THE CONQUEST OF JAMAICA
The capture of Jamaica by the expedition sent out by Cromwell in 1655
was the blundering beginning of a new era in West Indian history. It was
the first permanent annexation by another European power of an integral
part of Spanish America. Before 1655 the island had already been twice
visited by English forces. The first occasion was in January 1597, when
Sir Anthony Shirley, with little opposition, took and plundered St. Jago
de la Vega. The second was in 1643, when William Jackson repeated the
same exploit with 500 men from the Windward Islands. Cromwell's
expedition, consisting of 2500 men and a considerable fleet, set sail
from England in December 1654, with the secret object of "gaining an
interest" in that part of the West Indies in possession of the
Spaniards. Admiral Penn commanded the fleet, and General Venables the
land forces.[119] The expedition reached Barbadoes at the end of
January, where some 4000 additional troops were raised, besides about
1200 from Nevis, St. Kitts, and neighbouring islands. The commanders
having resolved to direct their first attempt against Hispaniola, on
13th April a landing was effected at a point to the west of San Domingo,
and the army, suffering terribly from a tropical sun and lack of water,
marched thirty miles through woods and savannahs to attack the city. The
English received two shameful defeats from a handful of Spaniards on
17th and 25th April, and General Venables, complaining loudly of the
cowardice of his men and of Admiral Penn's failure to co-operate with
him, finally gave up the attempt and sailed for Jamaica. On 11th May, in
the splendid harbour on which Kingston now stands, the English fleet
dropped anchor. Three small forts on the western side were battered by
the guns from the ships, and as soon as the troops began to land the
garrisons evacuated their posts. St. Jago, six miles inland, was
occupied next day. The terms offered by Venables to the Spaniards (the
same as those exacted from the English settlers on Providence Island in
1641--emigration within ten days on pain of death, and forfeiture of all
their property) were accepted on the 17th; but the Spaniards were soon
discovered to have entered into negotiations merely to gain time and
retire with their families and goods to the woods and mountains, whence
they continued their resistance. Meanwhile the army, wretchedly equipped
with provisions and other necessities, was decimated by sickness. On the
19th two long-expected store-ships arrived, but the supplies brought by
them were limited, and an appeal for assistance was sent to New England.
Admiral Penn, disgusted with the fiasco in Hispaniola and on bad terms
with Venables, sailed for England with part of his fleet on 25th June;
and Venables, so ill that his life was despaired of, and also anxious to
clear himself of the responsibility for the initial failure of the
expedition, followed in the "Marston Moor" nine days later. On 20th
September both commanders appeared before the Council of State to answer
the charge of having deserted their posts, and together they shared the
disgrace of a month in the Tower.[120]
The army of General Venables was composed of very inferior and
undisciplined troops, mostly the rejected of English regiments or the
offscourings of the West Indian colonies; yet the chief reasons for the
miscarriage before San Domingo were the failure of Venables to command
the confidence of his officers and men, his inexcusable errors in the
management of the attack, and the lack of cordial co-operation between
him and the Admiral. The difficulties with which he had to struggle
were, of course, very great. On the other hand, he seems to have been
deficient both in strength of character and in military capacity; and
his ill-health made still more difficult a task for which he was
fundamentally incompetent. The comparative failure of this, Cromwell's
pet enterprise, was a bitter blow to the Protector. For a whole day he
shut himself up in his room, brooding over the disaster for which he,
more than any other, was responsible. He had aimed not merely to plant
one more colony in America, but to make himself master of such parts of
the West Indian islands and Spanish Main as would enable him to dominate
the route of the Spanish-American treasure fleets. To this end Jamaica
contributed few advantages beyond those possessed by Barbadoes and St.
Kitts, and it was too early for him to realize that island for island
Jamaica was much more suitable than Hispaniola as the seat of an English
colony.[121]
Religious and economic motives form the key to Cromwell's foreign
policy, and it is difficult to discover which, the religious or the
economic, was uppermost in his mind when he planned this expedition. He
inherited from the Puritans of Elizabeth's time the traditional
religious hatred of Spain as the bulwark of Rome, and in his mind as in
theirs the overthrow of the Spaniards in the West Indies was a blow at
antichrist and an extension of the true religion. The religious ends of
the expedition were fully impressed upon Venables and his successors in
Jamaica.[122] Second only, however, to Oliver's desire to protect "the
people of God," was his ambition to extend England's empire beyond the
seas. He desired the unquestioned supremacy of England over the other
nations of Europe, and that supremacy, as he probably foresaw, was to be
commercial and colonial. Since the discovery of America the world's
commerce had enormously increased, and its control brought with it
national power. America had become the treasure-house of Europe. If
England was to be set at the head of the world's commerce and
navigation, she must break through Spain's monopoly of the Indies and
gain a control in Spanish America. San Domingo was to be but a
preliminary step, after which the rest of the Spanish dominions in the
New World would be gradually absorbed.[123]
The immediate excuse for the attack on Hispaniola and Jamaica was the
Spaniards' practice of seizing English ships and ill-treating English
crews merely because they were found in some part of the Caribbean Sea,
and even though bound for a plantation actually in possession of English
colonists. It was the old question of effective occupation _versus_
papal donation, and both Cromwell and Venables convinced themselves that
Spanish assaults in the past on English ships and colonies supplied a
sufficient _casus belli_.[124] There was no justification, however, for
a secret attack upon Spain. She had been the first to recognize the
young republic, and was willing and even anxious to league herself with
England. There had been actual negotiations for an alliance, and
Cromwell's offers, though rejected, had never been really withdrawn.
Without a declaration of war or formal notice of any sort, a fleet was
fitted out and sent in utmost secrecy to fall unawares upon the colonies
of a friendly nation. The whole aspect of the exploit was Elizabethan.
