The ex-Regent’s influence.... The queen’s influence.... continued
reforms.... King adopts new title.... cruel punishments
abolished.... Arch demolished.... Yun Chi-ho.... Korea astonished at
Japanese victory over Chinese.... Buddhist monks allowed in
Seoul.... Yi Chun-yong banished.... Independence Day.... Pak
Yong-hyo.... again banished.... American Mining concession.... Count
Inouye retires.... cholera.... official change.... Educational
reform.... arrival of Viscount Miura.... Japanese policy.... Miura
directly implicated in murder of queen.... Inouye not concerned....
Japanese Government ignorant of Miura’s plot.
The year 1895 was big with history. Its events created a strong and
lasting impression upon the whole Korean people and it is in the light
of these events that the whole subsequent history of the country must be
interpreted. The year opened in apparent prosperity. The king had taken
oath to govern according to enlightened principles and had exhorted his
officials to adhere strictly to the reform program, protesting that if
he himself failed to do so it would be an offence against Heaven. The
Tă-wŭn-gun had retired from public life but as his son, the brother of
the king, was Minister of the Household and his grandson Yi Chun-yong
held a position near the king, there can be no doubt that in a private
way the Tă-wŭn-gun exercised fully as much influence as he had done
while in active office. It is necessary to bear in mind that the enmity
of the queen against the ex-Regent extended to the sons of the latter
and in spite of the terms of the king’s oath constant pressure was
brought to bear upon the king from that direction. Whatever be the
reason, we find that in January Yi Chun-yong was sent to Japan as Korean
Minister, an act that was really in favor of the anti-Regent faction
since it temporarily removed one of the chief actors from the immediate
stage.
As the king had sworn to pay personal attention to the details of
government it was deemed advisable to remove the cabinet meeting place
to the palace itself. Whether this was in accord with the spirit of the
reforms may be doubted, for it worked directly for the complete
centralization of power which later caused a reversal of the whole
governmental policy.
The progress of the so-called reforms went on apace. The outside, the
integuments, were changed, whatever may or may not have happened in the
inner mind. The long baggy sleeves which had distinguished the true
_yang-ban_ were done away and the side-openings of the long coats were
sewed up. The width of the hat brims was curtailed and other minor
changes were effected. A salutary change was made by putting power into
the hands of the ministers of state to carry out the work of their
respective offices according to law without referring every thing to the
central government, excepting in very important cases where it affected
other departments. The immemorial customs regarding the salutations of
inferiors to superiors and _vice versa_ were largely done away and more
democratic rules formulated. The Home Minister undertook to correct many
abuses in the country, to ferret out cases where cultivated land
returned no revenue, because of the indirection of the _ajŭns_, and by
this means the revenue of the government was very largely augmented.
At the advice of the leading members of the Cabinet His Majesty adopted
the title of _Ta-gun-ju Pye-ha_ ([Korean]) [Korean] in place of his
former title of _Chon-ha_ ([Korean]). This elevated him to a position
somewhat higher than that of _Wang_ ([Korean]) but still much lower than
the title of emperor which he later assumed. All other members of the
Royal Family were likewise elevated one degree.
At this time a radical change was made in the manner of punishing
criminals. The cruel forms of execution and of torture which had always
prevailed were done away and more humane methods instituted.
Decapitation was done away and strangulation substituted. This worked no
relief for the criminal but the horrible spectacle of public
decapitation was relegated to the past.
A large number of men who had been banished or who had fled the country
because of connection with the troubles of 1884 and other years, were
pardoned and their relatives were again recognized as eligible to
office.
On the native New Year which occurred in February the king issued an
important edict saying that office should be given not only to men of
noble blood but to others of good character and attainments, and he
ordered that such men be selected and sent up from the country as
candidates for official position. This was very pleasing to the country
people and was hailed as a genuine sign of political renovation. At the
same time the ancient arch outside the West Gate was demolished. This
arch was the only remaining sign of Chinese suzerainty and its
demolition broke the last visible thread which bound Korea to her great
patron. We say visible advisedly, for there can be no doubt that the
intrinsic loyalty of the vast majority of Koreans to China was still
practically unimpaired.
