1896
The political situation in 1896, when the parties began to prepare for
the presidential election, was more complex than it had been since
1860. The repeal, in 1893, of the purchase clause of the Sherman silver
act had divided the Democrats into factions; the financial and
industrial distress in the same year had been widely attributed to fear
of Democratic misgovernment; the Wilson-Gorman tariff act of 1894 had
discredited the party and aroused ill-feeling between the President and
Congress; the Pullman strike and the use of the injunction had aroused
bitterness in the labor element against the administration; the income
tax decision of 1895 had done much to shake popular confidence in the
Supreme Court; the Hawaiian and Venezuelan incidents had caused minor
dissent in some quarters; and the bond sales had made Cleveland
intensely unpopular in the West and South. The Democratic party was
demoralized and leaderless. The Republicans were better off because
they had been out of power during the years of dissension and panic,
but they had been without a leader since the death of Blaine in 1893
and were far from united in regard to the most pressing issues. Indeed,
the sectional differences in both parties, and the unexpected strength
of the Populist movement caused no little anxiety among the political
leaders. And finally, the volume and character of the currency was
still undetermined. The Democrats had divided on the question. The
Republicans were almost as little united; they had played politics in
passing the Sherman silver act and three years later had assisted a
President of the opposite party in accomplishing the repeal of its most
important provision. From the standpoint of the silver supporters
neither party organization was to be trusted. The outstanding political
questions of 1896, therefore, were whether the supporters of silver
could capture the machinery of one of the parties and whether the other
unsettled issues could ride into the campaign on the strength of the
financial agitation. The answers to these questions gave the campaign
and election its peculiar significance.
The background of 1896 is to be found in the South and West, where the
farmers' alliances and the Populist party continued their success in
arousing and directing the ambitions of the discontented classes. In
1892, it will be remembered, the Populists had cast more than a million
ballots and had chosen twenty-two presidential electors, two senators,
and eleven representatives. In 1894, at the time of the congressional
election, they had increased their voting strength more than forty per
cent., and had elected six senators and six members of the House,
besides several hundreds of state officials. In the Senate it happened
that the two great parties had been almost equally strong, after the
election of 1894, so that the Populist group had held the balance of
power. The insistence of the South and West that Congress do something
further for silver had not lessened. A measure providing for the
coinage of a portion of the silver bullion in the treasury had been
defeated in 1894 only through the President's veto. Indeed the only
hope of the East and of the supporters of the gold standard was the
unflinching determination of the head of a party to which the East and
the gold supporters were, in the main opposed.
The growing enthusiasm for silver which was sweeping over the South and
West and rapidly developing into something resembling frenzy was
difficult for the more stolid East to comprehend. Not merely the
politician, but the man on the street and in the store, the
school-teacher, the farmer and the laborer, in those portions of the
country, fell to discussing the virtues of silver as currency and the
effect of a greater volume of circulating medium upon prices and
prosperity. The two metals became personified in the minds of the
people. Gold was the symbol of cruel, snobbish plutocracy; silver of
upright democracy. Gold deserted the country in its hour of need;
silver remained at home to minister to the wants of the people. Such
arguments as those presented in _Coin's Financial School_, published in
1894, brought financial policy within the circle of the emotions of its
readers even if they did not satisfy the more critical student of
monetary problems. This influential little volume, written by W.H.
Harvey, acted as a hand-book of free coinage, cleverly setting forth
the major arguments for the increased use of silver and bringing
forward objections which were triumphantly demolished. Simple
illustrations enforced the lessons taught by its pages: a wood-cut of a
cripple with one leg indicated how handicapped the country was without
the free coinage of two metals; in another, Senator Sherman and
President Cleveland were depicted digging out the silver portion of the
foundations of a house which had been erected on a stable basis of both
gold and silver; in a third, western farmers were seen industriously
stuffing fodder into a cow which capitalists were milking for the
benefit of New York and New England.[1] With the enthusiasm and the
sincerity of the early crusaders, the people assembled in ten thousand
schoolhouses to debate the absorbing subject of the currency. Indeed
the South and West had become convinced that the miseries inflicted
upon mankind by war, pestilence and famine had been less "cruel,
unpitying, and unrelenting than the persistent and remorseless
exaction" which the contraction of the volume of the currency had made
upon society. Low prices, the stagnation of industry, empty and idle
stores, workshops and factories, the increase of crime and
bankruptcy--all were laid at the door of the gold standard.
The East looked upon the rising in the West at first with amusement,
and was quite ready to accept the diagnosis of a western newspaper man,
quoted by Peck in his _Twenty Years of the Republic_:
What's the matter with Kansas?
