Voltaire and Rousseau have the double title to hatred of being Frenchmen

and freethinkers. But even orthodox Frenchmen fare little better. 'The

French Bossuets, Bourdaloues, Fénelons, &c., whatever may be thought of

their meagre and attenuated rhetoric, are one and all the most

commonplace of thinkers.' In fact, the mere mention of France acts upon

him like a red rag on a bull. The French, 'in whom the lower forms of

passion are constantly bubbling up, from the shallow and superficial

character of their feelings,' are incapable of English earnestness.

Their taste is 'anything but good in all that department of wit and

humour'--the department, apparently, of anecdotes--'and the ground lies

in their natural want of veracity;' whereas England bases upon its

truthfulness a well-founded claim to 'a moral pre-eminence among the

nations.' Belgians, French, and Italians attract the inconsiderate by

'facile obsequiousness,' which, however, is a pendent of 'impudence and

insincerity. Want of principle and want of moral sensibility compose the

original _fundus_ of southern manners.' Our faults of style, such as

they are, proceed from our manliness. In France there are no unmarried

women at the age which amongst us gives the insulting name of old maid.

'What striking sacrifices of sexual honour does this one fact argue!'

The French style is remarkable for simplicity--'a strange pretension for

anything French;' but on the whole the intellectual merits of their

style are small, 'chiefly negative,' and 'founded on the accident of

their colloquial necessities.' They are amply compensated, too, by 'the

prodigious defects of the French in all the higher qualities of prose

composition.' Even their handwriting is the 'very vilest form of

scribbling which exists in Europe,' and they and the Germans are 'the

two most gormandising races in Europe.' They display a brutal

selfishness in satisfying their appetites, whereas Englishmen at all

public meals are remarkably conspicuous for 'a spirit of mutual

attention and self-sacrifice.' It is enough to show the real degradation

of their habits, that they use the 'odious gesture' of shrugging their

shoulders, and are fond of the 'vile ejaculation "bah!"' which is as bad

as to puff the smoke of a tobacco-pipe into your companion's face. They

have neither self-respect nor respect for others. French masters are

never dignified, though sometimes tyrannical; French servants are

always, even without meaning it, disrespectfully familiar. Many of their

manners and usages are 'essentially vulgar, and their apparent

affability depends not on kindness of heart, but love of talking.'

The impudence of the assertions is really amusing, though one cannot but

regret that the vulgar prejudice of the old-fashioned John Bull should

have been embodied in the pages of a master of our language. They are

worth notice because they were not special to De Quincey, but

characteristic of one very intelligible tendency of his generation. De

Quincey's prejudices are chiefly the reflection of those of the

Coleridge school in general, though he added to them a few pet aversions

of his own. At times his genuine acuteness of mind raises him above the

teaching of his masters, or at least enables him to detect their

weaknesses. He discovers Coleridge's plagiarisms, though he believes

and, indeed, speaks in the most exaggerated terms of his philosophical

pretensions; whilst, in treating of Wordsworth, he points out with great

skill the fallacy of some of his theories and the inconsistency of his

practice. But whilst keenly observant of some of the failings of his

friends, he reproduces others in even an exaggerated type. He shows to

the full their narrow-minded hatred of the preceding century, of all

forms of excellence which did not correspond to their favourite types,

and of all speculation which did not lead to, or start from their

characteristic doctrines. The error is fully pardonable. We must not

look to men who are leading a revolt against established modes of

thought for a full appreciation of the doctrines of their antagonists;

and if De Quincey could recognise no merit in Voltaire or Rousseau, in

Locke, Paley, or Jeremy Bentham, their followers were quite prepared to

retaliate in kind. One feels, however, that such prejudices are more

respectable when they are the foibles of a strong mind engaged in active

warfare. We can pardon the old campaigner, who has become bitter in an

internecine contest. It is not quite so pleasant to discover the same

bitterness in a gentleman who has looked on from a distance, and never

quite made up his mind to buckle on his armour. De Quincey had not

earned the right of speaking evil of his enemies. If a man chances to be

a Hedonist, he should show the good temper which is the best virtue of

the indolent. To lie on a bed of roses, and snarl at everybody who

contradicts your theories, seems to imply rather testiness of temper

than strength of conviction. De Quincey is a Christian on Epicurean

principles. He dislikes an infidel because his repose is disturbed by

the arguments of freethinkers. He fears that he will be forced to think

conscientiously, and to polish his logical weapons afresh. He mutters

that the man is a fool, and could be easily thrashed if it were worth

while, and then turns back to his opium and his rhetoric and his beloved

Church of England. There is no pleasanter institution for a gentleman

who likes magnificent historical associations, and heartily hates the

rude revolutionists who would turn the world upside down, and thereby

disturb the rest of dreamy metaphysicians.

