Corruption.... edicts of reform.... trouble with Japan.... envoy to
Europe.... death of Queen Cho.... the fisheries dispute....
oppression.... retrogression.... excessive taxation....
insurrections.... foreigners threatened.... on the verge of
anarchy.... prefects punished.... revolt in Song-do.... Tong-hak
manifesto.... government helpless.... Japan uneasy.... Kim Ok-kyun
murdered.... revolting barbarity.... the fall of Chŭn-ju.... Korea
asks China for help.... Chinese troops arrive.... Japanese
movements.... the other powers interfere.... Japanese demands....
proposed reforms.... the palace taken by the Japanese.... the
sinking of the Kowshing.... war declared.... Korea breaks with
China.... Japan promises to leave Shanghai alone.... Japanese in
Shanghai.... battle of Asan.... battle of P’yŭng-yang.... battle of
the Yalu.
At this time the administration of the government was anything but
exemplary. The selling of the same office at such short intervals
increased the burden on the people to an almost unbearable point, so
that there were frequent uprisings in country districts. In Korea the
people form the court of final appeal. If a prefect oversteps the line
which marks the limit of the people’s endurance and they drive him from
the place the government ordinarily accepts it as final.
The following year the government was obliged to take notice of this
state of things and the king sent out a proclamation saying that the
taking of bribes and the extortion of money in the provinces would be
severely punished. He took this opportunity also to speak about robbery
and gambling, which had begun to run rife in the land. The people were
forbidden to dress in silk, excepting those over fifty years of age.
The year 1890 opened with serious trouble in Ham-gyŭng Province. Cho
Pyŭng-sik, a man of indomitable will and one whose unbridled temper had
more than once gotten him into serious trouble, was governor in that
province. The people had mortgaged their bean crop to the Japanese
exporters, of Wŭn-san, and had received some $176,000 therefor. But when
the beans had been harvested and were ready for shipment the governor
forbade its delivery. He wanted the Japanese to sell it back to the
people, as it was a year of scarcity, but this they refused to do; and
the beans rotted where they lay. The Japanese promptly took the matter
up and demanded an indemnity. The Foreign Office at once recognised the
validity of the claim but the king ordered Cho Pyŭng-sik to pay the bill
himself, since he had acted throughout without orders from Seoul. The
unhappy governor was obliged to part with all his patrimony and several
of his relatives had to do likewise. As this was not enough to settle
the bill the government paid the balance.
This year saw the first embassy to Europe appointed in the person of Cho
Siu-heui but owing to his illness his place was filled by Pak Che-sun
who started on his mission but never got further than Hong-kong. It is
probable that it was through Chinese influence that he got no further.
The fourth moon of the year saw the death of the aged Dowager Queen Cho,
through whose influence the present king came to the throne. She was
buried with royal honors and the people assumed mourning for one year.
Serious difficulties arose in regard to the fisheries in the south. The
Japanese had been accorded the right to fish in Korean waters, but on
the island of Quelpart a curious custom prevails. The women do the
fishing. They enter the water entirely nude and gather shell-fish. All
males are prohibited by law from coming within sight of the
fishing-grounds. The Japanese fishing-boats, however, did not hesitate
to pass into these prohibited waters and as a result the Koreans were
deprived of the means of livelihood. The Korean government took the
reasonable ground that the Japanese in coming near the Korean coast
should observe the local customs and prejudices, but the Japanese
government refused to take any sentimental view of the question and
after a long discussion the Koreans failed to carry their point.
The year 1891 beheld the elevation to power of Min Yong-jun a man who
championed the most conservative principles of the retrogressive party
in power. The king’s son by the concubine Lady Kang was made Prince
Eui-wha. Corruption in official circles was accentuated by the lessening
of the term of office of country prefects thereby entailing fresh
burdens on the people, for they had to provide each prefect with money
to liquidate the debt he had incurred in purchasing the position. There
was an instant and loud outcry from all sides. The powers that be saw
that the limit of the people’s endurance had been passed and they
hastened to revoke the law. This same year a consulate was founded at
Tientsin and Yi Myŭng-sang became the first incumbent.