We all know; yet here we are at it again. We have an old
moss-back Jacksonian who snorts and howls because there is a
bath-tub in the State House. We are running that old jay for
Governor.... We have raked the ash-heap of failure in the State
and found an old human hoop-skirt who has failed as a business
man, who has failed as an editor, who has failed as a preacher,
and we are going to run him for Congressman-at-large.... Then we
have discovered a kid without a law practice and have decided to
run him for Attorney-General.
Later the East looked upon tendencies in the West with more concern:
Roosevelt, although admitting the honesty of the Populists, characterized
their ignorance as "abysmal"; others were more inclined to doubt their
sincerity; their conventions were supposed to be made up of cranks and
unsexed women; and their principles were looked upon as "wild and crazy
notions."
In fact it was no simple task to distinguish between the legitimate
grievances and ambitions of the westerners, and their eccentricities
and errors. Nor was this difficulty lessened by the reputation with
which some of the proponents of silver were justly or unjustly
credited. "Sockless Jerry" Simpson and Mrs. Lease were among them--the
Mrs. Lease to whom was ascribed the remark "Kansas had better stop
raising corn and begin raising hell!"[2] Benjamin R. Tillman was
another--a rough, forceful character, leader of the poor whites and
small farmers of South Carolina, organizer of the "wool hats" against
the "silk hats" and the "kid gloves"--Governor of the state and later
member of the federal Senate. Although a Democrat, he was thoroughly at
odds with Cleveland, and publicly declared it was his ambition to stick
his pitchfork into the President's sides.[3] Richard P. Bland, of
Missouri, had the disadvantage of having been one of the earliest of
the silver supporters, since he had initiated the bill which resulted
in the Bland-Allison act, and was looked upon in the East as a
thorough-going, free-silver radical. Governor Altgeld, of Illinois,
leader of the Democrats of that state from 1892 to 1896, was a
successful lawyer who was looked upon by his friends as a
liberal-minded humanitarian, the friend of
The mocked and the scorned and the wounded,
the lame and the poor,
whose sympathies with the laboring classes had given him the support of
the reformers and the wage earners. But his pardon of the Haymarket
anarchists and his attitude during the Pullman strike had led the East
to regard him as a dangerous revolutionist and an enemy to society.[4]
The free-silver movement nevertheless continued to gather momentum. For
some years influential silver advocates had been associated in the
Bimetallic League, an organization which supported the free coinage
of both gold and silver. Among its members were prominent Democrats,
Republicans and Populists, especially from the western states, and some
of the foremost labor leaders. At one of its meetings in 1893 it was
determined to invite every labor and industrial organization in the
country to send delegates. A few experts, even in the East, gave some
scientific support to the argument for the greater use of silver.
Eastern Republicans like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proposed free coinage
of both metals by an international agreement, which, they thought,
might be brought about through threats of tariff discrimination against
nations refusing to adhere to the arrangement. A silver convention in
Nebraska in 1894 was attended by a thousand delegates. From the point of
view of party harmony the subject was a nuisance. Democratic state
conventions were badly divided. Thirty of them adopted resolutions
distinctly favorable to free coinage and fourteen opposed. Ten of the
latter committed themselves definitely to the gold standard. The
fourteen included all the northeastern states, together with Michigan,
Wisconsin and Minnesota. Such gold Democrats as President Cleveland
sought to stem the tide, but Cleveland's control over his followers was
rapidly dwindling, and it seemed likely that the silver element of the
party might reach out to seize the organization and displace the former
leaders.
The Republican professional politicians were as ignorant of technical
monetary problems as the Democrats, and moreover did not wish to risk
popular disapproval in any section by utterances which might be
offensive to that part of the country. The first Republican state
convention during 1896 was that in Ohio. Its financial plank was
awaited with interest, because of the early date of the meeting and
because its proceedings were in the hands of friends of the most
prominent candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. The
convention dodged the issue by demanding that all our currency be
"sound as the Government and as untarnished as its honor," and that
both metals be used as currency and kept at parity by legislative
restrictions. The New York _Tribune_ thought that this could mean
nothing but a gold standard; the _Times_ was fearful that it would lead
to silver; the _Springfield Republican_ condemned it as "chock full of
double-dealing." Its ambiguity, however, was in line with the purposes
and ambitions of two men who were actively preparing for the campaign
of 1896--Marcus A. Hanna and Major William McKinley.
