with Spain and
suppression of heresy--a policy which had lately triumphed in the
Peace of Cateau Cambrésis. Yet his jealousy of the Guises and of
the queen-mother caused him for the present to join the party of the
Bourbons.
| The Guises.
Lastly came the Guises. This family, the cadet branch of the House of
Lorraine, was founded by Claude, second son of Réné of Lorraine,
the grandson of Réné le Bon, of Anjou, through his daughter
Iolante. Claude had earned a reputation by his defence of the eastern
frontier after the defeat of Pavia, 1525, and had married his daughter
Mary to James V. of Scotland. In reward for his services, Francis I.
had erected Guise, Aumale, and Mayenne into duchies which Claude left
on his death (1550) to two of his sons, Francis, Duke of Guise, and
Claude, Duke of Aumale; while two others, Charles and Louis, entered
the Church to become the Cardinals of Lorraine and Guise. Duke Francis
had surpassed his father’s fame by his defence of Metz (1552-1553),
and by the taking of Calais (1558). Ostentatious and open-handed, he
courted popularity, and what he lacked in statesmanship was supplied
by his younger brother Charles, the Cardinal, who, in spite of his
avarice and his arrogance, was scrupulous in the outward observance
of his clerical duties, a master of diplomacy, and an accomplished
scholar of persuasive speech. Although we must wait till the next
generation for the full development of the schemes of this ambitious
family--schemes which no doubt expanded as the opportunities presented
themselves--yet the foundations were already laid by these two
remarkable men. The key to the policy of the Guises is to be found in
the fact that they were only half Frenchmen, and that they were only
remotely connected with the royal family. Looked upon as upstarts
by the older nobility, and afraid of being excluded from power by
the Bourbons, they asserted their descent from the House of Anjou,
and even from the Karolings. The family of Anjou, if still existing
in the male line, would have been nearer to the throne than the
Bourbons themselves. But the male line had died out with Charles
of Maine (1481), and accordingly the Guises pressed the claims of
the female line, through which they could trace their descent from
Réné of Anjou. Their half-foreign extraction presented greater
difficulties. These they had no doubt in part removed by their
military exploits in defending France. Now that the war was over, they
naturally adopted the cause of Catholicism, which gave them a certain
popularity among the lower classes, more especially of Paris, which
city remained intensely Catholic throughout. Their foreign policy,
although Catholic, was not Spanish at this date, for they dreamt of
supporting the claim of Mary, Queen of Scots, wife of Francis II.,
to the throne of England, and of uniting the three countries into a
strong monarchy which might balance the Austro-Spanish power.
| Catherine de Medici.
Amid these conflicting factions, belonging to none of them, yet
anxious to control them all, stood Catherine de Medici, the
Queen-mother. ‘What,’ said Henry IV. of her subsequently, ‘could a
poor woman have done, with her husband dead, five small children
upon her hands, and two families who were scheming to seize the
throne--our own and the Guises? I am astonished that she did not do
even worse.’ The clew to the policy of this much-abused woman lies
in her foreign extraction and her previous life. A Florentine and a
Medici, she was unpopular in France, while she failed to secure the
love of her husband, Henry II., and saw her influence eclipsed by
Diana of Poictiers, his mistress. This exclusion from all influence
working on a jealous nature, had bred an intense passion to rule. Had
direct rule now been possible for her, Catherine might have done well
enough; for though devoid of moral elevation, she was not vicious. She
was very industrious and painstaking, and anxious to please. She
wished to maintain the independence of the country against the designs
of Spain, as well as the authority of the crown which was threatened
by the internal factions; if a Catholic, she was certainly no bigot,
and would probably have granted at least a contemptuous toleration to
the Huguenots. But when power was denied her, and her position was
threatened, like a true Medici she betook herself to intrigue--so
often the resource of the weak--and pursued a policy of balance which
was all the more fatal because it did not succeed.
| The Guises in power.
As Francis was over thirteen, it was not necessary to have a
regency. None the less, it would have been natural that Antony of
Navarre, as the nearest male relation of full age, should be called
to power. This was, however, prevented by the Guises. Uncles of the
Queen, they succeeded in obtaining complete control of the young King;
and Catherine, seeing that they were too strong to be opposed, jealous
of Navarre, and disliking Montmorenci on account of his insolent
behaviour to her during her husband’s life, threw herself on their
support. Montmorenci was dismissed, and retired to his estates at
Chantilly; Coligny was deprived of his governorship of Picardy, nearly
all the governors on whom the Guises could not depend were removed,
and while the Duke controlled the army, the Cardinal of Lorraine
became the head of the civil administration. Having thus monopolised
the government of the kingdom, the Guises resumed the procedure
against the refractory members of the ‘Parlement,’ which had been
stayed by the death of Henry II. Anne de Bourg, condemned by a special
commission, was executed in spite of his appeal against the legality
of the court, and the others were suspended or imprisoned.
| The Tumult of Amboise. March 17, 1560.
But the triumph of the Guises was not to go unchallenged, and a
formidable opposition was aroused in which their political and
religious opponents joined hands. The nobility were indignant at being
deprived of their governorships, and asserted the right of the princes
of the blood against these upstart foreigners. The heavy taxation and
the poor success of the war in Scotland, where Mary of Guise, assisted
by her brothers, was carrying on an unequal struggle against the
‘Lords of the Congregation,’ added to the grievances. Those who wished
to revive the authority of the States-General seized the opportunity
to attack the despotic government of the Guises, and the religious
discontent served as a rallying-point. In the spring of 1560, De la
Renaudie, a noble of Perigord, formed a plot to remove the King,
who was at Amboise, from the hands of the Guises, and to place the
Prince of Condé at the head of the government. The plot, however,
was betrayed. De la Renaudie was killed in a skirmish, and the other
conspirators cruelly punished, some being hung from the balcony of the
castle.
Although the ‘Tumult of Amboise’ was by no means exclusively confined
to the Protestants, it marks the moment when they finally became
a political and aggressive party, and when they were joined by
the smaller nobility of the provinces; while it furnished the
government with a pretext for declaring that the interests of the
monarchy and of the Catholic Church were identical. For the moment
the Guises pretended somewhat to change their policy. On first
hearing of the plot, they had issued an Edict in the King’s name
promising forgiveness for all past deeds; and, although the Edict of
Roromantin, which followed in May, 1560, gave exclusive jurisdiction
over matters of conscience to the ecclesiastical courts, it urged
the desirability of proceeding gently in the matter. The Guises even
listened to demands of Coligny, which were supported by Catherine
and Michel L’Hôpital, who had just been made chancellor, to summon
a States-General, and a Council of the French prelates for the
discussion of grievances, political and religious. To these proposals,
however, they had consented in the belief that they could postpone
the ecclesiastical Council under pretext that the Council of Trent
was shortly to be reopened, and that they could secure a subservient
majority in the Estates-General by influencing the elections, and
by excluding and imprisoning those who would not subscribe to the
articles of the Catholic faith.
| The triumph of the Guises prevented, by death of
| Francis II. Dec. 5, 1560.
The death of Mary, the Regent of Scotland (June 10, 1560), and the
Treaty of Leith (July 6), by which the French were to evacuate
Scotland, and King Francis and his wife, Mary Stuart, were to abandon
their claims to the throne of England, had removed the apprehensions
of Philip. He therefore offered to help the Guises in securing
their power. The Pope and the Duke of Savoy were to send troops to
exterminate the Vaudois and to attack Geneva, while Philip was to
invade Navarre. Condé and the King of Navarre having rashly answered
a summons to Orleans, where the court had assembled for the meeting of
the States-General, were seized; an unsuccessful attempt was made to
assassinate Navarre; and Condé, tried before a special commission for
complicity in the late conspiracy, was condemned to die. The triumph
of the Guises seemed secured, when it was snatched from them by the
sudden death of the young King from a disease in the ear (December 5,
1560).
§ 4. _Charles IX., December 1560--May 1574._
| Catherine rules in the name of Charles IX.
The Guises, baulked of their prey, went at first in such fear of their
lives that they shut themselves up in their palace, and Catherine at
last seemed to have her opportunity. As Charles IX. was only ten, a
regency was necessary, and, beyond all dispute, the office should
have been held by Antony of Navarre. But he agreed to surrender his
right to the Queen-mother, reserving for himself only the office of
Lieutenant-general. Catherine was delighted. ‘He is so obedient,’
she wrote to her daughter the Queen of Spain, ‘that I dispose of
him as I please.’ She now hoped to act the part of mediator between
the two religious parties, and, by playing off the Guises against
the Bourbons, to rule. Her first difficulty was with regard to the
States-General. Summoned on December 15, 1560, to Orleans, they were
prorogued till the following August, when they met again at Pontoise.
| The States-General. August 1561.
This, the first meeting of the States-General for seventy-seven
years, is noticeable as illustrating the political ideas of the
Huguenots, who found themselves in a majority, and for the remarkable
reforms proposed, which, if carried out, might have saved France
from civil war, and altered her future history. The nobles, while
insisting on their privileges, urged the reformation of the judicial
system, and the substitution of an elective magistracy for one which,
through the system of purchase, was rapidly becoming hereditary;
they denounced the chicanery of the ecclesiastical courts and the
abuses of pluralities and non-residence; they petitioned that nobles
who preferred the Calvinistic worship should be allowed to use the
churches for their services.
The demands of the Tiers État went further. They asked that the
Prerogative should be limited by triennial meetings of the Estates,
and by the appointment of a Council from which the clergy should be
excluded. They petitioned for the sale of church lands. From the
interest of the capital thus obtained, the clergy were to be paid
fixed stipends, and the balance was to be spent on paying the debts of
the crown, and in loans to the principal cities for the furtherance of
their commerce. They demanded that persecution should cease, since ‘it
is unreasonable to compel men to do what in their hearts they consider
wrong,’ and that a national Council, in which the laity as well as the
clergy should have votes, and in which the Word of God should be the
sole guide, should be summoned for the final settlement of religious
questions. This would have meant the establishment of the Reformed
opinions in France, and for this Catherine was certainly not prepared,
for the Huguenots after all only represented some one-thirtieth of the
nation.
| The Colloquy of Poissy.
Nor did the results of the ‘Colloquy of Poissy,’ which was held
near by at the same time, offer better hopes that comprehension
would be possible. At this conference eleven ministers--among whom
were Theodore Beza, the disciple of Calvin, and Peter Martyr the
Italian--and twenty-two laymen appeared. But as might be expected,
the attempt served rather to accentuate the differences between the
two creeds. The only practical result of the Colloquy was that the
bishops, to meet the demands of the third estate with regard to Church
property, pledged themselves to pay by instalments the sum needed
for the redemption of those crown lands which had been alienated to
satisfy the public creditors.
| The Edict of Jan. 1562.
Comprehension was plainly impossible. It remained to be seen whether
toleration was practicable. This was attempted by the Edict of
January, 1562, which, while it insisted on the Huguenots surrendering
the churches which they had occupied, allowed them, until the
decision of a General Council, to assemble for worship in any place
outside walled towns. Thus the policy of L’Hôpital seemed to have
triumphed. The Huguenots were given a legal recognition, and ceased
to be outlaws. But the appearances were delusive, and the Edict of
January really only precipitated civil war. L’Hôpital himself had
confessed, at the opening of the States-General, that ‘It was folly
to hope for peace between persons of different religions. A Frenchman
and an Englishman,’ he said, ‘who are of the same religion have
more affection for one another than citizens of the same city, or
vassals of the same lord, who hold to different creeds.’ Nor was this
all. Religious differences were in many cases embittered by personal
rivalry, by selfish interests, and by political prejudices, and all
these had been intensified by the demands of the third estate. If
granted, the demands would have revolutionised the constitution of
the country, and they could only have been successful if backed up by
the nation. But the third estate, nominated for the most part by the
municipal oligarchies, represented neither the views of the peasants
in the country districts nor those of the lower classes in the towns,
who were mostly Catholics. Those whose interests and prejudices they
assailed formed the great majority of the nation, and these henceforth
learnt to look upon the Huguenots as their deadly enemies. The higher
nobility were frightened at the demand for resumption of the crown
lands, many of which were in their hands; the Church resented the
cry for disendowment; the lawyers were indignant at the attack on
their privileges, and were as jealous as ever of the claims of the
States-General to rule the country. It is, in fact, from this time
that we must date the uncompromising hostility to the Reformers
of these three powerful bodies--the nobility, the clergy, and the
lawyers--many of whom hitherto had not been unwilling to show some
favour to the Huguenots. The only chance of the Huguenots now depended
on the maintenance of peace. Although they had not gained all that
they desired, and although the Edict was only to be provisional,
their adherents were increasing so fast that in a short time they
might hope to be able to command respect. One archbishop--that of
Aix--and six bishops, besides the Cardinal of Châtillon, were said
to favour the new opinions. Throgmorton informed the Queen of England
that even Charles IX. himself was wavering. Catherine did not object
to her ladies reading the New Testament and singing the psalms of
the Huguenot Marot, and certainly she would not have hesitated to
continue her policy of toleration if she could thereby have secured
her authority. Unfortunately the administration was not powerful
enough to enforce the law, and the religious and political animosities
were too deep. The leaders of the Huguenots could not entirely control
the more hot-headed spirits, and iconoclastic outrages occurred,
more especially in the south; while the Catholics were determined to
overthrow the Edict as soon as possible.
| The massacre of Vassy. March 1, 1562.
| Duke of Guise enters Paris, March 16; and secures the
| person of the king. April 6.
Already in April, 1561, Montmorenci had been reconciled to the
Guises. They now succeeded in gaining over the unstable King of
Navarre by offering him the island of Sardinia and a kingdom in
Africa, or possibly a divorce from his Protestant wife, Jeanne
d’Albret, and the hand of Mary, Queen of Scots, with the crown of
Scotland, and some day that of England. In the south, massacres and
outrages occurred; and finally, on Sunday, March 1, the Duke of
Guise coming across some Huguenots who were worshipping in a barn at
Vassy, in Champagne, ordered his followers to disperse the meeting as
being contrary to the law. The Huguenots, though unarmed, probably
made some resistance, and the affair ended in the massacre of some
fifty or sixty men and women, while two hundred more were seriously
wounded. As the town of Vassy was apparently not a ‘walled’ one, the
Huguenots were probably within their rights. In any case, the Duke had
no authority to take the execution of the law into his own hands. It
may be true that he had not intended his followers to proceed to
such extremities, but at least he never denounced or punished the
perpetrators. For the rest, the massacre of Vassy was not the only one
that had occurred since the Edict, and it is important only because it
was committed with the acquiescence of one of the great party leaders,
and because in thus transferring the quarrel from the country to the
court, it rendered war inevitable. The question was, Who should secure
the person of the King? The Duke advancing rapidly, entered Paris
(March 16) in spite of the order of Catherine to the contrary. On her
retiring with the young King to Fontainebleau he followed her; and
the Queen-mother, seeing no other alternative, consented to return to
Paris (April 6), Charles IX. crying ‘as if they were taking him to
prison.’ Catherine, after attempting to support the weaker party, had
ended, as was her wont, in siding with the stronger.
| Condé’s Manifesto. March.