It was inspired by Drake and Raleigh, a reversion to the Elizabethan
gold-hunt. It was the first of the great buccaneering expeditions.[125]
Cromwell was doubtless influenced, too, by the representations of Thomas
Gage. Gage was an Englishman who had joined the Dominicans and had been
sent by his Order out to Spanish America. In 1641 he returned to
England, announced his conversion to Protestantism, took the side of
Parliament and became a minister. His experiences in the West Indies and
Mexico he published in 1648 under the name of "The English-American, or
a New Survey of the West Indies," a most entertaining book, which aimed
to arouse Englishmen against Romish "idolatries," to show how valuable
the Spanish-American provinces might be to England in trade and bullion
and how easily they might be seized. In the summer of 1654, moreover,
Gage had laid before the Protector a memorial in which he recapitulated
the conclusions of his book, assuring Cromwell that the Spanish colonies
were sparsely peopled and that the few whites were unwarlike and
scantily provided with arms and ammunition. He asserted that the
conquest of Hispaniola and Cuba would be a matter of no difficulty, and
that even Central America was too weak to oppose a long resistance.[126]
All this was true, and had Cromwell but sent a respectable force under
an efficient leader the result would have been different. The exploits
of the buccaneers a few years later proved it.
It was fortunate, considering the distracted state of affairs in Jamaica
in 1655-56, that the Spaniards were in no condition to attempt to regain
the island. Cuba, the nearest Spanish territory to Jamaica, was being
ravaged by the most terrible pestilence known there in years, and the
inhabitants, alarmed for their own safety, instead of trying to
dispossess the English, were busy providing for the defence of their own
coasts.[127] In 1657, however, some troops under command of the old
Spanish governor of Jamaica, D. Christopher Sasi Arnoldo, crossed from
St. Jago de Cuba and entrenched themselves on the northern shore as the
advance post of a greater force expected from the mainland. Papers of
instructions relating to the enterprise were intercepted by Colonel
Doyley, then acting-governor of Jamaica; and he with 500 picked men
embarked for the north side, attacked the Spaniards in their
entrenchments and utterly routed them.[128] The next year about 1000
men, the long-expected corps of regular Spanish infantry, landed and
erected a fort at Rio Nuevo. Doyley, displaying the same energy, set out
again on 11th June with 750 men, landed under fire on the 22nd, and next
day captured the fort in a brilliant attack in which about 300 Spaniards
were killed and 100 more, with many officers and flags, captured. The
English lost about sixty in killed and wounded.[129] After the failure
of a similar, though weaker, attempt in 1660, the Spaniards despaired of
regaining Jamaica, and most of those still upon the island embraced the
first opportunity to retire to Cuba and other Spanish settlements.
As colonists the troops in Jamaica proved to be very discouraging
material, and the army was soon in a wretched state. The officers and
soldiers plundered and mutinied instead of working and planting. Their
wastefulness led to scarcity of food, and scarcity of food brought
disease and death.[139] They wished to force the Protector to recall
them, or to employ them in assaulting the opulent Spanish towns on the
Main, an occupation far more lucrative than that of planting corn and
provisions for sustenance. Cromwell, however, set himself to develop and
strengthen his new colony. He issued a proclamation encouraging trade
and settlement in the island by exempting the inhabitants from taxes,
and the Council voted that 1000 young men and an equal number of girls
be shipped over from Ireland. The Scotch government was instructed to
apprehend and transport idlers and vagabonds, and commissioners were
sent into New England and to the Windward and Leeward Islands to try and
attract settlers.[131] Bermudians, Jews, Quakers from Barbadoes and
criminals from Newgate, helped to swell the population of the new
colony, and in 1658 the island is said to have contained 4500 whites,
besides 1500 or more negro slaves.[132]
To dominate the Spanish trade routes was one of the principal objects of
English policy in the West Indies. This purpose is reflected in all of
Cromwell's instructions to the leaders of the Jamaican design, and it
appears again in his instructions of 10th October 1655 to Major-General
Fortescue and Vice-Admiral Goodson. Fortescue was given power and
authority to land men upon territory claimed by the Spaniards, to take
their forts, castles and places of strength, and to pursue, kill and
destroy all who opposed him. The Vice-Admiral was to assist him with his
sea-forces, and to use his best endeavours to seize all ships belonging
to the King of Spain or his subjects in America.[133] The soldiers, as
has been said, were more eager to fight the Spaniards than to plant, and
opportunities were soon given them to try their hand. Admiral Penn had
left twelve ships under Goodson's charge, and of these, six were at sea
picking up a few scattered Spanish prizes which helped to pay for the
victuals supplied out of New England.[134] Goodson, however, was after
larger prey, no less than the galleons or a Spanish town upon the
mainland. He did not know where the galleons were, but at the end of
July he seems to have been lying with eight vessels before Cartagena and
Porto Bello, and on 22nd November he sent Captain Blake with nine ships
to the same coast to intercept all vessels going thither from Spain or
elsewhere. The fleet was broken up by foul weather, however, and part
returned on 14th December to refit, leaving a few small frigates to lie
in wait for some merchantmen reported to be in that region.[135] The
first town on the Main to feel the presence of this new power in the
Indies was Santa Marta, close to Cartagena on the shores of what is now
the U.S. of Columbia. In the latter part of October, just a month before
the departure of Blake, Goodson sailed with a fleet of eight vessels to
ravage the Spanish coasts. According to one account his original design
had been against Rio de la Hacha near the pearl fisheries, "but having
missed his aim" he sailed for Santa Marta. He landed 400 sailors and
soldiers under the protection of his guns, took and demolished the two
forts which barred his way, and entered the town. Finding that the
inhabitants had already fled with as much of their belongings as they
could carry, he pursued them some twelve miles up into the country; and
on his return plundered and burnt their houses, embarked with thirty
pieces of cannon and other booty, and sailed for Jamaica.[136] It was a
gallant performance with a handful of men, but the profits were much
less than had been expected. It had been agreed that the seamen and
soldiers should receive half the spoil, but on counting the proceeds it
was found that their share amounted to no more than £400, to balance
which the State took the thirty pieces of ordnance and some powder,
shot, hides, salt and Indian corn.[137] Sedgwick wrote to Thurloe that
"reckoning all got there on the State's share, it did not pay for the
powder and shot spent in that service."[138] Sedgwick was one of the
civil commissioners appointed for the government of Jamaica. A brave,
pious soldier with a long experience and honourable military record in
the Massachusetts colony, he did not approve of this type of warfare
against the Spaniards. "This kind of marooning cruising West India trade
of plundering and burning towns," he writes, "though it hath been long
practised in these parts, yet is not honourable for a princely navy,
neither was it, I think, the work designed, though perhaps it may be
tolerated at present." If Cromwell was to accomplish his original
purpose of blocking up the Spanish treasure route, he wrote again,
permanent foothold must be gained in some important Spanish fortress,
either Cartagena or Havana, places strongly garrisoned, however, and
requiring for their reduction a considerable army and fleet, such as
Jamaica did not then possess. But to waste and burn towns of inferior
rank without retaining them merely dragged on the war indefinitely and
effected little advantage or profit to anybody.[139] Captain Nuberry
visited Santa Marta several weeks after Goodson's descent, and, going on
shore, found that about a hundred people had made bold to return and
rebuild their devastated homes. Upon sight of the English the poor
people again fled incontinently to the woods, and Nuberry and his men
destroyed their houses a second time.[140]
On 5th April 1656 Goodson, with ten of his best ships, set sail again
and steered eastward along the coast of Hispaniola as far as Alta Vela,
hoping to meet with some Spanish ships reported in that region.
