E. W. WYNKOOP, United States Indian Agent.
Hon. THOMAS MURPHY, Superintendent Indian Affairs.
The italics are mine, but I desire to invite attention to the
confidence and strong reliance placed in these Indians by a man who
was intimately associated with them, interested in their welfare, and
supposed to be able to speak authoritatively as to their character and
intentions. If they could deceive him, it is not surprising that other
equally well-meaning persons further east should be equally misled.
The above letter is dated August 10, 1868. The following extract is
from a letter written by the same party and to the Superintendent of
Indian Affairs, dated at same place on the 10th of September, 1868,
exactly one month after his positive declaration that the Cheyennes
“were perfectly satisfied, and there will be no trouble with them this
season.”
Here is the extract referred to: “Subsequently I received permission
from the Department to issue to them their arms and ammunition, which I
accordingly did. But a short time before the issue was made a war party
had started north from the Cheyenne village, on the war path against
the Pawnees; and they, not knowing of the issue and smarting under
their _supposed_ wrongs, committed the outrages on the Saline river
which have led to the present unfortunate aspect of affairs. The United
States troops are now south of the Arkansas river in hot pursuit of the
Cheyennes, the effect of which I think will be to plunge other tribes
into difficulty and finally culminate in a general Indian war.” It will
be observed that no justification is offered for the guilty Indians
except that had they been aware of the wise and beneficent intention
of the Government to issue them a fresh supply of arms, they might
have delayed their murderous raid against the defenceless settlers
until after the issue. Fears are also expressed that other tribes may
be plunged into difficulty, but by the same witness and others it is
easily established that the other tribes referred to were represented
prominently in the war party which had devastated the settlements on
the Saline. First I will submit an extract of a letter dated Fort
Larned, August 1, 1868, from Thomas Murphy, Superintendent of Indian
Affairs, to the Hon. N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Washington, D. C.:
SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I held a council to-day
with the Arapahoes and Apache Indians, at which I explained to them
why their arms and ammunition had been withheld; that the white
settlers were now well armed and determined that no more raids
should be made through their country by large bodies of Indians;
and that while the whites were friendly and well disposed toward
the Indians, yet if the Indians attempted another raid such as they
recently made on the Kaw reservation, I feared themselves and the
whites would have a fight, and that it would bring on war.
The head chief of the Arapahoes, Little Raven, replied “that no
more trips would be made by his people into the settlements: that
their hearts were good toward the whites, and they wished to remain
at peace with them.” I told him I would now give them their arms
and ammunition; that I hoped they would use them for the sole
purpose of securing food for themselves and families, and that in
no case would I ever hear of their using these arms against their
white brethren. Little Raven and the other chiefs then promised
that these arms should never be used against the whites, and Agent
Wynkoop then delivered to the Arapahoes one hundred pistols,
eighty Lancaster rifles, twelve kegs of powder, one and one-half
kegs of lead, and fifteen thousand caps; and to the Apaches he
gave forty pistols, twenty Lancaster rifles, three kegs of powder,
one-half keg of lead, and five thousand caps, for which they
seemed much pleased.... I would have remained here to see the
Cheyennes did I deem it important to do so. From what I can learn
there will be no trouble whatever with them. They will come here,
get their ammunition and leave immediately to hunt buffalo. They
are well and peacefully disposed toward the whites, and, unless
some unlooked-for event should transpire to change their present
feelings, they will keep their treaty pledges.
This certainly reads well, and at Washington or further east would
be regarded as a favorable indication of the desire for peace on
the part of the Indians. The reader is asked to remember that the
foregoing letters and extracts are from professed friends of the
Indian and advocates of what is known as the peace policy. The letter
of Superintendent Murphy was written the day of council, August 1.