Meanwhile, Condé had retreated from Paris (March 23) to
Orleans. Being joined there by Coligny and d’Andelot he published
a manifesto in which he justified his appeal to arms, and declared
that he did so to free the King from unlawful detention by the
‘Triumvirate’--Guise, Montmorenci, and the Marshal St. André. Thus,
if the Catholics were the first to break the peace at Vassy, the
Huguenots were the first to appeal to arms. Many have blamed them
for want of patience, and held that, if they had refrained from
raising the standard of rebellion, they would in time have gained
toleration. Calvin had always been opposed to war, and Coligny
only consented after much hesitation, overborne, it is said, by
the entreaties of his wife. But it is extremely doubtful whether
they could thus have disarmed persecution; the Catholic party were
determined to crush out heresy; and, as it was, the victims of 1562
exceeded those of the massacre of St. Bartholomew. A more serious
charge is that the Huguenots, under the garb of religion, were
pursuing political objects; but this assertion may be brought with
equal truth against all parties in the religious struggles of the
century. In France, as elsewhere, the religious disaffection furnished
a rallying-point for, and a creed to, all the smouldering discontent
in the country. With some the religious, with others the political,
and even the personal element was strongest. ‘The grandees,’ says a
Venetian observer, ‘adopted reform for ambition, the middle classes
for Church property, the lower classes for Paradise.’ Moreover, the
accusation would be equally true of the Catholics. If Condé was
fighting for the control of the government, he had a juster claim
thereto than the half-foreign Guises. The political aims of the
Huguenots, as represented at Orleans, were more worthy of support
than the absolutist opinions of the Guises. If the Huguenots may
be charged with reviving feudalism at one moment, and of being
republicans at another, the Guises at first fought for political as
well as religious tyranny, and latterly masqueraded as the champions
of pure democracy. Finally, the cause of the Huguenots, although that
of a minority--and, it must be confessed, an unpopular minority--was
yet the cause of national independence, which was threatened by the
ever-tightening alliance of the Guises with Philip of Spain. Nor
must it be supposed that there was nothing deeper on either side;
indeed, it was the presence of religious convictions which gave to the
struggle at once its earnestness and its ferocity.
| The geographical and social distribution of the two
| parties.
The geographical distribution of the two parties does not bear out
the idea that there is a natural affinity between Protestantism and
the Teutonic races, and between the Celtic and Romance nations and
Catholicism. It is true that the lower classes in Celtic Brittany were
strongly Catholic, but so was the north-east of France, in which the
Teutonic element was strong, while the Huguenots found their chief
support in the south-west, which was Romance. The main stronghold of
the Huguenots may be described as a square enclosed between the Loire,
the Saône, and the Rhone on the north and east; the Mediterranean,
the Pyrenees, and the Bay of Biscay on the south and west; while
Dauphiné and Normandy were their outposts. Yet even here it was only
in Eastern Languedoc and in Dauphiné, and later, at La Rochelle,
that they solidly held their own, or that they were supported by the
majority of the population, both noble and non-noble. Elsewhere,
in those provinces where the nobles inclined to Protestantism, the
peasants generally remained Catholic. While the Huguenots had, with
the exception of Condé and his relations, few adherents among the
grandees, they found their main support in the smaller nobility and
in the trading classes of the towns. Of these, the nobility formed,
at their own charges, a most admirable light cavalry, and, in spite
of the inferiority of their arms, proved in many a battle that they
were more than a match for mail-clad men-at-arms. Unfortunately their
poverty, their dislike of discipline, and their local interests
rendered them unfit for a long campaign, and this accounts for the
fact that their victories often led to such poor results.
On the side of the Catholics were ranged the mass of the greater
nobles, the Church, and the official classes of the magistracy
and bureaucracy, the peasants of the rural districts, except in
the Cevennes and Dauphiné, and the lower classes in the towns,
more especially of Paris, and later, of Orleans and Rouen. The
intense Catholicism of these and other towns is to be explained
by the influence of the religious houses, and in Paris of the
University which, with its sixty-five colleges, formed almost a
town of itself, and, together with the monasteries, owned a large
part of the city and its suburbs. The moral strength of Catholicism
depended on the conservative instincts of the people and on their
religious traditions, which were so closely intertwined with the
business and pleasures of life, and which were shocked by the
iconoclasm of the Huguenots; while the feudal, separatist, and
republican tendencies of the Huguenots at once prevented harmony among
themselves, and opened them to the charge of being enemies to unity
and centralisation--always dear to the French mind. The Catholics
had also the possession of the King’s person and of the financial
resources of the government and the Church, and were assisted by the
subsidies of Philip II. Finally, the Catholics were able to recruit
their troops by mercenaries not only from the Catholic states of
Germany, but also from the Lutherans, who gave but scant support
to their Calvinistic brethren. That under these circumstances,
coupled with the fact that they never numbered more than one-tenth
of the population, the Huguenots maintained the struggle so long as
they did must be, in the main, attributed to the zeal and devotion
of many--notably of the ministers--to the stubbornness of the
_bourgeoisie_, the superiority of their cavalry, and the ability of
their leaders, especially of Condé and of Coligny.
| First Civil War. Aug. 1562-March 1563.
| Rouen taken by the Catholics. Oct. 26, 1562.
| Battle of Dreux. Dec. 19, 1562.
| Assassination of Francis, Duke of Guise. Feb. 18,
| 1563.
The war began in August by the taking of Poictiers by St. André,
and the surrender of Bourges, which gave the centre of France, up to
the gates of Orleans, to the Catholics. In September, the Huguenots
secured the alliance of Elizabeth of England, who feared lest the
triumph of the Guises might mean that the whole of the resources of
France would be used to place Mary Queen of Scots on the English
throne. Yet with her usual caution, Elizabeth demanded the cession
of Dieppe and Havre as the price of her assistance. The indignation,
however, caused by the cession of these towns was scarcely balanced by
the niggardly help which the Queen vouchsafed to the Protestants; and
on the 28th of October, the Catholics gained a brilliant success by
the capture of Rouen, the capital of Normandy, which henceforth became
‘one of the eyes of the Catholics.’ The loss of the town was, however,
sufficiently compensated for by the death of the fickle Antony of
Navarre of a wound received at the siege, for thereby the headship
of his house devolved on Condé, and on his own son the future Henry
IV., a boy of ten years old. In December, the attempt of Condé to
neutralise the effect of the loss of Rouen by an attack on Normandy
led to the battle of Dreux, on the Eure, which was really a victory
for the Catholics. The losses on their side were indeed the heavier;
the Marshal St. André was slain, and the Constable Montmorenci
taken prisoner. Nevertheless, Condé himself fell into the enemy’s
hands, and Coligny was forced to retire on Orleans. In February of
the following year, Coligny again returned and took several towns of
importance in Normandy. But the Duke of Guise had taken advantage
of his absence to besiege Orleans (February 5), and the city seemed
doomed, when the Duke was assassinated by a fanatic named Poltrot, who
believed that it was the will of God that he should rid the world of
‘the butcher of Vassy.’
| Pacification of Amboise. March 12, 1563.
The death of the leader of the Catholics revived the hopes of
Catherine that she might succeed in keeping the balance between the
two parties. Accordingly, on March 12, the Pacification of Amboise
was signed. By that treaty, Condé and Montmorenci were exchanged;
nobles were permitted to hold Protestant services in their houses; in
each _sénéchaussée_,[81] one city was to be granted, in the suburbs
of which the Huguenots might worship; and in every town where the
Protestant service had been held in the preceding March one or two
places were to be designated by the King, where it might be continued
_inside_ the walls. From these provisions, however, Paris was to be
excepted. The treaty was followed by a united attack on Havre, from
which the English were driven on the 25th of July, and Elizabeth was
forced to surrender her claim to the restitution of Calais. Coligny
was opposed to the treaty. It did not, in his opinion, give sufficient
security to the Protestants; but Condé, who was as rash in making
peace as he had been in declaring war, had fallen under the fatal
influence of Mdlle. de Limeuil, one of the ladies of Catherine’s
suite, and was deluded with the promise that he would be appointed
Lieutenant-general, and could then watch over the interests of his
party. In this he was disappointed; for Catherine, to escape from
her promise, had Charles, who was now thirteen, declared of age; and
although she herself was anxious to prevent any further hostilities,
such was not the wish of the Pope, of the Guises, or of Philip.
| The Conspiracy of Meaux, and the Second Civil War.
| Sept. 1567-March 1568.
| The battle of St. Denis. Nov. 10, 1567.
| The Edict of Longjumeau. March 1568.
At a conference held at Bayonne in June, 1565, Alva, in his master’s
name, urged the Queen-mother to dismiss the chancellor L’Hôpital, to
‘show herself a good Catholic,’ and to proceed to stringent measures
against the Huguenots. Very possibly she might have complied if
Philip had consented to further her dynastic aims by giving the hand
of Don Carlos to her second daughter, and that of his sister, the
widowed Queen of Portugal, to her favourite son, Henry of Anjou;
Philip, however, rejected the proposal, and Catherine refused to
follow his advice. Nevertheless, the alarm of the Protestants was
natural; it was rumoured that a League had been made and a massacre
of the Protestants decided upon, and finally, the levying of some
Swiss Catholic troops, ostensibly to watch the march of Alva from
Piedmont to the Netherlands (cf. p. 332), led to the conspiracy of
Meaux in September, 1567. The Protestant leaders proposed to seize
the person of the King, to insist on the removal of the Cardinal of
Lorraine, and to demand that unrestricted liberty of conscience should
be conceded. The court, warned at the last moment of its danger,
escaped with difficulty to Paris, escorted by the Swiss troops; and
the Cardinal, after a hair-breadth escape, fled to Rheims. Condé
then advanced on St. Denis, where he was attacked by the Constable
with an overwhelming force (November 10, 1567). But the Huguenots
fought so stubbornly, and the Parisian levies so badly, that the
battle was indecisive. On the Huguenot side, more men of note fell,
yet on the Catholic side, the Constable Montmorenci was mortally
wounded. The death of Montmorenci for the moment strengthened the
hands of Catherine and the influence of L’Hôpital. Accordingly, in
March, 1568, the Edict of Longjumeau confirmed the Treaty of Amboise,
which was to last ‘till by God’s grace all the king’s subjects should
be reunited in the profession of one religion.’
| Third Civil War. Sept. 1568-Aug. 1570.
| Battle of Jarnac. March 13, 1569.
Catherine hoped that the Catholic party would be weakened by the
death of Montmorenci. She kept the office of Constable vacant,
and conferred on the Duke of Anjou, the brother of the King, the
less ambitious title of Lieutenant-general. But her hopes of thus
maintaining peace were not to be realised. The ‘Parlements’ throughout
France had opposed the Edict of Longjumeau, and that of Toulouse
went so far as to execute the King’s messenger on the charge of
heresy. The Huguenots, not unnaturally, refused to surrender all the
cities, as they had promised in the treaty. The Cardinal of Lorraine
returned, and, in August, 1568, a plot was formed to seize Condé
and the Châtillons, who only succeeded in effecting their escape
to La Rochelle owing to a sudden flood in the Loire. L’Hôpital, in
despair, retired; and Catherine was once more forced to adopt the
policy of the Guises. The Edicts of Toleration were revoked, and the
‘Patched-up Peace,’ as it was called, was at an end. In this, the
third Civil War, Orleans, which had been surrendered at the last
truce, became one of the Catholic outposts; while La Rochelle, which
only declared for the Huguenots in February 1568, was the chief
Protestant stronghold. No serious battle, however, occurred till
the spring of the year 1569. Then the Duke of Anjou, a young man of
eighteen years, won the battle of Jarnac on the Charente (March 13th),
in which Condé was slain after he had surrendered. The death of
Condé was looked upon as a serious blow to the Huguenot cause. But it
is doubtful whether they lost much, for, although Condé was popular,
and did not, like his brother, sacrifice his religious convictions
to his personal interest, he was an ambitious man, and his aims had
been chiefly political. His moral character was, moreover, weak; and,
though a brave soldier, he was not a general of the first order, while
as a statesman his conduct often verged on foolhardiness.
The expectation of the Catholics that the victory of Jarnac would put
an end to the war was not fulfilled. The battle was not much more
than a cavalry skirmish. The death of Condé left Coligny in supreme
command, and served, as a contemporary says, ‘to reveal in all its
splendour the merits of the admiral,’ who was in every way, except
as a diplomatist, the superior of his predecessor. Even the loss of
d’Andelot, who at this juncture died of fever, did not prevent the
Huguenots from meeting at first with considerable success.
| Expedition of the Duke of Zweibrücken and William of
| Orange. May 1569.
| Battle of Moncontour. Oct. 3, 1569.
In May, 1569, Wolfgang, Duke of Zweibrücken (Deux Ponts), entered
France at the head of ‘reiters’ from lower, and of ‘landsknechts’ from
upper Germany, and a force of French and Flemish troops under William
of Orange and Louis of Nassau. Forcing their way to the Loire they
seized La Charité, a place of considerable importance as commanding
the passage of the river from Burgundy and Champagne, and, although
Wolfgang himself died of fever during the campaign, his troops
effected a union with Coligny near Limoges (June 12). Unfortunately,
instead of attacking Saumur, which commanded the road to Anjou
and Brittany, they turned south against Poictiers. The city was
bravely held by Henry, Duke of Guise, the young son of Francis, who
here first displayed his military genius; and, after seven weeks,
Coligny was forced to abandon the siege by the advance of the Duke
of Anjou. Coligny was anxious to avoid a battle, for William of
Orange had departed to raise fresh troops in Germany; his losses
before Poictiers had been considerable; and, as usual, he had found
it difficult to keep his forces long in the field. But the Germans
demanded pay, which he could not give, or to be led against the enemy;
and Coligny, forced to accept the challenge of Anjou with far inferior
forces, suffered a serious defeat at Moncontour (October 3), where
he was severely wounded. Had Anjou at once pursued, the Huguenots
might have been completely crushed; fortunately, whether owing to the
jealousy of the Guises at this success of Anjou or no, it was decided
first to reduce Saint Jean d’Angély. The city fell, indeed, after
seven weeks’ siege, but ‘as the siege of Poictiers was the beginning
of the mishaps of the Huguenots, so that of Saint Jean d’Angély was
the means of wasting the good fortune of the Catholics.’ La Rochelle
still held out; the winter came on; the Duke of Anjou resigned his
command, while his successor, the Duke of Montpensier, retired to
Angers.
| Expedition of Coligny. Oct. 1569-June 1570.
Meanwhile in October, Coligny, now recovered of his wounds, had
started on a brilliant expedition. He crossed the south of France, his
army growing like a snowball, and reached the Rhone; thence, hugging
the right bank of the Saône, he marched northwards to Arnay Le Duc,
where an indecisive engagement with Marshal de Cossé (June 25),
caused him to retreat to La Charité, and thence to his own castle at
Châtillon-sur-Loire. Coligny had not, indeed, succeeded in carrying
out his plan of uniting with William of Orange, who was collecting a
force on the German frontier, and of forcing his way to Paris, but the
campaign showed conclusively that the Huguenots were not yet crushed.
Philip II. would send to the Catholics nothing but promises; Queen
Elizabeth, unwilling to see the Huguenots completely routed, was
considering the question of aiding them; Charles was jealous of the
military success of his brother Anjou; and Catherine was not sorry to
listen to the advice of Francis of Montmorenci, eldest son of the old
Constable, to come to terms once more.
| Peace of St. Germain. Aug. 8, 1570.
By the Peace of St. Germain (August 8, 1570), which closed the third
Civil War, the Huguenots not only regained all that they had obtained
by the Edict of Longjumeau, but were allowed to celebrate their
services in two cities of each of the twelve provinces of France, and
received as securities four cities which they were to hold for two
years--La Rochelle, Montauban, Cognac, and La Charité. They were also
to be restored to all their property, honours, and offices, and were
given the right of challenging a certain number of the judges in the
‘Parlements,’ and a right of appeal from that of Toulouse, which had
been the most violent. Thus the Huguenots had at last obtained liberty
of conscience, and terms with regard to the holding of services,
which, if not completely satisfactory, were perhaps as much as they
could expect. Moreover, they might well hope that this time the
terms would be kept, for the Treaty of St. Germain was followed by a
complete change in the foreign policy of the court.
| Change in the policy of the French Court.
