LATER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS[1]
At the close of the war with Spain it was commonly remarked that the
United States had become a world power; books and periodicals written
on the history of the period were based upon the assumption that
America had swung out into the current of international affairs and
that the traditional isolation of this country had become a thing of
the past. Time must be appealed to, however, for answers to fundamental
questions concerning the character of this change. Did the United
States become a world power in the sense that the majority of its
people threw off that policy of steering clear of permanent alliances
which had been expressed by Washington in his farewell address, in
favor of the policy of participation in world affairs on a footing with
the larger European states? Did the people of the United States after
1898 take a constant and informed interest in world politics and
international relations? Or did the people, after a slight excursion
into the West Indies and the Philippines, return to the traditional
attitude of "splendid isolation"? Was the extent to which the United
States became a world power sufficient to make probable its entry into
a European war?
A cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the United States has
always been its attachment to international peace, particularly through
the practice of arbitration. The great hopes raised by the two Hague
Conferences were striking proofs of this fact. In 1899, at the
suggestion of Czar Nicholas II of Russia, twenty-six leading powers
conferred at The Hague, in order to discover means of limiting
armaments and ensuring lasting peace. A second conference was held in
1907 at the suggestion, in part, of President Roosevelt. At this
gathering forty-four states were represented, including most of the
Latin-American republics. During the two conferences many questions
relating to international law were discussed, and the conclusions
reached were expressed in the form of "Conventions," which the several
powers signed. In the main these agreements related to the rights and
duties of nations and individuals in time of war. Most important among
the agreements was one for the pacific settlement of international
disputes, according to which, in certain less important controversies,
the states concerned would appoint a "commission of inquiry" which
would study the case and give its opinion of the facts involved. It was
also agreed to organize a Permanent Court of Arbitration to be
available at all times for the peaceful settlement of differences.
Strictly speaking this body was not a Court, but a list of judges to
which each nation was to contribute four, and when any countries became
involved in a controversy they could draw arbitrators from the list.
Moreover the powers agreed "if a serious dispute threatens to break out
between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the Permanent
Court is open to them."
The United States was a party to four of the fifteen cases presented to
the Court between 1902 and 1913. The first controversy was between the
United States and Mexico and involved "The Pious Fund," a large sum of
money which was in dispute between Mexico and the Roman Catholic Church
of California, and the second concerned claims of the United States,
Mexico and eight European countries against Venezuela. As the Court was
successfully appealed to in case after case, high hopes began to be
entertained that the "Parliament of Man" had at last been established.
Elihu Root, the Secretary of State, asserted in a communication to the
Senate in 1907 that the Second Conference had presented the greatest
advance ever made at a single time toward the reasonable and peaceful
regulation of international conduct, unless the advance made at The
Hague Conference of 1899 was excepted.
In the meantime, in 1904, under President Roosevelt's leadership,
treaties were arranged with France, Germany, Great Britain and other
nations, under which the contracting parties agreed in advance to
submit their disputes to The Hague Court, although excepting questions
involving vital interests, independence or national honor. While the
Senate was discussing the treaties, it fell into a dispute with the
President in regard to its constitutional rights as part of the
treaty-making power, and although there was general agreement on the
value of the principle of arbitration, yet the Senate insisted upon
amending the treaties, whereupon the President refused to refer them
back to the other nations. Secretary Root revived the project, however,
in 1908 and 1909 and secured amended treaties with a long list of
nations, including Austria-Hungary, France and Great Britain. President
Taft signed treaties with France and England in 1911 which expanded the
earlier agreements so as to include "justiciable" controversies even if
they involved questions of vital interest and honor, but again the
Senate added such amendments that the project was abandoned. Bryan,
Secretary of State from 1913 to 1915, undertook still further to expand
the principles of arbitration, and during his term of office many
treaties were submitted to the Senate, under which the United States
and the other contracting parties agreed to postpone warfare arising
from any cause, for a year, in order that the facts of the controversy
might be looked into. Many of these treaties were ratified by the
Senate.