He is quite pathetic, too, about the British Constitution. 'Destroy the

House of Lords,' he exclaims, 'and henceforward, for people like you and

me, England will be no habitable land.' Here, he seems to say, is one

charming elysium, where no rude hand has swept away the cobwebs or

replaced the good old-fashioned machinery; here we may find rest in the

'pure, holy, and magnificent Church,' whose Articles, interpreted by

Coleridge, may guide us through the most wondrous of metaphysical

labyrinths, and dwell in a grand constitutional edifice, rich in

picturesque memories, and blending into one complex harmony elements

contributed by a long series of centuries. And you, wretched French

revolutionists, with your love of petty precision, and irreverent

radicals and utilitarians, with your grovelling material notions,

propose to level, and destroy, and break in upon my delicious reveries.

No old Hebrew prophet could be more indignant with the enemy who

threatened to break down the carved work of his temples with axes and

hammers. But his complaint is, after all, the voice of the sluggard. Let

me dream a little longer; for much as I love my country and its

institutions, I cannot rouse myself to fight for them. It is enough if I

call their assailants an ugly name or so, and at times begin to write

what might be the opening pages of the preface to some very great work

of the future. Alas! the first digression diverts the thread of the

discourse; the task becomes troublesome, and the labour is abruptly

broken off. And so in a life of seventy-three years De Quincey read

extensively and thought acutely by fits, ate an enormous quantity of

opium, wrote a few pages which revealed new capacities in the language,

and provided a good deal of respectable padding for magazines. It

sounds, and many people will say that it is, a harsh and, perhaps they

will add, a stupid judgment. If so, they may find plenty of admirers who

will supply the eulogistic side here too briefly indicated. I will only

say two things: first, that there are very few writers who have revealed

new capacities in the language, and in English literature they might

almost be counted on the fingers. Secondly, I must confess that I have

often consulted De Quincey in regard to biographic and critical

questions, and that though I have generally found something to admire, I

have always found gross inaccuracies and almost always effeminate

prejudices and mere flippancies draped in elaborate rhetoric. I take

leave, therefore, to insist upon faults which are passed over too easily

by writers of more geniality than I claim to possess.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] It is curious that De Quincey, in his Essay on Style, explains that

political economy, and especially the doctrine of value, is one of those

subjects which cannot be satisfactorily treated in dialogue--the very

form which he chose to adopt for that particular purpose.

_SIR THOMAS BROWNE_

'Let me not injure the felicity of others,' says Sir Thomas Browne in a

suppressed passage of the 'Religio Medici,' 'if I say that I am the

happiest man alive. I have that in me that can convert poverty into

riches, adversity into prosperity, and I am more invulnerable than

Achilles; fortune hath not one place to hit me.' Perhaps on second

thoughts, Sir Thomas felt that the phrase savoured of that presumption

which is supposed to provoke the wrath of Nemesis; and at any rate, he,

of all men, is the last to be taken too literally at his word. He is a

humorist to the core, and is here writing dramatically. There are many

things in this book, so he tells us, 'delivered rhetorically, many

expressions therein merely tropical,... and therefore also many things

to be taken in a soft and flexible sense, and not to be called unto the

rigid test of reason.' We shall hardly do wrong in reckoning amongst

them this audacious claim to surpassing felicity, as we may certainly

include his boast that he 'could lose an arm without a tear, and with

few groans be quartered into pieces.' And yet, if Sir Thomas were to be

understood in the most downright literal earnest, perhaps he could have

made out as good a case for his assertion as almost any of the troubled

race of mankind. For, if we set aside external circumstances of life,

what qualities offer a more certain guarantee of happiness than those

of which he is an almost typical example? A mind endowed with an

insatiable curiosity as to all things knowable and unknowable; an

imagination which tinges with poetical hues the vast accumulation of

incoherent facts thus stored in a capacious memory; and a strangely

vivid humour that is always detecting the quaintest analogies, and, as

it were, striking light from the most unexpected collocations of

uncompromising materials: such talents are by themselves enough to

provide a man with work for life, and to make all his work delightful.