Marcus A. Hanna, or "Mark" Hanna as he was universally known, was an
Ohioan, born in 1837.[5] As a young man he entered upon a business
career in Cleveland, first in a wholesale grocery company, later in a
coal and iron firm and finally in a variety of industrial and
commercial enterprises which his energy and ability opened to him. The
expansion of industrial America after the Civil War was coincident with
the greater part of Hanna's career and he was a typical product of that
period in his political, economic and social philosophy. After he had
attained a degree of business success he became actively interested in
politics and took a prominent part in placing Joseph B. Foraker in the
governor's chair in Ohio in 1885. Strained relations between the two
turned Hanna's attention to the fortunes of John Sherman. When it
became apparent in 1888 that the presidential campaign would turn upon
President Cleveland's tariff principles, Hanna, who looked upon the
protective tariff as synonymous with industrial expansion and even of
industrial safety, threw his weight upon the side of Sherman, who was
again seeking the Republican nomination. The failure of Sherman was a
blow to Hanna, but it called to his attention the pleasing personality
of a more prominent protectionist, William McKinley. He was an
important agent in McKinley's successful campaign for the governorship
of Ohio in 1891. Two years later the Governor met serious financial
reverses, and again Hanna proved to be a firm friend. Aided by other
men of means he rescued McKinley from bankruptcy. Between the two there
sprang up a mutual admiration of unusual strength, and finally, in
1894-1895, Hanna withdrew from his business enterprises in order to
devote his entire time to the political fortunes of his friend.
Mark Hanna had extraordinary capacity for leadership. Sociable,
open-handed, full of energy, direct, aggressive, shrewd, daring, a hard
fighter, a loyal friend, an organizer and a man of his word, he was
essentially a man of action. In politics he was practical and
straight-forward. He wanted results, not reforms, and results meant
accepting the prevailing methods and using them. When he wished a
street-railway franchise in Cleveland, he bought enough influence with
the city government to get what he wanted, as others of his day did. He
was a strict party man; good government and safety to industry, he
believed, were dependent upon Republican control. Patriotism therefore
demanded his utmost energy in getting Republicans elected. In political
campaigns his counsel, his energy and his money were always available.
A protective customs tariff, a "sound" currency system and a free hand
in the conduct of business were the things which he most desired from
the government.
William McKinley would have been a formidable competitor for the
presidential nomination in 1896 even without the assistance of his
rugged friend. His personality was attractive, in a pleasing, soothing,
tactful, ingratiating way. His military career had been honorable even
if not famous. For most of the time from 1877 to 1891 he had been a
member of the House of Representatives, becoming identified
particularly with the high protective tariff and acting as sponsor for
the McKinley act of 1890. After being defeated for re-election, just
subsequent to the passage of the tariff law, he had become Governor of
Ohio for two terms. The panic of 1893 and the ill-fated Wilson-Gorman
tariff act during the time when he was Governor caused the tide of
popular favor to swing away from the Democrats; McKinley, as the
apostle of protection, appeared in a more favorable light; and his
partisans began to press him forward as the logical nominee for 1896
and as "the advance agent of Prosperity." The fact that his home was in
a populous state in the Middle West was also in his favor, because the
Republicans had frequently chosen their candidate from this debatable
ground rather than from the Northeast, where success was to be had
without a struggle.
Hanna's first care upon determining to devote himself to the interests
of McKinley was to keep the candidate before the people as the one man
who could rescue the nation from industrial depression. To that end he
widely circulated the Cleveland _Leader_, a strong McKinley organ, for
eighteen months at his own expense; he rented a house in Georgia,
entertained Governor McKinley there and brought numbers of southern
politicians to meet the candidate; and experienced political workers
were sent all over the country and especially to the South to prepare
the way for the election of delegates to the nominating convention.
Hanna himself went to the East to discover on what terms the support of
some of the states in that section could be obtained. On his return he
reported that aid would be assured by a guarantee that the patronage of
the administration would go to certain powerful politicians; Hanna
thought the bargain a desirable one, but the candidate objected and
Hanna acquiesced. The campaign of publicity and of personal canvass for
delegates and influence continued. First and last, it is estimated,
Hanna contributed over $100,000 for this purpose, urging his assistants
always to use funds only for legitimate ends, although promising
McKinley partisans who aided in the work that they would be "consulted"
in the disposition of patronage.
Two difficulties stood in the way of completely ensuring the choice of
McKinley as the candidate by the convention. Several states had
"favorite sons" whom they would be sure to present, and if so many of
these should appear as to prevent McKinley's nomination on the first
ballot or at least on an early one, there might be a stampede to an
unknown man--a "dark horse"--and then Hanna's ambitions would be
frustrated. Thomas B. Reed of Maine was an especial source of anxiety
as he possessed considerable strength throughout New England. To guard
against such a danger, Hanna sedulously cultivated the popular demand
for Governor McKinley and also fought in the state conventions for
delegates even against favorite sons. A crucial state was Illinois,
where Senator Cullom was powerful. The Senator says that a
representative of McKinley offered him "all sorts of inducements" to
withdraw, but McKinley's biographer mentions no such attempt at a
bargain. Eventually Cullom made the fight and was defeated, and from
then on, the nomination of McKinley seemed sure unless he should be
tripped by the currency issue.