Catherine had hitherto followed two lines of conduct. At one time she
had tried to act as a mediator between the two religious parties; at
another to support the weaker, and thus maintain a balance. But both
had failed. The crown was not powerful enough for the first, and,
instead of succeeding in the second, she had been obliged to join
the stronger party. A third alternative remained. Might it not be
possible to revive the national hostility to Spain; sink religious
differences in a foreign war; form a great Protestant league against
the Pope and Spain; divide the Netherlands with England and William
of Orange; and at home secure the authority of the crown? Such were
the views of Coligny, which were now to be adopted by the King and
Catherine. Charles IX., feeble though he was, was not without some
traces of better things; he had always been averse to civil war, and
saw that Spain had been the chief gainer from the discords of France,
since, as Marshal Vielleville had said long ago, ‘as many gallant
gentlemen had fallen in one battle as would have sufficed to drive
the Spaniards out of Flanders.’ The Spanish victory of Lepanto over
the Turks in October, 1571, only served to intensify Charles’ dread
of Philip. Moreover, as we have seen, he was jealous of the fame his
brother, the Duke of Anjou (the favourite of his mother), had gained
in the late campaign, and hoped that he might eclipse it by leading a
national war against the Spaniard. But the support of the King would
have been of little value had not Catherine also favoured the designs
of Coligny. Philip had refused to further her dynastic interests at
the Conference of Bayonne, in June 1565 (cf. p. 407). His third wife,
Elizabeth of France, had died in 1568. He now declined either to marry
Margaret of Valois, Catherine’s second daughter, or to urge the claims
of that lady upon the young King of Portugal. Accordingly Catherine
wished to marry her to the young King of Navarre, the first prince
of the blood, whose possessions[82] stretched from the Pyrenees to
the other side of the Garonne, and whose friendship, whether he was
converted or not, might be of great assistance to her. His mother,
however, Jeanne d’Albret, dreaded the influence of the depraved
court of France on her son, and rightly suspected the character of
the young princess; and Catherine, eager to gain the assistance of
the Admiral, who alone was likely to overcome the scruples of the
Queen of Navarre, listened to his suggestions, and negotiations were
opened with William of Orange and with England. The Prince eagerly
welcomed these overtures. He had long realised that the revolt of the
Netherlands against Spain would not be successful if fought solely
on religious lines. The Protestants were too scattered, and too much
divided among themselves, for that; and the only chance lay in waging
a political war against Spanish tyranny, in alliance with foreign
powers. Accordingly Louis of Nassau was sent to negotiate, and there
was talk of an alliance of France, England, and the Empire, and of
a division of the Netherlands between them. In pursuance of this
scheme, Elizabeth of England was approached; but though at this time
quarrelling with Philip over the exploits of the ‘Sea-dogs’ on the
Spanish Main, and angry at the support he had given to the Ridolfi
plot in 1571, she had insuperable objections to see Antwerp and the
Scheldt in French hands. It was therefore proposed that she should
marry the Duke of Anjou, and that he should be declared sovereign of
the Netherlands (cf. p. 338). To this proposal Elizabeth appeared
more favourably inclined, and Walsingham, her agent in France, was
closely questioned as to the personal appearance of the Duke. The
negotiations broke down, indeed, in January, 1572, owing to the
preference of Anjou, who had been influenced by the Guises, for the
hand of the Queen of Scots, ‘the rightful Queen of England,’ but
even then Alençon, Anjou’s younger brother, was suggested; and a
correspondence on the subject, which, on the part of Elizabeth at
least, was only entered into to gain time, continued until arrested by
the massacre of St. Bartholomew.
| La Marck seizes Brille. April 1, 1572.
While Elizabeth trimmed, events moved rapidly. On the 1st of April,
1572, the Comte de la Marck, a Flemish refugee, being expelled from
Dover with his ships by the order of the English Queen, who was
not yet prepared for an open breach with Philip, seized Brille and
Flushing, and Holland and Zealand rose. In May, Louis of Nassau,
having by the connivance of Charles raised a force, chiefly of
Huguenots, in France, took Mons, the capital of Hainault, while
Elizabeth, not to be outdone, allowed English volunteers to cross to
Flushing. The dream of Coligny seemed likely to be fulfilled, and
Charles appeared to be on the point of declaring war on Spain.
| Catherine becomes alarmed at the growing influence of
| Coligny.
| Genlis defeated and taken prisoner. July 19, 1572.
| Attempted assassination of Coligny. Aug. 22, 1572.
| The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Aug. 24, 1572.
Unfortunately, the apprehensions of Catherine had been in the meantime
aroused. She had consented to the Treaty of St. Germain because she
feared the Guises; she was now threatened by the more distasteful
ascendency of Coligny, who, if we may believe Tavannes, advised
Charles that he would never be truly King until he had emancipated
himself from his mother’s control. She therefore returned to the
idea, often entertained, and often pressed upon her, of getting rid
of the leaders of the Huguenots, more especially of Coligny. At what
date she finally decided on this course it is impossible to say
with certainty, but there is evidence to show that the scheme had
assumed practical shape as early as February, 1572. Even then had the
movement in the Netherlands met with complete success, King Charles
might have made up his mind to declare war against Spain; Elizabeth
might have cast away her doubts, and some of the Protestant princes
of Germany would have joined the alliance. The position of Coligny
would then have been too strong for Catherine, who, as she had often
done before, might have submitted to the inevitable, and the hopes of
Burleigh and Walsingham of beating back Catholicism behind the Alps
and the Pyrenees might have been realised. Unfortunately, de la Noue
was driven from Valenciennes, a French detachment under the Count of
Genlis was cut to pieces by the son of Alva in an attempt to relieve
Mons (July 19), and Genlis himself was taken prisoner. The hands of
Catherine were now free, and she planned the assassination of Coligny
with the Duke of Anjou and Henry of Guise. The attempt was made in
the midst of the festivities which followed the marriage of Henry of
Navarre and Margaret. Whether, if it had succeeded, Catherine would
have been satisfied, or whether she hoped that the murder would cause
the Protestants to rise, and thus give the Catholics an excuse for
proceeding further, it is impossible to say. In any case, the assassin
missed his aim; Coligny escaped with a serious wound, and it was
necessary to proceed to further extremities. Accompanied by the Duke
of Anjou, by Birago a Milanese, the successor of L’Hôpital in the
chancellorship, and by others, the Queen-mother visited the King,
and, with threats and imputations that he was too timid to act, at
last persuaded him. ‘By God’s death,’ said he, ‘since you insist that
the admiral must be killed, I consent; but with him every Huguenot
in France must perish, that not one may remain to reproach me with
his death, and what you do, see that it be done quickly.’ The King’s
consent obtained, the plan was rapidly concerted between Catherine,
Anjou, Henry of Guise, and Charron, the ‘Prévôt des Marchands’ of
Paris. Whether, even then, it was intended to dispose of more than
some of the leaders is doubtful, but, when once the order had gone
out, the fanatical mob of Paris could not be restrained. On Sunday
morning, August 24, the massacre began, and was subsequently taken up
in the provinces.
| No change in foreign policy contemplated.
Such appears to be the truth with regard to the causes of this pitiful
tragedy, which some think had been premeditated as early as the
Treaty of St. Germain itself. All direct evidence, however, has been
destroyed, and the facts have been so distorted by partisanship,
that certainty is no longer possible. The number of victims has
been variously stated; but at the lowest computation they were not
less than 1000 in Paris, and 10,000 elsewhere. Among the victims,
besides Coligny, were Teligny, his son-in-law, and La Rochefoucauld,
an important noble of Poitou. Navarre and the young Condé were
spared, but were forced to abjure Protestantism, and were practically
prisoners in the hands of Catherine and the Guises. As to any future
policy, the Court had not made up its mind. Catherine, it is said, had
hoped that, if the responsibility could be thrown upon the Guises, the
Huguenots would rush to arms and attack them, and that an obstinate
struggle would then ensue, which would weaken the two factions, and
justify the King in interfering to restore order; thus both parties
might be destroyed, and she and her favourite son Anjou might be left
without dangerous rivals. Accordingly the King at first announced
that the affair had been the result of the long-standing quarrel
between the Guises and the Châtillons, which the Government had
done its best to suppress. But as the Guises would not accept the
responsibility, the King changed his tone, justified the crime by
declaring that the Huguenots had been plotting against the crown, and,
with singular baseness, urged Alva to put to death all the Huguenot
prisoners he had taken before Mons. At the same time, Catherine was
eager not to alienate the Protestants abroad. She looked upon the
massacre as a domestic incident, and was not unwilling to continue the
policy of Coligny now that he was gone. This she was the more anxious
to do, because she now entertained the idea of securing the crown
of Poland, just vacant by the death of the last of its hereditary
Kings, the Jagellons, for her favourite son Anjou. It was therefore
announced that the Edict of Amboise would be kept, and negotiations
were continued with the Protestant powers. This policy met with some
success.
| Attitude of European Powers.
| Anjou elected King of Poland. May 9, 1573.
The rulers of Europe expressed delight or disapprobation according
to their sentiments, but guided their policy as their interest
demanded. Philip was at first beside himself with joy; it meant,
he thought, the end of the French alliance with the Netherlands;
Alva, however, warned him that the overthrow of the Huguenots would
strengthen France too much. Elizabeth declared her disgust, but
could not afford to quarrel with France; while William the Silent,
especially after the fall of Mons on September 19, was not in a
position to abandon all hopes of French assistance. The Protestant
Princes of Germany at first showed great indignation, but did nothing
to interfere with the candidature of the Duke of Anjou, who was
elected King of Poland (May 9, 1573).
| Effect of Massacre on France.
| 4th Civil War. August, 1572-June, 1573.
| Treaty of La Rochelle. June 24, 1573.
| Rise of the Politiques.
At home, Catherine was not so successful, and ‘France,’ says Sully,
‘atoned for the massacre by twenty-six years of disaster, carnage,
and horror.’ On the news of the massacre, the survivors took up
arms, but they were not strong enough to meet their enemies in the
field, and the resistance was confined to a few cities, of which
Nîmes and Montauban in the south, Sancerre and La Rochelle in the
west, were the most important. The Government in vain attempted their
reduction. The siege of La Rochelle cost the lives of some 20,000
men, and of more than 300 officers of some distinction. Sancerre was
reduced to such straits that cats, rats, mice, and even dogs, were
eaten; the last, says Jean de Lery, whose narrative has not been
inaptly called a cookery book for the besieged, were found to be
rather sweet and insipid. At last, on June 24, 1573, the Government
despairing of success, and unwilling that the Polish ambassadors
should find their new King, the Duke of Anjou, who was in command
of the army, besieging a Protestant town, concluded the Treaty of
La Rochelle. By this treaty the Huguenots were promised liberty of
conscience throughout France, and the right of holding services in La
Rochelle, Nîmes, and Montauban. These towns were also to be free from
royal garrisons. In August, by the mediation of the Polish ambassador,
Sancerre was admitted to the same terms. But the treaty could not
last. It was doubtful whether the Government were sincere, and it was
not likely that the Huguenots would consent to forego their rights
of worship. Besides all this, their cause was being strengthened by
the rise of the ‘Politiques,’ or ‘Peaceable Catholics’ as they called
themselves. This party, born of the horror and weariness which the
Civil War had caused, was anxious to establish peace on the basis of
mutual toleration. Its leaders were the two sons of the old Constable,
Francis, Marshal of France and Governor of Paris, and Henry Damville,
Governor of Languedoc. Their jealousy of the Guises they had inherited
from their father, yet their ideas as to toleration would have been
most distasteful to him, and, still more so, the opinions of his two
youngest sons, William (Thoré), and Charles (Méru), who adopted the
Huguenot faith. The Politiques were strongest in the south, where the
adherents of the two creeds had been more equally balanced, and where
the struggle had been most severe. As a whole they were not actuated
by high principle. If they adopted the views of L’Hôpital it was
from cynical indifference to religion, rather than from conviction as
to the merits of toleration, and the leaders at least were largely
influenced by ambition or personal motives. Indeed, the massacre of
St. Bartholomew was followed by a general lowering of tone and of
morality throughout France.
| Change in the character and views of the Huguenot
| Party.
Closely connected with the Politiques stood Navarre and Henry of
Condé, who had been forced to abjure their faith and were practically
prisoners in royal hands, and the King’s brother, the Duc d’Alençon,
who selfishly sided with Huguenots in the hope of securing the crown
on the death of Charles IX. At this time, too, the results of the
massacre were seen in a complete transformation of the views of the
Huguenots. Hitherto, the party had been dominated by the nobility,
great and small, who, in spite of the feudal colour which they gave
to the movement, had asserted that they were not fighting against
the crown, but for the removal of foreign and unpopular ministers,
while the third estate had limited its demands to an extension of the
powers of the States-General. But now many of the greater nobility
had fallen, and many had abjured their faith. The importance of the
_bourgeoisie_ and of the ministers had consequently increased, and
under their influence republican ideas had become more prominent;
while the feudal element, which was still represented by the smaller
local nobility, went to strengthen separatist tendencies. The change
was accompanied by the appearance of numerous political pamphlets, of
which the most striking were the _Franco-Gallia_ of Hotman, and the
_Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos_ from the pen of Languet, or possibly of
Duplessis-Mornay, the faithful adviser of Henry of Navarre.
| The Franco-Gallia, and Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos.
The _Franco-Gallia_, adopting the historical method, asserts that
the Teutonic nations saved France from the tyranny of Rome, revived
the free institutions of the Gauls, and established an elective
monarchy, which governed through the people and for the people, in
whom eventually the sovereignty resides. The decadence of this free
constitution began with the Capetian Kings, who in time overthrew the
privileges of the Estates, and introduced the despotic rule of King
and ‘Parlement.’ The writer goes on to illustrate from the history
of France the evil results of the rule of women, and holds that this
is the reason for their exclusion from the throne, rather than any
fundamental law, like the Salic Law, which conflicts with the primeval
right of free election.
The author of the second treatise, the _Vindiciæ_, adopts the
opposite method, and seeks to prove his point by a deductive
argument. Both King and people have made a contract with God: the King
to rule his country well, the people to depose him when he fails to do
so. Hence resistance to a tyrant is a duty. Nevertheless, the right of
resistance does not belong to individuals, except, indeed, against an
invader, an usurper, or a woman, if such, in defiance of law, seek to
rule a country; for they are outside the law. In other cases, not the
individuals, but their representative, the magistracy, should be the
judge of breach of contract. Thus, although the doctrine of resistance
is clearly enunciated, the resistance must come from the properly
constituted authorities, and the writer objects to anything which
savours of anabaptism or other extreme views.
| Political organisation of the Huguenots.
| Fifth Civil War. Feb. 1574-May 1576.
| Death of Charles IX. March 30, 1574.
The Huguenots did not limit themselves to theory. On the 24th of
August, 1573, the anniversary of St. Bartholomew, the Protestants
of Languedoc and Upper Guienne formed two federative republics,
each divided into dioceses with small deliberative assemblies,
which were to send deputies to the central assemblies at Nîmes and
Montauban. These, with an elective governor, were to have the power
of levying troops and of imposing taxes on Protestant and Catholic
alike. This republican form of government, in which we see the
Presbyterian ideas of church-government applied to secular politics,
was to be extended to all parts of France which the Protestants might
subsequently win. After thus settling the government of the south,
the Huguenots sent a petition to the King demanding complete liberty
of conscience and of worship throughout the kingdom, and the cession
of two fortresses in each province as a security. The Politiques
at the same time published a manifesto demanding toleration. ‘If
Condé had been alive and in possession of Paris he would not have
asked so much,’ said Catherine. And on February, 1574, the fifth
war broke out. An unsuccessful attempt on the part of Navarre and
Alençon to fly from St. Germain, led to the imprisonment of the
Marshal Montmorenci, and Marshal de Cossé, another Politique. Henry
of Condé effected his escape, and negotiated with the German princes
for help. Before, however, any event of importance occurred, the
unfortunate King, Charles IX., passed away (March 30, 1574), tortured
to the last by remorse, and terrified by visions of the massacre to
which, in an evil hour, he had consented.
§ 5. _The reign of Henry III., March 1574-July 1589._
| Henry III. leaves Poland and reaches France. Sept.
| 1574.