Mark his words of advice to Little Raven as to how the arms were to be
used, and note Little Raven’s reply containing his strong promises of
maintaining friendly relations with the whites. Yet the second night
following the issue of arms, a combined war party of Cheyennes and
Arapahoes, numbering over two hundred warriors, almost the exact number
of pistols issued at the council, left the Indian village to inaugurate
a bloody raid in the Kansas settlements; and among the Arapahoes was
the son of Little Raven. By reading the speech made by this chief
in the council referred to by Mr. Murphy, a marked resemblance will
be detected to the stereotyped responses delivered by Indian chiefs
visiting the authorities at Washington, or when imposing upon the
credulous and kind-hearted people who assemble at Cooper Institute
periodically to listen to these untutored orators of the plains. The
statements and promises uttered in the one instance are fully as
reliable as those listened to so breathlessly in the others. Regarding
the raid made by the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, it will be considered
sufficient perhaps when I base my statements upon the following “Report
of an interview between Colonel E. W. Wynkoop, United States Indian
Agent, and Little Rock, a Cheyenne chief, held at Fort Larned, Kansas,
August 19, 1868, in the presence of Lieutenant S. M. Robbins, Seventh
United States Cavalry, John S. Smith, United States interpreter, and
James Morrison, scout for Indian agency.”
Question by Colonel Wynkoop: “Six nights ago I spoke to you in regard
to depredations committed on the Saline. I told you to go and find out
by whom these depredations were committed and to bring me straight
news. What news do you bring?”
Little Rock: “I took your advice and went there. I am now here to
tell you all I know. This war party of Cheyennes which left the camp
of these tribes above the forks of Walnut creek about the 2d or 3d of
August, went out against the Pawnees, crossed the Smoky Hill about
Fort Hays, and thence proceeded to the Saline, where there were ten
lodges of Sioux in the Cheyenne camp when this war party left, and
about twenty men of them and four Arapahoes accompanied the party.
The Cheyennes numbered about two hundred; nearly all the young men in
the village went; _Little Raven’s son was one of the four Arapahoes_.
When the party reached the Saline they turned down the stream, with
the exception of twenty, who, being fearful of depredations being
committed against the whites by the party going in the direction of the
settlements, kept on north toward the Pawnees. The main party continued
down the Saline until they came in sight of the settlement; they then
camped there. A Cheyenne named Oh-e-ah-mo-he-a, a brother of White
Antelope, who was killed at Sand Creek, and another named Red Nose,
proceeded to the first house; they afterwards returned to the camp
and with them a woman captive. The main party was surprised at this
action, and forcibly took possession of her, and returned her to her
house. The two Indians had outraged the woman before they brought her
to the camp. After the outrage had been committed, the parties left the
Saline and went north toward the settlement of the south fork of the
Solomon, _where they were kindly received and fed by the white people_.
They left the settlements on the south fork and proceeded toward the
settlements on the north fork. When in sight of these settlements, they
came upon a body of armed settlers, who fired upon them; they avoided
the party, went around them, and approached a house some distance
off. In the vicinity of the house they came upon a white man alone
upon the prairie. Big Head’s son[D] rode at him and knocked him down
with a club. The Indian who had committed the outrage upon the white
woman, known as White Antelope’s brother, then fired upon the white
man without effect, while the third Indian rode up and killed him.
Soon after they killed a white man, and, close by, a woman--all in the
same settlement. At the time these people were killed, the party was
divided in feeling, the majority being opposed to any outrages being
committed; but finding it useless to contend against these outrages
being committed without bringing on a strife among themselves, they
gave way and all went in together. They then went to another house
in the same settlement, and there killed two men and took two little
girls prisoners; this on the same day. After committing this last
outrage the party turned south toward the Saline, where they came upon
a body of mounted troops; the troops immediately charged the Indians,
and the pursuit was continued a long time. The Indians having the two
children, their horses becoming fatigued, dropped the children without
hurting them. Soon after the children were dropped the pursuit ceased;
but the Indians continued on up the Saline. A portion of the Indians
afterward returned to look for the children, but they were unable to
find them. After they had proceeded some distance up the Saline, the
party divided, the majority going north toward the settlements on the
Solomon, but thirty of them started toward their village, supposed
to be some distance northwest of Fort Larned. _Another small party
returned to Black Kettle’s village_, from which party I got this
information.[E] I am fearful that before this time the party that
started north had committed a great many depredations.”
[D] Afterward captured by my command and killed in a difficulty
with the guard at Fort Hays, Kansas, in the summer of 1869.
[E] Little Rock was a chief of Black Kettle’s band of
Cheyennes, and second in rank to Black Kettle.