The silver question was the second obstacle in the way of success. Not
only was the party divided, but McKinley's record on the subject was
far from consistent. He had voted for the Bland free-silver bill in
1877, for the Bland-Allison act in 1878 and for the passage of that act
over President Hayes's veto. In 1890 he had urged the passage of the
Sherman silver purchase law, intimating that he would support a free
coinage measure if it were possible to pass it. Hardly more than a year
later he was campaigning for the governorship of Ohio, and there he
denounced the free coinage of silver and advocated international
bimetallism. In 1896 McKinley feared that a definite public utterance
on the one side or the other of the question would widen the division
in the party, prevent his nomination and lose the election. Hence the
ambiguous currency plank in the Ohio state convention and hence, also,
the refusal of the candidate to commit himself openly. Nevertheless he
commissioned a friend to go to the East and explain his attitude
privately to certain leaders and prominent business men, urging them
not to force a declaration for gold before the convention met. In this
way, he thought, the currency issue might be subordinated, the tariff
emphasized and the party held together. In this state of uncertainty
the currency situation was allowed to rest until the convention met at
St. Louis on June 16.
The platform adopted was, for the most part, of the usual sort. It
urged popular attention to the matchless achievements of thirty years
of Republican rule and contrasted that period of "unequalled success
and prosperity" with the "unparalleled incapacity, dishonor, and
disaster" of Democratic government; it promised the "most ample
protection" to the products of mine, field and factory; generous
pensions, American control of Hawaii, a Nicaragua canal, the Monroe
doctrine, restricted immigration and the arbitration of labor disputes
affecting interstate commerce received the support of the party.
It was the currency plank, however, that differentiated the platform of
1896 from that of other campaigns. Many Republican leaders and business
men, particularly in the East, were disposed to call for a definite
party statement in favor of a gold standard and had reached the point
where they could not be put off by the usual meaningless straddle.
Thomas C. Platt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Joseph B. Foraker, Charles W.
Fairbanks and other party chiefs were among them. Hanna was ready to
declare for gold after he had been assured of the nomination of his
candidate. McKinley was willing to stand for gold, although he
preferred not to mention that word in the plank and hoped to make the
contest on the tariff. Moreover so many silver delegates had already
been elected to the Democratic convention, which was soon to be held,
that a definite utterance from that party seemed a certainty. The
Prohibitionists had already divided into halves over the dominant
issue. It was almost imperative, therefore, for the Republican
convention to be more explicit than it had hitherto ventured to be. As
leader after leader arrived who was insistent upon a gold standard, it
became increasingly evident to Hanna that he must proceed with caution.
If McKinley committed himself to gold, the silver advocates would balk
at his candidacy, and perhaps unite on somebody else; if he committed
himself to silver, he would lose the eastern leaders. The astute Hanna
therefore allowed sentiment in favor of the gold plank to gather force,
although holding the discussion as far as possible under cover, and
kept McKinley from making a definite statement. Then at the last
minute, when the McKinley delegates were numerous enough to ensure the
nomination of the Major and when it was too late for the silver forces
to agree upon an opposition candidate, Hanna gave way to the pressure
for gold and agreed to the plank which he had always favored.[6]
Despite the canny management of Hanna a defection took place over the
decision on the currency issue. As soon as the platform was read,
Senator Henry M. Teller, of Colorado, moved to replace the gold plank
by one advocating the free coinage of silver. The earnestness with
which Teller urged the adoption of the substitute was an indication of
the sincerity of the western wing of the party. He had been a strict
Republican since the formation of the party in the mid-fifties, yet he
now found himself forced to accept a policy which he believed to be
pernicious or break the political bonds which had held him for forty
years. The majority of the convention, however, was determined to adopt
the gold plank and overwhelmingly defeated the Teller amendment,
whereupon the Senator and thirty-three other silver supporters solemnly
withdrew from the hall.
The way was now clear for the nomination of a candidate. Thomas B.