The death of Charles IX. gave Henry a pretext for hastily leaving
Poland, where he had already become unpopular. He did not, however,
appear to be in any hurry to reach his new kingdom. Warned by his
mother to avoid North Germany, since ‘the German princes had too
many causes of quarrel with France,’ he passed through Austria and
Italy. At Venice, he wasted two months in luxury and debauch, and
is said to have been corrupted by the licence of that town. On his
arrival in France (September, 1574), he seemed for a moment inclined
to adopt a conciliatory policy. But his mother, now that her favourite
son was King, hoped that if he were victorious over the Huguenots her
influence would be paramount, and expected everything from the hero
of Jarnac and Moncontour. The King therefore announced that he would
recognise liberty of conscience, but would not tolerate religious
practices which deviated from Catholicism, and that he would speak of
peace when his castles and his cities had been restored.
| Peace of Monsieur. May, 1576.
Thus the war dragged on, though without any decisive events, and soon
Henry III. began to crave for peace that he might indulge in his
pleasures. The definite alliance of the Politiques with the Huguenots
of the south, which took place in December, enabled the rebels to
hold their own. In September, 1575, Alençon, and in the following
February, Navarre, effected their escape. Meanwhile Duke Casimir,
son of the Elector Palatine, who dreamt of heading an aggressive
Calvinistic party in Europe, had invaded France, ravaged Burgundy and
the Bourbonnois, and, in March, joined Alençon at Sozé. Finally,
by the exertions of Francis of Montmorenci, the Marshal, who had
been released by the King, the Peace of Monsieur (May, 1576) gave
to the Huguenots better terms than they had hitherto obtained. They
were allowed to worship where they liked, except within two leagues
of Paris, and within the domains of any lord who might withhold his
sanction. Cases in which Protestants were concerned were to be tried
by ‘Chambres mi-parties’ in each ‘Parlement,’--that is, by courts
composed of an equal number of judges of the two religions. The
Estates were to be convened at Blois; and eight cities were to be
held by the Huguenots in pledge of the fulfilment of the treaty. The
Duke of Alençon, or Anjou, as he had now become in consequence
of the accession of Henry of Anjou to the throne, was to receive
the duchies of Berry, Touraine, and Anjou, with reservation of
the rights of suzerainty to the crown. To Henry of Navarre was
given the governorship of Guienne, and to Henry of Condé that of
Picardy, with Péronne as his residence. The last concession was an
important one, for Picardy hitherto had been very Catholic in its
sympathies, and had divided the Huguenots from their Protestant allies
in the Netherlands. The Peace of Monsieur was received with violent
indignation by the Catholics of France, and led to an agitation
which was directed almost as much against the crown as against the
Huguenots.
| The Catholic Leagues.
| The Guises adopt democratic views.
The idea of forming associations of ‘Better Catholics’ was no new
one. Shortly after the Edict of Amboise, in 1563, we find mention of
several, such as the Fraternity of the Holy Ghost in Burgundy, and
the Christian and Royal League of Champagne. With the massacre of
St. Bartholomew these associations had fallen into neglect; they were
now to be revived on a much more important scale. The first of these
new leagues was that of Péronne, organised by Humières, the old
governor who refused to surrender the fortress to Condé (1576). The
example was speedily followed elsewhere, and formed the counterpart
to Huguenot federation in the south (cf. p. 419). The organisation
of these leagues was a military one. Their objects were declared
to be: the defence of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church; the
preservation of Henry III. in the obedience of his subjects, and after
him ‘of all the posterity of the House of Valois’; the execution
of the resolutions which should be presented by the Estates which
were about to meet; and the restoration of the ancient liberties as
they existed in the time of Clovis, the first Christian King. In
this declaration we are reminded of a new departure in the policy
of the Guises. Hitherto they had attempted to secure their power as
the first ministers of the crown, and supported the principles of
despotic rule. But Henry III. threatened to shake himself free from
their influence, and was already leaning upon his favourites ‘the
Mignons.’ Accordingly, Henry of Guise, who, by the death of his uncle,
the cardinal, in 1574, was the undoubted leader of his house, assumed
a position of antagonism to the crown, and even began to dream of
some day winning the throne itself. The unpopularity which Henry III.
incurred by the Peace of Monsieur and by his foppish follies, caused
the Duke to lean on popular support, while many of the Catholic nobles
had joined the Politiques. Thus the party of the Guises, without
completely breaking with the upper classes, began to seek its fulcrum
in a lower stratum.
| Henry III. tries to make use of the States-General.
The change is represented not only in the articles of these Catholic
Leagues but also in the Catholic pamphlets of the day, which began to
borrow the popular doctrines of the _Franco-Gallia_ and other Huguenot
writings. Denying the application of the Salic Law to France, they
asserted that the title of the House of Lorraine was superior to
that of the Bourbon, and even to that of the House of Valois itself,
since it could trace its descent through the female line from Charles
the Great himself. In the face of these new developments, Henry III.
followed for some time an oscillating policy. At first he forbade
all Associations. Subsequently he abandoned that idea, and tried to
utilise them for the purpose of influencing the elections to the
States-General which were to meet at Blois according to the Treaty,
in the hope, by the aid of the Catholic majority thus obtained, of
putting down both the Guises and the Huguenots. In this he was only
partially successful. The Huguenots, indeed, despairing of success
owing to the terrorism and intrigues of the League, declined even
to send deputies from those districts and towns which were in their
power, and the Catholics finding themselves in a majority, demanded
that there should be only one religion in France. Yet so great was the
dislike to a continuance of the war that they refused the necessary
supplies, and brought forward constitutional demands which made Henry
III. only too glad to be quit of them (March 1577).
| Sixth Civil War, 1577.
| Treaty of Bergerac. Sept. 17, 1577.
In the war which had broken out in the meantime, the King was somewhat
more successful. The Duke of Anjou (Alençon), who had now deserted
the Huguenots, took command of the royal army; the aristocratic
prejudices and the religious indifference of the Politiques could
ill agree with the earnestness of the republican and Calvinistic
burghers; and Damville, who by the death of his brother had now
become Duke of Montmorenci and Marshal of France, soon abandoned the
alliance and made his peace with the court (May, 1577). Under these
circumstances the Huguenots lost ground. In May fell La Charité
on the Loire; in August, Brouage, a place next in importance to La
Rochelle; and it was only the want of union among the Catholics
themselves, and the utter weariness of the country, which enabled the
Huguenots to gain such favourable terms as they did by the Treaty
of Bergerac (September 17, 1577). Their right of worship was indeed
restricted to the domains of nobles, to all cities where worship
was held at the date of the peace, and elsewhere to one city or
its suburbs in each sénéchaussée--Paris itself being specially
excluded. The ‘Chambres mi-parties’ were also confined to the four
southern ‘Parlements’ where the Huguenots were strongest. But they
still had eight cities intrusted to them in pledge for six years,
and Condé received St. Jean d’Angély instead of Péronne. The King
was probably sincere in desiring to maintain the Peace of Bergerac,
for he was anxious if possible to escape from the thraldom of the
Guises, and the violations of the treaty which occurred were due to
the insubordination of the governors of provinces, to the popular
fanaticism, and to the stubborn ill-will of the Law Courts.
| Seventh Civil War, April 1580, to Peace of Fleix,
| Nov. 1580.
In 1580, indeed, ‘The Lovers’ War’ broke out. This was caused,
however, rather by quarrels between the King and Henry of Navarre
concerning the dower of Margaret, and it is noticeable that the great
Protestant leader, de la Noue, disapproved of it, and that neither La
Rochelle nor the southern towns took part in it. It was ended by the
Peace of Fleix, in Perigord (26th November, 1580), which confirmed the
Treaty of Bergerac, and closed the Seventh Civil War.
| Disorganisation of France.
The Peace of Fleix was followed by five years of feverish peace,
which served only to illustrate the utter disorganisation of the
country and the demoralisation of all classes. Although there were
not wanting earnest, if fanatical, adherents of the two creeds,
these formed an ever lessening minority; and for the most part,
as a competent observer tells us, ‘Men were combating not for the
faith, nor for Christ, but for command.’ Of the greater nobles, the
Guises were attempting to overawe the crown, if not to seize it for
themselves; the rest, like Henry de Montmorenci the Marshal, and
the Duke of Mercœur, strove to make themselves independent in
the provinces of which they were governors. The smaller nobility
played the same game on a less magnificent scale, and in some cases
had degenerated into brigands; while many, both great and small,
spent their leisure in duels and assassinations, often caused by
some shameful intrigue. Even the women resorted to the dagger to
free themselves from an inconvenient lover, or to avenge some act of
infidelity. While the upper classes were thus disturbing the country
with their ambitions and their vices, the lower classes were bemoaning
their social grievances, and threatening social war. At the head of
this seething mass of iniquity, and of political, social, and moral
anarchy, stood a vacillating, effeminate King, and an intriguing
Queen-mother.
Henry III. had in earlier life shown some character. He was far more
able than his brothers, the unfortunate Charles IX., or the Duke of
Anjou (Alençon); and had distinguished himself in the battles of
Jarnac and Moncontour. His natural gifts, however, had been choked
in a life of licence and of luxury, and ever since his accession he
had gone from bad to worse. He dressed himself more like a woman than
a man; he surrounded himself with favourites, and with lap-dogs;
he relieved the monotony of his debaucheries by ridiculous acts
of penance and superstition which deceived no one. No doubt, the
idea of raising new men to power to balance the ambitions of the
older nobility was not altogether a foolish one, and some of the
favourites, like Épernon, Joyeuse, and the Marshal de Biron, were
men of capacity. But others, like Villequier and D’O, would have
disgraced any court; while all were influenced by sordid and unworthy
motives. By the King’s side stood the Queen-mother, still intriguing
for power though life was fast ebbing, and descending to the arts
of a procuress to win her opponents. Clearly there was no hope for
France until the last of this degenerate race of the Valois had
disappeared. The only chance for a continuance of internal peace,
such as it was, lay in a vigorous foreign policy, which might have
monopolised the attention of the turbulent spirits, and put the King
at the head of a united people.
| Sovereignty of Netherlands accepted by Anjou. Sept.
| 1580-Feb. 1582.
| Expedition to the Azores. June 1582.
| The French Fury. Jan. 16, 1583. Anjou leaves
| Netherlands, June 1583, and dies. Assassination of
| William of Orange. July 10, 1584.
For this, the offer of the sovereignty of the Netherlands to the
Duke of Anjou, in September, 1580, furnished an opportunity which
Catherine, angry at the recent occupation of Portugal by Philip
(cf. p. 298), eagerly embraced. Even the King himself approved;
while Elizabeth received with favour the advances of Anjou for her
hand in marriage. The sovereignty was finally conferred on the Duke
in February, 1582. In the June of that year, Catherine sent an
expedition to the Azores in support of Antonio, the Pretender of
Portugal. William of Orange might well hope that France was about to
return to the policy of Coligny, and, in alliance with the Protestant
Queen of England, and the Netherlands, finally to join issue with the
representative of the Catholic reaction. His hope was not, however,
to be realised. Henry III. was not prepared for so bold a course, and
was half-jealous of his brother. Elizabeth had been only scheming to
prevent the Netherlands from being incorporated into France, and, if
possible, to embroil France with Philip, and, for all her love-making,
had no intention of really marrying Anjou. The expedition to the
Azores, as well as another which was despatched in June, 1583, was
destroyed by a Spanish fleet under the Marquis de Santa Cruz. Anjou,
ill satisfied with the restricted authority granted to him, rashly
attempted to establish himself in a more independent position by
seizing Bruges and Antwerp (January 16). The attempt failed, and in
June, 1583, Anjou retired from the Netherlands to die in the following
June. One month after (July, 1584), William the Silent fell a victim
to the pistol of Balthazar Gérard.
| Sovereignty of Netherlands offered to Henry III. Oct.
| 1584.
| The Catholic League.
The deaths of Anjou and of William the Silent both led to most
momentous consequences. The first made the Protestant, Henry of
Navarre, the heir-presumptive, and rendered a renewal of civil war
almost inevitable; the second was followed by the offer of the
sovereignty of the Netherlands to Henry III. It seemed by no means
impossible that Henry III. would reconcile himself with his heretic
heir, and accept the offer made him. At once the apprehensions of the
French Catholics, of the Guises, and of Philip were aroused, and the
outcome was the Catholic League. Following the model of the Catholic
Associations of 1576, the League was formed in Paris. The city was
divided into five districts: the president of each of these, assisted
by an elective Council of Eleven, formed the famous _Sixteen._ This
Council deliberated on the measures to be adopted, and its decisions
were communicated to the faithful through the agency of professional
and trade associations. The example of Paris was rapidly followed in
the provincial towns; and France was threatened with the tyranny of
a central club with its affiliated societies, whose authority was
maintained partly by terrorism, partly by the fanaticism excited
through the preaching of friars and Jesuits.
| Treaty of Joinville. Jan. 1585.
Although Henry of Guise did not altogether approve of the democratic
principles adopted by the Catholic League, his interests demanded
that he should put himself at the head of it. But this was not the
only important change in the policy of the Guises. The reputation
of the family had been originally made in defending France against
Spain, and Francis, Duke of Guise, had always been anti-Spanish in
his views; while Philip, on his side, was most unwilling to see Mary,
Queen of Scots, their kinswoman, triumphant in England, and had even
sent secret help to the Scottish rebels. Of late, however, the more
imperative necessity of preventing the French from assisting the
Dutch, or from incorporating any part of the Netherlands into France,
had caused Philip to alter his views. Negotiations had accordingly
been entered into with Henry of Guise as early as the end of the year
1581, and Philip pretended to favour the family designs in favour of
Mary Stuart, now a captive in the hands of Elizabeth. The death of
Anjou, and the danger of reconciliation between Henry III. and the
heretic Henry of Navarre, still further aroused the apprehensions of
Philip. He therefore approved of the organisation of the League, and
in January, 1585, concluded the Treaty of Joinville with Guise. The
allies bound themselves to eradicate heresy, and to proclaim the
Cardinal of Bourbon, the Catholic uncle of Henry of Navarre, King
in the event of the decease of Henry III.; the viscounty of Béarn
and French Navarre was to be ceded to Philip, as a price of his
assistance. In March, 1585, the Leaguers issued a manifesto, in which
they declared their intention to restore the dignity and unity of the
crown, to secure the nobility in their ancient privileges, to drive
unworthy favourites from the court, to relieve the country from new
taxes, and to prevent future troubles by settling the succession
on a Catholic king, and by providing for regular sessions of the
States-General.
Meanwhile, to enforce their views they had seized the three
bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, most of the towns of Picardy, all
Champagne, and the larger part of Burgundy, Normandy, and Brittany;
while in June they presented an ultimatum to the King insisting on the
withdrawal of the late Edict of Toleration. The formidable movement
which was thus inaugurated was the outcome of the union of three
forces:--
1. The determination of the Catholic party to oppose the claims of a
heretic heir.
2. The jealousy of the Guises for the King’s ‘Mignons.’
3. The European policy of Philip II., who not only dreaded the French
alliance with the Netherlands, but also feared that it might lead to
a definite alliance with the Protestant Queen of England, and thus
shatter his hopes of re-establishing his authority and that of the
Catholic Church.
| Henry III. submits to the League. July 5, 1585.
| Sixtus excommunicates Henry of Navarre. Sept. 9,
| 1585.