Question by Colonel Wynkoop: “Do you know the names of the principal
men of this party that committed the depredations, besides White
Antelope’s brother?”
Answer by Little Rock: “There were Medicine Arrow’s oldest son, named
Tall Wolf; Red Nose, who was one of the men who outraged the woman, Big
Head’s son named Porcupine Bear; and Sand Hill’s brother, known as the
Bear that Goes Ahead.”
Question by Colonel Wynkoop: “You told me your nation wants peace; will
you, in accordance with your treaty stipulations, deliver up the men
whom you have named as being the leaders of the party who committed the
outrages named?”
Answer by Little Rock: “I think that the only men who ought to suffer
and be responsible for these outrages are White Antelope’s brother and
Red Nose, the men who ravished the woman; and when I return to the
Cheyenne camp and assemble the chiefs and head men, I think those two
men will be delivered up to you.”
Question by Colonel Wynkoop: “I consider the whole party guilty; but it
being impossible to punish all of them, I hold the principal men, whom
you mentioned, responsible for all. They had no right to be led and
governed by two men. If no depredations had been committed after the
outrage on the woman, the two men whom you have mentioned alone would
have been guilty.”
Answer by Little Rock: “After your explanation I think your demand for
the men is right. I am willing to deliver them up, and will go back to
the tribe and use my best endeavors to have them surrendered. I am but
one man, and cannot answer for the entire nation.”
Other questions and answers of similar import followed.
The terms of the interview between Colonel Wynkoop and Little Rock were
carefully noted down and transmitted regularly to his next superior
officer, Superintendent Murphy, who but a few days previous, and within
the same month, had officially reported to the Indian Commissioner
at Washington that peace and good will reigned undisturbed between
the Indians under his charge and the whites. Even he, with his strong
leaning toward the adoption of morbid measures of a peaceful character,
and his disinclination to believe the Indians could meditate evil
toward their white neighbors, was forced, as his next letter shows, to
alter his views.
OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS, ATCHISON, KANSAS,
August 22, 1868.
SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a letter of the 19th
inst. from Agent Wynkoop, enclosing report of a talk which he had
with Little Rock, a Cheyenne chief, whom he had sent to ascertain
the facts relative to the recent troubles on the Solomon and Saline
rivers, in this State. The agent’s letter and report are full, and
explain themselves. I fully concur in the views expressed by the
agent that the innocent Indians, who are trying to keep, in good
faith, their treaty pledges, be protected in the manner indicated
by him, while I earnestly recommend that the Indians who have
committed these gross outrages be turned over to the military,
and that they be severely punished. When I reflect that at the
very time these Indians were making such loud professions of
friendship at Larned, receiving their annuities, etc., they were
then contemplating and planning this campaign, I can no longer have
confidence in what they say or promise. War is surely upon us,
and in view of the importance of the case, I earnestly recommend
that Agent Wynkoop be furnished promptly with the views of the
Department, and that full instructions be given him for his future
action.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
(Signed) THOMAS MURPHY, Superintendent Indian Affairs.
Hon. C. E. MIX, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Washington, D. C.
What were the recommendations of Agent Wynkoop referred to in Mr.
Murphy’s letter? They were as follows: “Let me take those Indians whom
I know to be guiltless and desirous of remaining at peace, and locate
them with their lodges and families at some good place that I may
select in the vicinity of this post (Larned); and let those Indians
be entirely subsisted by the Government until this trouble is over,
and be kept within certain bounds; and let me be furnished with a
small battalion of United States troops, for the purpose of protecting
them from their own people, and from being forced by them into war;
let those who refuse to respond to my call and come within the bounds
prescribed, be considered at war, and let them be properly punished. By
this means, if war takes place--which I consider inevitable--we can be
able to discriminate between those who deserve punishment and those who
do not; otherwise it will be a matter of impossibility.”
This proposition seems, from its wording, to be not only a feasible
one, but based on principles of justice to all concerned, and no doubt
would be so interpreted by the theorizers on the Indian question who
study its merits from afar. Before acting upon Colonel Wynkoop’s plan,
it was in the regular order referred to General Sherman, at that time
commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, in which the Indians
referred to were located. His indorsement in reply briefly disposed of
the proposition by exposing its absurdity:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,
September 19, 1868.