The attitude of the American people toward the pacific settlement of
international disputes found expression in many ways in addition to the
arrangement of treaties. At Lake Mohonk, yearly conferences were held
at which leading citizens discussed phases of international peace.
Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn, the publisher, devoted large sums of
money to countrywide education and propaganda on the subject. The
leaders of the movement and the membership of the organizations
included so many of the most prominent persons of their time--public
officials, university presidents and men of influence as to prove that
the traditional American reliance upon international arbitration was
more firmly rooted in 1914 than ever before in our history.
The attitude of the United States toward purely European controversies
was illustrated in our action on the Moroccan question. In 1905-1906 a
controversy broke out between Germany and France in relation to
Morocco, and in January of the latter year a conference was held at
Algeciras in southern Spain in which ten European nations and the
United States took part. The result of the meeting was an "Act" which
defined the policy of the signatory powers toward Morocco. The Senate,
in ratifying the Act, asserted that its action was not to be considered
a departure from our traditional policy of aloofness from European
questions.
[Illustration:
Caribbean interests of the United States]
The outstanding incident in our relations with that part of America
south of the republic of Mexico was the controversy with Colombia over
the Panama Canal strip. The project for a canal across the Isthmus of
Panama was as old as colonization in America. For present purposes,
however, it is not necessary to go farther into the past than the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, by the terms of which the United States
and Great Britain agreed that neither would obtain any control over an
isthmian canal without the other. As time went on, however, American
sentiment in favor of a canal built, owned and operated by the United
States alone grew so powerful that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901
was arranged with Great Britain. This agreement permitted a canal
constructed under the auspices of the United States. Sentiment in
Congress was divided between a route through Nicaragua and one through
that part of the Republic of Colombia known as Panama, but in 1902 an
act was passed authorizing the President to acquire the rights of the
New Panama Canal Company, of France, on the isthmus for not more than
$40,000,000, and also to acquire a strip of land from Colombia not less
than six miles wide.[2] In case the President was unable to obtain
these rights "within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," he
was to turn to the Nicaragua route. President Roosevelt was himself in
favor of the Panama project.
The Hay-Herran convention with Colombia was accordingly drawn up and
signed in January, 1903, giving the United States the desired rights on
the isthmus, but the Senate of Colombia rejected the treaty. Thereupon
the New Panama Canal Company became alarmed because it would lose
$40,000,000 in case the United States turned from Panama to Nicaragua,
and its agents busied themselves on the isthmus in the attempt to
foment a break between Colombia and its province of Panama; the people
of Panama became aroused because their chief source of future profit
lay in their strategic position between the two oceans; and the
President was concerned because Congress would soon meet and might
insist on the Nicaragua route or at least greatly delay progress. He
hoped for a successful revolt in Panama which would enable him to treat
with the province rather than with Colombia, and he even determined to
advise Congress to take possession forcibly if the revolt did not take
place.
The administration meanwhile kept closely in touch with affairs in
Panama, and having reason to suspect the possibility of a revolution
sent war vessels to the isthmus on November 2, 1903, to prevent troops,
either Colombian or revolutionary, from landing at any point within
fifty miles of Panama. Since the only way by which revolution in Panama
could be repressed was through the presence of Colombian troops, the
action of the American government made success highly probable in case
a revolt was attempted. On the next day the plans of the Canal Company
agents or of some of the residents of Panama came to a head; early in
the evening a small and bloodless uprising occurred; and while the
United States kept both sides from disturbing the peace, the insurgents
set up a government which was recognized within two days, and Philippe
Bunau-Varilla, a former chief engineer of the Company, was accredited
to the United States as minister. A treaty was immediately arranged by
which the United States received the control of a zone ten miles wide
for the construction of a canal, and in return was to pay $10,000,000
and an annuity of $250,000 beginning nine years later, and to guarantee
the independence of Panama. The Secretary of State, John Hay, described
the process of drawing up the treaty in a private letter of November
19, 1903:
Yesterday morning the negotiations with Panama were far from
complete. But by putting on all steam, getting Root and Knox and
Shaw together at lunch, I went over my project line by line, and
fought out every section of it; adopted a few good suggestions:
hurried back to the Department, set everybody at work drawing up
final drafts--sent for Varilla, went over the whole treaty with him,
explained all the changes, got his consent, and at seven o'clock
signed the momentous document.