Reed, Senator Quay and other favorite sons received but scant support,
and McKinley was nominated by an overwhelming majority on the first
ballot. Garrett A. Hobart, a lawyer and business man whose reputation
was confined to New Jersey, his home state, was nominated for the
vice-presidency. The platform and the candidate were generally hailed
with favor in the East. To be sure, critical newspapers were inclined
to look askance upon McKinley's past. The New York _Evening Post_, for
example, favored a gold standard but decried the candidate's "absence
of settled convictions about leading questions of the day, and his want
of clear knowledge on any subject." Yet on the whole, the platform and
the candidate were popular, and, in view of the serious factional
disputes among the Democrats, the Republicans seemed likely to make
good their boast that victory would be so easy that they could nominate
and elect a "rag baby" if they chose. The redoubtable Hanna was
appointed chairman of the National Republican Committee, from which
office he was to direct the campaign. McKinley still believed that the
contest would be of the old-fashioned sort and that it would turn on
the tariff, despite the platform utterance of the party. And so it
might have proved had it not been for an important change of purpose
and leadership in the opposition.
The friends of free silver coinage went to the Democratic convention at
Chicago on July 7 with the same determination to get a definite
statement on the currency question that had characterized the eastern
leaders at the Republican convention. Without the loss of a moment they
wrested the control of the organization from the former leaders by
defeating Senator Hill of New York, a gold Democrat, for the temporary
chairmanship and electing Senator Daniel of Virginia, a recognized
proponent of free silver. Hill's support came mainly from the
Northeast; Daniel's, from the West and South. Senator White of
California, a representative of the silver wing, was then chosen
permanent chairman and the convention was ready for the contest over
the platform. While it awaited that document, however, it listened to
several favorite leaders, of whom Senator Tillman and Governor Altgeld
of Illinois were the best known. From the sentiments expressed by these
men it was clear that the radical Democrats believed that they were
speaking for the masses of the people and that they were bent upon
making far-reaching changes both in the organization and the creed of
the party.
A disquieting feature was a degree of turbulence beyond that which
usually characterizes our nominating conventions. The official
proceedings record the following, for example, while Senator Tillman
was addressing the delegates:
I hope that when this vast assembly shall have dispersed to its home
the many thousands of my fellow-citizens who are here will carry
hence a different opinion of the pitchfork man from South Carolina
to that which they now hold. I come to you from the South--from the
home of secession--from that State where the leaders of--(the
balance of the sentence of the speaker was drowned by hisses). Mr.
Tillman (resuming): There are only three things in the world that
can hiss--a goose, a serpent, and a man....
In the last three or four or five years the Western people have come
to realize that the condition of the South and the condition of the
West are identical. Hence we find to-day that the Democratic party
of the West is here almost in solid phalanx appealing to the South,
and the South has responded--to come to their help.... Some of my
friends from the South and elsewhere have said that this is not a
sectional issue. I say it is a sectional issue. (Long prolonged
hissing.)
At length, the platform was presented. It was a summary of the
complaints against the East which had been forming in the West and
South ever since the days of the Greenbackers and the "Ohio idea." It
recognized first that the money question was paramount to all others;
laid hard times at the door of the gold standard, which it denounced as
a British policy; and demanded the free coinage of both metals at the
existing legal ratio, under which sixteen parts of silver by weight
were declared equivalent to one part of gold in minting coins. Nor
would the party wait for the consent of any other nation. It opposed
the issuance of interest-bearing bonds in time of peace, condemned the
bond transactions of the Cleveland administration and denounced the
national bank-note system. The McKinley tariff was declared a prolific
breeder of trusts which enriched the few at the expense of the many.
The plank concerning the income tax, which had so recently been
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, excited much
condemnation among Republicans and conservative Democrats, who
denounced it as an attack on the Court. It noted that the Court had
uniformly sustained income taxes for nearly a hundred years and
declared it to be the duty of Congress
to use all the constitutional power which remains after that
decision, or which may come from its reversal by the court as
it may hereafter be constituted, so that the burdens of taxation
may be equally and impartially laid, to the end that wealth may
bear its due proportion of the expenses of the government.
The reaction of the party on the labor disputes of recent years and
especially the Pullman strike was clearly in evidence. Arbitration of
such controversies was called for; "interference" by federal
authorities in local affairs was condemned; government by injunction
was objected to; and the passage of such laws was demanded as would
protect all the interests of the laboring classes.
A minority of the platform committee now presented the opposing point
of view. It objected to many of the planks; complained that some were
ill-considered, others revolutionary; and offered two amendments,
one advocating the gold standard, the other expressing commendation
of Cleveland's administration. The contest was then on. Tillman
excoriated Cleveland and declared that the East held the West and
South in economic bondage; Hill denounced the currency, income tax and
Supreme Court planks as furiously as any Republican could have wished.
The currency plank, he thought, was unwise, that on the income tax
unnecessary, that on the Court assailed the supreme tribunal, and the
entire program was "revolutionary."
