THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS
Policy of Charles V.--Regency of Margaret of Parma--The
States-General of 1559 and their grievances--Granvella
retires--Edict of Segovia--The Confederates at St.
Trond--Alva--Execution of Egmont, Hoorne and
Montigny--Jemmingen--The ‘Beggars’ seize Brille--Alliance with
France--St. Bartholomew--Fall of Mons--Siege of Haarlem--Don
Requesens--Military events--Conference at Breda--Exploits of
Mondragon--Sack of Antwerp--Pacification of Ghent--Don John--The
Perpetual Edict--The Archduke Mathias--Gemblours--Alexander of
Parma--Union of Arras and Utrecht--Sovereignty offered to Duke
of Anjou--The French Fury--Assassination of Orange--Successes of
Parma--Henry III. and Elizabeth decline the
Sovereignty--Leicester in the Netherlands--The Armada--Successes
of Maurice--Death of Parma--The Archdukes Ernest and
Albert--Truce of 1609--Condition of Netherlands.
The revolt of the Netherlands has been generally looked upon
as a notable instance of the resistance of a democracy to
religious persecution. The statement, however, requires some
modification. The religious element, no doubt, furnished
a principle of enthusiasm to many, more especially in the
northern provinces. Yet persecution was not the primary, nor
indeed the chief cause of discontent, and many Catholics, at
first, in any case, joined the party of resistance;[67] while the
oligarchical character of the government of many of the towns,
and the influential position held by the nobles, more especially
in the southern and western provinces, remind us that the
movement was far more oligarchical in character than has
often been allowed.
| Previous history of the Netherlands.
Of the seventeen provinces which formed the Netherlands at the
accession of Philip II., the greater number had been gradually
collected together by the powerful Dukes of Burgundy during the
fifteenth century, by successful marriages, by cession, and by
conquest. On the marriage of the Burgundian heiress Mary to Maximilian
they had passed to the house of Hapsburg, and thence, by the marriage
of the Archduke Philip and Joanna, to their son Charles V. The tie
which bound these provinces together was purely a personal one. They
were held by various titles.[68] They were inhabited by peoples of
different race and language; the Dutchman in the north-east, the
Flamand in Brabant, the Walloon and the German in the western and
southern provinces. The social conditions also varied. In Flanders
and Brabant the country districts were in the hands of a powerful
nobility, the cities inhabited by an industrial and turbulent people,
controlled by opulent burghers. In the north, the democratic element
predominated, more especially in the Frisian provinces, and the
inhabitants spent their life either in fishing and commerce on the
sea, or in saving their country from its inroads. These differences,
social and political, were reflected in the variety of their
institutions. Each province had its own peculiar government. Many had
especial privileges guaranteed them by charter, and no native of one
province could constitutionally hold office in another.
| Policy of Charles V.
The attempt of the Dukes of Burgundy to establish a more centralised
system of government, and to fuse these heterogeneous elements into
greater unity, had been strenuously resisted, more especially by the
burghers of Brabant and of Flanders, and the relations between the
provinces and their rulers had often been severely strained. During
the rule of the Archduke Philip (1494-1506) the struggle had abated,
but with the accession of Charles V., the policy of consolidation
and centralisation was again resumed. The boundaries were extended
by the acquisition of West Friesland in 1524, of the lordship of
Gröningen in 1536, and of the duchy of Gueldres and of the county of
Zutphen in 1543. By the treaty of Madrid (1526), Artois, Flanders,
and Tournay were freed from their dependence on France, and in 1528,
Charles acquired the temporalities of the bishopric of Utrecht, and
the lordship of Overyssel. In 1548, the whole of the Netherlands were
formed into the Burgundian Circle, while retaining their independence
of the Diet and the Imperial Chamber, and Charles thought of erecting
them into a middle kingdom under a separate government--a policy
which was, unfortunately, reversed when, in 1555, Charles decided to
leave these provinces to his son. Owing to his necessary absence from
the country, the Emperor left the control of the government in the
hands of Governesses--his aunt, Margaret of Savoy, ruling from 1506
to 1530; his sister, Mary of Hungary, the widow of Lewis, from 1530
to 1555--yet the policy of centralisation was steadily pursued. A
States-General composed of clergy, nobles, and city representatives
from each of the provinces, was summoned, although its meeting was
not a success. A Central Court of Justice was again established at
Mechlin, to which all provincial courts were declared subject. The
control of the administration was placed in the hands of three
Councils: a Privy Council, to act as a ministry of police and justice;
a Court of Finance over the financial chambers of the provinces; and
a Council of State, composed chiefly of the greater nobles, which,
under the presidency of the Regent, was to administer foreign affairs
and exercise a general superintendence over the other Councils. The
provinces were placed in the hands of Stattholders, nominated from the
ranks of the nobility by the Emperor himself. The other officials,
both municipal and judicial, were usually appointed by him. The
privileges of the towns were gradually circumscribed, and the attempt
of Ghent to refuse a tax voted by the States-General, and generally to
resist the centralising policy of the Emperor, was crushed out with
merciless severity in 1540; the immunities and privileges of the city
were declared forfeit, and the exclusive nomination of ten magistrates
vested in the Emperor’s hands (cf. p. 209).
It was on the question of heresy, however, that Charles proved himself
most inexorable. Not only had the doctrines of Luther early spread
among the Netherlanders, but the more extreme views of Calvin, which
were even better suited to the genius and character of the people;
while the extravagant and anarchical views of the Anabaptists of
Munster had appeared at Amsterdam, and elsewhere. Untrammelled by
the political difficulties which surrounded him in Germany, Charles
was eager to crush out these opinions. A series of edicts, termed
‘Placards,’ culminating in that of 1550, threatened death by pit,
fire, or sword to all convicted of heresy, or of harbouring heretics,
of dealing in heretical books, of attending conventicles, of disputing
on the Scriptures, or of image breaking. An attempt, indeed, to
appoint one Inquisitor-General, with uncontrolled powers of enforcing
these edicts, led to such discontent that the Inquisitor had to fly,
and Charles was fain to content himself with dividing the office
among four, who were not to proceed to sentence without the consent
of the provincial council. If the number of victims under these
‘Placards’ has been grossly exaggerated, yet at least Charles had not
refrained from persecution. Nevertheless, he was not unpopular in the
Netherlands; the religious and political grievances had not as yet
become identified. Charles was a Fleming born; in his earlier years he
was entirely in the hands of his Flemish councillors, and if latterly
the exigencies of his European position enforced his residence
elsewhere, he often visited the home of his birth; and not only
abstained from appointing foreigners to office in the Netherlands,
but irritated his Spanish subjects by raising Flemings to the highest
posts in Spain. His constant wars offered a profession to those who
cared for the pursuit of arms, and the wide extent of his empire gave
commercial opportunities of which the industrious Flemings were eager
to take advantage. At no time was the prosperity of the Netherlands
greater; the looms in the western towns were never busier; the lands
of Flanders and of Artois were rich in corn; the north-east provinces
furnished ample supplies of butter and of cheese, while the fishermen
enriched themselves by the herring fishery. Antwerp, which of late
had taken the place of Bruges as the entrepot of commerce, became
one of the most populous and prosperous towns in Europe; its quays
were crowded with the shipping, its banking houses with the business
men, of every nation. The riches of the Netherlands may be estimated
by remembering that in a few years they contributed no less than
twenty-four millions of ducats to the finances of the Emperor. These
contributions had, however, only been extorted with difficulty; the
Netherlands complained that their revenues were expended on wars
in which they were not concerned; the religious difficulties were
increasing; and when Charles, in 1555, handed over the government to
his son, it was pretty clear that this prosperous yet turbulent and
independent people could only be kept loyal by clever and conciliatory
statesmanship.
| Philip at once alienates the sympathies of the
| Netherlanders.