Although the Senate ratified the treaty, the action of the President
was the cause of a storm both in that body and throughout the nation.
In self-defence Roosevelt condemned Colombia's refusal to ratify the
Hay-Herran treaty and asserted that no hope remained of getting a
satisfactory agreement with that country; that a treaty of 1846 with
Colombia justified his intervention; and that our national interests
and the interests of the world at large demanded that Colombia no
longer prevent the construction of a canal. On the other hand the
President's critics called attention to the unusual haste that
surrounded every step in the "seizure" of Panama; condemned the
disposition of war vessels which prevented Colombia from even
attempting to put down the uprising; and insinuated that the
administration was in collusion with the insurgents. Roosevelt's
successors in the presidency felt there was some degree of justice in
the claim of Colombia that she had been unfairly treated by her big
neighbor and several different attempts were made to negotiate treaties
which would carry with them a money payment to Colombia. On July 29,
1919, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate unanimously
reported to that body the favorable consideration of a treaty providing
for a money payment of $25,000,000, but other matters intervened and no
further progress resulted.[3]
The work of constructing the waterway was delayed by changes of plan
until 1906, when a lock canal was decided upon, and shortly afterward a
start was made. So huge an undertaking--the isthmus is forty-nine miles
wide at this point--was an engineering task of unprecedented size, and
involved stamping out the yellow fever, obtaining a water supply,
building hospitals and dwellings and finding a sufficient labor force,
as well as the more difficult problems of excavating soil and building
locks in regions where land-slides constantly threatened to destroy
important parts of the work. At length, however, all obstacles were
overcome and on August 15, 1914, the canal was opened to the passage of
vessels.
The final diplomatic question relating to the canal concerned the rates
to be charged on traffic passing through. By the terms of the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty with Great Britain, the United States agreed that
the canal should be free and open to all nations "on terms of entire
equality." In 1912 Congress enacted legislation exempting American
coast-wise vessels from the payment of tolls, despite the protest of
Great Britain. As President Wilson was of the opinion that our action
had been contrary to our treaty agreement, he urged the repeal of the
act upon his accession in 1913, and succeeded in accomplishing his
purpose.
The construction of the Canal under American auspices committed the
United States to new responsibilities in the Caribbean. Her coaling
station in Cuba, the possession of Porto Rico and the protection of the
isthmus made it a matter of national safety to preserve stable
governments in Central America and the West Indies. The infiltration of
American capital into the region served to ally economic with political
interest, for like European investors, our capitalists have taken a
part in the exploitation of South American sugar, fruit, coffee, oil
and asphalt. With the islands and shores of the Caribbean Sea alone,
American trade doubled in the decade after 1903. Orderly government
south of the United States became accordingly essential to the welfare
of our outlying possessions, and to the commercial interests of a group
of investors. The most important international questions that have
arisen in Spanish America related to Venezuela in 1902 and Santo
Domingo in 1905.
Venezuela had long granted concessions to foreign investors--Germans,
English, Italians and others--in order to develop her mines, timber and
railroads, but unsettled conditions in the country frequently resulted
in the non-fulfillment of the obligations which had been entered into.