Encountering none, he stood for the Main, and landed on 4th May with
about 450 men at Rio de la Hacha. The story of the exploit is merely a
repetition of what happened at Santa Marta. The people had sight of the
English fleet six hours before it could drop anchor, and fled from the
town to the hills and surrounding woods. Only twelve men were left
behind to hold the fort, which the English stormed and took within half
an hour. Four large brass cannon were carried to the ships and the fort
partly demolished. The Spaniards pretended to parley for the ransom of
their town, but when after a day's delay they gave no sign of complying
with the admiral's demands, he burned the place on 8th May and sailed
away.[141] Goodson called again at Santa Marta on the 11th to get water,
and on the 14th stood before Cartagena to view the harbour. Leaving
three vessels to ply there, he returned to Jamaica, bringing back with
him only two small prizes, one laden with wine, the other with cocoa.
The seamen of the fleet, however, were restless and eager for further
enterprises of this nature, and Goodson by the middle of June had
fourteen of his vessels lying off the Cuban coast near Cape S. Antonio
in wait for the galleons or the Flota, both of which fleets were then
expected at Havana. His ambition to repeat the achievement of Piet Heyn
was fated never to be realised. The fleet of Terra-Firma, he soon
learned, had sailed into Havana on 15th May, and on 13th June, three
days before his arrival on that coast, had departed for Spain.[142]
Meanwhile, one of his own vessels, the "Arms of Holland," was blown up,
with the loss of all on board but three men and the captain, and two
other ships were disabled. Five of the fleet returned to England on 23rd
August, and with the rest Goodson remained on the Cuban coast until the
end of the month, watching in vain for the fleet from Vera Cruz which
never sailed.[143]
Colonel Edward Doyley, the officer who so promptly defeated the attempts
of the Spaniards in 1657-58 to re-conquer Jamaica, was now governor of
the island. He had sailed with the expedition to the West Indies as
lieutenant-colonel in the regiment of General Venables, and on the death
of Major-General Fortescue in November 1655 had been chosen by
Cromwell's commissioners in Jamaica as commander-in-chief of the land
forces. In May 1656 he was superseded by Robert Sedgwick, but the latter
died within a few days, and Doyley petitioned the Protector to appoint
him to the post. William Brayne, however, arrived from England in
December 1656 to take chief command; and when he, like his two
predecessors, was stricken down by disease nine months later, the place
devolved permanently upon Doyley. Doyley was a very efficient governor,
and although he has been accused of showing little regard or respect for
planting and trade, the charge appears to be unjust.[144] He firmly
maintained order among men disheartened and averse to settlement, and at
the end of his service delivered up the colony a comparatively
well-ordered and thriving community. He was confirmed in his post by
Charles II. at the Restoration, but superseded by Lord Windsor in August
1661. Doyley's claim to distinction rests mainly upon his vigorous
policy against the Spaniards, not only in defending Jamaica, but by
encouraging privateers and carrying the war into the enemies' quarters.
In July 1658, on learning from some prisoners that the galleons were in
Porto Bello awaiting the plate from Panama, Doyley embarked 300 men on a
fleet of five vessels and sent it to lie in an obscure bay between that
port and Cartagena to intercept the Spanish ships. On 20th October the
galleons were espied, twenty-nine vessels in all, fifteen galleons and
fourteen stout merchantmen. Unfortunately, all the English vessels
except the "Hector" and the "Marston Moor" were at that moment absent to
obtain fresh water. Those two alone could do nothing, but passing
helplessly through the Spaniards, hung on their rear and tried without
success to scatter them. The English fleet later attacked and burnt the
town of Tolu on the Main, capturing two Spanish ships in the road; and
afterwards paid another visit to the unfortunate Santa Marta, where they
remained three days, marching several miles into the country and burning
and destroying everything in their path.[145]
On 23rd April 1659, however, there returned to Port Royal another
expedition whose success realised the wildest dreams of avarice. Three
frigates under command of Captain Christopher Myngs,[146] with 300
soldiers on board, had been sent by Doyley to harry the South American
coast. They first entered and destroyed Cumana, and then ranging along
the coast westward, landed again at Puerto Cabello and at Coro. At the
latter town they followed the inhabitants into the woods, where besides
other plunder they came upon twenty-two chests of royal treasure
intended for the King of Spain, each chest containing 400 pounds of
silver.[147] Embarking this money and other spoil in the shape of plate,
jewels and cocoa, they returned to Port Royal with the richest prize
that ever entered Jamaica. The whole pillage was estimated at between
£200,000 and £300,000.[148] The abundance of new wealth introduced into
Jamaica did much to raise the spirits of the colonists, and set the
island well upon the road to more prosperous times. The sequel to this
brilliant exploit, however, was in some ways unfortunate. Disputes were
engendered between the officers of the expedition and the governor and
other authorities on shore over the disposal of the booty, and in the
early part of June 1659 Captain Myngs was sent home in the "Marston
Moor," suspended for disobeying orders and plundering the hold of one of
the prizes to the value of 12,000 pieces of eight. Myngs was an active,
intrepid commander, but apparently avaricious and impatient of control.