It remained to be seen what line of conduct Henry III. would adopt
in the face of this formidable conspiracy. Sixtus V., who had just
succeeded Pope Gregory XIII. (August 26, 1585), did not altogether
approve of the League. ‘I fear me,’ he said, ‘that matters will
be pressed so far that the King, Catholic though he be, will be
constrained to appeal to the heretics for aid to rid himself of the
tyranny of the Catholics,’ and this for a moment did not appear
impossible. Henry III. went so far as to acknowledge Henry of Navarre
as his lawful successor, and laughed at the claims of the Cardinal
as those ‘of an old fool.’ He forbade all Leagues and Associations,
and even made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Duke of Guise at
Metz. But a continuation of such a bold policy was scarcely to be
looked for from such a King. Elizabeth, although she could scold Henry
for submitting to rebels within his kingdom, would not depart from her
position of dubious neutrality; Henry of Navarre, although professing
his willingness ‘to be instructed,’ refused to declare himself a
Catholic; while Catherine, who was hoping to secure the succession
for her daughter Claude and her husband the Duke of Lorraine, warned
the King of the danger of opposing so powerful a coalition. Henry, to
his ruin, listened to his mother’s advice, and allowed her to yield,
in his name, to the demands of the Leaguers at the Conference of
Nemours (July 5, 1585). The Edicts of Toleration were revoked, and
they of the Huguenot faith who would not conform were to leave the
country. Sixtus, now partly relieved from his apprehensions, issued a
Bull of Excommunication against Henry of Navarre.
| Altered position of the Huguenots and Catholics.
The capitulation of Henry III. to the League brought Henry of Navarre
prominently to the front. He had already shown his military abilities
during the Lovers’ War, and, in 1581, he had been appointed ‘Protector
of the Churches.’ He now became the representative of all those whose
bigotry or whose interest did not destroy their patriotism. It is
interesting to note how completely the position of the two parties
was reversed. The charges of opposing the legitimate successor, of
holding republican doctrines, and of alliance with the foreigner,
once brought against the Huguenots, could now be laid at the door of
the Catholics; while the Huguenots could claim to be fighting for the
principle of legitimacy and of national independence. Navarre was,
accordingly, supported by the Politiques and by the Constable Henry of
Montmorenci, who was, however, chiefly influenced by personal jealousy
of the Guises. Even the ‘Parlement’ of Paris remonstrated against
the intolerance of the Edict, and against the Papal Bull. Although
opposed as before to the concession of the right of worship to the
Protestants, its members were in favour of liberty of conscience,
and resented, as they had always done, the papal claim to interfere
in the internal affairs of France. Thus the party of the Huguenots
was by no means a contemptible one. The centre of their position
lay in the territories belonging to Henry of Navarre, or under
his control. These, spreading from the Spanish frontier to the
Dordogne, and from the Bay of Biscay to Languedoc, comprised Lower
Navarre and Béarn, which Henry held in his own right, and seven
fiefs which he held of the King of France. He was also Governor of
Guienne, and he was not without adherents in Normandy and Brittany,
while Languedoc was held by the Constable. And yet the position
of the Huguenots was discouraging enough. If their party was not
confined to those of their religious profession, this only added to
the divisions which had always weakened them. The Catholics held by
far the greater part of France; in the Netherlands, Alexander of
Parma had secured Antwerp (August, 1585), and threatened to carry
all before him, and were his task in the Netherlands finished, how
should they resist the united forces of the League and of Philip
II.? What wonder if many apostatised or fled, and that the beard of
Henry of Navarre turned white with anxiety. Already Philip dreamed of
overthrowing Elizabeth of England, of placing Mary Queen of Scots on
the English throne, and of subjugating France under his lieutenant,
the Duke of Guise. Fortunately, however, the King of Spain as usual
procrastinated, and preferred to work his end by diplomacy and by
bribes, rather than by arms. The Guises were not in complete accord
with him, and Henry III. himself daily grew more impatient of the
yoke. To these causes, and to the personal ability of the King of
Navarre, the salvation of France must be attributed.
| Eighth Civil War. War of the three Henries.----1585-April
| 30, 1589.
| Battle of Courtras. Oct. 20, 1587.
| The Barricades. Aug. 12, 1588.
| Assassination of Henry of Guise. Dec. 23, 1588.
| Ten years Truce. April 30, 1589.
| Death of Catherine, Jan. 5; Assassination of Henry III.
| July 31, 1589.
Henry III. hoped, in the war which now broke out, to humble the
Huguenots, and yet curb the ambition of the Guises. He accordingly
gave to the Duke of Joyeuse, his favourite, the command of the army
which was to advance against the Huguenots, while he himself opposed
the German ‘reiters’ whom Casimir, brother of the Elector Palatine,
had sent to the assistance of the Protestants. Unfortunately for
the King, Joyeuse was defeated and slain by Henry of Navarre at
Courtras on the Isle (October 20, 1587), and although the ‘reiters’
were forced to retire, the Guises succeeded in gaining the credit
of their retreat. ‘Saul,’ cried the fanatics of Paris, ‘has slain
his thousands, but David his ten thousands.’ Philip was anxious at
this moment to prevent any interference with his schemes for the
Armada. His envoy, Mendoza, therefore urged the Duke of Guise to make
further demands on the King; and on his hesitating to comply with
these, the Duke entered Paris in defiance of the royal command (May
12). The attempt of the King to reassert his authority by ordering the
Municipal Guard and the Swiss to secure the important points of the
city was answered by the ‘barricades’; and Henry III., finding himself
no longer master of his capital, retired to Chartres, never again to
enter Paris. Forced for the moment to submit to the League, the feeble
monarch next tried to outbid the Guises with the deputies of the
States-General, which assembled at Blois on September 16, 1588. But
so extreme were the views adopted by the League at this moment that
this proved impossible. Accordingly, the King turned to the last
expedient of the coward, and ordered the assassination of Henry of
Guise in his royal palace of Blois (December 23, 1588). The Cardinal
of Guise the brother of the Duke, was executed the next day, and the
Cardinal of Bourbon was held a prisoner. ‘Now at last I am King,’ said
Henry. The illusion was soon to be dispelled, for the assassination
of the Duke led to the open revolt of the League. Supported by the
decision of the Sorbonne, it declared that the crown was elective;
and when the ‘Parlement’ resisted, its more obstinate members were
imprisoned. The Duke of Mayenne, the eldest surviving brother of the
murdered Duke, was made Lieutenant-General of the realm, and ruled
Paris with a Council of forty, formed of deputies from the affiliated
societies of the League. The example of Paris was followed elsewhere,
and the League secured most of the important towns of the centre and
south of France. Meantime, the failure of the royal army in Guienne
destroyed the last chance of maintaining an independent attitude, and
the King at last did what he should have done four years before, and
threw himself into the arms of Henry of Navarre. A truce for a year
was made between the two Henries (April 30, 1589). The King promised
to leave the Huguenots undisturbed, and Navarre engaged to oppose the
Duke of Mayenne. The armies of the two Kings shortly after advanced
on Paris, which seemed doomed, when the dagger of the Dominican,
Jacques Clement, an emissary of the League, avenged the assassination
of the Duke of Guise (July 31). The death of the last Valois King
had been preceded only a few months by that of Catherine de’ Medici,
his mother. She died (January 5, 1589), with the reproaches of the
Cardinal of Bourbon ringing in her ears: ‘If you had not deceived us
and brought us here (to Blois) with fine words, the two brothers (the
Guises) would not be dead, and I should be a free man.’
§ 6. _Henry IV. and the League, July 1589--May 1598._
By the assassination of Henry III., Henry of Navarre became the
legitimate King of France. The question was, whether he would make
good his claim. Had he now been willing to declare himself a Roman
Catholic, he would have at once won over the more conservative of
the people, for the League was daily becoming more anarchical; the
Cardinal of Bourbon, who was by it acknowledged as King Charles
X., was but a puppet of Spain; and the Spanish alliance was ever
growing more unpopular. But conversion would have probably lost him
the support of the Huguenots, while it would not have gained the
more fanatical members of the League. Accordingly, Henry refused. He
offered to recognise Catholicism; to grant to the Huguenots no
privileges beyond those they had hitherto gained; and to submit ‘to
the instruction’ of a National or General Council. In thus acting he
was guided by policy, not by conviction; and the interpretation he
would put on his favourite phrase ‘receiving instruction’ would depend
on his success in the field.
| 9th and last Civil War. 1589-1595.
| Battle of Arques, 5 Sept. 1589; and of Ivry, March
| 1590.
| Siege of Paris.
| Death of Alexander of Parma. Dec. 1592.
Not feeling strong enough to attack Paris itself, Henry determined to
hold Picardy, Champagne, and Normandy, whence the capital drew her
supplies. The Duke of Longueville was therefore sent to Picardy, the
Marshal d’Aumont to Champagne, while Henry himself dropped back on
Normandy, and occupied Dieppe, the most important of the Norman ports,
and valuable on account of its proximity to England. The attempt
of the Duke of Mayenne to dislodge him was foiled at the battle
of Arques (September 21). In the following March, 1590, the still
more brilliant victory of Ivry, near Dreux, conclusively proved the
superiority of Henry over his antagonist. Henry perhaps ‘committed the
bravest folly’ that ever was in staking the fate of a kingdom on a
single battle, in which he had far inferior forces; but at least his
intrepidity won for him the admiration of his countrymen. Possibly
if he had pressed on at once, Paris might have been taken; but Henry
had not the faculty of making the best of a victory, and preferred
to continue his more cautious policy of starving the city into
submission. He occupied Corbeil, Lagny, and Creil, which commanded the
upper Seine, the Marne, and the Oise, and by the end of August, Paris
was reduced to fearful straits. ‘Nothing was cheap except sermons.’ As
at Sancerre, dogs, cats, rats, and mice were eagerly devoured; some,
it is said, even ate the flesh of children; and the people were loudly
clamouring for peace or bread, when the approach of Alexander of
Parma, from the Netherlands, baulked Henry of his prey, and forced
him to retire (September 10). In the year 1592, Parma again entered
France, and saved Rouen from Henry’s clutches. In December, however,
the death of the great commander freed the King from immediate
apprehension, and left the League without any leader who could
match him in the field. Nevertheless, the war seemed likely to be
indefinitely protracted. The party of the League indeed threatened to
break up. Mayenne was impatient of Spanish influence, and was becoming
daily more disgusted with the extravagance of the League in Paris. In
the preceding November, the Sixteen had even dared to execute Brisson,
the president of the ‘Parlement,’ and two other judges who opposed
them, and had established a reign of terror. Accordingly, Mayenne had
marched into the city, seized and condemned four of the Sixteen to
death, and reasserted his authority. Hated, however, as he was by the
fanatics, he was in no position to carry on the war with vigour unless
with Spanish help, which he wished to do without.
| Position of Henry of Navarre.
| Declaration of Mantes. July, 1591.
Henry, too, was gaining popularity. Although his sensuality, his
lack of real conviction, his cynical indifference, prevent our
making altogether a hero of the King of Navarre, his superabundant
energy, his splendid courage, his frankness, affability, and genuine
humanity, coupled with his caustic wit, had already endeared him to
his countrymen. And yet he was not powerful enough to win his country
by the sword; the Catholics would not consent to see a heretic on
the throne of France; his attempt to settle the religious difficulty
by the Declaration of Mantes (July, 1591), which acknowledged the
Catholic religion as that of the State, while he himself remained
a Protestant, pleased neither party. Too many, like the Marshal
Biron and D’O, who had control of the finances, were interested in
perpetuating the war, lest a return of peace might deprive them of
employment, or of the hope of carving out a fortune for themselves.
| The States-General. Jan. 26, 1593.
| Henry IV. ‘receives instruction.’ July 23, 1593.
Meanwhile, France was going to ruin. Trade was at a standstill.
Even the more patriotic of the nobles--whether Catholic or
Protestant--despairing of peace, were aiming at their own independence,
and the enemies of France were taking advantage of her weakness;
Philip II. hoped to place his nominee on the throne, and to secure
Brittany; the Duke of Savoy was attempting to encroach on her
south-east frontier; and even Elizabeth of England was demanding
Calais, or some other return for help, niggardly and intermittent
though it was. The earnest desire, therefore, of all the moderate
Catholics in France who were not sold to Philip, that Henry would
‘go to Mass,’ cannot excite surprise. In the spring of 1593, the
meeting of the States-General, summoned to settle the question of the
succession, brought matters to a crisis. The Cardinal of Bourbon had
died in 1590; and, according to the Catholic view, the throne had
been vacant for three years. Philip II., therefore, instructed his
representative the Duke of Feria, to propose that the crown should
be conferred on the Infanta (who through her mother represented the
House of Valois in the female line). If, however, the Salic Law
could not be violated, he was to suggest that the Archduke Ernest,
the Governor of the Netherlands, and brother of the Emperor Rudolf,
should be chosen King, or, failing him, the young Duke of Guise, who
should take the Infanta as his Queen. In all probability, had the Duke
of Feria at once proposed the Duke of Guise as King, he would have
been accepted; but fortunately for Henry IV. he first suggested the
Infanta, and thereby aroused the indignation of the ‘Parlement’
and of all those who cared for the fundamental laws of the country,
and were not wholly sold to Spain. Convinced that delay was perilous,
Henry now accepted the offers of a deputation of the Estates-General
sent to hold conference with him at Suresnes, and promised to
‘receive instruction’ within two months, while at the same time he
strengthened his position by occupying Dreux. On July 23, Henry IV.
recognised the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church as the true one,
and promised obedience. On the following February 27, he was anointed
in the Cathedral of Chartres, since Rheims, where this ceremony should
have been performed, was still in the hands of the League.
In dealing with the justification of Henry’s ‘conversion’ it must
always be remembered that, although by no means a disbeliever, he
had no strong convictions as to the relative merits of Catholicism
and Calvinism, and was a man on whom religious scruples sat somewhat
lightly. To him, therefore, the question would necessarily be one
to be decided on the grounds of political expediency. But some may
be disposed to think that, even if Henry had been convinced of
the superiority of the Huguenot faith, it would still have been
his duty to guide his policy by the same considerations. Any one
in his position, it has been said, would have been justified in
accepting Catholicism as the State religion if he had good grounds
for believing: first, that there was no other way of giving peace
to his country; and secondly, that he could, while officially
recognising Catholicism, secure complete and lasting toleration
for the Huguenots. Of the first, it was not difficult to convince
himself. He had attempted to win France by arms and had failed. We
must remember also that the Huguenots, after all, represented but a
small minority of the nation, and that a large number of the Catholics
preferred the Duke of Guise with his Spanish wife to a heretic
King. Nor is it easy to believe that, if Henry had been willing to
efface himself, any settlement which the Huguenots would have accepted
could have been arrived at. On the second point, opinions will
probably always differ. The danger was that in accepting Catholicism,
he would revive the idea as to the intimate connection between Church
and State in France which led men to look on heresy as treason. We
know that the Edict of Nantes did not last; but whether the Revocation
was inevitable, and, if so, whether Henry ought to have foreseen it,
may well be questioned.
| Henry secures Rouen, March 17; and enters Paris,
| March 21, 1594.
The King of Navarre was thus at last acknowledged King of France. By
his ‘conversion’ he won to his side all Catholics except the most
fanatical of the Leaguers, and those who, like the Dukes of Mayenne
and of Mercœur, were intent on their personal interests. While,
therefore, Henry restrained as far as possible all hostile operations,
he steadily pursued a policy which he had long adopted of buying over
those whose opposition was still to be dreaded. The governors of
provinces were confirmed in their governorships, or offered pensions;
the smaller nobility were tempted by subordinate offices and money;
the cities were promised exemption from extraordinary taxation and
freedom from Huguenot worship within their walls. The wisdom, and
indeed the necessity, of this course have been disputed, and certainly
the evil results of it--the independence of the nobility, the venality
of the government, the serious straining of the finances--long
outlived the King himself. Yet at least it must be confessed that the
policy succeeded. On March 17, Rouen surrendered, and Henry secured
all Normandy. Four days later Brissac, just appointed Governor of
Paris by the Duke of Mayenne, accepted the offers of Henry, brought
over the Parisian magistrates, and opened the gates. The Duke himself
had already left, the Spanish troops were forced to evacuate the city
with some sixty of the more prominent Leaguers, and Henry was at last
master of his capital. ‘That which is Cæsar’s has been given unto
Cæsar,’ said one to the King. ‘Given?’ said he, looking at Brissac;
‘No, sold, and for a goodly price.’
| Dukes of Lorraine and Guise come to terms.
| Jesuits expelled. Dec. 1594. War declared against
| Spain. Jan. 17, 1595.