Germany, for example, claimed that the government of Venezuela had
guaranteed dividends on the stock of a railroad built by German
subjects and had failed to live up to the contract. Having in mind the
possible use of force to compel Venezuela to carry out her alleged
obligations, Germany consulted our state department to discover whether
our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine would lead us to oppose the
contemplated action. The attitude of President Roosevelt in 1901 was
that there was no connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the
commercial relations of the South American republics, except that
punishment of those nations must not take the form of the acquisition
of territory. In 1902 Germany, Great Britain and Italy proceeded to
blockade some of the ports of Venezuela, and the latter thereupon
agreed to submit her case to arbitration. Apparently, however, Germany
was unwilling to relinquish the advantage which the blockade seemed to
promise, and in the meantime Roosevelt became fearful that the result
of the blockade might be the more or less permanent occupation of part
of Venezuela. He therefore told the German ambassador that unless the
Emperor agreed to arbitration within ten days, the United States would
send a fleet to Venezuela and end the danger which Roosevelt feared.
The pressure quickly produced the desired results, and during the
summer of 1903 many of the claims were referred to commissions. The
three blockading powers believed themselves entitled to preferential
treatment in the settlement of their claims, over the non-blockading
nations, while the latter held that all of Venezuela's creditors should
be treated on an equality. This portion of the controversy was referred
to the Hague tribunal, which subsequently decided in favor of the
contention raised by Germany, Great Britain and Italy, and eventually
all the claims were greatly scaled down and ordered paid.[4]
The Venezuela case made evident the possibility that European creditors
of backward South American nations might use their claims as a reason
for getting temporary control over harbors or other parts of these
countries. There was also ground for the fear that temporary control
might become permanent possession. Hence in the Santo Domingo case, the
United States adopted a new policy. The debts of Santo Domingo were far
beyond its power to pay; its foreign creditors were insistent. An
arrangement was accordingly made by which the United States took over
the administration of the custom houses, turned over forty-five per
cent. of the income to the Dominican government for current expenses,
and used the remainder to pay foreign claims. The plan worked so well
that its main features were continued and imitated in the protectorates
over Haiti (1915) and Nicaragua (1916).
The progress which has been made in composing the jarring relations
among the American states is due in part to the Pan American Union and
to the Pan American Conferences. The Union is an organization of
twenty-one American republics which devotes itself to the improvement
of the commercial and political relations of its member states. The
first Pan American Conference, held at Washington in 1889, has already
been mentioned.[5] At the second, at Mexico City in 1901, the American
republics which had not already done so agreed to the conventions
signed at The Hague in 1899. At the third conference at Rio de Janeiro
in 1906 and the fourth in Buenos Aires in 1910, its field of effort was
further broadened, and in the latter year a recommendation was passed
that the Pan American states bind themselves to submit to arbitration
all claims for pecuniary damages.
President Wilson continued unbroken the policy of protectorates which
President Roosevelt had initiated in the case of San Domingo. His
statements of general policy were conciliatory and evidently designed
to allay suspicion, and he constantly expressed the view that the
American states were cooperating equals. And having asserted that the
United States had no designs upon territory, and nothing to seek except
the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, he gave
practical evidence of his purposes by urging that all unite to
guarantee one another their independence and territorial integrity,
that disputes be settled by investigation and arbitration, and that no
state allow revolutionary expeditions against its neighbors to be
fitted out on its territory.[6]
American relations with Great Britain between 1896 and 1914 were such
as to lend themselves to amicable settlement. The question of the
boundary between Alaska and Canada, to be sure, contained some of the
elements of trouble. The treaty of 1825, between Russia and Great
Britain, had established the boundary between Alaska and Canada in
terms that were somewhat ambiguous, the most important provision being
that the line from the 56th degree of north latitude to the 141st
degree of west longitude should follow the windings of the coast, but
should be drawn not more than ten marine leagues inland. The coast at
this point is extremely irregular, and the few important towns of the
region are at the heads of the bays. With the discovery of gold in the
Klondike region in 1897 and the consequent rush of population to the
coast settlements, the question of jurisdiction became important.