The succession of Philip II. at this critical moment was most
unfortunate. His cold and arrogant behaviour was contrasted with
the more genial manners of the great Emperor; he made no secret of
his devotion to Spain and his contempt for his Fleming subjects,
while his bigoted adherence to the Catholic faith was proved by his
renewal of the edicts of 1550, in all their severity. Even the war
with France was not popular in the Netherlands; they complained that
their interests were sacrificed to those of Spain, and resisted the
demands made upon their purses. The Peace of Cateau Cambrésis (1559)
still further increased this discontent. By that treaty, the Duke of
Savoy, who had been Regent in Brussels since 1555, was restored to his
dominions in Italy. It therefore became necessary to choose another
Regent. Here was an opportunity of conciliating the Netherlanders by
appointing some Flemish noble, of whom there were at least two well
qualified for the post. William of Nassau had, by the death of his
cousin Réné in 1544, succeeded, not only to large possessions in
Holland and in Brabant, but to the rich lands of Chalons in France,
and the principality of Orange on the Rhone. Appointed Stattholder of
Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and West Friesland by Charles V., he had
been intrusted by him with military command, and with the conduct of
diplomatic missions, an employment for which he displayed a special
gift. By character and position he would have been excellently well
fitted for the position of Regent. Failing him, there was Lamoral,
Count of Egmont, and Stattholder of Flanders and Artois, who although
inferior to the Prince of Orange in ability and strength of character,
had gained a great reputation in the battles of St. Quentin and
Gravelines, and was, owing to his genial and impulsive nature, a
general favourite.
| Margaret of Parma appointed Regent. 1559-1567.
| The Consulta.
| Unpopular measures of Philip.
| Grievances presented by States-General of 1559.
Philip, however, had no intention of appointing any one who was
likely to be too powerful or independent, and finally selected his
half-sister Margaret, Duchess of Parma, the illegitimate daughter
of Charles V., and wife of Ottavio Farnese, grandson of Pope Paul
III. Margaret, who was at this time thirty-eight years of age, was the
daughter of a Flemish lady. She had been brought up by two Regents
of the Netherlands, Margaret of Savoy, and Mary of Hungary, and her
appointment was not disliked. But although of masculine appearance and
voice, she was a woman of no great political ability, and was apt to
adopt the policy of any one who for the moment was most influential,
and unfortunately those in power were most unpopular. Philip had
given instructions that she was to rule by the aid of the three
Councils, that of Finance, the Privy Council, and the Council of
State. The Council of State comprised amongst its members several
of the higher nobility, the most notable of whom were the Prince
of Orange and Egmont. It was nominally the supreme authority in
the Netherlands; but Philip gave orders that all the more delicate
questions of State should be in the hands of an interior Council,
termed the Consulta, which was composed of Count Berlaymont, Viglius,
and Granvelle. Of this triumvirate, Count Berlaymont, the president
of the Council of Finance, was a Fleming of good family, an honest
man, but with narrow and despotic views. Viglius, the president of
the Privy Council, was a jurist and a humanist of some reputation,
and a friend of Erasmus; yet he was so avaricious that he took orders
in order to enjoy the revenues of several benefices; he was wanting
in initiative, and was the humble follower of Granvelle. This man,
son of Charles’ chancellor, was born in 1517, at Besançon, in
Franche-Comté. Raised to the see of Arras at the age of twenty-five,
he had, during the declining years of his father, and after his
death in 1550, enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, and was by
him specially recommended to Philip, who appointed him president of
the Council of State. Although a hardworking and able statesman of
polished and insinuating manners, and with a real interest in the
welfare of the Netherlands, he was ambitious, fond of power, corrupt,
and greedy. He was disliked as a Burgundian by the Netherlanders, and
detested as the representative of the views of Philip. Nor was the
policy of the King calculated to smooth the susceptibilities of the
Flemings. The Spanish troops, whose presence had been necessitated
by the war, were not removed on the conclusion of peace, and made
up for the arrears in their pay by extortion and plunder; while the
well-known intention of Philip to crush out heresy caused widespread
apprehension. These, and other grievances found expression at the
meeting of the States-General, which had been summoned to Ghent in
August, 1559. Philip indeed promised to withdraw the troops--a promise
which, owing to his procrastination, was not fulfilled till October
1560--but the other grievances he did not deign to notice. Sooner than
reign over heretics, he declared to his ministers he would rather
not reign at all; while the opposition shown to the foreigner caused
him to remark: ‘I, too, am a foreigner; will they refuse to obey me
as their Sovereign?’ Having thus disregarded the complaints of his
people, Philip left the Netherlands never to return again, after
accusing William of Orange, if we may credit a contemporary writer, of
being the real mover in the opposition which had shown itself in the
States-General.
| Philip’s scheme of ecclesiastical reform.
The departure of the King was followed by another measure which
seriously aggravated the discontent. The ecclesiastical organisation
of the Netherlands was very imperfect. There were only three
sees--Arras, Tournay, and Utrecht, and their dioceses were far too
large to be efficiently administered. That of Utrecht alone included
three hundred walled towns and eleven hundred churches. The other
parts of the Netherlands were either under the jurisdiction of the
Bishop of Cambray, a free imperial city, or under that of foreign
Bishops such as Liège, while the duchy of Luxemburg formed part of
four foreign dioceses. The confusion and conflicts with regard to
appeals were further increased by the fact that these bishoprics
were under the jurisdiction of foreign metropolitans: the two first
being subject to the archbishopric of Rheims, Utrecht to that of
Cologne. Charles V. himself had planned a reform; time, however, and
opportunity failed him, and it was left to Philip to carry it out on a
more extended basis. The number of the bishoprics was to be increased
to fifteen; they were to be freed from all foreign control, and to be
organised under three archbishoprics--Mechlin, Cambray, and Utrecht,
of which Mechlin, with Granvelle as its archbishop, was to enjoy the
primacy; the requisite revenues were to be supplied from the abbey
lands within each diocese, and the abbeys to be placed under priors
dependent on the bishops: each bishop was to appoint nine additional
prebendaries, two of whom were to be Inquisitors and to assist him in
the work of rooting out heresy. The announcement of this scheme was
met with a storm of opposition from Catholic and Protestant alike. The
bishops, it was declared, would be the creatures of the crown; while
the abbots, whose place they were to take, had been elected by the
monks, and had represented the local interests in the provincial
assemblies and in the States-General. The appropriation of the
revenues of the abbeys was denounced as an act of spoliation, by the
nobles especially, whose sons had often filled the place of abbot. The
more careless and ignorant of the clergy feared the stricter
supervision and discipline which would ensue. Above all, the measure
was condemned as an attempt to introduce the Spanish Inquisition. It
is true, no doubt, that some reform was needed, and that much of the
opposition was due to interested motives; nevertheless it was unwise,
if not unconstitutional, to introduce such a radical alteration in
the ecclesiastical organisation of the country without the approval
of the States-General, or even of the Council of State. The change
would certainly have enhanced the despotic authority of the crown;
while the inquisitorial powers given to the bishops at the very
moment when Philip was crushing out Protestantism in Spain, were of
dangerous import. In a word, the measure was inopportune unless it
was avowedly intended to serve the interests of authority and of
persecution, and if it was so intended, it demanded the most strenuous
opposition. Accordingly, the scheme met with such resistance that it
could not be fully carried out; Antwerp, which was specially protected
against an increase of ecclesiastical power by ‘La Joyeuse Entrée’
(the charter of Brabant), Gueldres, Utrecht, and five other places
escaped. But even mutilated as it was, the measure served to unite
the religious and political malcontents, and seriously increased the
unpopularity of the government.
| William of Orange heads the Opposition.
| Granvelle retires. March 1564.
| Egmont sent to Spain, Jan. 1565. Philip refuses to
| listen.
| The Edict of Segovia.