To them, moreover, we must add a disposition absolutely incapable of

controversial bitterness; 'a constitution,' as he says of himself, 'so

general that it consorts and sympathises with all things;' an absence of

all antipathies to loathsome objects in nature--to French 'dishes of

snails, frogs, and toadstools,' or to Jewish repasts on 'locusts or

grasshoppers;' an equal toleration--which in the first half of the

seventeenth century is something astonishing--for all theological

systems; an admiration even of our natural enemies, the French, the

Spaniards, the Italians, and the Dutch; a love of all climates, of all

countries; and, in short, an utter incapacity to 'absolutely detest or

hate any essence except the devil.' Indeed, his hatred even for that

personage has in it so little of bitterness, that no man, we may be

sure, would have joined more heartily in the Scotch minister's petition

for 'the puir de'il'--a prayer conceived in the very spirit of his

writings. A man so endowed--and it is not only from his explicit

assertions, but from his unconscious self-revelation, that we may credit

him with closely approaching his own ideal--is admirably qualified to

discover one great secret of human happiness. No man was ever better

prepared to keep not only one, but a whole stableful of hobbies, nor

more certain to ride them so as to amuse himself, without loss of temper

or dignity, and without rude collisions against his neighbours. That

happy art is given to few, and thanks to his skill in it, Sir Thomas

reminds us strongly of the two illustrious brothers Shandy combined in

one person. To the exquisite kindliness and simplicity of Uncle Toby he

unites the omnivorous intellectual appetite and the humorous pedantry of

the head of the family. The resemblance, indeed, may not be quite

fortuitous. Though it does not appear that Sterne, amidst his

multifarious pilferings, laid hands upon Sir Thomas Browne, one may

fancy that he took a general hint or two from so congenial an author.

The best mode of approaching so original a writer is to examine the

intellectual food on which his mind was nourished. He dwelt by

preference in strange literary pastures; and their nature will let us

into some secrets as to his taste and character. We will begin,

therefore, by examining the strange furniture of his mind, as described

in his longest, though not his most characteristic book--the 'Inquiry

into Vulgar Errors.' When we turn over its quaint pages, we feel as

though we were entering one of those singular museums of curiosities

which existed in the pre-scientific ages. Every corner is filled with a

strange, incoherent medley, in which really valuable objects are placed

side by side with what is simply grotesque and ludicrous. The modern man

of science may find some objects of interest; but they are mixed

inextricably with strange rubbish that once delighted the astrologer,

the alchemist, or the dealer in apocryphal relics. And the possessor of

this miscellaneous collection accompanies us with an unfailing flow of

amusing gossip: at one moment pouring forth a torrent of out-of-the-way

learning; at another, making a really passable scientific remark; and

then lapsing into an elaborate discussion of some inconceivable

absurdity; affecting the air of a grave inquirer, and to all appearance

fully believing in his own pretensions, and yet somehow indulging

himself in a half-suppressed smile, which indicates that the humorous

aspect of a question can never be far removed from his mind. Mere

curiosity is not yet differentiated from scientific thirst for

knowledge; and a quaint apologue is as good a reward for the inquirer as

the discovery of a law of nature. The numerous class which insists upon

a joke being as unequivocal as a pistol-shot, and a serious statement as

grave as a Blue-book, should therefore keep clear of Sir Thomas Browne.