As yet, nobody had quite expressed the feelings of the convention.
Tillman was too crude; Hill had no remedy for long-standing ills. At
this juncture William J. Bryan stepped upon the platform. He was a
young man--only thirty-six years of age--and known but slightly as a
representative from Nebraska who possessed many of the arts and
abilities of an orator. Bryan began with a modest and tactful
declaration that his opposition to the gold wing of the party was
based solely on principles and not at all on personalities. The
convention had met, he insisted, not to debate but to register a
judgment already rendered by the people. Old leaders had been cast
aside because they had refused to express the desires of those whom
they aspired to lead. Briefly he outlined the reply of the radicals
to the objections made by Hill and the gold wing to the proposed
platform. The conservatives, Bryan declared, had complained that
free silver coinage would disturb business:
We say to you that you have made the definition of a business man
too limited in its application. The man who is employed for wages is
as much a business man as his employer; the attorney in a country
town is as much a business man as the corporation counsel in a great
metropolis; the merchant at the cross-roads store is as much a
business man as the merchant of New York; the farmer who goes forth
in the morning and toils all day--who begins in the spring and toils
all summer--and who by the application of brain and muscle to the
natural resources of the country creates wealth, is as much a
business man as the man who goes upon the board of trade and bets
upon the price of grain; the miners who go down a thousand feet into
the earth, or climb two thousand feet upon the cliffs, and bring
forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured into
the channels of trade are as much business men as the few financial
magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world. We come
to speak for this broader class of business men.
The time was at hand, Bryan insisted, when the currency issue must be
squarely met:
We have petitioned, and our petitions have been scorned; we have
entreated, and our entreaties have been disregarded; we have
begged, and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no
longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more. We defy them.
The radical wing of the Democracy had now found its orator. Every word
was driven straight to the hearts of the sympathetic hearers. The income
tax law had been constitutional, Bryan complained, until one of the
judges of the Supreme Court had changed his mind; the tariff was less
important than the currency because "protection has slain its thousands,
the gold standard has slain its tens of thousands." Fundamentally, he
insisted, the contest was between the idle holders of idle capital and
the struggling masses who produce the capital:
If they come to meet us on that issue we can present the history of
our nation. More than that; we can tell them that they will search
the pages of history in vain to find a single instance where the
common people of any land have ever declared themselves in favor of
the gold standard. They can find where the holders of fixed
investments have declared for a gold standard, but not where the
masses have....
You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the
gold standard; we reply that the great cities rest upon our broad and
fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your
cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and
the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country....
Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world,
supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and
the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold
standard by saying to them: You shall not press down upon the brow
of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a
cross of gold.
The frenzy of approval which this brief speech aroused was proof that
the West and South had found a herald. Whether wisely or not, the
radicals acclaimed their leader and the party was embarked upon a
program that made the campaign of 1896 a memorable one. Without further
ado, the amendments of the conservatives were voted down--the vote
being sectional, as before. Proposals that changes in the monetary
standard should not apply to existing contracts and that if free
coinage should not effect a parity between gold and silver at a ratio
of 16 to 1 within a year, it should be suspended, were both voted down
without so much as a division. The platform was then adopted by an
overwhelming majority and radical democracy had the bit in its teeth.
In the East the platform was viewed with amazement. The New York
_World_, a Democratic newspaper, expressed the opinion that the only
doubt about the election would be the size of McKinley's victory. The
Republican _Tribune_ thought that the party was afflicted with
"lunacy"; that it had become the "avowed champion of the right of
pillage, riot and trainwrecking"; that the platform was an anarchist
manifesto and a "call to every criminal seeking a chance for outrage."
Before Bryan's speech it had been impossible to foretell who the party
candidate for the presidency would be, although the veteran free silver
leader, Richard P. Bland, had been looked upon as a logical choice in
case his well-known principles should become those of the convention.
After the speech, however, it was clear that Bryan embodied the
feelings of many of his colleagues and on the fifth ballot he was
chosen as the candidate. The vice-presidential choice was Arthur
Sewall, of Maine, a shipbuilder and banker who believed in the free
coinage of silver.
The gold Democrats were now in a quandary. Many of them had refrained
from voting at all in the convention after the silver element had
gained control. Strict partisans, however, adopted the position of
Senator Hill who was asked after the convention whether he was a
Democrat still. "Yes," he is said to have retorted, "I am a Democrat
still--very still." Some frankly turned toward the Republican party,
while others organized the National Democratic party and adopted a
traditional Democratic platform, with a gold plank. After considering
the possibility of nominating President Cleveland for a third term, the
party chose John M. Palmer for the presidency and Simon B. Buckner for
the vice-presidency. Soon after the Democratic convention, the People's
party and the Silver party met in St. Louis. Both nominated Bryan for
the presidency, and thereafter the Democrats and the Populists made
common cause.