I now regard the Cheyennes and Arapahoes at war, and that it
will be impossible for our troops to discriminate between the
well-disposed and the warlike parts of these bands, unless an
absolute separation be made. I prefer that the agents collect all
of the former and conduct them to their reservation within the
Indian territory south of Kansas, there to be provided for under
their supervision, say about old Fort Cobb. I cannot consent to
their being collected and held near Fort Larned. So long as Agent
Wynkoop remains at Fort Larned the vagabond part of the Indians
will cluster about him for support, and to beg of the military. The
vital part of these tribes are committing murders and robberies
from Kansas to Colorado, and it is an excess of generosity on our
part to be feeding and supplying the old, young, and feeble, while
their young men are at war.
I do not pretend to say what should be done with these, but it will
simplify our game of war, already complicated enough, by removing
them well away from our field of operations.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
(Signed) W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General, commanding.
Again, on the 26th of the same month, General Sherman, in a letter
to General Schofield, then Secretary of War, writes: “The annuity
goods for these Indians, Kiowas and Comanches, should be sent to Fort
Cobb, and the Indian agent for these Indians should go there at once.
And if the Secretary of the Interior has any contingent fund out of
which he could provide food, or if he could use a part of the regular
appropriation for food instead of clothing, it may keep these Indians
from joining the hostile Cheyennes and Arapahoes. The latter should
receive nothing, and now that they are at war, I propose to give them
enough of it to satisfy them to their hearts’ content, and General
Sheridan will not relax his efforts till the winter will put them at
our mercy. He reports that he can already account for about seventy
dead Indians, and his forces are right in among these hostile Indians
on the Upper Republican, and on the head of the Canadian south of Fort
Dodge.”
Still another letter from General Sherman to the Secretary of War
argues the case as follows: “All the Cheyennes and Arapahoes are now
at war. Admitting that some of them have not done acts of murder,
rape, etc., still they have not restrained those who have, nor have
they on demand given up the criminals as they agreed to do. The treaty
made at Medicine Lodge is, therefore, already broken by them, and the
War Department should ask the concurrence of the Indian Department,
or invoke the superior orders of the President against any goods
whatever, even clothing, going to any part of the tribes named, until
this matter is settled. As military commander I have the right, unless
restrained by superior orders, to prevent the issue of any goods
whatever to Indians outside of these reservations; and if the agency
for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes be established at or near old Fort
Cobb, the agent should if possible be able to provide for and feed
such as may go there of their own volition, or who may be driven there
by our military movements.... I have despatched General Hazen to the
frontier, with a limited amount of money wherewith to aid the said
agents to provide for the peaceful parts of those tribes this winter,
while _en route_ to and after their arrival at their new homes. No
better time could be possibly chosen than the present for destroying
or humiliating those bands that have so outrageously violated
their treaties and begun a devastating war without one particle of
provocation; and after a reasonable time given for the innocent to
withdraw, I will solicit an order from the President declaring all
Indians who remain outside of their lawful reservations to be outlaws,
and commanding all people, soldiers and citizens, to proceed against
them as such. We have never heretofore been in a condition to adopt
this course, because until now we could not clearly point out to these
Indians where they may rightfully go to escape the consequences of the
hostile acts of their fellows. The right to hunt buffaloes, secured
by the treaties, could also be regulated so as to require all parties
desiring to hunt to procure from the agent a permit, which permit
should be indorsed by the commanding officer of the nearest military
post; but I think, the treaty having been clearly violated by the
Indians themselves, this hunting right is entirely lost to them, if we
so declare it.”
The foregoing extracts from letters and official correspondence which
passed between high dignitaries of the Government, who were supposed
not only to be thoroughly conversant with Indian affairs, but to
represent the civil and military phase of the question, will, when
read in connection with the statements of the superintendent and agent
of the Indians, and that of the chief, Little Rock, give the reader
some idea of the origin and character of the difficulties between the
whites and Indians in the summer and fall of 1868. The tabulated list
of depredations by Indians, accompanying the chapter descriptive of
General Forsyth’s campaign, will give more extended information in a
condensed form.