In April, 1562, the first attempt to rescue victims of the Inquisition
was made at Valenciennes; at the same time the opposition of the
nobles to Granvelle became more determined. As Archbishop of Mechlin,
he was looked upon, though wrongly, as the prime mover in the matter;
as president of the Council of State he was held responsible for all
the hated measures of the King; while his acceptance of a cardinal’s
hat, in 1561, still further awakened the jealousy of his enemies. The
malcontents found a leader in the Prince of Orange. In 1561, he had
taken as his second wife Anne, the daughter of Maurice of Saxony, the
old opponent of Charles V. The marriage had been opposed by Granvelle
as likely to strengthen the Protestant sympathies of the Prince, and
from that time forward there was open war between them. Finally, in
March 1563, Orange, Egmont, and Hoorne addressed a letter to Philip,
in which they demanded the dismissal of the Cardinal, and declined to
appear at the Council of State until their demand was granted. Even
the Regent Margaret, who had hitherto been a strenuous supporter of
Granvelle, deserted him, and supported the request of the nobles. In
March 1564, after long delay, Philip at last consented to dismiss his
minister. This however, had but little effect; for Berlaymont and
Viglius still remained, while Granvelle, from his place of retreat,
continued to advise the King; the system of government was unaltered,
the corruption continued, and the persecution did not cease. In the
following August, Philip added to the discontent by ordering on
his sole authority the publication of the Decrees of the Council
of Trent. This act met with general disapproval, not only from the
Protestants, but also from the Catholics, who looked upon it as an
infringement of their liberties. William of Orange expressed the
general opinion, when he declared in the Council of State that, in
the existing condition of public opinion, the Tridentine Decrees and
the edicts against heresy could not be enforced, and that it was time
that the corrupt system of government, the perversion of justice,
and the wranglings between the Councils should cease. To remedy this
state of things the nobles, led by the Prince of Orange and Counts
Egmont and Hoorne, urged on the Regent the necessity of summoning the
States-General and of increasing its powers, of reforming the Council
of State by the admission of more of the native nobility, and of more
completely subordinating the other Councils to it. Margaret, who had
now completely identified herself with the oligarchical party, adopted
their views, and Egmont was sent to Spain to urge their acceptance on
Philip (January 1565). Had Philip consented, the Netherlands might
have remained loyal; but the reforms would have involved an overthrow
of the bureaucratical system which had hitherto existed; the native
nobility would have regained power in the States-General, and in the
reformed Council of State, and a mitigation of the laws against heresy
must have followed. Philip therefore was unwilling to comply. In June,
1565, he had sent Alva to the Conference of Bayonne, and had urged
Catherine de Medici to proceed to stringent measures against the
Huguenots, and he was not likely to stultify himself by tolerating
heresy in his own dominions. He seemed indeed, at first, anxious to
procrastinate. Granvelle’s brother wrote in despair: ‘Everything goes
on from to-morrow to to-morrow: the only resolution is to remain
irresolute.’ Possibly Philip delayed in the hopes of winning over
Egmont. At all events, in October the King threw off the mask, and in
his famous despatches from the wood of Segovia forbade any change in
the system of administration, and ordered the edict against heresy to
be enforced with all severity.
| General opposition.
| The Compromise.
‘Now we shall see the beginning of a fine tragedy,’ said William
of Orange. The Regent, and even Berlaymont and Viglius, were
dismayed, and urged that Philip should be warned of the probable
consequences. But William declared that, ‘Since the word of his
majesty was so unequivocally expressed, all that remained for them
was to execute it.’ It is generally believed that the Prince of
Orange wished to precipitate matters; in any case his prophecy was
speedily to be fulfilled. In the agitation which ensued we find a new
element appearing. Hitherto the opposition for the most part had been
confined to the higher nobility, men who held some office, and who had
something to lose; now the lesser nobility began to move. These, like
the smaller nobility in France, had previously found occupation in the
wars, where they furnished a famous force of cavalry. The peace had
destroyed this occupation, and many had returned to their homes with
a turbulent spirit, a love of extravagance and of licence engendered
of the war, and ready for any opportunity of repairing their shattered
fortunes. Others, however, were of a more serious turn of mind, who
had, during their stay abroad, learnt and zealously adopted Protestant
opinions, while all were inspired by a sturdy love of freedom. Of the
less reputable, Henry, Viscount of Brederode, is a fair type. Philip
van Marnix, Lord of Sainte Aldegonde, represented the fanatical party;
while Louis of Nassau, the impetuous brother of William of Orange,
was the only statesman among them. Their views were expressed in ‘The
Compromise,’ a document which was very numerously signed by Catholics
as well as Protestants, and which declared that Philip had been
induced by evil councillors to establish the Inquisition, in violation
of his oath, and that they would resist it.
| Petition of the Confederates, April 5, 1566, sent to
| Spain by Bergen and Montigny.
It does not appear that any of the greater nobles signed the
Compromise. William of Orange himself openly condemned the violence
of its tone; yet his influence is probably to be traced in the
more moderate petition which the Confederates, led by Brederode,
presented to the Regent on April 5, 1566. In this petition, while
protesting their loyalty, they expressed their fears of a general
revolt, and demanded that envoys should be sent to Philip to urge upon
him the necessity of abolishing the Inquisition, and of summoning
the States-General for the purpose of moderating the edicts. The
Regent consented to despatch the Marquis de Bergen, and the Baron
de Montigny to Spain, and promised meanwhile some mitigation of
the edicts. Montigny reached Spain on June 17. But Philip, with
his usual procrastination, vouchsafed no answer until July 31. He
then promised that the Inquisition should be abolished, and that he
would content himself with the inquisitorial powers vested in the
bishops. Some hopes were held out that the severity of the edicts
would be moderated, and pardon was promised to any whom Margaret might
think deserving of it, on condition that they would abandon the League
of the Confederates and engage to support the government. To the
summoning of the States-General he would in no case consent.
| Meeting of Confederates at St. Trond. July 1566.
There is little reason to suppose that these terms would have
satisfied the Netherlanders even if the King had been sincere. But
we now know that he protested in the presence of the Duke of Alva,
a notary, and two jurists that, as these concessions had not been
granted of his own free will, he did not feel himself bound to
them. He wrote to the Pope to the same effect, and forthwith began
secret preparations for the despatch of Alva to punish those to whom
a pardon had just been offered. Meanwhile, events happened in the
Netherlands which, unfortunately, went some way to justify Philip’s
conduct. The Confederates, in one of those drinking-bouts with which
they were too apt to inflame their patriotism, had assumed the name
of Les Gueux, possibly in allusion to a remark of Berlaymont that
they were nothing but a crowd of beggars. In July, they held another
meeting at St. Trond, near Liège, where, in spite of the opposition
of many Catholics, notably Count Mansfeld, they determined to insist
on complete toleration, and on some guarantee against the vengeance
of Philip. On the 28th, headed by Louis of Nassau, they presented
their petition to the Regent, but were ill received; and so convinced
were they that Philip would not long delay his vengeance, that Louis
proceeded to subsidise a force of mercenaries in Germany.
| Iconoclasm causes a reaction.
At this moment an outburst of violent fanaticism ruined their
cause. The activity and violence of the preachers, which had of late
been increasing, led, in the early days of August, to a serious
outbreak of iconoclasm. Commencing at St. Omer, the contagion rapidly
spread, and in a fortnight four hundred churches were sacked in
Flanders alone, while in Antwerp the cathedral was stripped of all
its treasures. Images, relics, shrines, paintings, manuscripts and
books shared a common fate. Only a few of the southern provinces were
spared. The fanatics were joined by the criminal classes, and for
a time anarchy reigned supreme. Margaret, bowing before the storm,
followed the advice of William. She promised that the Reformers
should be allowed to hold their meetings in the places where they
had hitherto held them, until the King and the States-General should
otherwise command. The Confederate nobles, on a promise of pardon,
undertook to assist the government, and the Stattholders, despatched
to their respective provinces, succeeded--some by concessions, some by
more stringent measures--in partly restoring order. The violence had,
however, done its work. The Catholics, shocked at the extravagance
and profanity of the rioters, abandoned the movement in disgust. The
Lutherans, anxious to throw blame on the Calvinists, with whom they
had little sympathy, followed suit. Egmont and Hoorne made haste to
rally round the government; even William was forced to execute some of
the ringleaders in Antwerp before he could restore order. Margaret,
taking advantage of this reaction, assumed a bolder line, and
commanded that the towns which were least to be trusted should be
occupied by royal garrisons, levied among the Walloon and Catholic
provinces.
| The Confederates rise, but are defeated.