He seems to have endeavoured to divert most of the prize money into the
pockets of his officers and men, by disposing of the booty on his own
initiative before giving a strict account of it to the governor or
steward-general of the island. Doyley writes that there was a constant
market aboard the "Marston Moor," and that Myngs and his officers,
alleging it to be customary to break and plunder the holds, permitted
the twenty-two chests of the King of Spain's silver to be divided among
the men without any provision whatever for the claims of the State.[149]
There was also some friction over the disposal of six Dutch prizes which
Doyley had picked up for illegal trading at Barbadoes on his way out
from England. These, too, had been plundered before they reached
Jamaica, and when Myngs found that there was no power in the colony to
try and condemn ships taken by virtue of the Navigation Laws, it only
added fuel to his dissatisfaction. When Myngs reached England he lodged
counter-complaints against Governor Doyley, Burough, the
steward-general, and Vice-Admiral Goodson, alleging that they received
more than their share of the prize money; and a war of mutual
recrimination followed.[150] Amid the distractions of the Restoration,
however, little seems ever to have been made of the matter in England.
The insubordination of officers in 1659-60 was a constant source of
difficulty and impediment to the governor in his efforts to establish
peace and order in the colony. In England nobody was sure where the
powers of government actually resided. As Burough wrote from Jamaica on
19th January 1660, "We are here just like you at home; when we heard of
the Lord-Protector's death we proclaimed his son, and when we heard of
his being turned out we proclaimed a Parliament and now own a Committee
of safety."[151] The effect of this uncertainty was bound to be
prejudicial in Jamaica, a new colony filled with adventurers, for it
loosened the reins of authority and encouraged lawless spirits to set
the governor at defiance.
On 8th May 1660 Charles II. was proclaimed King of England, and entered
London on 29th May. The war which Cromwell had begun with Spain was
essentially a war of the Commonwealth. The Spanish court was therefore
on friendly terms with the exiled prince, and when he returned into
possession of his kingdom a cessation of hostilities with Spain
naturally followed. Charles wrote a note to Don Luis de Haro on 2nd June
1660, proposing an armistice in Europe and America which was to lead to
a permanent peace and a re-establishment of commercial relations between
the two kingdoms.[152] At the same time Sir Henry Bennett, the English
resident in Madrid, made similar proposals to the Spanish king. A
favourable answer was received in July, and the cessation of arms,
including a revival of the treaty of 1630 was proclaimed on 10th-20th
September 1660. Preliminary negotiations for a new treaty were entered
upon at Madrid, but the marriage of Charles to Catherine of Braganza in
1662, and the consequent alliance with Portugal, with whom Spain was
then at war, put a damper upon all such designs. The armistice with
Spain was not published in Jamaica until 5th February of the following
year. On 4th February Colonel Doyley received from the governor of St.
Jago de Cuba a letter enclosing an order from Sir Henry Bennett for the
cessation of arms, and this order Doyley immediately made public.[153]
About thirty English prisoners were also returned by the Spaniards with
the letter. Doyley was confirmed in his command of Jamaica by Charles
II., but his commission was not issued till 8th February 1661.[154] He
was very desirous, however, of returning to England to look after his
private affairs, and on 2nd August another commission was issued to Lord
Windsor, appointing him as Doyley's successor.[155] Just a year later,
in August 1662, Windsor arrived at Port Royal, fortified with
instructions "to endeavour to obtain and preserve a good correspondence
and free commerce with the plantations belonging to the King of Spain,"
even resorting to force if necessary.[156]
The question of English trade with the Spanish colonies in the Indies
had first come to the surface in the negotiations for the treaty of
1604, after the long wars between Elizabeth and Philip II. The endeavour
of the Spaniards to obtain an explicit prohibition of commerce was met
by the English demand for entire freedom. The Spaniards protested that
it had never been granted in former treaties or to other nations, or
even without restriction to Spanish subjects, and clamoured for at least
a private article on the subject; but the English commissioners
steadfastly refused, and offered to forbid trade only with ports
actually under Spanish authority. Finally a compromise was reached in
the words "in quibus ante bellum fuit commercium, juxta et secundum usum
et observantiam."[157] This article was renewed in Cottington's Treaty
of 1630. The Spaniards themselves, indeed, in 1630, were willing to
concede a free navigation in the American seas, and even offered to
recognise the English colony of Virginia if Charles I. would admit
articles prohibiting trade and navigation in certain harbours and bays.
Cottington, however, was too far-sighted, and wrote to Lord Dorchester:
"For my own part, I shall ever be far from advising His Majesty to think
of such restrictions, for certainly a little more time will open the
navigation to those parts so long as there are no negative capitulations
or articles to hinder it."[158] The monopolistic pretensions of the
Spanish government were evidently relaxing, for in 1634 the Conde de
Humanes confided to the English agent, Taylor, that there had been talk
in the Council of the Indies of admitting the English to a share in the
freight of ships sent to the West Indies, and even of granting them a
limited permission to go to those regions on their own account. And in
1637 the Conde de Linhares, recently appointed governor of Brazil, told
the English ambassador, Lord Aston, that he was very anxious that
English ships should do the carrying between Lisbon and Brazilian ports.
The settlement of the Windward and Leeward Islands and the conquest of
Jamaica had given a new impetus to contraband trade. The commercial
nations were setting up shop, as it were, at the very doors of the
Spanish Indies. The French and English Antilles, condemned by the
Navigation Laws to confine themselves to agriculture and a passive trade
with the home country, had no recourse but to traffic with their Spanish
neighbours. Factors of the Assiento established at Cartagena, Porto
Bello and Vera Cruz every year supplied European merchants with detailed
news of the nature and quantity of the goods which might be imported
with advantage; while the buccaneers, by dominating the whole Caribbean
Sea, hindered frequent communication between Spain and her colonies. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the commerce of Seville, which had
hitherto held its own, decreased with surprising rapidity, that the
sailings of the galleons and the Flota were separated by several years,
and that the fairs of Porto Bello and Vera Cruz were almost deserted. To
put an effective restraint, moreover, upon this contraband trade was
impossible on either side. The West Indian dependencies were situated
far from the centre of authority, while the home governments generally
had their hands too full of other matters to adequately control their
subjects in America. The Spanish viceroys, meanwhile, and the governors
in the West Indian Islands, connived at a practice which lined their own
pockets with the gold of bribery, and at the same time contributed to
the public interest and prosperity of their respective colonies. It was
this illicit commerce with Spanish America which Charles II., by
negotiation at Madrid and by instructions to his governors in the West
Indies, tried to get within his own control. At the Spanish court,
Fanshaw, Sandwich and Godolphin in turn were instructed to sue for a
free trade with the Colonies. The Assiento of negroes was at this time
held by two Genoese named Grillo and Lomelin, and with them the English
ambassadors several times entered into negotiation for the privilege of
supplying blacks from the English islands. By the treaty of 1670 the
English colonies in America were for the first time formally recognised
by the Spanish Crown. Freedom of commerce, however, was as far as ever
from realisation, and after this date Charles seems to have given up
hope of ever obtaining it through diplomatic channels.