While Forsyth was moving his detachment of scouts through the valleys
of the Republican, in the northwestern portion of Kansas, General
Sheridan had also arranged to have a well-equipped force operating
south of the Arkansas river, and in this way to cause the two favorite
haunts of the Indians to be overrun simultaneously, and thus prevent
them when driven from one haunt from fleeing in safety and unmolested
to another. The expedition intended to operate south of the Arkansas
was composed of the principal portion of the Seventh Cavalry and a few
companies of the Third Regular Infantry, the entire force under command
of Brigadier-General Alfred Sully, an officer of long experience
among the Indians, and one who had in times gone by achieved no
little distinction as an Indian fighter, and at a later date became a
partial advocate of the adoption of the peace policy. General Sully’s
expedition, after being thoroughly equipped and supplied, under his
personal supervision, with everything needful in a campaign such as was
about to be undertaken, crossed the Arkansas river about the 1st of
September, at Fort Dodge, and marching a little west of south struck
the Cimarron river, where they first encountered Indians. From the
Cimarron the troops moved in a southeasterly direction, one day’s march
to Beaver creek, the savages opposing and fighting them during the
entire day. That night the Indians came close enough to fire into the
camp, an unusual proceeding in Indian warfare, as they rarely molest
troops during the hours of night. The next day General Sully directed
his march down the valley of the Beaver; but just as his troops were
breaking camp, the long wagon train having already “pulled out,” and
the rear guard of the troops having barely got into their saddles, a
party of between two and three hundred warriors, who had evidently in
some inexplicable manner contrived to conceal their approach until the
proper moment, dashed into the deserted camp within a few yards of the
rear of the troops, and succeeded in cutting off a few led horses and
two of the cavalrymen who, as is so often the case, had lingered a
moment behind the column. General Sully and staff were at that moment
near the head of the column, a mile or more from camp. The General,
as was his custom on the march, being comfortably stowed away in his
ambulance, of course it was impossible that he or his staff, from
their great distance from the scene of actual attack, could give the
necessary orders in the case.
Fortunately, the acting adjutant of the cavalry, Brevet Captain A. E.
Smith, was riding at the rear of the column and witnessed the attack
of the Indians. Captain Hamilton of the cavalry was also present in
command of the rear guard. Wheeling his guard to the right about, he
at once prepared to charge the Indians and to attempt the rescue of
the two troopers who were being carried off as prisoners before his
very eyes. At the same time Captain Smith, as representative of the
commanding officer of the cavalry, promptly took the responsibility
of directing a squadron of cavalry to wheel out of column and advance
in support of Captain Hamilton’s guard. With this hastily formed
detachment, the Indians, still within pistol range, but moving off with
their prisoners, were gallantly charged and so closely pressed that
they were forced to relinquish possession of one of their prisoners,
but not before shooting him through the body and leaving him on the
ground, as they supposed, mortally wounded. The troops continued to
charge the retreating Indians, upon whom they were gaining, determined
if possible to effect the rescue of their remaining comrade. They were
advancing down one slope while the Indians just across a ravine were
endeavoring to escape with their prisoner up the opposite ascent, when
a peremptory order reached the officers commanding the pursuing force
to withdraw their men and reform the column at once. Delaying only long
enough for an ambulance to arrive from the train in which to transport
their wounded comrade, the order was obeyed. Upon rejoining the column
the two officers named were summoned before the officer commanding
their regiment, and, after a second-hand reprimand, were ordered in
arrest and their sabres taken from them, for leaving the column without
orders--the attempted and half successful rescue of their comrades and
the repulse of the Indians to the contrary notwithstanding. Fortunately
wiser and better-natured counsels prevailed in a few hours, and their
regimental commander was authorized to release these two officers from
their brief durance, their sabres were restored to them, and they
became, as they deserved, the recipients of numerous complimentary
expressions from their brother officers. The terrible fate awaiting
the unfortunate trooper carried off by the Indians spread a deep gloom
throughout the command. All were too familiar with the horrid customs
of the savages to hope for a moment that the captive would be reserved
for aught but a slow lingering death, from torture the most horrible
and painful which savage, bloodthirsty minds could suggest. Such was
in truth his sad fate, as we learned afterwards when peace (?) was
established with the tribes then engaged in war. Never shall I forget
the consummate coolness and particularity of detail with which some of
the Indians engaged in the affair related to myself and party the exact
process by which the captured trooper was tortured to death; how he was
tied to a stake, strips of flesh cut from his body, arms, and legs,
burning brands thrust into the bleeding wounds, the nose, lips, and
ears cut off, and finally, when from loss of blood, excessive pain, and
anguish, the poor, bleeding, almost senseless mortal fell to the ground
exhausted, the younger Indians were permitted to rush in and despatch
him with their knives.