On February thirteenth Yun Chi-ho returned from many years’ sojourn in
America and China where he had gained a genuine insight into truly
enlightened government, and his return to Korea would have been a most
happy augury had there been enough enlightened sentiment in the country
to form a basis for genuine as distinguished from superficial reform.
Meanwhile the Japanese were carrying everything before them in Manchuria
and the end had now come. The Korean government therefore sent a special
envoy to the Japanese headquarters on the field at Hai-cheng,
congratulating them upon their brilliant successes. Soon after this the
war terminated with the treaty of Shimonoseki by the terms of which
China ceded to Japan southern Manchuria, and the island of Formosa,
abjured all interest in Korea and paid an enormous indemnity. The result
astonished the Koreans but so strong was the feeling in favor of China
that very many still clung to the idea that China would pay the money
and then go to work preparing for a much greater struggle with the
victorious Japanese.
Since the year 1456 Buddhist monks had been forbidden to enter Seoul.
This was part of the general policy of this dynasty to give Buddhism no
political foothold. Now the Japanese secured from the government a
reinstatement of the Buddhists in their original position and for the
first time in four centuries and a half the mendicant monk with his
wooden gong and rosary begged on the streets of Seoul.
In April a great misfortune overtook the house of the ex-Regent. His
grandson, Yi Chun-yong, nephew to the king, was arrested and charged
with having connived with _tonghaks_ and others to depose the king and
assume the reins of power. It was not shown that Yi Chun-yong had been a
main mover in the scheme or that he had even favored the idea, but the
very fact that his name had been used in such a connection was enough to
send him into banishment on the island of Kyo-dong, off Kang-wha. Four
other men connected with this affair were executed. This was a severe
blow to the ex-Regent and did much to bring him to the point which made
possible the terrible events of the following October.
The sixth of June witnessed a great celebration in Seoul, which has gone
down in history as Independence Day. A fete was held in the “Old Palace”
which exceeded in brilliancy any similar demonstration since the opening
of Korea to foreign relations.
It was inevitable that, from the moment of his arrival in Korea, Pok
Yong-hyo should be at sword’s points with the Tă-wŭn-gun, for the
returned refugee represented the radical wing of the reform party, which
the ex-Regent had always bitterly opposed; and besides the presence of
such a strong man would necessarily subtract from the influence of the
aged but autocratic prince. It is probable that the Japanese brought Pak
Yong-hyo back to Korea under the impression that he would prove a
willing instrument in their hands, but they soon discovered that he had
ideas and opinions of his own and that he was working rather for Korea
than for Japan. He failed to fall in with some of the plans which would
help the Japanese but at the expense of Korea and, in fine, he became
something of an embarrassment to his former benefactors. Meanwhile the
king and queen were both attached to him, and this for several reasons.
He was a near relative of the king and would have no cause for desiring
a change in the status of the reigning house; in the second place he was
a determined enemy of the Tă-wŭn-gun, and in the third place he was sure
to work against a too liberal policy toward the Japanese. This attitude
of increasing friendliness between him and the Royal family was a
further cause of uneasiness to the Japanese, although Count Inouye
himself had done much to win the good will of the queen. Finally Pak
Yong-hyo had won the lasting gratitude of the king and queen by exposing
the machinations of Yi Chun-yong.
The ex-Regent was determined that Pak Yong-hyo should be gotten out of
the way. To this end he concocted a scheme which, with the probable
sanction of the Japanese, seemed to promise success. He laid before the
king certain grave charges of treason against Pak, which, though not
believed either by the king or the queen, convinced them that it would
be impossible to shield him from probable destruction; for the people
still called him a traitor, the ex-Regent would spare no pains to see
him put out of the way and it was evident that the Japanese would not
take any strong measures to protect him. The queen called him up and
advised him to make good his escape before action could be taken on the
charge of treason. He complied and forthwith escaped again to Japan. He
had not as yet broken with the Japanese and they were doubtless glad to
help him away. It was early in July that he passed off the stage,
perhaps for ever, and thus there were lost to Korea the services of one
of the most genuinely patriotic Koreans of modern times. If the Japanese
could have determinedly put the ex-Regent in the background and allowed
Pak Yong-hyo to work out his plans on terms of amity with the Royal
family all the evils which followed might easily have been averted. It
was this act, as we believe, of allowing the ex-Regent to carry out his
scheme of personal revenge that caused the whole trouble and there never
was a time, before or since, when brighter hopes for Korea were more
ruthlessly sacrificed.