The Confederate nobles, who had not been directly concerned in
these riotous proceedings, knowing that they would none the less
be held responsible, now rose. Compromised, however, as they were
by the extravagant conduct of the fanatics, and not quite prepared
to make common cause with them, they failed to obtain adequate
support. William forbade the citizens of Antwerp to march to the
defence of the patriots, who had seized the village of Austruweel
near by (March 13, 1567). They were defeated by the royal troops,
and their leader, the brother of St. Aldegonde, was slain. On April
2, Valenciennes, which had refused to admit the royal troops, was
taken; and shortly the Regent was practically mistress of the country,
with the exception of the province of Holland, and the city of
Antwerp. Fortresses were built in the principal towns; the meetings
of the Calvinists were dispersed; and many suffered death on the
scaffold, or at the hands of a ruthless soldiery.
| Philip determines on stringent measures.
| William of Orange retires to Nassau. April 30, 1567.
| Egmont declines to move.
Yet Philip was not satisfied. He had for some time determined to
replace Margaret by a stronger hand, and, in spite of the opposition
of his chief minister, the Prince of Eboli, to take summary vengeance,
not only on the authors of the late excesses, but upon the greater
nobles, whom he held responsible for the troubles. Of this intention
William of Orange was fully informed through his secret and paid
agents at Madrid, and, despairing of successful resistance for
the present, he decided to retire. His conduct has been severely
criticised. Had he stayed, it has been said, and raised the standard
of civil war, the cruel rule of Alva might have been prevented, or
the struggle would have been ended sooner and with more brilliant
success. It must be admitted that there is something to be said for
this view. Subsequent events proved that the political and religious
issues must eventually become identified; and if so, the sooner that
occurred the better. The government was as yet ill-provided with
troops upon whom it could depend, and a victory at this moment would
have rallied to the Prince’s standard many who had not declared
themselves, and yet have made him strong enough to suppress the most
extravagant of his partisans. William might possibly have made the
venture if Egmont could have been prevailed upon to move. But Egmont
was a Catholic, and the movement had become decidedly anti-Catholic;
he still remembered the conciliatory treatment he had received in
Spain: he still trusted to Philip’s clemency and shrank from open
rebellion. Without Egmont, William was unwilling to take action. He
was an aristocrat at heart: he looked for reform to a properly
representative Estates-General, and was disgusted at the mob-rule
which had of late prevailed. Although he had probably by this time
embraced Lutheranism, he had no sympathy with the Calvinistic tenets,
and scarcely realised their strength as the militant creed of those
who fought for political liberty. Moreover, he had alienated the
Calvinists by his conduct during the late troubles, and it was
questionable whether they would heartily rally round him. Finally,
the Lutheran princes of Germany could not be depended upon, and, of
success without foreign aid, he despaired. With these views, he had
no alternative but to fly; and, after vainly warning Egmont that he
feared Philip was merely ‘making a bridge of him whereby he might
enter the Netherlands,’ he took refuge, together with his brother and
some of the other Confederates, in his county of Nassau (April 30,
1567).
| Alva despatched to the Netherlands. April 1567.
William gone, all opposition was at an end. Antwerp opened its
gates on the day he left for Germany. Brederode, who had held
out at Viana in Holland, fled to Germany, to die in the summer
of 1568, a victim to his intemperate mode of life; and shortly
after all Holland submitted. The churches were now taken from the
Calvinists; the Regent issued a new edict which threatened death
to all Calvinistic preachers, and all who had been a party to the
late sacrilegious attack on the churches. The Prince of Orange had
left none too soon. Three days before he crossed the frontier, Alva
had started from Spain (April 27). The question as to the despatch
of Alva had been debated in the royal council. Ruy Gomez, Prince
of Eboli, the chief minister of Philip, and others, urged that the
Flemings were a people more likely to be overcome by clemency than
by arms. This was also the opinion of Margaret, who informed Philip
that order was now re-established, and that all that was needed was
‘not an army but a vigilant police.’ Philip, however, was of another
mind. He had from the first chafed under the restraints imposed on
his despotic authority by the privileges and independent spirit of
the Netherlanders, especially in the matter of taxation. He was
determined to root out heresy there, as he had done in Spain. Above
all he was eager to inflict summary vengeance on the nobles, whom he
considered the real authors of the troubles, and the chief obstacles
to the triumph of arbitrary rule. For this task no more fit agent
could have been found than the Duke of Alva. With a father’s blood
to revenge, he had been nurtured in the wars against the Moors. At
the age of thirty-nine he led the army of Charles V. against the
Lutherans at Mühlberg, and since then had governed Italy with a rod
of iron. His severity only increased with his age; and now at the age
of sixty, a good general, a severe disciplinarian, an enemy of all
political freedom, and a narrow bigot, he was a man after Philip’s
own heart, and one to succeed if severity without statesmanship could
win success. Appointed in the first instance Captain-General, with
supreme control over military affairs, he was by a later commission,
of March 1, 1567, invested with supreme control in civil matters as
well, and all authorities, including the Regent herself, were ordered
to obey his commands. He was to inquire into the causes of the recent
troubles, to bring the suspected to trial, with full authority of
punishment or pardon, and to reduce the country to submission.
| Alva reaches Brussels, Aug. 22, 1567. Margaret
| resigns, December.
With these extensive powers, and with an army of about 10,000 men,
chiefly composed of Spanish veterans, Alva reached Genoa on the 17th
of May. Thence he marched to the Mont Cenis, and, passing the Alps,
pressed northwards. His advance caused considerable apprehension at
once to the city of Geneva and the French court. Condé, indeed,
offered to raise a force and overwhelm him as he deployed from the
mountain passes. But Catherine declined, and contented herself with
levying a body of Swiss Catholics to watch his progress. Alva,
however, was careful to give no pretext for attack; enforcing the
strictest discipline, he proceeded by way of Franche-Comté and
Lorraine to Luxemburg. This he reached on August 8, and entered
Brussels on the 22nd. Margaret, hurt at the way in which she had
been treated, demanded her recall. Her request was not granted till
December 1567, but her authority was at an end, and even her protests
against the tyranny and cruelty of Alva’s rule were disregarded. The
horrors which followed have, perhaps, served to place her eight
years’ administration in too favourable a light. And yet, if she
had at first acquiesced in the unpopular measures of Granvella, she
had subsequently joined the greater nobles and backed their demands
for some mitigation of the Inquisition, and for the summoning of
the Estates-General. She had, indeed, put down the Iconoclasts with
a severe hand, but in this she had been supported by the higher
nobility, and probably would not have dissociated herself from their
cause. With no great administrative ability, and with some want of
initiative, she had a real interest in her charge, and a belief in
the loyalty of the greater nobles and in their fitness to rule the
country. She would probably not have altogether opposed their request
for an extension of the authority of the Estates-General, for a reform
of the Council of State, and for some toleration; and, had these
been granted, the troubles might have ceased. There was, however, no
prospect that Philip would grant such concessions, and under these
circumstances a continuation of her rule was impossible.
| Egmont and Hoorne arrested, Sept. 9, 1567. Council of
| Blood erected.