The claim of Great Britain was that the word "coast" should be
interpreted to include adjacent islands. Hence the ten league line
would follow the general direction of the shore but would cut across
the inlets and headlands and thus leave the towns in the possession of
Canada. The American contention was that the line should follow closely
the windings of the shore of the mainland, thus giving the United
States a continuous strip of coast. The controversy was referred in
1903 to a board composed of three Americans, two Canadians and the Lord
Chief Justice of England. On all the important points the English
representative concurred with the Americans and a line was subsequently
drawn in general conformity with our contention.[7]
The most complicated negotiation of the period, as well as one of the
most complicated in our history, concerned the North Atlantic Coast
fisheries. Under the treaty of 1818 relating to matters remaining over
from the War of 1812, the United States possessed certain rights on the
fishing grounds off Newfoundland and Labrador. From then on there was
intermittent negotiation concerning the meaning of the terms of the
treaty and the justice of fishing regulations made by Canada. In 1908
the United States and Great Britain made a general arbitration treaty,
under the terms of which the fisheries question was referred to members
of the Court of Arbitration at The Hague.[8] The award, made in 1910,
upheld the rights of American fishermen on the coasts of Newfoundland,
and recommended the establishment of a permanent fishery commission to
settle all future controversies. This was accomplished in 1912 and an
irritating and long-standing dispute was put to rest.
"Dollar diplomacy" was the chief novelty in our relations with China.
The expression was used in President Taft's administration, when his
Secretary of State, P.C. Knox, devoted much attention to promoting
loans, contracts and concessions in Central and South America, and more
particularly in China. The argument for dollar diplomacy was that it
opened new fields for the use of American capital, and thus indirectly
benefited the whole people. The President also believed that
investments in China would further American influence there and react
favorably in continuing the open-door policy which had been initiated
by Secretary Hay. The objection most commonly made was that the
government became bound up in the interests of investors and might be
compelled to interpose with armed force when difficulties arose between
the investor and the state where the investment was made.
An opportunity for large investments in China was presented during
1912-1913. In the former year a revolution in that distracted country
had come to an end and a republic had been set up with Yuan Shih-kai as
President. Since the new government was in need of funds, it undertook
to borrow through an associated group of bankers from six foreign
nations, the United States among them. The financial interests agreed
to the loan, but insisted on having a hand in the administration of
Chinese finance, so as to ensure repayment. At this point President
Wilson's administration began. The bankers at once asked him whether he
would request them to participate in the "six-power" loan, as President
Taft had done. Wilson declined to make the request, fearing that at
some future time the United States might be compelled to interfere in
Chinese financial and political affairs, whereupon the American bankers
withdrew and the six-power group subsequently disintegrated.
Relations with Japan have been a cause for negotiation on several
occasions. During the Russo-Japanese War, which came to a close in
1905, American sympathies were mainly with the Japanese. The
correspondence which brought about a cessation of hostilities was
initiated by President Roosevelt, and the peace conference was held in
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. During the course of the sessions American
sympathies shifted somewhat to the Russian side, and when the Japanese
did not receive all that they demanded of Russia they felt somewhat
dissatisfied.
A subject which seemed at times to contain unpleasant possibilities was
the restriction of Japanese immigration into the United States. The
western part of the country, especially California, has objected
vigorously to the presence of the Japanese on the coast, and as Japan
refused to agree to such a treaty as that which restricts Chinese
immigration, recourse was had to the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908,
by which the Japanese government itself undertook to prevent the
emigration of laborers to the United States. It was more difficult to
reach an agreement concerning Japanese who were already living in the
United States. In 1913 the legislature of California had before it a
law forbidding certain aliens from holding land in the state. As the
act would apply almost solely to the Japanese, the federal government
was placed in an embarrassing position. Under existing treaties the
Japanese were granted equal rights with other aliens, but the states
were able to modify the practical operation of treaty provisions, as
California planned to do, by declaring certain aliens ineligible to
citizenship and then placing particular restrictions upon them. The
Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, went to California and attempted
to persuade the state authorities to alter their land laws. Although
the law was eventually passed, it was modified to the extent of
allowing Japanese to lease agricultural lands for terms not greater
than three years.