At the opening of the campaign, then, it was evident that class and
sectional hatreds would enter largely into the contest. The Populists
and the radical Democrats felt that they were fighting the battle of
the masses against "plutocracy"--the subtle and corrupting control of
public affairs by the possessors of great fortunes; they thought that
they saw arrayed against them the forces of wealth and the
corporations, seeking to enslave them. The conservative Democrats and
the gold Republicans saw in their opponents an organized attempt to
carry out a program of dishonesty and socialism. The one side believed
that the creditor class desired to scale debts upward; the other, that
the debtor class wished to scale them down. The radicals believed that
the Supreme Court was in the control of the wealthy; the conservatives,
that their opponents sought to assail the highest tribunal in the land.
The peculiar circumstances preceding the year 1896, however, focussed
attention on the monetary standard rather than upon the other demands
of the Populist-Democratic fusion.
Each candidate adopted a plan of campaign that was suited to his
individual situation. Bryan was relatively unknown and he therefore
decided to appeal directly to the people, where his powers as a speaker
would have great effect. The usual "notification" meeting was held in
Madison Square Garden, in New York City, so as to carry the cause into
the heart of "the enemy's country." During the few months of the
campaign the Democratic candidate travelled 18,000 miles, made 600
speeches and addressed nearly five million people. The effect was
immediate. The forces of social unrest, hitherto silent in great
measure, were becoming vocal and nobody could measure their extent.
McKinley had prophesied that thirty days after the Republican
convention nothing would be heard about the currency. When the thirty
days had passed, on the contrary, scarcely anything was heard except
that very question. Whatever his personal wishes, McKinley must meet
the problem face to face, and in alarm, Hanna and the Republican
campaign leaders put forth unparalleled efforts to save the party from
defeat.
The share of McKinley in these efforts was a novel one. Instead of
going upon the stump, he remained at his home in Canton, Ohio. A
constant stream of visiting delegations of supporters from all points
of the compass came to hear him speak from his front porch. Some of the
delegations came spontaneously; the visits of others were prearranged;
but in all cases the speeches delivered were looked over beforehand
with great care. The candidate memorized or read his own remarks and
carefully revised those which the spokesman of the visitors planned to
offer. In this way, any such untoward incident as the Burchard affair
was avoided and the accounts of the front-porch speeches which went out
through the press contained nothing which would injure the chances for
success. The effectiveness of the plan was attested on all sides.
In addition, extraordinary attempts were put forth to instruct the
people on various aspects of the currency question. A small army was
organized to distribute literature and address rallies; 120,000,000
documents were distributed from the Chicago and New York headquarters;
newspapers were supplied with especially prepared matter; posters and
buttons were scattered by the carload. At the dinner-table, on the
street corner, in the railroad train, in store, office and shop, the
people gave themselves over to a heated discussion of the merits of
gold and silver as currency and to the feasibility of free coinage at a
ratio of 16 to 1. The amount of money which these efforts required was
unusually large. Business men and banking institutions, especially in
New York, contributed liberally. The Standard Oil Company gave
$250,000; large life insurance companies helped freely, although the
fact was well concealed at the time. Business men were fearful that
Bryan's election would mean a great shrinkage in the value of their
properties. Many feared that the Democrats would assail the Supreme
Court and that their leader would surround himself with advisors of a
reckless and revolutionary character. Funds therefore poured into the
Republican war-chest to an amount estimated at three and a half million
dollars.
Before the close of the campaign a feeling akin to terror swept over
the East; contracts were made contingent upon the election of McKinley;
employees were paid on the Saturday night before election day and
notified that they need not return to work in the event of Democratic
success. Although caution and good manners characterized the utterances
of the two candidates, their supporters were hardly so restrained. The
following, for example, is typical of the editorial utterances of the
New York _Tribune_:
Let us begin with the Ten Commandments. "Thou shalt not take the
name of the Lord thy God in vain." The Bryan campaign from beginning
to end has been marked with such a flood of blasphemy, of taking
God's name in vain, as this country, at least, has never known
before. "Thou shalt not steal." The very foundation of the Bryan
platform is wholesale theft. "Thou shalt not bear false witness."
In what day have Bryan and his followers failed to utter lies,
libels and forgeries? "Thou shalt not covet." Why, almost every
appeal made by Bryan, or for him, has been addressed directly to
the covetousness, the envy, and all the unhallowed passions of
human nature. A vote for Bryan is a vote for the abrogation of
those four Commandments.