No sooner had Alva reached Brussels than the scheme of Philip rapidly
unrolled itself. In spite of the protests of Margaret, the Walloon
soldiers in the chief towns were replaced by Spanish soldiery,
who forthwith made up for the restraint imposed on them during
their march, by a reckless cruelty and a licence which even Alva
deplored. Egmont and Hoorne, enticed by fair promises, were arrested
on the 9th of September, together with Egmont’s secretary, Backerzell,
and Van Stralen, the Burgomaster of Antwerp. To try such offenders the
ordinary courts could not be trusted. Accordingly Alva created the
‘Council of his Excellency’ or of ‘Tumults,’ which became popularly
known as the Council of Blood. This terrible tribunal was nominally
composed of twelve judges. Two of these, Berlaymont and Noircarmes,
were nobles, and six were lawyers of the country; but these eight only
acted as assessors, or sub-commissioners, and the right of voting on
the cases was reserved to three Spaniards, Juan de Vargas, Del Rio,
and La Torre, the final ratification of their decisions being reserved
to Alva, who was president. Of this trio, Juan de Vargas, who presided
in the absence of Alva, was a miscreant who, after violating his ward,
an orphan in Spain, had fled from justice, and earned immunity by
subservience to the will of the King. He was in the habit of relieving
the monotony of his work of blood by cruel jokes at the expense of
the accused; while another judge, Hessels, who subsequently had much
influence, is reported, when aroused from naps in court, to have
cried out automatically: ‘To the gallows, to the gallows.’ To furnish
victims for this court, commissioners, despatched to the provinces,
arrested on the charge of treason all preachers, or harbourers of
them, all members of Calvinistic consistories, all who had joined
in destroying Catholic, or in building Protestant churches, and all
who had signed the Compromise. Except in more important cases, the
commissioners or local authorities proceeded to judgment, the revision
of their sentences being alone reserved for the Council itself; and
rarely, if ever, was the revision exercised on the side of mercy. The
punishment was death and confiscation of goods, and Alva hoped from
this source to replenish the exhausted treasury. As to the precise
number of the victims it is impossible to speak with certainty. Alva
is said to have boasted that he had executed 18,600 during the period
of his rule. This is probably an exaggerated statement, but that the
victims are to be counted in thousands is not to be doubted, nor that
the trials and executions were accompanied with all the refinements
that cruelty could suggest. It is indeed difficult to find a parallel
in history for this irresponsible and tyrannical court, which was
created by the mere word of Alva, without even the authority of
his written instrument, much less of the royal warrant, and which
violated every constitutional privilege of the Netherlanders. Alva
had indeed succeeded in his designs ‘of making every man feel that
any day his house might fall about his ears.’ Under the pressure of
these cruel proscriptions, the tide of emigration, which had already
begun under the rule of Margaret, assumed such proportions, even as
early as October, 1567, that a decree was then issued threatening
confiscation and death to all who left the country or abetted others
in so doing. This, however, only increased the panic; and by the end
of Alva’s administration, Granvella declared that there were 60,000
fugitives in England, and more in Germany.
| Louis of Nassau wins the battle of Heiligerlee. May
| 23, 1568.
The vengeance of Alva and his master could not, however, be sated
until the heads of the most distinguished had fallen. Since the arrest
of Counts Egmont and Hoorne, the proceedings against them had been
dragging slowly on, but in the early summer of 1568, events occurred
to hasten the hand of Alva. William of Orange and his brother Louis
had, by the end of April, succeeded in collecting a motley force of
Germans, of Huguenots, and of exiles from the Netherlands, and now
attempted a triple attack, in the hopes of exciting a rising against
the Spanish rule. Two of the attempts (that of Hoogstraten on Brabant,
and that of Coqueville, with his Huguenots, on Artois) failed, the
latter being dispersed by a French corps which was despatched by
Charles IX. But on May 23, Louis of Nassau succeeded in defeating a
force of Spanish soldiers at Heiligerlee under the Count of Aremberg,
the governor of Groningen, who himself fell in battle.
| Egmont and Hoorne condemned and executed. June 5,
| 1568.
The defeat of Heiligerlee hurried on the doom of the two Counts. Alva,
anxious to retrieve the disaster in person, was determined not to
leave them alive behind him. The counsel for the prisoners had
hitherto delayed to produce their evidence, probably in the hope that
the exertions made in favour of their clients by the Duke of Lorraine,
by many of the German princes,[69] and even by the Emperor himself,
might at least secure them a trial before the order of the Golden
Fleece, of which they were members. This privilege was, however,
refused them, on the ground that it did not extend to charges of
treason. On the 1st of June, a decree was published, declaring that
the time allowed for the production of witnesses had expired. On
the following day, Vargas and del Rio pronounced the prisoners
guilty of treason, and the sentence was confirmed by Alva. They were
convicted of having given their support to the Confederate nobles,
who signed the Compromise; of having shown favour to the sectaries
in their respective governments of Flanders and Artois, of Gueldres
and Zutphen; and of being parties to the conspiracy of the Prince of
Orange. On June 5, they were led to execution in the market-place of
Brussels. A few days before, the secretary of Egmont, Backerzell, and
the Burgomaster of Antwerp, had shared the same fate, after having
been cruelly tortured in the vain hope of extorting evidence from them
against Egmont and Hoorne. That the trial and condemnation of these
two nobles was flagrantly illegal is not to be questioned. It violated
the ancient privilege that no Fleming should be tried by a foreign
judge, and the right, definitely acknowledged by a law of 1531, of
the Knights of the Golden Fleece to be tried by their own order, a
law which Philip himself had confirmed in 1550. Moreover, the court
had been erected without a royal warrant; and the cause was decided
before the defendants had produced their evidence. Nor does it appear
that, apart from the technical aspects of the question, Egmont and
Hoorne had been guilty of treason. As Catholics they certainly had no
sympathy with the Sectaries; and this their conduct at the time of
the Iconoclastic riots shows; and if they indirectly supported the
movement of the Confederates who signed the ‘Compromise,’ there is
no proof that they intended to appeal to arms, or to throw off the
Spanish yoke--or that they did anything more than insist, perhaps with
somewhat too great vehemence, on the constitutional privileges of
their country.
| Montigny condemned and secretly executed in Spain.
| March 1570.
There yet remained one more noble for whose blood Philip thirsted. Of
the two envoys sent to Spain in 1566 (cf. p. 327) the Marquis of
Bergen had died in May 1567. In the following September, as soon
as the arrest of Egmont and Hoorne was known in Spain, Bergen’s
companion, the Baron de Montigny, brother of Count Hoorne, had been
seized. But it was not till February, 1569, that proceedings against
him were commenced. The results of the examination to which he was
then subjected were sent to the Council of Blood, which after a
year’s delay condemned him to death (March 4, 1570), without giving
him the opportunity of defending himself. The verdict was kept close,
and finally Philip ordered that he should be secretly executed in
Spain. This was represented to the unfortunate man as an act of
mercy, whereby he would be saved from the humiliation of a public
execution--while it was publicly announced that he had died a natural
death. His property, as well as that of the Marquis of Bergen, was,
however, confiscated. So successfully was the secret kept, that this
act of perfidy and tyranny was never known till 1844, when access to
the records at Simancas was granted by the Spanish government. Philip
might now indulge the hope that he had rid himself of all his enemies;
but Granvelle with truer insight remarked that ‘as they had not caught
William, they had caught nothing.’
| Louis of Nassau defeated at Jemmingen. July 21, 1568.
| Fruitless expedition of William of Orange. Oct. 1568.
From the tragedy in the market-place of Brussels, Alva marched
against Louis of Nassau, and on July 21, defeated him at the battle
of Jemmingen. In vain did William of Orange strive to retrieve this
disaster. In spite of the express command of the Emperor Maximilian,
who was attempting to mediate, he crossed the Meuse on October 5,
1568, and entered Brabant with a levy of German mercenaries, to
which were subsequently added a body of Huguenots under the Comte de
Genlis. In mere numbers Orange had the advantage over his adversary,
but in nothing else. Alva avoided a pitched battle, and with his
veterans completely outmanœuvred the ill-disciplined troops of
William, who soon became insubordinate and began to desert. No city
opened its gates; and the Prince, disheartened at the want of support
which he received, was forced to retreat to Strasburg, whence, after
disbanding most of his worthless troops, he and his brother joined
Coligny, and took part in the campaign of 1569 in France.
| Financial tyranny of Alva.