In 1917, Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, and Viscount
Ishii, special ambassador of Japan, reached an important agreement
concerning American relations in the Orient. By it the United States
admitted the interest of Japan in China, but the two placed themselves
on record as mutually opposed to the acquisition by any government of
special rights in China that would affect the independence or the
territorial integrity of that country. Nevertheless Japan had already
forced China in 1915 to grant her territorial and economic concessions
that constituted a grave menace to Chinese independence, and final
settlement between the two awaited later events.
It is impossible at the present time to give an accurate account of
American relations with Mexico during the decade preceding 1920. Mexico
and Mexican affairs are but ill understood in the United States; and
the purposes and acts of the chief figure in the most important events,
President Wilson, will not be fully known until papers are made public
and explanations presented that only he can give. His conduct of
Mexican affairs, moreover, had to face constant change on account of
the outbreak and progress of a European war in 1914, and many critical
decisions had to be arrived at during 1915-1916 when political
partisanship in the United States was at fever heat and when the most
bitter opponents of the administration were ready to pounce upon every
act and hold it up to public scorn. Nor is the exact character of some
of the pressure brought to bear upon the President fully known.
American capital in vast amounts had gone into Mexico as into other
parts of Latin America. Mining companies, railroad, ranching and
plantation companies, and private individuals had invested in a land
that has been called "the storehouse of the world," because of its
fabulous resources in mineral wealth and fertile soil. In 1912
President Taft said that American investments had been estimated at one
billion dollars. President Wilson in 1916 warned the public that agents
of American property owners in Mexico were scattered along the border
originating rumors which were unjustified by facts, in order to bring
about intervention for the benefit of investors. For these reasons most
accounts of Mexican relations, whether they uphold or condemn the steps
taken by the administration, are rendered defective by prejudice or
lack of information. It is possible, therefore, to give only a bare
narrative of a few of the most important events following 1910.
The strong hand of Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico from 1877 to 1880 and
from 1884 to 1911. The government was autocratic; the resources of the
country were in the hands of foreigners; and while a few magnates were
wealthy, the mass of the people were poor and ignorant. The country was
infested with bands of robbers, but Diaz managed to control them and
even made some of the leaders governors of states. Such was the country
that is separated from Arizona and New Mexico by an imaginary line and
from Texas by a narrow river that shrinks in summer almost to a bed of
sand.
In 1910 Francisco Madero organized a revolt, compelled Diaz to flee to
Europe in 1911, and was himself chosen President. Taft meanwhile had
sent troops to the border, stray bullets from across the line killed a
few American citizens and the demand for intervention began. Madero was
soon overthrown by General Victoriano Huerta, who became provisional
president. Shortly afterward Madero was shot under circumstances that
pointed to Huerta as the instigator of the assassination, but his
friends kept the fires of revolt alive, and Governor Carranza of
Coahuila, the state across the border from northwest Texas, refused to
recognize the new ruler. It was at this juncture that Wilson succeeded
Taft. General Huerta was promptly recognized by the leading European
nations but President Wilson refused to do so, on the ground that the
new government was founded on violence, in defiance of the constitution
of Mexico and contrary to the dictates of morality. He then sent John
Lind to Mexico to convey terms to Huerta--peace, amnesty and a free
election at which Huerta himself would not be a candidate. When the
latter refused the proposal, President Wilson warned Americans to leave
Mexico and adopted the policy of "watchful waiting," hoping that Huerta
would be eliminated through inability to get funds to administer his
government. In the meanwhile the destruction of lives and property
continued.