But progressive measures kept on apace and during July the government
issued new and important mining, quarantine and army regulations and
organized a domestic postal system. A valuable mining concession in the
district of Un-san in the north was granted to an American syndicate, a
transaction that has proved the most profitable, at least to the
foreigner, of any attempt to open up the resources of Korea.
Near the end of the month Korea suffered the misfortune of seeing Count
Inouye retire from the Legation in Seoul and return to Japan. Never did
the Japanese have such need of a strong and upright man in Seoul and
never had a Japanese Minister in Seoul opportunity for greater
distinction. There are those who believe that he despaired of
accomplishing anything so long as the two opposing factions in Seoul
were led by personalities so strong and so implacable in their mutual
hatred as the queen and the ex-Regent. It is not unlikely that he felt
that until one or other of these should be permanently removed from the
field of action there could be no real opportunity for the renovation of
Korea. This by no means implies that he desired such removal to be
effected by forcible means but it is not unnatural to suppose that he
must have given expression to the conviction as to the futility of doing
anything under existing conditions in the peninsula. There have been
some who have believed that the Japanese authorities in Tokyo determined
upon the removal of the obstacle in Seoul by any means in their power.
Subsequent events gave some color to this surmise but we cannot and do
not believe that the Japanese government was a party to the plot which
ended in the tragedy of the following October but that a fanatical and
injudicious Japanese Minister to Korea privately gave his sanction to an
act which the Japanese government would have sternly forbidden had they
been consulted.
[Illustration: _THE AMERICAN MINES AT TA-BA-WI._]
The summer of 1895 witnessed the first serious epidemic of cholera in
Korea since the far more destructive one of 1886. Special plague
hospitals were erected in Seoul and in spite of their temporary and
inadequate nature the foreign protestant missionaries of Seoul, who were
in charge, accomplished very much in the way of local relief. It is
impossible to say what the total mortality in Seoul was, to say nothing
of the country at large, but it is probable that ten or twelve thousand
people died in the Capital before the subsidence of the epidemic.
The forces which worked to the expulsion of Pok Yong-hyo also operated
to curtail the term of banishment of Yi Chun-yung who was recalled from
Kyo-dong Island on August 6th, but even the ex-Regent could not secure
the residence of his grandson in Seoul, so he sent the young man to
Japan, since which time he has been numbered with the political refugees
and has never been able to think of returning to his native land. After
the departure of Count Inouye, who had enjoyed the partial confidence of
the queen, the ex-Regent’s prospects improved to such an extent that
several of the ministers of state who were well affected toward Her
Majesty were removed and others substituted; especially significant was
the removal of the king’s brother Yi Chŭ-myŭn from the Ministry of the
Household. As he was the son of the ex-Regent, this would seem to be a
defeat for that faction but, in fact, his removal from that position was
a necessary step to the carrying out of the dangerous plot which was
already being formulated in the mind of the queen’s determined enemy.
This summer, which witnessed so many curious contradictions, was further
distinguished by a determined effort in the line of education. The
Educational Department projected a Normal school and a beginning was
made. One hundred and seventeen young men were sent to study in Japan
and other measures of lesser importance were carried out.