The expeditions of William and of Louis had been premature. The
Netherlands, cowed by the late reign of terror, and always slow
to move, had not answered their appeal, and Alva felt so secure
that he determined to furnish Philip with tangible evidence of his
success. He had long talked of ‘the stream fathoms deep’ of wealth
which he would cause to flow from the Netherlands. The confiscations
of the disloyal falling short of his expectations, he now proposed
to tax the wealth of all. In March, 1569, summoning in haste the
Estates of each province, he demanded a tax of one per cent. on
all property, moveable and immoveable, a tax of five per cent. on
every sale of landed property, and one of ten per cent. on every
sale of moveables. The two first were heavy enough, but the third
amounted to nothing less than a proscription of all trade. Before
a commodity reached the hands of the consumer it would have to pay
the tax at least four times--first, as raw material; then, when it
passed from the manufacturer to the wholesale dealer; again, when
it was sold to the retail dealer; and, finally, when it was bought
by the consumer. The absurdity of this tax was patent to all but
Alva. Viglius, and even Berlaymont and Noircarmes tried to dissuade
him from his purpose; and, although most of the provincial assemblies,
inspired by fear, at first consented, the opposition of Utrecht,
which was soon imitated, forced Alva to postpone its enforcement for
two years, in return for a stated sum. In July, 1570, an amnesty
was proclaimed, although with so many exceptions as to render it
nugatory; and no sooner did Alva, on the expiration of the two years’
respite, attempt to enforce the hated tax (July 31, 1571) than a
storm of opposition arose. In vain did Alva offer to remit the tax
on raw materials, and on corn, meat, wine, and beer. In spite of the
threat of a fine on those who refused to sell, merchants declined
to deal, shops were shut, trade was at a standstill, debtors were
not able to meet their creditors, and many banks broke. The distress
caused by the lack of employment was also aggravated in the northern
provinces by a fearful inundation, caused by a north-westerly gale
which had destroyed the dykes in the winter of 1570. The numbers of
the ‘wild beggars’--already considerable--seriously increased, while
the Spanish troops, furious for their pay, which Alva was unable to
provide, became daily more insubordinate. The words of Margaret were
now fulfilled. ‘This man,’ she said, ‘is so detested by the people
that he will make the very name of Spaniard hateful.’ Even Alva
himself acknowledged that all had turned against him, and demanded
his recall. Philip, informed of the universal disaffection, had,
in September, 1571, appointed the Duke of Medina Celi as Alva’s
successor, but his love of procrastination caused delay, and the Duke
had not left Spain when the news arrived that Brille had been seized
by the ‘Beggars of the Sea.’
| Brille seized by the ‘Beggars.’ April 1, 1572.
| General revolt of the Northern Provinces.
Of those who fled from the tyranny of Alva, some had betaken
themselves to the sea, and carried on an organised system of piracy
against Spanish commerce. Although common fear of the Guises had
led to friendly relations between Philip and Elizabeth in the early
part of her reign, and still prevented open hostility between them,
Elizabeth had, more especially since the overthrow of Mary Stuart at
Carberry Hill (June, 1567), given a tacit approval to the attacks of
the English seamen on the Spanish settlements and trade, had harboured
the Dutch privateers, and even allowed them to sell their plunder in
English markets. In 1568, she had actually seized a Genoese loan,
which was on its way to the Netherlands. Philip had in retaliation
supported the Ridolfi plot of 1571, in favour of Mary Queen of Scots
and the Duke of Norfolk. The plot failed indeed, yet at this moment
Elizabeth was not anxious openly to defy the Spaniard. She therefore
ordered the Dutch privateers, then under the command of William de
La Marck, a noted and unprincipled freebooter, to leave the shores
of England. The fleet of twenty-four vessels accordingly put out to
sea, and La Marck, after attacking a Spanish merchant fleet which
he met in the channel, suddenly seized the town of Brille, at the
mouth of the Meuse (April 1, 1572). The seizure of Brille had not
been authorised by William of Orange, who was not yet prepared for
active operations, nor was it intended at first to be more than a
temporary raid. Nevertheless, it was the first act in the Revolt
of the Netherlands. The news of the ‘Beggars’’ exploit spread like
fire. Flushing, which commands the opening of the Scheldt, was the
first to rise; Enkhuizen, the Spanish arsenal on the Zuyder Zee,
soon followed, and shortly after, the chief towns of Holland and
Zealand--with the exception of Amsterdam and Middleburg--as well as
those in Guelderland, Overyssel, Utrecht, and Friesland, declared for
the Prince of Orange.
| The French support the Rebels.
| Louis of Nassau takes Mons. May 24, 1572.
| Genlis defeated before Mons. July 19.
From this time forward the revolt of the Netherlands becomes closely
involved in the wider range of European politics, and with the
diplomatic relations of the great powers of France, Spain, and
England. As is more fully explained in the chapter on the religious
wars in France (pp. 411, 429), the policy of the French court was at
this moment in favour of supporting the Netherlands. Since the treaty
of St. Germains (August, 1570) Coligny had been in power, and had
prevailed on Catherine, and on her feeble son, Charles IX., to divert
the attention of the French from their civil and religious troubles
at home, by reviving the slumbering hostility against Spain. Even
Elizabeth of England, angry at the support Philip had given the
Ridolfi plot, and anxious to prevent either the dreaded union of
France and Spain, or the incorporation of any part of the Netherlands
into France, listened to these schemes, and entertained the idea of
marrying Anjou or his brother Alençon, to whom the sovereignty of
the Netherlands was to be offered. William of Orange had eagerly
embraced the French Alliance; and the outcome of the negotiations was
the taking of Mons, the capital of Hainault, on May 24, by Louis of
Nassau, assisted by a Huguenot force under the Comte de Genlis. On the
15th of July, the nobles and deputies from six cities of the northern
provinces met at Dort. While still acknowledging the sovereignty of
Philip, they recognised William as their Stadtholder, voted him a sum
of money, and gave him authority to take measures for liberating the
country from Spanish tyranny. William, assured of support from the
northern provinces, and trusting in the co-operation of the French,
had already crossed the Rhine on the 7th July, with the intention of
raising the southern provinces. A bitter disappointment was, however,
in store for him. On July 19, Genlis was defeated and taken prisoner
in his attempt to relieve Mons, which had been invested by the son of
Alva; and although the advance of William in the following August was
well received by most of the southern towns, his hopes were suddenly
dashed to the ground by the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew
(August 24, 1572).
| Change in the policy of the French court.
| Effects of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew.
| Fall of Mons. Sept. 19.
| Reduction of Southern Provinces.
The reasons for this astounding revolution in the policy of the French
court are dealt with elsewhere (cf. p. 413 ff.). We are here concerned
with its effects on the struggle in the Netherlands. The news of the
massacre of St. Bartholomew fell ‘like the blow of a sledgehammer’ on
William of Orange. He continued, indeed, his march to relieve Mons,
but Alva, who had assumed the command on the 27th of August, avoided,
according to his wont, a pitched engagement; the troops of William,
discouraged by the defection of the French, became insubordinate;
the Prince himself was only saved from surprise in a night attack by
the watchfulness of his spaniel, and was forced to fall back on the
northern provinces. Louis of Nassau, thus deserted by his brother,
and no longer in hope of French assistance, capitulated on September
19. His troops were allowed to retire, in spite of the treacherous
request of Charles IX. that they should be cut to pieces, but the city
was cruelly treated in violation of the terms of capitulation. The
fall of Mons decided the fate of the southern provinces. City after
city returned to its allegiance and was admitted to pardon, with the
exception of the city of Mechlin. This prosperous city, that it might
serve as an example, was given over to pillage for three days by the
commands of Alva; churches and monasteries were ruthlessly sacked, and
Catholics as well as Protestants suffered at the hands of the brutal
soldiery.
| Campaign of Don Frederick in the North.
| Siege of Haarlem. Dec. 9-July 14.
| Defeat of Spanish Fleet off Enkhuizen.