War was barely avoided in the spring of 1914 when a boat's crew of
American marines was imprisoned in Tampico. An apology was made, but
General Huerta refused to order a salute to the United States flag, and
troops were accordingly landed at Vera Cruz, where slight encounters
ensued. At this juncture Argentina, Brazil and Chile, "the ABC powers"
made a proposal of mediation which was accepted. The conference averted
war between the United States and Mexico, although failing to solve the
questions at issue. Shortly afterward, however, Huerta retired from the
field unable to continue his dictatorship, and the American troops were
withdrawn.
The end was not yet however. Carranza and his associate, Villa, fell to
quarreling. Bands of ruffians made raids across the border, and Mexico
became more than before a desolate waste peopled with fighting
factions. At President Wilson's suggestion six Latin-American powers
met in Washington in 1915 for conference, and decided to recognize
Carranza as the head of a _de facto_ government. Diplomatic relations
were then renewed after a lapse of two and a half years. In a message
to Congress the President reviewed the imbroglio, but expressed doubts
whether Mexico had been benefited.
His fears soon proved to be well founded. In 1916 Villa crossed into
New Mexico and raided the town of Columbus. With the consent of
Carranza the United States sent troops under General Pershing across
the line to run down the bandits, but the only result was to drive the
Villistas from the region near the border. Renewed raids, this time
into Texas, indicated the need of larger forces and the state militia
were called upon, but after nearly a year of service they were
withdrawn early in 1917. Not long afterward Carranza was elected
president for a term of four years, but in 1920 another revolt ended in
his assassination. The country is in a condition of wretchedness, and
neither life nor property is safe from bands of marauders, President
Wilson has patiently attempted to give Mexico a chance to work out her
own salvation without hindrance from other countries and without
exploitation by investors,--but the problem remains unsettled.[9]
In view of some aspects of the foreign relations of the United States
since 1914, it is apparent that such diplomatic incidents as those
concerned with boundaries, fisheries and Latin-American protectorates
were not the most important forces in determining the outlook of
America upon Europe. In spite of the huge immigration of Europeans into
America since the Civil War, the United States has seldom drawn upon
European experience and has never sought to model itself on European
lines. American legislators have not commonly studied either English or
continental practices; our institutions and our constitutional
limitations have been so peculiarly our own that slight attention has
been paid to the outside world. Even the ancient resentment against
England had dwindled by 1914, leaving the United States without any
traditional "enemy." Tradition, as well as geographical isolation,
tended to keep us apart from the currents of European action.
Nevertheless America was being inter-related with the rest of the world
through means with which the diplomats had little to do. In 1867 the
Atlantic cable had finally been placed in successful operation, and
forty years afterward the globe was enmeshed in 270,000 miles of
submarine telegraph wires. In 1901 wireless telegraphic messages were
sent across the ocean, and within a few years private and press notices
were being sent across the Atlantic, vessels were commonly equipped
with instruments, and international regulations concerning
radio-telegraphy were adopted by the chief powers of the world. Most
important of all was the constant passage of merchant vessels shuttling
back and forth between America and Europe, and weaving the two into one
commercial fabric. With Great Britain, with Germany, with France, Italy
and the Netherlands, during 1913, the United States exchanged products
valued at nearly two and a half billion dollars. This was an amount
more than twice as great as the entire trade with Europe twenty years
before. Over half a billion dollars' worth was with Germany, to which
country we sent cotton, copper, food-stuffs, lard and furs in return
for fertilizers, drugs, dyes, cotton manufactures and toys. American
corporations had branches in Germany, while German manufacturers
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in factories here. So huge a
volume of commerce concerned the welfare not only of the ordinary
commercial classes--ship owners, exporters and investors--but the much
larger number of producers, manufacturers, miners, meat-packers, and
farmers who directly and indirectly supplied the materials for export.
In the meantime a change was taking place in the attitude of America
toward world affairs. Inaccurate as it was to describe the United
States as a world power at the time of the Spanish War, nevertheless
the war itself and the colonial responsibilities which it entailed
helped to a small degree to break down the isolation of America;
frequent communication with Europe, and the expansion of American
commerce tended in the same direction.