Henry, anxious to secure his eastern frontier which was always
threatened from the Netherlands, next laid siege to Laon, which
surrendered on the 2nd of August, 1594. A fortnight later Amiens,
and other towns of Picardy, followed its example. The spring of the
year 1595 was marked by a far more important event. Henry succeeded
in conciliating the Duke of Lorraine and the young Duke of Guise. The
former restored the cities of Toul and Verdun; the latter surrendered
his governorship of Champagne in exchange for that of Provence,
where he shortly proved his loyalty by driving out Épernon, one of
Henry III.’s ‘Mignons,’ who, after joining Henry IV., had played
him false. The only important nobles who still held out were the
Dukes of Mayenne and of Mercœur, both members of the House of
Guise, and the Duke of Nemours. The two first were loth to abandon
the ambitions of their family, and hoped, by the aid of Spain, to
turn their governorships of Burgundy and of Brittany into hereditary
principalities. The Duke of Nemours, with the support of Savoy,
threatened the country round Lyons. Henry, therefore, after some
futile negotiations with Spain, in which the idea of Henry’s marrying
the Infanta was entertained, determined to declare open war against
Spain. An open war, he held, was far preferable to a continuation of
unavowed hostilities; the national enthusiasm against the foreigner
might be aroused; all those who continued to resist would incur the
charge of treachery to their country; while the English and the Dutch
promised their assistance. The war was preceded by the expulsion of
the Jesuits. Introduced into France by Henry II. they had made many
enemies; the ‘Parlement’ objected to their extravagant assertions
of papal supremacy, and to their attacks on the prerogatives of the
crown; the Bishops resented their claim to be free from episcopal
authority; the older orders grudged them their popularity, the
University their educational success. Although it does not appear
that the Jesuits had taken any prominent part in the organisation
of the League, and though they were, as a matter of fact, at this
time out of favour in Spain, where they opposed the tyranny of
the Inquisition, they were nevertheless denounced as the tools of
Philip. An attempted assassination of Henry IV. by one of their
pupils, though not apparently instigated by them, brought matters to
a crisis. They were convicted by the ‘Parlement’ of attempting to
subvert the laws of Church and State, of instigating to rebellion and
assassination, and were expelled the kingdom (December 29, 1594).
| The Duke of Mayenne driven from Burgundy.
| Fuentes takes Doullens, July 1595; and besieges
| Cambray.
| The Duke of Mayenne submits. Jan. 1596.
War was declared against Spain on January 17, 1595. The young
Marshal Biron, who had been intrusted with the governorship of
Burgundy, succeeded in driving Mayenne from that province. The King,
on marching to support him against the attack of a Spanish force
under Don Fernan de Velasco, the Constable of Castile, was nearly
surprised at Fontaine-Française. He, however, saved himself by his
intrepidity; and the Spanish general retreated, much to the disgust
of Mayenne. Henry now entered Franche-Comté; but the Swiss who were
guarantors of the neutrality of the country, remonstrated, and the
King, unwilling to incur their hostility, retreated. His presence was
indeed needed elsewhere. The Duke of Longueville, after a successful
campaign in Artois, had died in April; and Turenne, the Duke of
Bouillon, had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Spaniards
under Fuentes, in an attempt to raise the siege of Doullens (July 24,
1595). Doullens fell, and Fuentes laid siege to Cambray, which had
been in French hands since the expedition of the Duke of Anjou in 1581
(cf. p. 361). The King, too late to save Cambray, which capitulated in
October, besieged La Fère, a fortress on the Oise, which the League
had surrendered to the Spaniards, and the siege dragged on through the
winter. The success of Henry in the field had not been brilliant. He
was more successful in diplomacy. In September, 1595, Clement VIII. at
last consented to grant him absolution, and in the following January,
the Duke of Mayenne finally made his peace. The terms he received
were too high. His debts, which were enormous, were paid; he was
made Governor of the Isle de France, and received three fortresses
as places of security. Épernon, who soon followed the example of
Mayenne, was equally well rewarded. Truly Henry was teaching his
people that rebellion, if prolonged, was the way to royal favour.
There now remained no other important noble in arms except the Duke
of Mercœur; and the winning of Marseilles by the young Duke of
Guise, which also took place in January, caused Henry to declare
‘that God had indeed pity for France.’ Yet the outlook was not very
promising. The financial straits were severe: Elizabeth would not, and
the Dutch could not, render any efficient help; while the Huguenots
were becoming very troublesome. They were scandalised at the desire of
Henry IV. to get a divorce from his faithless and hated wife, Margaret
of Valois, that he might marry his mistress, Gabrielle d’Estrées;
they were outraged by the delay of the King in dealing with their
grievances, while the rebellious Leaguers were receiving all that they
could desire, and they even talked of enforcing their claims by arms.
| Archduke Albert takes Calais. April, 1596.
| Sully’s financial reforms.
In April, 1596, the new Governor of the Netherlands, the Cardinal
Archduke Albert, invaded France and inflicted a serious blow on the
prestige of Henry’s army by taking Calais. The town might have been
saved if Elizabeth had not demanded its possession as a price of
her assistance, and higgled till it was too late. In the ensuing
month, Henry, in a measure, balanced this serious loss by taking La
Fère, and by driving the Archduke across the frontier; but he was
quite unable to dislodge the Spanish garrisons from Calais or from
Doullens. If the war was to be continued with vigour, money at least
must be found; and to this object the Baron de Rosny (Sully), who had
lately been appointed ‘surintendant’ of the finances, now turned his
attention. New offices were created, which were sold to the highest
bidder. Loans were extorted from the rich. Those who had filled their
pockets by frauds on the exchequer were forced to disgorge part of
their ill-gotten gains, and some attempt was made to put a stop to
such corruption in the future. The tax on salt was raised, and in the
autumn an Assembly of Notables granted the King the ‘Pancarte,’ or
duty of 5 per cent. on all goods offered for sale.[83]
| Porto Carrero seizes Amiens. Mar. 11, 1597.
| Amiens recovered. Sept. 19, 1597.
| Philip agrees to a truce.
| The Duc de Mercœur submits. Mar. 20, 1598.
Yet what Henry gained with one hand he was, with his usual
recklessness, ready to spend with the other. Much of the money thus
obtained was being thrown away on expensive festivities in Paris,
when the news suddenly arrived that Porto Carrero, the Governor of
Doullens, had seized the important town of Amiens by a clever _coup
de main_ (March 11, 1597). ‘Enough,’ said Henry, ‘of playing the
King of France; ’tis time to be the King of Navarre again.’ Biron
was despatched to besiege Amiens forthwith. In June, the King
followed himself with an army, in which the presence of Montmorenci,
Mayenne, and Épernon showed that the old factions had been well-nigh
extinguished. The English and the Dutch also sent reinforcements, in
pursuance of a treaty of alliance which they had made in the previous
year (August-October, 1596). On September 3, Porto Carrero died. The
Archduke Albert, unable to raise supplies even on credit, owing to
Philip’s late act of repudiation, could not advance to the relief of
the garrison till September 12; then, finding himself in the presence
of a superior force, he retreated ‘like a priest,’ and on September
19, 1597, Amiens was at last recovered. Henry now determined to
take advantage of his success to negotiate with Spain. Philip did
not refuse his offer. Tortured by disease, knowing that his end was
approaching, that Spain could no longer bear the strain of war, and
that his feeble son was not likely to succeed where he had failed, he
was anxious to leave his country at peace. He accordingly agreed to a
truce, and to hold a conference at Vervins in the following January
for finally settling the terms of peace. The affairs of Brittany Henry
was determined to settle without any foreign interference; and this he
succeeded in doing without drawing the sword. The Bretons, despairing
of successful resistance now that the aid of Spain was withdrawn,
deserted the Duke of Mercœur, who was forced to come to terms at
Angers (March 20). He surrendered the governorship of Brittany, with
the hand of his daughter, to Cæsar, the illegitimate son of the King
by Gabrielle d’Estrées, and received a pension in return. Thus at
last all resistance had ended, and France was once more united.
| The Edict of Nantes. April 15, 1598.
The King was now in a position to attend to the grievances of the
Huguenots. On entering Paris he had republished the Edict of 1576,
with the amendments added thereto by the treaties of Bergerac and
Fleix. Since he could no longer be their Protector, nor allow any
other to hold that position, he had also authorised the Huguenots
to organise themselves into a federative system for defence, and
ten provinces had been formed, each with its elected assembly and a
General Council of ten nominated by the assemblies. But the Huguenots
were not satisfied; they complained that these concessions were
not sufficient, and that they were often violated. All members of
the League, whether noble or town, who came to terms were allowed
to forbid the exercise of the Protestant religion within their
jurisdiction, and what security had the Huguenots that one who could
so lightly change his own religion would care or dare to protect that
of others? They therefore had demanded more formal ratification of
the privileges already granted them, an extension of the system of
‘Chambres mi-parties’ to all the ‘Parlements’ of France, and admission
to all offices. The King, in spite of the grave discontent which at
times threatened to break out in open war, had hitherto refused to
satisfy their demands; until the Catholics were completely reconciled
such a policy might be dangerous, and certainly would be futile, since
Henry was not strong enough to enforce his promises. Now, however,
that he was really master of France, he had neither the excuse nor
the wish to delay any longer. Negotiations had, indeed, been going
on for some time, and finally led to the Edict of Nantes, which was
published on April 15, 1598. The clauses of this famous Edict followed
closely on the lines of the Treaty of Bergerac of 1577. The Huguenots
were permitted to hold divine service in all towns specified by that
treaty, or in which it had been held in 1596 and 1597; and besides
this, in one town in each bailiwick and in the fiefs of Protestant
nobles. In these privileged towns they were also allowed to found
colleges and schools, and to print books. Paris, however, as before,
with a circuit of five leagues, was especially exempted till 1606,
when the King allowed a temple to be built at Charenton, five miles
distant. Huguenot ministers were to be exempt from military service,
and the King promised to contribute an annual sum for their support;
while the Protestants, on their part, were to pay tithes. In the
‘Parlements’ of Paris, Rouen, and Rennes, special ‘Chambres de
l’Édit’--one of the judges of which was to be a Protestant--were to
be established to try cases in which Huguenots were concerned; while
three ‘Chambres mi-parties’ at Castres, Bordeaux, and Gap were to
exercise a similar jurisdiction in the south. Finally, the Huguenots
were to be allowed to hold synods, to have admission to all colleges
and schools; all offices were to be open to them, and they were to
suffer in no way for their religion. They were to hold the eight
cities they possessed for eight years, but to allow the Catholic
worship to continue there. Considering that the Huguenots did not
number more than one-twelfth of the population of France, the terms
they thus obtained were as favourable as they could expect, and all
that was perhaps possible in the existing condition of France.
But the principle on which the Edict was based was radically
faulty. It can scarcely be called an Edict of general toleration, for
no other religion but that of Calvinism was allowed. Moreover, the
concession of the privilege of worship to individual nobles, and to
congregations in special towns, tended to accentuate the independence
and isolation of the Huguenots, and to perpetuate the centrifugal
tendencies, both of feudalism and of federative republicanism, which
the wars of religion had intensified, and which were yet to give
trouble to France. As long as there was a King on the throne willing
and able to enforce the Edict, the compromise continued fairly
satisfactory. But after he was gone, the chances that the Edict
would be permanent day by day became less. The Huguenots, partly in
self-defence, partly in pursuance of political aims which the Edict
had fostered, attempted to form those towns which had been granted
them into a semi-independent federation; and when, to check this,
Richelieu deprived them of these pledges for the fulfilment of the
Edict, he left them to fall defenceless before the tyranny and bigotry
of Louis XIV.
| Peace of Vervins. May 2, 1598.
While Henry was thus removing the last traces of opposition in France,
the negotiations with Spain had been going on; and, on May 2, the
Peace of Vervins was signed. Spain evacuated all the conquests she
had made in France during the last war with the exception of Cambray;
Henry, on his part, restoring the county of Charolais. The Duke of
Savoy came to terms at the same time; he surrendered Berre, the only
place he held in Provence; while the question as to the Marquisate of
Saluces, which he had seized in 1588, was referred to the arbitration
of the Pope.[84] Neither the Dutch nor the English were included in
the Peace. The Dutch refused to enter into any treaty which did not
recognise their independence, while Elizabeth was not unwilling to
see the war continue between France and Spain. She had even attempted
to make capital out of the negotiations, going so far as to suggest
to Philip that he should cede Calais in exchange for Brille and
Flushing, which she still held. Henry accordingly contented himself
with securing the right of his allies to become parties to the treaty
within six months.
Conclusion.
| Condition of Europe at the Peace of Vervins.
| Decline of Spain.
The Treaty of Vervins scarcely made any alteration in the political
geography of Europe. Its importance lies rather in the changed
conditions which accompanied it, and followed it. A few months
after the signing of that treaty, Philip II. died (September 12,
1598) in his seventy-second year, at the Escurial--that magnificent
though somewhat strange mixture of ‘a palace, a monastery, and a
tomb,’ which is the chief architectural monument of his reign. Had
Philip been a wiser man, he might have retained the obedience of the
Netherlands, and profited by their industry and their colonies. He
might have developed the resources and the constitutional liberties
of his country, and enriched her by commerce with America. He might
have turned her arms against the Turk, made himself master of the
Mediterranean, and left Spain consolidated and prosperous. Intent,
however, on more magnificent schemes, he had failed disastrously. His
attempt to lead the Catholic reaction, and to re-establish the
unity of the Church on the basis of Spanish supremacy, had ended in
disaster. The defeat of the Armada had saved England from both Spain
and Rome. The United Provinces had virtually won their religious and
political freedom, and Henry IV. had bowed the Spaniard from his
doors. Meanwhile Spain, exhausted by the constant drain which the vast
attempts involved, and ruined by the disastrous policy pursued at home
(cf. ch. vii.), was fast declining. After Philip’s death her royal
race degenerated rapidly; and with a shrinking population, paralysed
industries, and attenuated resources, she was forced to step aside and
leave the struggle for supremacy to others.
| Successes of the Catholic Reaction.
And yet the Catholic reaction, of which Philip had been the leading
spirit, had not been without its successes. If England, the United
Netherlands, and the Scandinavian kingdoms had decisively broken away
from Rome, Protestantism had been completely crushed out in Spain and
in Italy, and in 1587, Catholicism was finally restored in Poland by
Sigismund. In France, if the Huguenots had secured toleration, that
toleration was not to last; and Catholicism had not only captured the
King, but had again been recognised as the religion of the State. In
Germany, too, the advance of Protestantism had, since the middle of
the century, been arrested. The Jesuits had by this time made their
influence felt, not only by their missionary and educational work
among the people, but also on the policy of the Princes. In Bavaria,
Albert III. (1550-1579) drove out the Protestants, and made his Duchy
a stronghold of Catholicism. In 1576, Rudolf II. succeeded his father,
Maximilian II., in the most important of the Austrian dominions,[85]
and was elected Emperor. Maximilian had been half-inclined towards
Lutheranism. Rudolf, educated under the influence of his mother,
the daughter of Charles V., and subsequently at the Spanish Court,
was strongly Catholic. He dismissed the Protestant preachers from
Vienna, and supported a Catholic policy in the Empire. The advance
of Catholicism was also favoured by the dissensions between the
Lutherans and the Calvinists, who were respectively headed by the
Electors of Saxony and of the Palatinate. Under these circumstances,
quarrels over the controverted clauses of the Peace of Augsburg were
inevitable (cf. pp. 248-9). The Catholics questioned the right of the
Bishop of Magdeburg to a seat in the Diet, and, in 1581, had driven
Gebhard Truchsess from his Electoral See of Cologne, because these two
prelates had embraced Protestantism.
| Disorganised condition of Germany.
Day by day the relations between the adherents of the two creeds
became more strained. Already the Thirty Years’ War was looming in
the distance--a war in which Protestantism was indeed to hold her
own, but at the price of the destruction of German nationality and
unity, almost of German independence, and of the crippling of national
prosperity and intellectual growth for more than a century.
| Condition of France.
| Revival of the Royal authority.