The peace of 1660 between England and Spain was supposed to extend to
both sides of the "Line." The Council in Jamaica, however, were of the
opinion that it applied only to Europe,[159] and from the tenor of Lord
Windsor's instructions it may be inferred that the English Court at that
time meant to interpret it with the same limitations. Windsor, indeed,
was not only instructed to force the Spanish colonies to a free trade,
but was empowered to call upon the governor of Barbadoes for aid "in
case of any considerable attempt by the Spaniards against Jamaica."[160]
The efforts of the Governor, however, to come to a good correspondence
with the Spanish colonies were fruitless. In the minutes of the Council
of Jamaica of 20th August 1662, we read: "Resolved that the letters from
the Governors of Porto Rico and San Domingo are an absolute denial of
trade, and that according to His Majesty's instructions to Lord Windsor
a trade by force or otherwise be endeavoured;"[161] and under 12th
September we find another resolution "that men be enlisted for a design
by sea with the 'Centurion' and other vessels."[162] This "design" was
an expedition to capture and destroy St. Jago de Cuba, the Spanish port
nearest to Jamaican shores. An attack upon St. Jago had been projected
by Goodson as far back as 1655. "The Admiral," wrote Major Sedgwick to
Thurloe just after his arrival in Jamaica, "was intended before our
coming in to have taken some few soldiers and gone over to St. Jago de
Cuba, a town upon Cuba, but our coming hindered him without whom we
could not well tell how to do anything."[163] In January 1656 the plan
was definitely abandoned, because the colony could not spare a
sufficient number of soldiers for the enterprise.[164] It was to St.
Jago that the Spaniards, driven from Jamaica, mostly betook themselves,
and from St. Jago as a starting-point had come the expedition of 1658 to
reconquer the island. The instructions of Lord Windsor afforded a
convenient opportunity to avenge past attacks and secure Jamaica from
molestation in that quarter for the future. The command of the
expedition was entrusted to Myngs, who in 1662 was again in the Indies
on the frigate "Centurion." Myngs sailed from Port Royal on 21st
September with eleven ships and 1300 men,[165] but, kept back by
unfavourable winds, did not sight the castle of St. Jago until 5th
October. Although he had intended to force the entrance of the harbour,
he was prevented by the prevailing land breeze; so he disembarked his
men to windward, on a rocky coast, where the path up the bluffs was so
narrow that but one man could march at a time. Night had fallen before
all were landed, and "the way (was) soe difficult and the night soe dark
that they were forced to make stands and fires, and their guides with
brands in their hands, to beat the path."[166] At daybreak they reached
a plantation by a river's side, some six miles from the place of landing
and three from St. Jago. There they refreshed themselves, and advancing
upon the town surprised the enemy, who knew of the late landing and the
badness of the way and did not expect them so soon. They found 200
Spaniards at the entrance to the town, drawn up under their governor,
Don Pedro de Moralis, and supported by Don Christopher de Sasi Arnoldo,
the former Spanish governor of Jamaica, with a reserve of 500 more. The
Spaniards fled before the first charge of the Jamaicans, and the place
was easily mastered.
The next day parties were despatched into the country to pursue the
enemy, and orders sent to the fleet to attack the forts at the mouth of
the harbour. This was successfully done, the Spaniards deserting the
great castle after firing but two muskets. Between scouring the country
for hidden riches, most of which had been carried far inland beyond
their reach, and dismantling and demolishing the forts, the English
forces occupied their time until October 19th. Thirty-four guns were
found in the fortifications and 1000 barrels of powder. Some of the guns
were carried to the ships and the rest flung over the precipice into the
sea; while the powder was used to blow up the castle and the
neighbouring country houses.[167] The expedition returned to Jamaica on
22nd October.[168] Only six men had been killed by the Spaniards, twenty
more being lost by other "accidents." Of these twenty some must have
been captured by the enemy, for when Sir Richard Fanshaw was appointed
ambassador to Spain in January 1664, he was instructed among other
things to negotiate for an exchange of prisoners taken in the Indies. In
July we find him treating for the release of Captain Myngs' men from the
prisons of Seville and Cadiz,[169] and on 7th November an order to this
effect was obtained from the King of Spain.[170]
The instructions of Lord Windsor gave him leave, as soon as he had
settled the government in Jamaica, to appoint a deputy and return to
England to confer with the King on colonial affairs. Windsor sailed for
England on 28th October, and on the same day Sir Charles Lyttleton's
commission as deputy-governor was read in the Jamaican Council.[171]
During his short sojourn of three months the Governor had made
considerable progress toward establishing an ordered constitution in the
island. He disbanded the old army, and reorganised the military under a
stricter discipline and better officers. He systematised legal procedure
and the rules for the conveyance of property. He erected an Admiralty
Court at Port Royal, and above all, probably in pursuance of the
recommendation of Colonel Doyley,[172] had called in all the
privateering commissions issued by previous governors, and tried to
submit the captains to orderly rules by giving them new commissions,
with instructions to bring their Spanish prizes to Jamaica for
judicature.[173]
The departure of Windsor did not put a stop to the efforts of the
Jamaicans to "force a trade" with the Spanish plantations, and we find
the Council, on 11th December 1662, passing a motion that to this end an
attempt should be made to leeward on the coasts of Cuba, Honduras and
the Gulf of Campeache. On 9th and 10th January between 1500 and 1600
soldiers, many of them doubtless buccaneers, were embarked on a fleet of
twelve ships and sailed two days later under command of the redoubtable
Myngs. About ninety leagues this side of Campeache the fleet ran into a
great storm, in which one of the vessels foundered and three others were
separated from their fellows. The English reached the coast of
Campeache, however, in the early morning of Friday, 9th February, and
landing a league and a half from the town, marched without being seen
along an Indian path with "such speed and good fortune" that by ten
o'clock in the morning they were already masters of the city and of all
the forts save one, the Castle of Santa Cruz. At the second fort Myngs
was wounded by a gun in three places. The town itself, Myngs reported,
might have been defended like a fortress, for the houses were contiguous
and strongly built of stone with flat roofs.[174] The forts were partly
demolished, a portion of the town was destroyed by fire, and the
fourteen sail lying in the harbour were seized by the invaders.