His most congenial readers are those who take a simple delight in

following out any quaint train of reflections, careless whether it may

culminate in a smile or a sigh, or in some thought in which the two

elements of the sad and the ludicrous are inextricably blended. Sir

Thomas, however, is in the 'Inquiry' content generally with bringing out

the strange curiosities of his museum, and does not care to draw any

explicit moral. The quaintness of the objects unearthed seems to be a

sufficient recompense for the labour of the search. Fortunately for his

design, he lived in the time when a poet might have spoken without

hyperbole of the 'fairy tales of science.' To us, who have to plod

through an arid waste of painful observation, and slow piecing together

of cautious inferences before reaching the promised land of wondrous

discoveries, the expression sometimes appears to be ironical. Does not

science, we may ask with a _primâ facie_ resemblance of right, destroy

as much poetry as it generates? To him no such doubts could present

themselves, for fairyland was still a province of the empire of science.

Strange beings moved through the pages of natural history, which were

equally at home in the 'Arabian Nights' or in poetical apologues. The

griffin, the phoenix, and the dragon were not yet extinct; the

salamander still sported in flames; and the basilisk slew men at a

distance with his deadly glance. More commonplace animals indulged in

the habits which they had learnt in fables, and of which only some

feeble vestiges now remain in the eloquence of strolling showmen. The

elephant had no joints, and was caught by felling the tree against which

he rested his stiff limbs in sleep; the pelican pierced its breast for

the good of its young; ostriches were regularly painted with a horseshoe

in their bills, to indicate their ordinary diet; storks refused to live

except in republics and free states; the crowing of a cock put lions to

flight, and men were struck dumb in good sober earnest by the sight of a

wolf. The curiosity-hunter, in short, found his game still plentiful,

and, by a few excursions into Aristotle, Pliny, and other more recondite

authors, was able still to display a rich bag for the edification of his

readers. Sir Thomas Browne sets out on that quest with all imaginable

seriousness. He persuaded himself, and he has persuaded some of his

editors, that he was a genuine disciple of Bacon, by one of whose

suggestions the 'Inquiry' is supposed to have been prompted.

Accordingly, as Bacon describes the idols by which the human mind is

misled, Sir Thomas sets out with investigating the causes of error; but

his introductory remarks immediately diverge into strange paths, from

which it is obvious that the discovery of true scientific method was a

very subordinate object in his mind. Instead of telling us by what means

truth is to be attained, his few perfunctory remarks on logic are lost

in an historical narrative given with infinite zest, of the earliest

recorded blunders. The period of history in which he most delighted was

the antediluvian--probably because it afforded the widest field for

speculation. His books are full of references to the early days of the

world. He takes a keen personal interest in our first parents. He

discusses the unfortunate lapse of Adam and Eve from every possible

point of view. It is not without a visible effort that he declines to

settle which of the two was the more guilty, and what would have been

the result if they had tasted the fruit of the Tree of Life before

applying to the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Then he passes