The international relations of the United States for the twenty years
immediately preceding 1914 may then be briefly summarized. The one
international problem which interested the greatest numbers of people
was the best method of arriving at international peace. Other problems,
except the Mexican question, were simple and inconspicuous, and the
majority of Americans knew little of European politics or international
relations. Only in the fields of communication and commerce was the
United States becoming increasingly and intimately related to the
remainder of the world, and the extent to which this change
supplemented the effect of the war with Spain in broadening the
American international outlook was a matter of conjecture.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The general texts mentioned at the close of Chapter XIII continue to be
useful.
On the Hague Conferences reliance should be placed upon G.F.W. Holls,
_The Peace Conference at the Hague_ (1900), by the secretary of the
American delegation; A.D. White, _Autobiography of Andrew D. White_ (2
vols., 1905), by a member of the delegation; J.W. Foster, _Arbitration
and the Hague Court_ (1904); P.S. Beinsch, in _American Political
Science Review_, II, 204 (Second Conference).
The best brief account of the acquisition of the canal strip is in
Latane; Theodore Roosevelt's story is in his _Autobiography_ and his
_Addresses and Presidential Messages_. On the Caribbean, C.L. Jones,
_Caribbean Interests of the United States_ (1916). The Venezuela
arbitrations are in _Senate Documents_, 58th Congress, 3rd session, No.
119 (Serial Number 4769). The Alaskan boundary question is clearly
discussed in Latane, with a good map, and J.W. Foster, _Diplomatic
Memoirs_ (2 vols., 1909). _The Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast
Fisheries Arbitration_ are in _Senate Document_ No. 870, 61st Congress,
3rd session (12 vols, 1912-1913): more briefly in G.G. Wilson, _Hague
Arbitration Cases_ (1915). S.K. Hornbeck, _Contemporary Politics in the
Far East_ (1916), is useful for Asiatic relations. Ogg, Fish, and the
_American Year Book_ provide material on Mexican affairs.
* * * * *
[1] The Presidents and Secretaries of State during this period were as
follows:
McKinley, 1897-1901; John Sherman, William R. Day, John Hay.
Roosevelt, 1901-1909; John Hay, Elihu Root, Robert Bacon.
Taft, 1909-1913; P.C. Knox.
Wilson, 1913-1921; W.J. Bryan, Robert Lansing, B. Colby.
[2] The French company had a concession on the isthmus and had already
done considerable work.
[3] Roosevelt, after his retirement from office was widely reported as
having said in an address at the University of California: "If I had
followed traditional, conservative methods, I would have submitted a
dignified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Congress, and
the debate on it would have been going on yet; but I took the Canal
Zone and let Congress debate." Cf. Jones, _Caribbean Interests_,
238-239.
[4] For the Roosevelt "threat," together with another version of the
story, cf. Thayer, _Hay_, II, 284-289 and _North American Review_,
Sept., 1919, 414-417, 418-420.
[5] Above, p. 289.
[6] The latest acquisition of the U.S. in the Caribbean Sea was the
Virgin Islands which were purchased from Denmark in 1916.
[7] The American members of the Commission were Elihu Root, who was
then Secretary of War, Senator H.C. Lodge, and ex-Senator George
Turner. The English member was the Lord Chief Justice, Baron
Alverstone; the Canadians were Sir Louis Amable Jette, Lieutenant
Governor of Quebec, and Allen B. Aylesworth of Toronto.
[8] The American member of the tribunal was Judge George Gray. The
closing argument for the United States was made by Elihu Root. Robert
Lansing was one of the associate counsel.
[9] The number of Americans killed in Mexico as given by the ambassador
in 1919 was as follows: 1911, 10; 1912, 6; 1913, 24; 1914, 30; 1915,
26; 1916, 46; 1917, 39; 1918, 31. N.Y. _Times_, July 20, 1919. For the
revolution of 1920 consult N.Y. _Times_, May 16 ff.