France, it is true, had suffered severely from her civil war of
thirty-six years. Trade and industry had been ruined, and her
finances heavily strained. The venality of her administrative system
had been increased. The Estates-General and the ‘Parlements,’ the
representatives of constitutional life, had been discredited; the
former by the extreme views it had at times adopted, both by their
subservience to the League. The power and self-importance of the
nobles had been increased during the civil wars, and by the system
adopted by Henry IV. of buying off their opposition. The desire for
federative republicanism had grown with the growth of Calvinism. All
these things had been the results of the religious wars. Yet after
all, it was the royal power and prestige which in the end had
benefited most from the internal discords. It was Henry who had given
his country peace at last, and thereby earned the gratitude of his
people; he it was who chiefly gained by the discredit into which the
organs of constitutional life had fallen, and by the divisions and
dissensions of his subjects. The nobles, indeed, were dangerous, but
Henry IV. was successful in defeating their intrigues. His able,
though self-sufficient and egotistical minister, Sully, reorganised
the finances, and did something to check the venality and corruption
which existed. The marvellous recuperative powers of the country
came to his assistance; and France under the clever, though somewhat
cynical, rule of her great King became once more a first-rate
Power. Had Henry lived longer, or had he been succeeded by a capable
son, the Thirty Years’ War would probably not have occurred, or
would have been ended sooner. The House of Hapsburg might have been
humbled to the dust, and France might have established a dangerous
supremacy in Europe. The assassination of Henry IV. in 1610 prevented
this; France, on his death, became the victim of a weak minority,
and a troubled regency; and Europe was not threatened with a French
supremacy until the reign of Louis XIV.
FOOTNOTES:
[80] Probably a corruption of the German word ‘Eidgenossen’
(confederates), first applied to the Protestant party in Geneva.
[81] Cf. Appendix I. for meaning of this.
[82] Henry held Lower Navarre and the Principality of Béarn in
his own right, and, as fiefs, the Duchies of Vendôme, Beaumont,
and Albret; the Counties of Bigorre, Armagnac, Rouergue,
Perigord, and Marle; the Viscounties of Limoges, and other
lordships. See Map of France.
[83] While Sully had been doing something to replenish the
exchequer of King Henry, his antagonist, Philip, attempted a more
summary method. On November 20, 1596, he publicly revoked all
assignments, or mortgages by which the taxes on the royal domain
had been pledged for money advanced to him. The pretext for this
wholesale repudiation was that his exertions for Christianity had
reduced him to beggary, while the money-lenders had been growing
rich at his expense. The deed, however, produced a panic. The
chief merchants and bankers suspended payment, and the credit of
Spain received a shock from which it did not easily recover.
[84] The Marquisate of Saluzzo in Piedmont had been ceded to
France by the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis, cf. p. 257. Henry IV.
in 1601 exchanged it with the Duke of Savoy for Bresse, Bugey,
and Gex.
[85] His brothers, Ferdinand and Charles, received Tyrol and
Styria. These were reunited to Austria proper under Ferdinand
II., and the Austrian dominions were declared indivisible, 1621.
APPENDIX I
THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION IN THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES.
Cf. Gasquet, _Institutions Politiques et Sociales de la
France_. Chéruel, _Dictionnaire Historique des Institutions de la
France_.
I. Central Administration.--_Conseil du Roi_ (King’s Council), or
_Conseil d’État_ (Council of State). The supreme Executive Council
of the realm. It also exercised _Legislative_ powers through its
Ordinances, and high _Judicial_ power until organisation of the Grand
Conseil.
=1.= Sometimes heard ultimate appeals from the Sovereign Law
Courts.
=2.= Evoked cases from other Courts in which public interests were
involved.
=3.= Heard complaints against the royal officials. These Judicial
Powers were subsequently transferred to--
=α.= The Grand Conseil.--Finally organised in 1497, to decide
questions of disputed jurisdiction between the other sovereign
Courts, but never very important. Composed of the Constable (the
Chief Military Officer), the Chancellor (the Supreme Civil Officer),
the Princes of the Blood, Officers of State.
=β.= The Conseil Privé or des parties. A Judicial Committee of the
Council erected in the seventeenth century.
A number of clerks (Maîtres de Requêtes) under the Conseil du
Roi, worked various Departmental Councils, such as those of War and
Finance.
II. Central Courts of Justice.
_A._ The Parlement of Paris.--The Central Judicial Court of the Realm,
sharing with the Grand Conseil the right of hearing appeals from all
subordinate Courts.
It also (1) issued Arrêts, or Injunctions.
(2) Registered all royal ordinances, treaties of peace, and other
public documents; and, from the reign of Louis XI., claimed the right
of refusing to register--a right which gradually ripened into a right
of veto. The King, however, could always override its veto by holding
a ‘Lit de Justice’--_i.e._ by summoning the Parlement, in solemn
assembly, before the Peers of France and the officers of State, and
ordering it to register.
Its members held office for life, and were, since the reign of
Louis XI., irremovable, unless convicted of some penal offence. As
membership was generally purchased from the King, they became
saleable, and, after the reign of Henry IV., practically hereditary.
The Parlement was divided into five Courts:--
1. _The Grand Chambre._--This heard all appeals of great importance,
and cases of first instance which concerned the Peers; cases of
treason; and criminal charges against royal officials and members of
the Parlement.
2. _Chambre des Requêtes._--Decided smaller cases of first instance.
3. _Chambre des Enquêtes._--Heard smaller cases of appeal, and
prepared the more important appeals for the Grand Chambre.
4. _Chambre de la Tournelle._--Tried less important criminal cases.
5. _Chambre de l’Édit._--Established after the Edict of Nantes,
1598, to try cases between Catholics and Huguenots. One or two of
the judges were to be Protestants.
_B._ Chambre des Comptes.--Exercised jurisdiction in all
financial matters dealing with the royal domain, and audited
accounts of the Baillis and Sénéschals; registered edicts
concerning the royal domain, and recorded the fealty and homage of
tenants-in-chief. Jurisdiction civil--not criminal.
_C._ Cour des Aides.--Exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction over
cases dealing with Taxation, and audited accounts of the Élus who
collected the direct taxes.
III. Local Justice and Administration.
1. _Provincial Parlements_, exercising the same authority as the
Parlement of Paris within their districts, existed in the fifteenth
century at--
Toulouse for Province of Languedoc, instituted 1443.
Grenoble „ Dauphiné, „ 1453.
Bordeaux „ Guienne, „ 1462.
Dijon „ Burgundy, „ 1477.
And the following were added during the sixteenth century at--
Aix for Provence, 1501.
Rouen for Normandy, 1515.
Rennes for Brittany, 1553.
Five more were subsequently added--
Pau for Béarn, 1620.
Metz „ 3 Bishoprics, 1633.
Douai „ Flanders, 1686.
Besançon „ Franche-Comté, 1676.
Nancy „ Lorraine, 1769.
Most of these Provinces had their separate Chambre des Comptes, and
Cour des Aides.
2. _The Baillis or Sénéschals_ (with Prévôts under them).
(_a_) Collected the dues from the royal domains (while the Élus
collected the regular direct taxes).
(_b_) Tried petty cases.
(_c_) Administered affairs, civil and military, of their Bailliage or
Sénéchaussée.
Their jurisdiction was subordinated to that of the Parlements, and
their financial accounts were under the Cours des Comptes, while that
of the Élus were audited by the Cours des Aides.
Francis I., however, appointed new officers--_the Lieutenants, Civil
and Criminel_--to whom, by the ordinance of 1560, the judicial
functions of the Baillis and Sénéschals were transferred. After that
date the importance of the Baillis and Sénéschals rapidly declined,
especially after the final institution of the Intendants by Richelieu.
Francis I. also appointed twelve _Lieutenants-Général_ over the
frontier Provinces. During the Civil War these were extended to most
of the Provinces; and the _Governors_, as they now were called, made
themselves so powerful as to be ‘very kings.’ Henry IV. did his best
to buy off these Governors; but their power was not finally overthrown
till the time of Richelieu.
3. In 1551 Henry II. instituted _Tribunaux Présidiaux_ as
intermediate Courts between the Parlements and those of the Baillis or
Sénéschals.
4. The nobles still retained their Seignorial Courts; but these,
jealously watched by the Baillis and Sénéschals, were confined to
questions between the Seigneur and his dependants.
5. The towns enjoyed municipal government, which varied very much, but
was usually composed of a General Assembly which elected a Corps de
Ville, which in its turn elected a municipality composed of the Mayor
and échevins (sheriffs). In Paris the Prévôt des Marchands took the
place of the Mayor. The rights of election, however, became day by day
more and more visionary. The officials were usually nominated by the
Crown, often in return for money. The towns also had their Courts, but
the judicial powers, always limited, were finally withdrawn.
In Paris, however, there was a peculiar Court, that of the
_Châtelet,_ under the Prévôt of Paris (to be distinguished from
the Prévôt des Marchands). The Prévôt of Paris had no Baillis
or Sénéschal over him. He administered the police of the city,
and heard cases on appeal from the Seignorial Courts of the town
and district, as well as certain cases especially reserved to the
_Châtelet_, such as dowries, rights of succession to property, etc.
The Estates-General (États Généraux).
Composed of three Chambers, consisting of deputies from the three
Orders of Nobles, Clergy, Tiers État (Third Estate).
_Mode of Election._--On fixed day, nobles, clergy, and townsmen met
in chief town of Bailliage or Sénéchaussée.
_Nobles and Clergy by direct Election._--The nobles and clergy drew
up their cahiers (petitions), and elected their deputies separately.
_Tiers État by double Election._--The townsmen chose a body of
electors, who drew up the cahier, and elected the deputy.
After 1484 the peasants of the villages took part in the election of
the Electoral Body.
In some of the Provinces a different system prevailed. Thus in
Languedoc and Champagne, the three orders elected their deputies in
common; in Brittany, the deputies of one order were chosen by the
other two orders.
_Procedure._--On the meeting of Estates-General the three orders
were summoned to a Royal Séance (Session), in which the reasons for
the summons were given.
The orders then separated, and each order proceeded to draw up their
general cahier apart. The three cahiers having then been presented
to the King, the States-General was dismissed.
_Powers._--The States-General were originally summoned not to
discuss, but to hear the will of the King, and to present
grievances.
These Petitions were of considerable value, for, although the
States-General was dismissed without having received the answer of
the King, the cahiers often furnished the basis for royal
ordinances. At various dates the Estates-General attempted to gain
the same powers as those finally secured by the English Parliament:
1. Frequent and regular Sessions.
2. That their petitions should be answered.
3. Control of taxation and of policy.
4. Appointment, or at least responsibility, of ministers.
But in spite of notable attempts, especially those of 1355-1358,
1484, 1561 (p. 398), 1576-7 (p. 423), 1588 (p. 431), the
States-General failed in obtaining its object, and after 1614,
ceased to be summoned until 1789.
_Reasons for failure of the States-General._--It is sometimes said
that the States-General did not represent France; it is more correct
to say that it represented France too well--in its want of cohesion,
its class divisions, its absence of local government. Nor were the
circumstances of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
propitious. During that period, the hundred years’ war, and the
religious wars, led the people of France to lean on the King; the
privileges of the feudal nobles prevented any unanimity between the
upper and lower classes, and allowed the bureaucracy to gain such
strength that it was impossible subsequently to overthrow it.
Thus the causes of failure may be tabulated as follows:--
1. The existence of three Houses prevented unanimity, more
especially because they represented class divisions which were
deep. The nobility being a caste dependent on blood; while the
upper offices of the Church were also filled by nobles.
2. There was no class of country gentry as in England, from whom
the knights of the shire were elected, and who united with the
burgesses in the House of Commons.
3. The number of royal officials elected as deputies of Tiers
État was generally very large.
4. The Estates-General of Orleans (1439), in establishing a
permanent army by the Ordonnance sur la Gendarmerie, was held to
have granted to the King a permanent tax, _the Taille_; and this,
in spite of several protests, was subsequently increased at the
royal will.
5. Since the nobles and clergy were exempt from the Taille--the
first because they served in the feudal array; the latter because
of their clerical privileges--the deputies of these two orders did
not support the Tiers État in their attempt to control the
purse. Thus the States-General lost the control of the purse.
6. There was no efficient local government like that of the
English shire. The real power being in the hands of the royal
officials, the Baillis and the Sénéschals, and later, of the
Intendants.
Provincial Estates.--It is true that all the Provinces of France
originally had their Provincial Estates composed of three orders.
(1) But in many Provinces they were artificial creations.
(2) They were weakened by the same class divisions as the
States-General.
Accordingly after the fifteenth century many Provinces lost their
Estates, and finally only some four survived the reign of Louis
XIV., and even those had but little power beyond that of assessing
the Taille.
The Church.--The Church had its
(1) _Ecclesiastical Courts_, which as elsewhere in Europe had
attempted to extend their jurisdiction very widely, not only over
clergy but over laity. By the end of the fifteenth century, however,
their jurisdiction was confined to offences of clerics or laics
against morals, the law or doctrine of the Church, and to cases
concerning the marriage and death-bed--_e.g._ divorce, wills, etc.;
any attempt on the part of the Ecclesiastical Courts to encroach on
the domain of secular jurisdiction being met by the Appels comme
d’abus (abuse), which were presented to the Parlement of Paris.
(2) Its Assemblies, in which, in and after the sixteenth century, the
clergy voted ‘dons gratuits’ (voluntary offerings) to the Crown.
The relations of the Church to the Crown and to the Pope were further
defined by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, and the Concordat of
Bologna (cf. p. 81).
TAXATION.
The revenue during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was drawn
from the following sources:--
I. The Royal Domain.
(_a_) Feudal incidents.
(_b_) Profits of Justice.
(_c_) Rights appertaining to the King as Sovereign--_e.g._ of
succeeding to property of aliens dying without heirs, and of all
bastards; fines on land granted in mortmain.
II. Direct Taxes.
(1) _The Taille_, which was of two kinds--
(_a_) In the _Pays d’États_ it was generally a tax on the value of
land, assessed by regular assessments, under orders of the
Provincial Assembly.
(_b_) In the other parts of France (the _Pays d’Élection_), it was a
tax levied on presumed income derived from whatever source, and
assessed in a very arbitrary fashion by Élus, who were responsible
to the Cour des Aides.
_Exempt from the Taille_ were Nobles following arms, Clergy, Students
at the Universities, Royal Officials, Municipal Authorities. Thus the
tax fell practically on the lower classes.
(2) _Dons Gratuits._--Taxes on clergy voted by ecclesiastical
assemblies.
III. Indirect Taxes.
(1) _Aides._--Dues levied on the sale of food-stuffs, wine, and other
articles.
(2) _Gabelles._--Salt was a royal monopoly; and every household had to
buy so much salt for every member above the age of eight. The price
was very high, but varied, as well as the amount to be bought, in
different Provinces.
(3) _Customs_ at the frontiers of every Province. These in later
days were so heavy that a cask of wine would pay its value before it
reached Paris.
(4) _Sale of Offices._--By the end of the sixteenth century there was
scarcely any royal office which was not sold.
The Aides, Gabelles, and Customs were in the hands of farmers of the
taxes, who exercised great extortion.
APPENDIX II
CONSTITUTION OF FLORENCE IN THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES.
I. Based on System of _Guilds_ (since 1282), cf. Von Reumont, Lorenzo
de Medici, vol. i. pp. 15 and 67. Villari, _Florence_, p. 312 ff.
Seven Greater Arti = Popolo Grasso.
Fourteen Lesser Arti = Popolo Minuto.
Each with its Council, Consuls, and Proconsuls. Number of eligible
citizens (Statuali), some 5000 out of 100,000.
II. Executive.--The _College,_ composed of Signory and Collegi--_I tre
Maggiori_ (offices).