At the close of the campaign _The Nation_ sagely observed, "Probably no
man in civil life has succeeded in inspiring so much terror, without
taking life, as Bryan."
The result of the election was decisive. McKinley and a Republican
House of Representatives were elected, and the choice of a Republican
Senate assured. The successful candidate received seven million
votes--a half million more than his competitor. All the more densely
populated states, together with the large cities--where the greatest
accumulations of capital had taken place--were carried by the
Republicans. Not a state north of the Potomac-Ohio line and east of
the Mississippi was Democratic, and even Kentucky, by a narrow margin,
and West Virginia crowded their way into the Republican column. On
the other hand Bryan's hold on the South and West was almost equally
strong. Never before had any presidential candidate received so great a
vote and not for twenty years did a Democratic candidate surpass it.
Moreover, although the Democratic vote on the Atlantic seaboard was
less than that received by Cleveland in 1892, Bryan's support in the
Middle West showed considerable gains over the earlier year, while
Kansas, Nebraska and all the mining states except California were
carried by the silver cause. On the whole the election seemed to
indicate that the voters of the country, after unusual study of the
issues of the campaign, clearly distrusted the free-silver program, but
that class and sectional discontent had reached large proportions.
[Illustration:
The Presidential Election of 1896--the shaded states
gave Bryan pluralities]
The political results of the election of 1896 were important. It
definitely fixed the attitude of the Republican party on the currency
question; it gave the party control of the executive chair and of
Congress at an important time; and it ensured the domination of the
propertied classes and the _laissez faire_ philosophy in the party
organization. On the other hand, the Democratic party had incurred the
suspicion and hostility of the East, with hardly a compensating
increase of strength in the West; its principles had become radical for
that day and had abruptly changed from those of previous years; its
membership included more of the discontented classes than before; and
its leadership had been snatched from the hands of an experienced and
conservative leader and placed in the care of an untried radical. It
remained to be seen whether the victors would attempt to study and meet
the complaints of the farmer and the wage earner; whether the new
Republican leaders would be able to preserve the _laissez faire_
attitude toward the railroads and the corporations; and whether the
forces of dissent represented in Populism and radical Democracy had
received a death blow or only a rebuff.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Peck contains one of the most illuminating accounts of the rising in
the West, together with the campaign of 1896. H. Croly, _Marcus A.
Hanna_ (1912), is one of the few critical biographies of leaders who
have lived since the Civil War. W.J. Bryan, _The First Battle_ (1897),
is indispensable; C.S. Olcott, _William McKinley_ (2 vols., 1916), is
uncritical and eulogistic, but makes important material available; C.A.
Beard, _Contemporary American History_ (1914), contains a good chapter;
W.H. Harvey, _Coin's Financial School_ (1894), is mentioned in the
text; Carl Becker's clever essay in _Turner Essays in American History_
(1910), throws light on Kansas psychology; S.J. Buck, _Agrarian
Crusade_ (1920), is excellent. Consult also D.R. Dewey, _National
Problems_ (1907); J.A. Woodburn, _Political Parties and Party Problems_
(1914); _Quarterly Journal of Economics_, X, 269; and F.E. Haynes,
_Third Party Movements_ (1916). The files of _The Nation_, and the New
York _Tribune_ and _Sun_ well portray eastern opinion. The references
to the rise of the populist movement under Chap. XII are also of
service.
* * * * *
[1] I have drawn at this point upon Peck, _Twenty Years of the
Republic_, 453-456.
[2] Peck, 451-453.
[3] For brief accounts of Tillman, see Leupp, _National Miniatures_,
117; N.Y. _Times_, July 4, 1918; N.Y. _Evening Post_, July 3, 1918.
[4] Cf. Whitlock, _Forty Years of It_, 64 ff.; Altgeld, _Live
Questions_ and _The Cost of Something for Nothing_.
[5] In connection with the following pages, consult Croly, _Marcus A.
Hanna_, one of the few satisfactory biographies of this period.
[6] As finally adopted, the gold plank asserted: "We are unalterably
opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair
the credit of our country. We are, therefore, opposed to the free
coinage of silver, except by international agreement with the leading
commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote,
and until such agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard
must be preserved. All our silver and paper currency must be maintained
at parity with gold, and we favor all measures designed to maintain
inviolably the obligations of the United States and all our money,
whether coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the
most enlightened nations of the earth." Several leaders claimed to
have been the real author of the gold plank. It seems more nearly true
that many men came to the convention prepared to insist on a definite
statement and that each thought himself the originator of the party
policy.