On the first day of September Viscount Miura arrived from Japan to
assume the duties of Minister. Over a month had elapsed since the
departure of Count Inouye. The Viscount was an enthusiastic Buddhist and
evidently belonged to the old rather than the new Japan. He was, withal,
a strenuous man and is said to have considered the settlement of the
Korean difficulties merely a matter of prompt and vigorous action. At
the time of his arrival the ex-Regent was living at his summer-house
near the river and from the very first he was in close relations with
the new Japanese Minister. It was quite evident that the latter had
espoused the cause of the ex-Regent as against the queen and that
instead of trying to close the breach which was constantly widening
between these two powerful personages he was preparing to make use of
this estrangement to further what he supposed to be the interests of
Japan. Min Yong-whan, the most powerful of the queen’s friends, was sent
to America as Minister; and everything was ready for the _coup_ which
had undoubtedly been determined upon. From the mass of conflicting
evidence, charge and counter charge, it is difficult to escape the
following conclusion. There were two different policies held by
political parties in Japan as to the best way to handle the Korean
question; one was what we may call the radical policy which advocated
strong measures and the instant and complete overthrow of all opposition
to the will of Japan in the peninsula; the other, or conservative,
policy looked to the attainment of the same object by gradual and
pacific means. It seems that the failure of Count Inouye to accomplish
anything definite in the line of a settlement of internal dissentions at
Seoul resulted in the appointment of Viscount Miura as an exponent of
the extreme radical policy. He was supposed to do prompt work but what
that work would be perhaps neither he nor his constituency saw clearly
before his arrival on the scene. It would be going much too far to say
that the assassination of the queen was once thought of, and yet it is
more than likely that those most conversant with conditions in Seoul
felt that by some means or other her enormous influence must be
permanently checked and that affairs must be so managed that she should
have nothing more to do in the handling of questions of state. How this
was to be accomplished neither Miura nor any of his advisers knew until
he came and looked over the field.
For this reason it is easy to see how the ex-Regent would be the first
man in Korea with whom the Japanese Minister would wish to consult, and
it is certain that the Tă-wŭn-gun would have but one word to say as to
the solution of the difficulty. His experience of twenty years had
convinced him that there was only one way to accomplish the object which
the Minister had in view and while Viscount Miura naturally shrunk from
adopting that course it would seem he too was at last convinced that it
was the only feasible plan. That he actually advised it in the first
instance we do not believe, but that he fell in with the plan which
others suggested and which they offered to carry through without his
personal intervention there can be no doubt whatever. Nor can there be
any question as to where the responsibility for the tragedy rests; not
with the Japanese Government, surely, except in-so-far as its
appointment of such a man to the difficult post of Minister to Seoul may
reflect upon its wisdom.
It has sometimes been hinted that Count Inouye upon his return to Japan
advocated some such policy as that which was carried out by Marquis
Miura but there is nothing to indicate that this is other than a libel,
for the whole career of that able statesman gives the lie to such
suspicions and his dispatches to his government show the very opposite
spirit from that intimated in these slanderous reports. For instance we
have the extract from his reports read in the Japanese Parliament in
which he says:
On one occasion the queen observed to me, “It was a matter of extreme
regret to me that the overtures made by me toward Japan were rejected.
The Tă-wŭn-gun, on the other hand, who showed his unfriendliness
toward Japan, was assisted by the Japanese Minister to rise in power.”
In reply to this I gave as far as I could an explanation of these
things to the queen and after allaying her suspicions I further
explained that it was the true and sincere desire of the emperor and
government of Japan to place the independence of Korea on a firm basis
and in the meantime to strengthen the Royal House of Korea. In the
event of any member of the Royal family, or indeed any Korean,
attempting treason against the Royal House, I gave the assurance that
the Japanese Government would not fail to protect the Royal House even
by force of arms.
This unequivocal promise of protection was made by Count Inouye just
before his departure for Japan and we do not and cannot believe that he
expressed anything but his honest sentiments and those of the government
that was back of him. It has been urged that the action of the Japanese
Government in acquitting Viscount Miura in the face of the evidence
given proves the complicity of that government in the outrage and its
previous knowledge that it was to be perpetrated, but this does not
necessarily follow. That government was doubtless unwilling to stultify
itself by acknowledging that its accredited minister to Korea was
actually guilty of the crime indicated in the charge. This attempt to
evade the responsibility was of course futile. There was no escape from
the dilemma in which that government was placed but the deduction that
it was _particeps criminis_ in the events of October 8th is
unbelievable. It was the work of Viscount Miura and of his staff and of
them alone, as is shown by the following extract from the Decision of
the Japanese Court of Preliminary Inquiry, which court sat in Hiroshima
in January 1896.