(1) _Signoría_ appointed for two months. Its members (unpaid with
exception of its Secretary, and Chancellor), lived in Palazzo Publico
at public cost.
Powers.--(_a_) Initiation of Legislation.
(_b_) Supreme Executive power.
(_c_) Right of summoning a Parlamento.
Members.--A. _Gonfalonier of Justice_ (first instituted 1293), must
be forty-five years of age and a member of one of Arti
Maggiori. Presided over all Councils--and could call out the
Militia. Originally elected by the Councils, but subsequently
appointed by lot. Cf. below.
B. _Eight Priori._--Two from each quarter of the city
(originally elected by the Arts), must be thirty years old and
members of a guild (six from Arti Maggiori, two from Minori since
1345). Each Prior presided with Gonfalonier for three days, and
could put any measure to the vote if Gonfalonier refused. (‘Il
proposto.’)
(2) _The Colleagues_ (_Collegi_).
(_a_) Twelve _Buonuomini_ (nine from greater, three from lesser
Arts). These acted as a Privy Council and check on the Signory.
(_b_) Sixteen _Gonfaloniers_ of the sixteen militia companies (four
from each quarter of the city), under the _Capitano del Popolo_.
(_c_) Nine assessors of the Priors.
A permanent paid Secretary called ‘Second Chancellor.’
_Exceptional. Capitani di Parte Guelfa._--These instituted in 1297,
for protection of city against Ghibellines, were continued long after
danger had passed away. They were from three to nine in number,
elected for two months, and empowered to administer proceeds of
confiscated property of Ghibellines exiled or condemned, and as these
sums were large the Capitani undertook the maintenance of fortresses
and defences and public buildings.
By Law of 1358 all who held or had held office might be accused
openly or secretly before the Capitani as being no genuine Guelph. No
witnesses for defence allowed--and if the accusation was supported by
six witnesses worthy of belief the accused could be condemned to fine
or death, without appeal.
By the end of the fourteenth century, however, this tyrannical
organisation had somewhat lost its power.
III. Foreign Affairs were in hands of--
(1) Dieci di Guerra--called later Dieci di libertà e Pace--first
appointed 1423.
(2) Two Councils, which considered the bills concerning foreign
affairs before they went to the ordinary Councils.
(_a_) _Consiglio del Dugento._--Two hundred of those who had held
the highest offices of State.
(_b_) _Consiglio Centotrentuno,_ 131 (the Signory, Captains of
Guelph Party, Ten of War, Councils of craftsmen, Consuls of Guilds,
and forty-eight citizens).
IV. Legislation after 1328.
A Law approved by the College went to--
1. The Two Councils of the Capitano del Popolo.
(_a_) Consiglio di Credenza or del Cento, 100 officials of guilds,
sometimes called Senate, often disregarded. Cf. Nardi, 1, 4
(b). Symonds, _Age of Despots_, p. 530.
(_b_) Consiglio del Popolo, 300 originally chosen from the greater
Arts--later from others as well, renewed every four months.
2. The Two Councils of the Podestà.
(_a_) A special Council of 90.
(_b_) The larger Consiglio del Podestà or del Commune, some
390. This contained judges and law officers (and therefore nobles,
since nobles could hold these offices), as well as popolani, and
were renewed every four months.
Finally, a law having passed these Councils had to be submitted to a
General Council of them all.
The Signory and the colleagues _ex officio_ were members of these
Councils.
_System of voting._ By ballot. Black and white beans. Black = yes,
white = no. ⅔ of black beans necessary to carry a question.
Tenere le fave or il partito = To vote no.
Rendere le fave or il partito = To vote yes.
L’autorità dei sei fave = Majority of ⅔ in Signory.
(6 out of 9.)
Il piu della fave = ⅔ of votes.
V. Justice.
=1.= _Court of Capitano del Popolo_--a paid officer--must be a foreign
noble and lawyer. Exercised summary criminal jurisdiction, especially
over Plebs.
=2.= _Court of Podestà_--a paid officer--must be a foreign (Italian)
noble and lawyer. Exercised higher civil and criminal jurisdiction.
=3.= _Executor of Justice_--a paid officer--must be a popolano and a
Guelph and a foreigner. Exercised summary jurisdiction, especially
over nobles.
All these held office for six months.
=4.= _Casa della Mercatanzia._ A tribunal for decision of Commercial
Cases, which also acted as a Board of Trade.
=5.= _Otto di Balía e Guardia_, nominated by Signory, held office for
four months.
A court of appeal from Court of Podestà and with powers of police.
The Signoria and the Otto had power to execute, banish, or imprison
any citizen.
VI. Mode of Appointment to Chief Magistracies.
Originally elected by the Councils, but subsequently this
replaced by system of ‘lot.’
For each office a purse (borsa), was formed every three or five years
of all citizens eligible to said office, and names were drawn out of
this purse.
In case of Priors, fifty wax balls, each containing eight names (six
from Arti Maggiori, two from Minori), were put in the purse, and then
a ball was drawn out.
_Eligibility_ (Benefiziati, the Eligible).--This was decided by a
Squittino (Scrutiny) conducted by a board--and persons could be
considered ineligible ‘messo a sedere,’ for the following reasons (the
disenfranchised 9000 out of 100,000):--
=1.= (_a_) _Grandi._--By Ordini della Guistizia, 1293, nobles could
not be members of the Signoria or of the Collegi or of
Consiglio del Popolo until 1434, when Cosimo allowed them to
enter Guilds.
(_b_) The Plebe or Ciompi, all not members of Guilds.
(_c_) Inhabitants of Contado, country districts.
=2.= _Ammonito._--’Warned’ for any political offence, _e.g._ being a
Ghibelline, and denounced by the Capitano del Parti Guelfa;
disqualification for life or shorter time. This system carried to
great extravagance. ‘Hast thou no enemy? Consent to admonish mine
and I will do the same by thine.’ Cf. Napier, ii. 235.
=3.= _Moroso di Specchio_ (mirror).--One who had not paid his
taxes. (_Netto di Specchio_, freed from this ineligibility.) By law
of 1421, taxes must have been paid for thirty years by self, father
and grandfather.
=4.= _Divieto_ (prohibited).--Even after names were drawn a man
might be disqualified because he or a relation had recently held
office--’veduto ma non seduto.’
The members of the board bound to secrecy, but
(1) As the period for which the purses had been made up drew to its
close, it became possible to guess who would be the coming
magistrates, and there were charlatans who pretended to foretell
this.
(2) The members of the boards of scrutiny were bribed to divulge the
names who would be drawn.
_Legalised Revolution._--At times of crisis the Signoria would
summon a Parlamento nominally of the whole citizens, but generally
only of party adherents, who granted exceptional powers (Balía) to a
certain number of citizens.
The _Balía_ (1) could alter the constitution.
(2) Appointed Accopiatori (couplers or joiners) who
selected those eligible to office, and sometimes
nominated the officials, _i.e._ appointed ‘a mano’
instead of ‘a sorte.’
In 1459 (under Cosimo) a council of 100 was instituted to elect the
Accopiatori.
Florence enjoyed political, but _no_ civil liberty.
(1) Powers of magistrates unchecked.
(2) No appeal from Law Courts. Arbitrary Jurisdiction.
(3) No liberty of Press.
CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION.
_N.B._ Signory lasted till 1530.
I. Under Lorenzo.
1472. Burd, _Machiavelli_, 81, 85, 89; Perrens’ _Histoire de Florence,
Depuis la domination des Médicis_, 1, 362, 445, 523; Armstrong,
_Lorenzo de’ Medici_.
Arti reduced to 12 by suppression of 9 Arti minori.
1480. After Pazzi Conspiracy.
_Consiglio de Settanta_ (College of 70), appointed by Signoria
with power to fill up its own vacancies from those who had held
office of Gonfalonier.
_Its work_ (_a_) To permanently nominate to offices (a mano).
(_b_) Appoint the _Otto di Pratica_ which superseded
the old Dieci di Libertà e Pace.
This College, originally appointed for five years, was
continually reappointed.
In 1490. This College intrusted some of its powers to a smaller
Committee of 17, of whom Lorenzo was one; and this Committee
(_a_) Appointed Accopiatori to nominate to offices.
(_b_) Supervised every branch of administration.
II. 1494. Savonarola’s Reforms. Cf. Burd, p. 94. Guicciardini, _Storia
Fiorentia_, iii. 120. Villari, _Savonarola_, p. 257. Perrens, ii.
c. 3. _Cambridge Mod. Hist._, vol. i. p. 158.
(1) Temporary.--A Parlamento summoned, who appointed 20 Accopiatori
(_Governo de’ Venti_). These filled up magistracies for the year and
prepared a Squittino for the future.
(2) Permanent.--Constitution formed in imitation of Venice. Consiglio
del Popolo and del Commune and Parlamento abolished.
=A.= _Consiglio Generale_, or Maggiore, formed of all eligible
‘benefiziati’ citizens (all those of age of 29 whose father,
grandfather, or great-grandfather had been veduto _or_ seduto for
one of three greater offices, about 3000). But if the number of the
‘benefiziati’ exceeded 1500, they were to be ‘sterzati,’ _i.e._
divided into 3, and ⅓ of the whole number were to form the Consiglio
for 6 months. A small number of citizens, above age of 24 and
otherwise qualified, were admitted, and each year 60 eligible but
neither veduto nor seduto might be elected if they received
two-thirds of votes.
=B.= _Consiglio degli Ottanta_, a Senate elected out of and by
Consiglio Generale for six months, must be 40 years of age.
The Senate was to advise _The Signory_ (which remained as before),
and elect ambassadors and commissioners to army.
The Consiglio Generale was
(1) To elect to magistracies by a complicated system of voting and
selection by lot. Cf. Guicciardini, _Storia Fiorentina_, iii. 125.
(Subsequently the system of direct appointment by lot was again
introduced. Cf. Guicciardini, iii. 155, 203, 235.)
(2) To hear criminal appeals from the Signory and Otto di Balía.
(3) To pass laws. The President _Il Proposto_, one of the Signory,
changed every third day, laid the law before the Signory and the
Collegi. If they approved it might be submitted to a _Practica_ of
selected members of the Consiglio d’Ottanta. Thence it went
before the Ottanta, and then to the Consiglio Generale. Here laws
could not be discussed, though Signory might call on some one to
speak in support, but were voted on.
=C.= Dieci di Libertà e Pace (called also Dieci di Balía), again
restored in place of the Otto di Pratica. The Signory, the Courts of
the Capitano and of the Podestà, the Mercatanzia, and the Otto di
Balía remained as before. The Dieci di Pace e Libertà restored.
In 1498. The Courts of the Podestà and the Capitano del Popolo were
restored.
This Government lasted till 1512, with these exceptions:--
(i) In 1502.
(_a_) The Gonfalonier to be elected for life, by a double system
of nomination and election. Piero Soderini elected. (Guicciardini,
iii. 281; Villari, _Life of Machiavelli_, ii. 102; Perrens,
_Hist. Flor._ ii. 408.)
(_b_) Courts of Podestà, of the Capitano del Popolo, and of
Mercatanzia abolished. Instead, the _Ruota della Justizia_
composed of five Doctors of Law with civil and criminal
jurisdiction. These to be foreigners elected by Signory and the
College for three years, and paid, one of whom was to be
Podestà. The Mercatanzia, however, continued as a Board of Trade.
(ii) 1506. A militia instituted at suggestion of Machiavelli.
All males from 15--50 years of age to serve, but only from the
city and country district (contado) of Florence. Not from her
subject cities. (Burd, 126.)
The militia placed under a new board of nine, _Nove della
Milizia_, which however was under the Dieci di Libertà e Pace in
time of war.
III. 1512. Return of Medici.
The constitution restored as it was before the revolution of 1494,
although nomination to offices lay practically in hands of the Medici,
Giuliano, and Lorenzo. (Burd, 145, 148.)
IV. 1527. Re-establishment of the constitution of Savonarola, 1494,
except that Gonfalonier was to be elected for 13 months.
V. 1530. Final overthrow of the Republic. Perrens, _Hist. Flor._,
iii. 368.
Alessandro de Medici appointed Grand Duke.
12 Reformatori elected in a Parlamento to ‘reform’ the State.
1. Signory abolished.
2. A Council of 200 elected for life.
3. A Senate of 48 elected for life from the 200, with powers of
legislation and taxation, and appointment to offices.
4. A Privy Council of four Councillors elected for three months by
12 Accopiatori chosen out of the Senate.
These with the hereditary Grand Duke fulfilled duties of the
Signory.
The Otto di Pratica }
The Otto di Guardia } to be nominated by the Senate.
The Buonuomini }
All distinction between higher and lower ‘arti’ abolished.
The offices paid.
TAXATION.
See Napier, iii. 117. Von Reumont, i. 30. Ewart, _Cosimo de’
Medici_. Armstrong, _Lorenzo de’ Medici_.
I. Indirect Taxes. Import and Export Duties. Monopoly on Salt.
II. On Real and Personal Property.
III. _Prestanze._--Forced loans on the estimated property. In theory
these were to be repaid and interest paid meanwhile, but this was
rarely done (‘tenere i luoghi’ (shares) = to withhold the payment of
interest), so much so that most took advantage of the law, that where
the amount did not exceed two golden florins they might pay one-third
down and forfeit all claim to interest or repayment.
The system led to great abuse. The influential got repaid, not so the
poor. Hence speculators connected with Government bought up claims on
the State for small sums, and then got the loan refunded.
The Assessment (estimo) of citizen’s property for II. and III. was
originally managed thus--
=1.= A Balía appointed who assigned to each ward their _quota_.
=2.= In each ward. Seven Boards of seven each (Sette Settine) made
seven schedules of assessment on the citizens according to their
idea of the property of each individual.
=3.= These seven schedules were sent to some of the best reputed
monasteries, which rejected the four schedules which differed most
widely, and then, adding up the amounts assessed to each taxpayer by
the three remaining schedules, divided the total by 3.
But under this system numerous exceptions had crept in; indeed, the
rich were largely exempted on the plea that they served the State by
taking office.
Hence the reform of the _Catasto_, 1427 (_Accatastare_, to heap up). A
valuation made every five years of all property subject to
taxation. (Lands, movables within or without city, rents, profits of
business.)
From this sum capitalised at the rate of 7 per cent., _i.e._ 7 florins
income = 100 florins capital, deductions for necessary expenses were
made. The remainder, which was looked upon as a surplus, was liable to
be taxed either for direct tax or for loans at the rate of ½ per
cent. on the capital.
From the time of Cosimo the Assessment was made by officials instead
of representative Committees, and the principle of graduation was
introduced. This became perpetual in 1480, when the tax was thrown on
land only at 1/10th of annual value (the _Decima Scalata_). In 1482
the tax on movables and professions (_Arbitrio_) was reintroduced.
Under Savonarola, 1494, the system of graduation was abolished and the
Decima was levied on land only, but shortly after the old system was
re-established.
In 1503. The Arbitrio, a tax on Professions established.
IV. Poll Tax from 1¼ to 4¼ florins per head between ages 17-70. In
cases of large young families only one member taxed.
Subject Towns and Districts of two kinds.
=1.= _Somissio_ by conquest or compact. The relation of Florence to
these differed; but, generally speaking, the Podestà was appointed
by Florence, and an appeal lay to Florentine Courts, while the
dependent city kept its own government and laws, and more or less
freedom of taxation.
The trade relations were peculiar. Both mother city and dependent
cities maintained protective duties against each other.
=2.= _Accomandigia._--Under a Protectorate, the town then called
_Raccomandato_. This did not amount to much more than acknowledging
the Florentine supremacy, and following her lead in war.[86]
Causes of instability of Florentine Government--
1. Conflict between idea of equality and desire of families to rule.
2. Jealousy of the Executive.
3. No adaptability in the Constitution.
4. Weakness and partiality of Justice.
5. Taxation the sport of parties, except when regulated by the
Catasto, and that only for a short time.