Altogether the booty must have been considerable. The Spanish
licentiate, Maldonado de Aldana, placed it at 150,000 pieces of
eight,[175] and the general damage to the city in the destruction of
houses and munitions by the enemy, and in the expenditure of treasure
for purposes of defence, at half a million more. Myngs and his fleet
sailed away on 23rd February, but the "Centurion" did not reach Port
Royal until 13th April, and the rest of the fleet followed a few days
later. The number of casualties on each side was surprisingly small. The
invaders lost only thirty men killed, and the Spaniards between fifty
and sixty, but among the latter were the two alcaldes and many other
officers and prominent citizens of the town.[176]
To satisfactorily explain at Madrid these two presumptuous assaults upon
Spanish territory in America was an embarrassing problem for the English
Government, especially as Myngs' men imprisoned at Seville and Cadiz
were said to have produced commissions to justify their actions.[177]
The Spanish king instructed his resident in London to demand whether
Charles accepted responsibility for the attack upon St. Jago, and the
proceedings of English cases in the Spanish courts arising from the
depredations of Galician corsairs were indefinitely suspended.[178]
When, however, there followed upon this, in May 1663, the news of the
sack and burning of Campeache, it stirred up the greatest excitement in
Madrid.[179] Orders and, what was rarer in Spain, money were immediately
sent to Cadiz to the Duke of Albuquerque to hasten the work on the royal
Armada for despatch to the Indies; and efforts were made to resuscitate
the defunct Armada de Barlovento, a small fleet which had formerly been
used to catch interlopers and protect the coasts of Terra-Firma. In one
way the capture of Campeache had touched Spain in her most vulnerable
spot. The Mexican Flota, which was scheduled to sail from Havana in June
1663, refused to stir from its retreat at Vera Cruz until the galleons
from Porto Bello came to convoy it. The arrival of the American treasure
in Spain was thus delayed for two months, and the bankrupt government
put to sore straits for money.
The activity of the Spaniards, however, was merely a blind to hide their
own impotence, and their clamours were eventually satisfied by the King
of England's writing to Deputy-Governor Lyttleton a letter forbidding
all such undertakings for the future. The text of the letter is as
follows: "Understanding with what jealousy and offence the Spaniards
look upon our island of Jamaica, and how disposed they are to make some
attempt upon it, and knowing how disabled it will remain in its own
defence if encouragement be given to such undertakings as have lately
been set on foot, and are yet pursued, and which divert the inhabitants
from that industry which alone can render the island considerable, the
king signifies his dislike of all such undertakings, and commands that
no such be pursued for the future, but that they unitedly apply
themselves to the improvement of the plantation and keeping the force in
proper condition."[180] The original draft of the letter was much milder
in tone, and betrays the real attitude of Charles II. toward these
half-piratical enterprises: "His Majesty has heard of the success of the
undertaking upon Cuba, in which he cannot choose but please himself in
the vigour and resolution wherein it was performed ... but because His
Majesty cannot foresee any utility likely to arise thereby ... he has
thought fit hereby to command him to give no encouragement to such
undertakings unless they may be performed by the frigates or men-of-war
attending that place without any addition from the soldiers or
inhabitants."[181] Other letters were subsequently sent to Jamaica,
which made it clear that the war of the privateers was not intended to
be called off by the king's instructions; and Sir Charles Lyttleton,
therefore, did not recall their commissions. Nevertheless, in the early
part of 1664, the assembly in Jamaica passed an act prohibiting public
levies of men upon foreign designs, and forbidding any person to leave
the island on any such design without first obtaining leave from the
governor, council and assembly.[182]
When the instructions of the authorities at home were so ambiguous, and
the incentives to corsairing so alluring, it was natural that this game
of baiting the Spaniards should suffer little interruption. English
freebooters who had formerly made Hispaniola and Tortuga their
headquarters now resorted to Jamaica, where they found a cordial welcome
and a better market for their plunder. Thus in June 1663 a certain
Captain Barnard sailed from Port Royal to the Orinoco, took and
plundered the town of Santo Tomas and returned in the following
March.[183] On 19th October another privateer named Captain Cooper
brought into Port Royal two Spanish prizes, the larger of which, the
"Maria" of Seville, was a royal azogue and carried 1000 quintals of
quicksilver for the King of Spain's mines in Mexico, besides oil, wine
and olives.[184] Cooper in his fight with the smaller vessel so disabled
his own ship that he was forced to abandon it and enter the prize; and
it was while cruising off Hispaniola in this prize that he fell in with
the "Maria," and captured her after a four hours' combat. There were
seventy prisoners, among them a number of friars going to Campeache and
Vera Cruz. Some of the prize goods were carried to England, and Don
Patricio Moledi, the Spanish resident in London, importuned the English
government for its restoration.[185] Sir Charles Lyttleton had sailed
for England on 2nd May 1664, leaving the government of Jamaica in the
hands of the Council with Colonel Thomas Lynch as president;[186] and on
his arrival in England he made formal answer to the complaints of
Moledi. His excuse was that Captain Cooper's commission had been derived
not from the deputy-governor himself but from Lord Windsor; and that the
deputy-governor had never received any order from the king for recalling
commissions, or for the cessation of hostilities against the
Spaniards.[187] Lyttleton and the English government were evidently
attempting the rather difficult circus feat of riding two mounts at the
same time. The instructions from England, as Lyttleton himself
acknowledged in his letter of 15th October 1663, distinctly forbade
further hostilities against the Spanish plantations; on the other hand,
there were no specific orders that privateers should be recalled.