The struggle round Mons had at least given the northern provinces
time to strengthen themselves, and to Holland the Prince of Orange
retired, to organise resistance. It was now the plan of Alva to try
and isolate the revolt by reducing the chief towns in the north,
and so to place the disaffected provinces between two fires. The
work was intrusted to his son, Don Frederick. Zutphen was taken
and its garrison put to the sword. The provinces of Guelderland,
Overyssel, and Groningen submitted, and Don Frederick passed on
westwards to Holland, where Amsterdam was the only city held by the
Spaniards. After razing the small town of Naarden to the ground, in
violation of the terms on which it had capitulated, Don Frederick laid
siege to the important town of Haarlem. The city lies on the narrowest
part of the neck of land which separates the Zuyder Zee from the
German Ocean, and which at that point is barely five miles broad. Its
occupation by the Spaniards would completely isolate the northern
portion of Holland. Alva, fully realising the strategical importance
of the city, ordered his son, who had a force of 30,000 men, to take
it at all hazards. The task, however, proved most serious. The city
was protected on the east by the large though shallow lake of Haarlem,
and by land was only approachable from the west. The inhabitants,
warned by the experience of Zutphen and of Naarden that they could
expect no mercy, resolved to resist to the last; and although the
garrison was but some 4000, it took the Spaniards more than seven
months before they could reduce the city (December 9-July 14). The
siege was marked by great cruelty on both sides; and, after the
surrender, the city became a shambles, over 2000 being murdered in
cold blood. The news of the fall of Haarlem is said to have raised
Philip from a bed of sickness; but the city had been dearly won. Don
Frederick had lost 12,000 men, and the cruelties of the victors only
nerved the Netherlanders to greater efforts. ‘Our cities,’ said
William, ‘are pledged to each other to stand every siege, to dare the
utmost, to endure every possible misery, yea rather, to set fire to
all our homes and be consumed with them, than ever to submit to the
decrees of this cruel tyrant.’ The independence of Holland, indeed,
may be said to have been won by the defence of Haarlem. Fifteen days
after the fall of the town, the Spanish soldiers, furious at the
arrears of their pay, mutinied. They were conciliated by the promise
of the pillage of the town of Alkmaar if they could take it, but this
they failed to do; and on the 11th of October, Alva suffered a still
more serious check in the destruction of his fleet off Enkhuizen.
| Alva superseded by Requesens. Nov. 17, 1573.
Philip, disheartened at the failure to crush out the revolt, and
assailed on all sides with complaints of the fiendish cruelty and
the incapacity of Alva, decided, after long hesitation, to supersede
him. The Duke de Medina Celi had been in the Netherlands since June,
1572; but, as it was not thought wise to change masters at such a
crisis, he had refrained from taking over the reins of power, and
remained a very unfriendly critic of Alva’s administration till
August, 1573, when he returned to Spain to swell the number of those
who condemned the policy of indiscriminate vengeance. Finally, on
the 17th of November, the new Lieutenant-Governor, Don Louis de
Requesens, Grand Commander of Santiago, arrived at Brussels. Alva left
the country, as he bitterly complained, without having gained the
approbation of the King, while he had incurred universal detestation
‘of Catholics as well as Protestants, of the clergy as well as
the laity.’ The tyranny and ferocity of his rule almost surpass
belief. Every form of torture which ingenuity could devise had been
exercised on his unfortunate victims, and he will ever remain in
history as the incarnation of fiendish cruelty. And yet, it must at
least be confessed that the policy he adopted was one after Philip’s
own heart in all but its failure, and that he had at least succeeded
in restoring the King’s authority in the southern provinces.
| Military events of the year 1574.
| Taking of Middleburg, Feb. 24.
| Defeat of Mooker Heyde, April 14.
| Siege of Leyden, Nov. 1573-Oct. 3, 1574.
It was the avowed intention of the new Governor-General to abandon
the system of wholesale proscription pursued by Alva, and to try and
win back the Netherlands by conciliatory measures. Nevertheless, his
attention was at first necessarily directed to military affairs. In
the north the cause of the patriots prospered. On the 21st of
February, 1574, Mondragon, who had held the important town of
Middleburg, was forced to capitulate, and thus the whole of the
island of Walcheren, which commands the two mouths of the Scheldt,
was finally lost to Spain; while the town of Leyden, which had been
invested since November, 1573, still held out for the Prince of
Orange. These successes in the north were, however, neutralised by the
terrible disaster of Mooker Heyde on the Meuse (April 14, 1574). Here
Louis of Nassau, as he attempted to force his way to join his brother
at the head of a motley body of French and German mercenaries, was
completely routed by the Spanish general Sancho de Avila. Louis
himself, with his brother, Count Henry, and Duke Christopher, son of
the Elector-Palatine, were among the slain. The death of Louis, ‘the
Bayard of the Netherlands,’ was a serious blow to William, who had
now lost three brothers in the field;[70] and Requesens, having with
difficulty quieted a serious mutiny of the victorious troops, ordered
the reinvestment of Leyden (May 26, 1574), which had been suspended
owing to the advance of Louis. In the opinion of Requesens, religion
had but little to do with the rebellion. He accordingly offered a
general amnesty to all, with a few exceptions, who would return to
Mother Church. But although this view of the Grand Commander was
correct enough with respect to the original causes of the revolt,
matters had changed, at all events in the northern provinces. There
religious and political discontent were fast becoming identified, and
already in the summer of 1572, William had complained of the cruelties
exercised by the patriots on priests and monks. The offers, therefore,
of the Governor-General were rejected, and with the cry, ‘Rather Turks
than Papists, better be drowned than taken,’ the citizens of Leyden
prepared to hold out to the last gasp. All hopes of succour by land
had been destroyed by the defeat of Mooker Heyde. Nevertheless, the
sea remained. This was indeed fifteen miles away; but the dykes were
cut; and, after a long and anxious delay, the wind shifted to the
north-west; two furious gales on the 18th September and the 1st and
2nd of October helped to heap the waters of the ocean on the land, and
enabled the fleet of Admiral Boisot to approach. The Spaniards, with
Valdés their commander, fled at the advance of this new enemy, and
the city was saved (October 3).
| Meeting of Estates of Brabant. June 1574.
| Conference at Breda. March-July 1575.
The relief of Leyden, the most brilliant success of the war--a success
commemorated by the foundation of the University--proved conclusively
that although the Spaniards might conquer by land, they were no
match for the ‘Sea Beggars’ wherever a ship could float. While this
memorable siege had been proceeding, Requesens had been attempting to
conciliate the southern provinces. On the 7th of June, an assembly of
the Estates of Brabant had been held at Brussels. The King’s pardon,
above mentioned, was published, and the abolition of the Council
of Blood and the tax of the tenth penny promised. The Estates, not
satisfied with this, demanded the departure of the Spanish troops,
the exclusion of foreigners from office, and the restoration of
municipal privileges to the cities, while they were niggardly in their
offers of money. Requesens had no authority to grant these demands,
and the attempt at complete restoration of the King’s authority in
the south had to be postponed. The alternative was to make peace
with William and the northern provinces. To this end, negotiations
had begun as early as the previous autumn, and finally in March,
1575, a conference was held at Breda. The commissioners who had been
appointed by the Estates of Holland and Zealand demanded the dismissal
of the foreigner, the summoning of the Estates-General from all the
provinces, and the toleration of Calvinistic opinion. The royal
commissioners offered to dismiss the foreign soldiers, if the Prince
would disband the German and other foreign mercenaries in his service,
and they consented to the summoning of an Estates-General. They,
however, asked that in return for the guarantee of the King’s
sign-manual and the pledge of the Emperor that the royal promises
should be kept, the Prince should give hostages and surrender some
of the most important towns he held. William was not likely thus to
deprive himself of effective means of resistance, and an agreement
was highly improbable on such terms, even if the religious difficulty
had not presented an insurmountable obstacle. The utmost that the
royal commissioners would offer was that those, who would not return
to the Catholic Church, should be allowed to sell their property
and leave the country. Requesens, despairing himself of peace on
such conditions, had made the curious suggestion to Philip that he
should surrender the Netherlands to some other ruler, who would
not have the same scruples with regard to toleration. ‘They might
be exchanged for Piedmont with the Duke of Savoy or be granted to
Philip’s second son.’ ‘To my son--never,’ wrote Philip on the margin
of the despatch. ‘I would rather he were a pauper than a heretic.’ And
in his answer to Requesens he suggested the advisability of adopting
Alva’s last advice to burn all the cities which could not be held;
then after secretly tempting the adherents of the Prince to win
pardon by assassinating their master, he relapsed into one of his
long periods of silence. Under these circumstances peace was clearly
impossible. The negotiations were broken off in July, 1575, and
Requesens with a heavy heart, a mutinous soldiery, an empty exchequer,
and a ruined credit, prepared for further operations.
| Increased authority given to the Prince of Orange.
| Mondragon secures the islands of Duiveland and
| Schouwen. Oct. 1575-June, 1576.