The expedition proceeded on down the valley of Beaver creek, the
Indians contesting every step of the way. In the afternoon, about
three o’clock, the troops arrived at a ridge of sand-hills, a few
miles southeast of the present site of “Camp Supply,” where quite a
determined engagement took place with the savages, the three tribes,
Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Kiowas, being the assailants. The Indians
seemed to have reserved their strongest efforts until the troops and
train had advanced well into the sand-hills, when a most obstinate
and well-conducted resistance was offered to the further advance of
the troops. It was evident to many of the officers, and no doubt to
the men, that the troops were probably nearing the location of the
Indian villages, and that this last display of opposition to their
further advance was to save the villages. The character of the country
immediately about the troops was not favorable to the operations of
cavalry; the surface of the rolling plain was cut up by irregular and
closely located sand-hills, too steep and sandy to allow cavalry to
move with freedom, yet capable of being easily cleared of savages by
troops fighting on foot. The Indians took post on the hilltops and
began a harassing fire on the troops and train. Had the infantry been
unloaded from the wagons promptly, instead of adding to the great
weight, sinking the wheels sometimes almost in to the axles, and had
they, with the assistance of a few of the dismounted cavalry, been
deployed on both sides of the train, the latter could have been safely
conducted through what was then decided to be impassable sand-hills,
but which were a short time afterward proved to be perfectly
practicable. And once beyond the range of sand-hills but a short
distance, the villages of the attacking warriors would have been found
exposed to an easy and important capture, probably terminating the
campaign by compelling a satisfactory peace. Captain Yates, with his
single troop of cavalry, was ordered forward to drive the Indians away.
This was a proceeding which did not seem to meet with favor from the
savages. Captain Yates could drive them wherever he encountered them,
but it was only to cause the redskins to appear in increased numbers
at some other threatened point. After contending in this non-effective
manner for a couple of hours, the impression arose in the minds of some
that the train could not be conducted through the sand-hills in the
face of the strong opposition offered by the Indians. The order was
issued to turn about and withdraw. This order was executed, and the
troop and train, followed by the exultant Indians, retired a few miles
to the Beaver, and encamped for the night on the ground now known as
“Camp Supply.”
Captain Yates had caused to be brought off the field, when his troop
was ordered to retire, the body of one of his men who had been slain in
the fight by the Indians. As the troops were to continue their backward
movement next day, and it was impossible to transport the dead body
further, Captain Yates ordered preparations made for interring it in
camp that night; but knowing that the Indians would thoroughly search
the deserted camp-ground almost before the troops should get out of
sight, and would be quick with their watchful eyes to detect a grave,
and if successful in discovering it would unearth the body in order
to obtain the scalp, directions were given to prepare the grave after
nightfall, and the spot selected would have baffled the eye of any one
but that of an Indian. The grave was dug under the picket line to which
the seventy or eighty horses of the troops would be tethered during the
night, so that their constant tramping and pawing should completely
cover up and obliterate all traces of the grave containing the body of
the dead trooper. The following morning even those who had performed
the sad rites of burial to their fallen comrade could scarcely have
been able to indicate the exact location of the grave. Yet when we
returned to that point a few weeks afterward it was discovered that the
wily savages had found the grave, unearthed the body, and removed the
scalp of their victim, on the day following the interment.
Early on the morning succeeding the fight in the sand-hills General
Sully resumed his march toward Fort Dodge, the Indians following and
harassing the movements of the troops until about two o’clock in the
afternoon, when, apparently satisfied with their success in forcing the
expedition back, thus relieving their villages and themselves from the
danger which had threatened them, they fired their parting shots and
rode off in triumph. That night the troops camped on Bluff creek, from
which point General Sully proceeded to Fort Dodge, on the Arkansas,
leaving the main portion of the command in camp on Bluff creek, where
we shall see them again.