in review every recorded speech before the Flood, shows that in each of

them, with one exception, there is a mixture of falsehood and error, and

settles to his own satisfaction that Cain showed less 'truth, wisdom,

and reverence' than Satan under similar circumstances. Granting all

which to be true, it is impossible to see how we are advanced in

settling, for example, whether the Ptolemaic or the Copernican system of

astronomy is to be adopted, or in extracting the grains of truth that

may be overlaid by masses of error in the writings of alchemists. Nor do

we really learn much by being told that ancient authorities sometimes

lie, for he evidently enjoys accumulating the fables, and cares little

for showing how to discriminate their degree of veracity. He tells us,

indeed, that Medea was simply a predecessor of certain modern artists,

with an excellent 'recipe to make white hair black;' and that Actæon was

a spirited master of hounds, who, like too many of his ancestors, went

metaphorically, instead of literally, to the dogs. He points out,

moreover, that we must not believe on authority that the sea is the

sweat of the earth, that the serpent, before the Fall, went erect like

man, or that the right eye of a hedgehog, boiled in oil, and preserved

in a brazen vessel, will enable us to see in the dark. Such stories, he

moderately remarks, being 'neither consonant unto reason nor

correspondent unto experiment,' are unto us 'no axioms.' But we may

judge of his scepticism by his remarks on 'Oppianus, that famous

Cilician poet.' Of this writer he says that 'abating the annual mutation

of sexes in the hyæna, the single sex of the rhinoceros, the antipathy

between two drums of a lamb's and a wolf's skin, the informity of cubs,

the venation of centaurs, and some few others, he may be read with

delight and profit.' Obviously we shall find in Sir Thomas Browne no

inexorably severe guide to truth! he will not too sternly reject the

amusing because it happens to be slightly improbable, or doubt an

authority because he sometimes sanctions a mass of absurd fables. Satan,

as he argues at great length, is at the bottom of most errors, from

false religions down to a belief that there is another world in the

moon; but Sir Thomas takes little trouble to provide us with an

Ithuriel's spear, and, indeed, we have a faint suspicion that he will

overlook at times the diabolic agency in sheer enthusiasm at the

marvellous results. The logical design is little more than ostensible;

and Sir Thomas, though he knew it not himself, is really satisfied with

any line of inquiry that will bring him in sight of some freak of nature

or of opinion suitable to his museum of curiosities.

Let us, however, pass from the anteroom, and enter this queer museum. We

pause in sheer bewilderment on the threshold, and despair of classifying

its contents intelligibly within any moderate space. This much, indeed,

is obvious at first sight--that the title 'vulgar errors' is to some

extent a misnomer. It is not given to vulgar brains to go wrong by such

complex methods. There are errors which require more learning and

ingenuity than are necessary for discovering truths; and it is in those

queer freaks of philosophical minds that Sir Thomas specially delights.

Though far, indeed, from objecting to any absurdity which lies on the

common highroad, he rejoices in the true spirit of a collector when he

can discover some grotesque fancy by rambling into less frequented paths

of inquiry. Perhaps it will be best to take down one or two specimens,

pretty much at random, and mark their nature and mode of treatment.

Here, for example, is that quaint old wonder, the phoenix, 'which, after

many hundred years, burneth itself, and from the ashes thereof ariseth

up another.' Sir Thomas carefully discusses the pros and cons of this

remarkable legend. In favour of the phoenix, it may be alleged that he

is mentioned 'not only by human authors,' but also by such 'holy

writers' as Cyril, Epiphanius, and Ambrose. Moreover, allusions are made

to him in Job and the Psalms. 'All which notwithstanding,' the following

grave reasons may be alleged against his existence: First, nobody has

ever seen a phoenix. Secondly, those who mention him speak doubtfully,

and even Pliny, after telling a story about a particular phoenix which

came to Rome in the censorship of Claudius, unkindly turns round and

declares the whole story to be a palpable lie. Thirdly, the name phoenix

has been applied to many other birds, and those who speak unequivocally

of the genuine phoenix contradict each other in the most flagrant way as

to his age and habitat. Fourthly, many writers, such as Ovid, only speak

poetically, and others, as Paracelsus, only mystically, whilst the

remainder speak rhetorically, emblematically, or hieroglyphically.

Fifthly, in the Scriptures, the word translated phoenix means a palm

tree. Sixthly, his existence, if we look closely, is implicitly denied

in the Scriptures, because all fowls entered the ark in pairs, and

animals were commanded to increase and multiply, neither of which

statements is compatible with the solitary nature of the phoenix.

Seventhly, nobody could have known by experience whether the phoenix

actually lived for a thousand years, and, therefore, 'there may be a

mistake in the compute.' Eighthly, and finally, no animals really

spring, or could spring, from the ashes of their predecessors and it is

impossible to believe that they could enter the world in such a fashion.

Having carefully summed up this negative evidence--enough, one would

have fancied, to blow the poor phoenix into summary annihilation--Sir

Thomas finally announces his grave conclusion in these words--'How far

to rely on this tradition we refer unto consideration.' And yet he feels

impelled to add a quaint reflection on the improbability of a statement

made by Plutarch, that 'the brain of a phoenix is a pleasant bit, but

that it causeth the headache.' Heliogabalus, he observes, could not have

slain the phoenix, for it must of necessity be 'a vain design to destroy

any species, or mutilate the great accomplishment of six days.' To which

it is added, by way of final corollary, that after Cain had killed Abel,

he could not have destroyed Eve, supposing her to have been the only

woman in existence; for then there must have been another creation, and

a second rib of Adam must have been animated.

Hours in a Library, Volume 1 New Edition, with Additions · 第 20 / 28 段