Meantime, steps had been taken by Holland and Zealand to form a union
and to reorganise the government. There had been a tendency of late
on the part of the burgher aristocrats to place restraints on the
authority of the Prince. But he refused to accept the responsibilities
of rule under such conditions; and accordingly, in June, 1575, he was
intrusted with absolute power in all matters concerning the defence
of the country, subject only to the power of the purse, which was
reserved to the Estates. The magistrates and other officials were
to be nominated by him out of a list supplied by the Estates. The
Estates also demanded that he should suppress the open exercise of
the ‘Roman religion.’ William, however, insisted on substituting
for these words ‘any religion at variance with the Gospel.’ The
clause, even as amended, showed very clearly that the religious
question was coming more and more to the front, and the difficulty
of any compromise on this question, not only with the King, but with
those southern provinces where Catholicism was strong. In October of
the same year, the Estates of Holland and of Zealand took a still
more decisive step. Hitherto they had declared themselves the loyal
subjects of King Philip; they now resolved to forsake the King and
seek the sovereignty of some other prince. But their efforts were not
successful. Elizabeth, to whom they first offered the sovereignty,
played her usual game. She listened graciously to their offers; she
allowed them to purchase arms and levy soldiers at their own expense
in England; but on the question of the sovereignty she reserved her
decision ‘until she had done all in her power to bring about an
arrangement between them and their King’ (April, 1576). An offer made
at the French court to the Duc d’Alençon was no more successful; and
while these fruitless negotiations were being pursued the patriots
suffered a serious reverse in the north of Zealand. Of the three
islands, Tholen, Duiveland, and Schouwen, which lie between the
northern outlet of the Scheldt and the Meuse, the last had remained
in the hands of the Spaniards. In September, 1575, an attack, led by
Mondragon and supported by the fleet, was made thence on Duiveland,
which was taken in October. A landing was then effected on Schouwen,
and the town of Zierickzee was besieged, to fall in the following
June, 1576. By this brave exploit of Mondragon the island province
of Zealand was cut in two, and the northern outlet of the Scheldt
commanded.
| Death of Requesens, March 5, 1576, followed by an
| interregnum of eight months.
| Revolt of Spanish soldiery. July 1576.
| The mutineers sack Antwerp. Nov. 4, 1576.
In the midst of this transient success, Requesens died suddenly of
a fever aggravated by the anxieties of his post (March 5). Philip
allowed several months to slip away before he finally decided
on his successor. Meanwhile, the Council of State carried on
the government. Of the old members there remained only the Duke
of Aerschot, Count Berlaymont, and Viglius. To these, several
Netherlanders and one Spaniard, Jerome de Roda, were added;
while Count Mansfeld, a German, was intrusted with supreme
military command. Although the Council of State was thus formed
almost exclusively of natives, its administration was still very
unpopular. Aerschot was secretly a partisan of William. The other
two original members had been associated with Cardinal Granvella,
and Berlaymont had besides been one of the judges of the Council of
Blood. In spite of the desire of the majority for a thorough change in
policy, the Council was divided, wanting in capacity, and absolutely
devoid of funds. Above all, it failed in maintaining the discipline
of the Spanish troops. No sooner had the town of Zierickzee fallen
(June 21), than the soldiers, furious on account of the arrears of
their pay, mutinied once more, deserted Mondragon, and left Zealand
for Brabant (July 15). The mutiny spread rapidly, and Alost in
Flanders was seized. The indignation and fear thus aroused led the
Estates of Brabant, then sitting at Brussels, to take measures of
self-protection. On July 26, they forced the trembling Council of
State to issue an edict against the mutineers. They then threatened
the Spaniards in the city, levied troops, and finally, on September 4,
arrested the members of the Council themselves. This only served to
further irritate the soldiery. The officers, already jealous at the
appointment of Mansfeld, now with few exceptions made common cause
with their mutinous troops, more especially Sancho de Avila, who was
in command of the citadel of Antwerp. Many of the German and Walloon
mercenaries joined, while De Roda, flying from Brussels to Antwerp,
declared himself the only representative of the King and openly
supported d’Avila. The mutineers now held the citadels of almost
every important town in the south, with the exception of Brussels,
and in many cases obtained possession of the towns themselves, which
they treated with great cruelty. Meanwhile, Orange had seized the
opportunity to try and win over the southern provinces. Although the
religious divisions between the north and south had of late become
accentuated, all were at least united in their desire to drive out
the foreigner, more especially the foreign soldiery, and to reassert
their political privileges. William, appealing to this common
motive, urged them to sink all differences, and with one heart and
will to work for the liberation of their country. Inspired by his
stirring words, delegates from the Estates of the southern provinces
appeared at Ghent, in the middle of October, to confer with the
representatives sent by the Estates of the north. Hardly had their
conference commenced when the violence of the mutineers reached its
climax. On the 4th November, the troops at Alost marched upon Antwerp,
joined hands with the garrison under d’Avila, overcame the German and
Walloon regiments which had been sent by the Estates of Brabant to
hold the town, and with the cries, ‘St. Iago, Spain, fire, murder,
and pillage,’ wreaked their vengeance on the city. Catholics and
Protestants, native and foreign merchants, women and children, the
poor as well as the rich, were attacked without discrimination. Eight
thousand persons were massacred; the finest buildings were burnt;
property to the value of twelve millions was destroyed or seized;
and Antwerp, the richest city of the Netherlands, and ‘one of the
ornaments of Europe,’ became ‘the most forlorn and desolate city of
Christendom.’
| Pacification of Ghent. Nov. 8, 1576.
| Successes of the Patriots.
The sack of Antwerp served, at least, the cause of William. On the 8th
of November, the Pacification of Ghent was signed by the delegates
of the northern and southern provinces assembled at that city. By
this famous treaty, it was agreed that the Spaniards should be at all
hazards expelled from the Netherlands, and that an Estates-General
from all the provinces should be summoned to take measures for the
common safety and future government. The Prince of Orange was to
continue lieutenant, admiral, and general for his Majesty in Holland
and Zealand. There should be freedom of trade and communication
between the provinces. All prisoners should be released, and all
confiscated property restored. The placards and ordinances against
heresy should be suspended until the Estates-General had decided
on the matter. No attack, however, should be made on the Catholic
religion outside the provinces of Holland and Zealand, and if the
property of prelates and other ecclesiastics in the north were
alienated, it should not be done without compensation. Lastly, no
province was to have the benefit of this treaty until it had given its
adhesion. The Pacification of Ghent was received with enthusiasm by
the whole of the Netherlands; and, although the religious difficulty
was postponed rather than solved, there seemed a reasonable prospect
that both Catholics and Protestants would at last unite, on the
basis of mutual toleration, to throw off the Spanish yoke. The
Pacification was at first followed by encouraging results. On November
11, the Spanish garrison surrendered the citadel of Ghent. That of
Valenciennes was bought from the German soldiery, and at the same time
the islands of Schouwen and Duiveland were abandoned by Mondragon. All
Zealand, with the exception of Tholen, was again free from Spanish
rule. Shortly after, Friesland and Groningen were regained by the
national party; and in January, 1577, the Pacification of Ghent was
confirmed by the Union of Brussels, an union which was numerously
signed in every province except that of Luxemburg.
| Don John of Austria arrives at Luxemburg. Nov. 3, 1576.
| The Perpetual Edict. Feb. 17, 1577.