Lyttleton was from first to last in sympathy with the freebooters, and
probably believed with many others of his time that "the Spaniard is
most pliable when best beaten." In August 1664 he presented to the Lord
Chancellor his reasons for advocating a continuance of the privateers in
Jamaica. They are sufficiently interesting to merit a _résumé_ of the
principal points advanced. 1st. Privateering maintained a great number
of seamen by whom the island was protected without the immediate
necessity of a naval force. 2nd. If privateering were forbidden, the
king would lose many men who, in case of a war in the West Indies, would
be of incalculable service, being acquainted, as they were, with the
coasts, shoals, currents, winds, etc., of the Spanish dominions. 3rd.
Without the privateers, the Jamaicans would have no intelligence of
Spanish designs against them, or of the size or neighbourhood of their
fleets, or of the strength of their resources. 4th. If prize-goods were
no longer brought into Port Royal, few merchants would resort to Jamaica
and prices would become excessively high. 5th. To reduce the privateers
would require a large number of frigates at considerable trouble and
expense; English seamen, moreover, generally had the privateering spirit
and would be more ready to join with them than oppose them, as previous
experience had shown. Finally, the privateers, if denied the freedom of
Jamaican ports, would not take to planting, but would resort to the
islands of other nations, and perhaps prey upon English commerce.[188]
Footnotes:
[Footnote 119: Venables was not bound by his instructions to any
definite plan. It had been proposed, he was told, to seize Hispaniola or
Porto Rico or both, after which either Cartagena or Havana might be
taken, and the Spanish revenue-fleets obstructed. An alternative scheme
was to make the first attempt on the mainland at some point between the
mouth of the Orinoco and Porto Bello, with the ultimate object of
securing Cartagena. It was left to Venables, however, to consult with
Admiral Penn and three commissioners, Edward Winslow (former governor of
Plymouth colony in New England), Daniel Searle (governor of Barbadoes),
and Gregory Butler, as to which, if any, of these schemes should be
carried out. Not until some time after the arrival of the fleet at
Barbadoes was it resolved to attack Hispaniola. (Narrative of Gen.
Venables, edition 1900, pp. x, 112-3.)]
[Footnote 120: Gardiner: Hist. of the Commonwealth and Protectorate,
vol. iii. ch. xlv.; Narrative of Gen. Venables.]
[Footnote 121: Gardiner: _op. cit._, iii. p. 368.]
[Footnote 122: _Cf._ the "Commission of the Commissioners for the West
Indian Expedition." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p. 109.)]
[Footnote 123: _Cf._ American Hist. Review, vol. iv. p. 228;
"Instructions unto Gen. Robt. Venables." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p.
111.)]
[Footnote 124: _Cf._ Narrative of Gen. Venables, pp. 3, 90;
"Instructions unto Generall Penn," etc., _ibid._, p. 107.
After the outbreak of the Spanish war, Cromwell was anxious to clear his
government of the charges of treachery and violation of international
duties. The task was entrusted to the Latin Secretary, John Milton, who
on 26th October 1655 published a manifesto defending the actions of the
Commonwealth. He gave two principal reasons for the attempt upon the
West Indies:--(1) the cruelties of the Spaniards toward the English in
America and their depredations on English colonies and trade; (2) the
outrageous treatment and extermination of the Indians. He denied the
Spanish claims to all of America, either as a papal gift, or by right of
discovery alone, or even by right of settlement, and insisted upon both
the natural and treaty rights of Englishmen to trade in Spanish seas.]
[Footnote 125: The memory of the exploits of Drake and his
contemporaries was not allowed to die in the first half of the
seventeenth century. Books like "Sir Francis Drake Revived," and "The
World encompassed by Sir Francis Drake," were printed time and time
again. The former was published in 1626 and again two years later; "The
World Encompassed" first appeared in 1628 and was reprinted in 1635 and
1653. A quotation from the title-page of the latter may serve to
illustrate the temper of the times:--
Drake, Sir Francis. The world encompassed. Being his
next voyage to that to Nombre de Dios, formerly
imprinted ... offered ... especially for the stirring up
of heroick spirits, to benefit their country and
eternize their names by like bold attempts. Lon. 1628.
_Cf._ also Gardiner, _op. cit._, iii. pp. 343-44.]
[Footnote 126: Gardiner, _op. cit._, iii. p. 346; _cf._ also "Present
State of Jamaica, 1683."]
[Footnote 127: Long: "History of Jamaica," i. p. 260; C.S.P. Colon.,
1675-76. Addenda, No. 274.]
[Footnote 128: Long, _op. cit._, i. p. 272 _ff._]
[Footnote 129: Ibid.; Thurloe Papers, VI. p. 540; vii. p. 260; "Present
State of Jamaica, 1683"; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 303-308.]
[Footnote 130: Long, _op. cit._, i. p. 245; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76.
Addenda, Nos. 236, 261, 276, etc.
The conditions in Jamaica directly after its capture are in remarkable
contrast to what might have been expected after reading the enthusiastic
descriptions of the island, its climate, soil and products, left us by
Englishmen who visited it. Jackson in 1643 compared it with the Arcadian
plains and Thessalien Tempe, and many of his men wanted to remain and
live with the Spaniards. See also the description of Jamaica contained
in the Rawlinson MSS. and written just after the arrival of the English
army:--"As for the country ... more than this." (Narrative of Gen.
Venables, pp. 138-9.)]
[Footnote 131: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 229, 232; Lucas:
Historical Geography of the British Colonies, ii. p. 101, and note.]
[Footnote 132: Lucas, _op. cit._, ii. p. 109.]
[Footnote 133: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 230, 231. Fortescue
was Gen. Venables' successor in Jamaica.]
[Footnote 134: Ibid., No. 218; Long, _op. cit._, i. p. 262.]
[Footnote 135: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 218, 252; Thurloe
Papers, IV. pp. 451, 457.]
[Footnote 136: Thurloe Papers, IV. pp. 152, 493.]
[Footnote 137: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, No. 236.]
[Footnote 138: Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 604.]
[Footnote 139: Ibid., pp. 454-5, 604.]
[Footnote 140: Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 452.]
[Footnote 141: Ibid., v. pp. 96, 151.]
[Footnote 142: This was the treasure fleet which Captain Stayner's ship
and two other frigates captured off Cadiz on 9th September. Six galleons
were captured, sunk or burnt, with no less than £600,000 of gold and
silver. The galleons which Blake burnt in the harbour of Santa Cruz, on
20th April 1657, were doubtless the Mexican fleet for which Admiral
Goodson vainly waited before Havana in the previous summer.]
[Footnote 143: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 260, 263, 266, 270,
275; Thurloe Papers, V. p. 340.]
[Footnote 144: _Cf._ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 12,430: Journal of Col.
Beeston. Col. Beeston seems to have harboured a peculiar spite against
Doyley. For the contrary view of Doyley, _cf._ Long, _op. cit._, i. p.
284.]
[Footnote 145: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda., Nos. 309, 310. In these
letters the towns are called "Tralo" and "St. Mark." _Cf._ also Thurloe
Papers, VII. p. 340.]
[Footnote 146: Captain Christopher Myngs had been appointed to the
"Marston Moor," a frigate of fifty-four guns, in October 1654, and had
seen two years' service in the West Indies under Goodson in 1656 and
1657. In May 1656 he took part in the sack of Rio de la Hacha. In July
1657 the "Marston Moor" returned to England and was ordered to be
refitted, but by 20th February 1658 Myngs and his frigate were again at
Port Royal (C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 295, 297). After
Admiral Goodson's return to England (Ibid., No. 1202) Myngs seems to
have been the chief naval officer in the West Indies, and greatly
distinguished himself in his naval actions against the Spaniards.]
[Footnote 147: Tanner MSS., LI. 82.]
[Footnote 148: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 316. Some
figures put it as high as £500,000.]
[Footnote 149: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 318. Captain
Wm. Dalyson wrote home, on 23rd January 1659/60, that he verily believed
if the General (Doyley) were at home to answer for himself, Captain
Myngs would be found no better than he is, a proud-speaking vain fool,
and a knave in cheating the State and robbing merchants. Ibid., No.
328.]
[Footnote 150: Ibid., Nos. 327, 331.]
[Footnote 151: C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, No. 326.]
[Footnote 152: S.P. Spain, vol. 44, f. 318.]
[Footnote 153: C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 17, 61.]
[Footnote 154: C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 20.]
[Footnote 155: Ibid., No. 145.]
[Footnote 156: Ibid., Nos. 259, 278. In Lord Windsor's original
instructions of 21st March 1662 he was empowered to search ships
suspected of trading with the Spaniards and to adjudicate the same in
the Admiralty Court. A fortnight later, however, the King and Council
seem to have completely changed their point of view, and this too in
spite of the Navigation Laws which prohibited the colonies from trading
with any but the mother-country.]
[Footnote 157: Art. ix. of the treaty. _Cf._ Dumont: Corps diplomatique,
T.V., pt. ii. p. 625. _Cf._ also C.S.P. Venetian, 1604, p. 189:--"I
wished to hear from His Majesty's own lips" (wrote the Venetian
ambassador in November 1604), "how he read the clause about the India
navigation, and I said, 'Sire, your subjects may trade with Spain and
Flanders but not with the Indies.' 'Why not?' said the King. 'Because,'
I replied, 'the clause is read in that sense.' 'They are making a great
error, whoever they are that hold this view,' said His Majesty; 'the
meaning is quite clear.'"]
[Footnote 158: S.P. Spain, vol. 35.]
[Footnote 159: C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 61.]
[Footnote 160: Ibid., No. 259.]
[Footnote 161: Ibid., No. 355.]
[Footnote 162: Ibid., No. 364.]
[Footnote 163: Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 154.]
[Footnote 164: Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 457.]
[Footnote 165: Beeston's Journal.]
[Footnote 166: Calendar of the Heathcote MSS. (pr. by Hist. MSS.
Commiss.), p. 34.]
[Footnote 167: Calendar of the Heathcote MSS., p. 34. _Cf._ also C.S.P.
Colon., 1661-68, No. 384:--"An act for the sale of five copper guns
taken at St. Jago de Cuba."]
[Footnote 168: Beeston's Journal.]
[Footnote 169: S.P. Spain, vol. 46.]
[Footnote 170: Ibid., vol. 47.]
[Footnote 171: C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 294, 375.]
[Footnote 172: Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 11,410, f. 16.]
[Footnote 173: Ibid., f. 6.]
[Footnote 174: Dampier also says of Campeache that "it makes a fine
show, being built all with good stone ... the roofs flattish after the
Spanish fashion, and covered with pantile."--_Ed._ 1906, ii. p. 147.]
[Footnote 175: However, the writer of the "Present State of Jamaica"
says (p. 39) that Myngs got no great plunder, neither at Campeache nor
at St. Jago.]
[Footnote 176: Beeston's Journal; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,964, f.
16:--"Original letter from the Licentiate Maldonado de Aldana to Don
Francisco Calderon y Romero, giving him an account of the taking of
Campeache in 1663"; dated Campeache, March 1663.
According to the Spanish relation there were fourteen vessels in the
English fleet, one large ship of forty-four guns (the "Centurion"?) and
thirteen smaller ones. The discrepancy in the numbers of the fleet may
be explained by the probability that other Jamaican privateering vessels
joined it after its departure from Port Royal. Beeston writes in his
Journal that the privateer "Blessing," Captain Mitchell, commander,
brought news on 28th February that the Spaniards in Campeache had notice
from St. Jago of the English design and made elaborate preparations for
the defence of the town. This is contradicted by the Spanish report, in
which it appears that the authorities in Campeache had been culpably
negligent in not maintaining the defences with men, powder or
provisions.]
[Footnote 177: S.P. Spain, vol. 46. Fanshaw to Sec. Bennet, 13th-23rd
July 1664.]
[Footnote 178: Ibid., vol. 45. Letter of Consul Rumbold, 31st March
1663.]
[Footnote 179: Ibid., 4th May 1663.]
[Footnote 180: C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 443. Dated 28th April 1663.]
[Footnote 181: Ibid., Nos. 441, 442.]
[Footnote 182: Rawlinson MSS., A. 347, f. 62.]
[Footnote 183: Beeston's Journal.]
[Footnote 184: C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 571; Beeston's Journal.]
[Footnote 185: S.P. Spain, vol. 46, ff. 94, 96, 108, 121, 123, 127, 309
(April-August 1664).]
[Footnote 186: C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 697, 744, 812.]
[Footnote 187: S.P. Spain, vol. 46, f. 280.]
[Footnote 188: S.P. Spain, vol. 46, f. 311.]