Another sign of retrogression was the execution of six men charged with
being accessory to the insurrection of 1882 although eleven years had
passed since that event.
The year 1892 passed without witnessing many events of special
importance, excepting that the state of things kept getting worse and
worse. It was a time during which the country was ripening for the great
disturbances of the following year. History shows that when the Korean
people are treated with anything like a fair degree of justice they are
loyal and peaceful. So long as the Korean is called upon to pay not more
than three or four times the legal rate of tax he will endure it quietly
and there will be no talk of seditious sects arising; but the people are
well aware that they themselves form the court of final appeal and when
all other means fail they are not slow to adopt any means of righting
their wrongs.
In 1893 Korea began to reap what she had sown in 1891 and 1892. Having
sown the wind she began to reap the whirlwind. The whole province of
P‘yŭng-an was in a ferment. Insurrections occurred in Kang-gye,
Song-ch‘ŭn, Ham-jong and in other parts of the province. But the
difficulty was not confined to the North. The sect called the Tong-hak
which had arisen in 1864 began to show its head in the south again.
Rumors began to multiply in Seoul that they were coming to the capital
in great numbers to drive out the Japanese and other foreigners. The
government despatched O Yun-jung, a civilian, to pacify them and for a
time quiet was preserved, but in March threatening plackards were
fastened to foreigners’ gates in Seoul inveighing against the Christian
religion and warning foreigners to leave the country at once. It was the
general feeling that although serious trouble was not likely to occur in
Seoul it would be well to be in a state of preparedness in case the
Tong-hak saw fit to put their words to the test of action.
At this time the Queen was extremely well-disposed toward that class of
female spiritual mediums called _mudang_, and one of them was elevated
to the rank of Princess. A Korean, An Hyo-je, who memorialised the king
against such practices, was overwhelmed with obloquy and was banished to
the island of Quelpart. Min Yong-jun had taken advantage of his high
position to add private profit to public usefulness and loud complaints
were heard on all sides against him and against others of the same name.
Insurrections of greater or less degree occurred in different parts of
the country and it seemed as if Korea were on the verge of anarchy. It
can hardly be gainsaid that this state of affairs was the legitimate
outcome of pro-Chinese agitation and was directly in line with
immemorial custom in China. Nothing could be truer than that Korea
needed reforming. The government found it necessary to deal with great
severity in some cases. Four prefects were taken to the center of the
city and publicly beaten and then banished. Even Min Yong-jun had to go
through the form of punishment in this public way, for the people of the
capital were so incensed against him that an insurrection seemed
imminent unless they were appeased. The Songdo people revolted against
the extortion that was practiced against them but they were overcome and
their ginseng was taken away from them by Kim Se-geui, the right hand
man of Min Yong-jun.
Late in the year the Tong-hak made a startling proclamation which they
secretly nailed to the gate of the governor’s yamen in Chŭn-ju. It
called upon all right-minded men to join in the march on the capital and
the extirpation of the foreigners. This seemed more tangible than the
former rumors and foreign men-of-war began to congregate at Chemulpo for
the protection of their nationals in Seoul. Hundreds of Japanese left
the city and hurried to Chemulpo for safety. A force of Korean infantry
marched southward to head off the revolutionists but they were easily
defeated and their arms and accoutrements fell into the hands of the
enemy.
It was quite evident that the Korean government was without the means or
the men to cope with such determined opposition. This deplorable state
of things was looked upon by Japan with some uneasiness. Korea seemed to
be coming more and more under Chinese influence and in the same
proportion her internal management became more corrupt. Japan regarded
Korea as an independent power and was determined to see that
independence upheld. This feeling on the part of Japan was sharply
accentuated when in the spring of 1894 a Korean detective, Hong Chong-u,
succeeded in gaining the confidence of Kim Ok-kyun who was living at
Tokyo as a political refugee. He was induced to accompany his betrayer
to Shanghai where, in a hotel, his betrayer shot him down in cold blood.
The Chinese government condoned the dastardly deed and sent the
assassin, together with the body of his victim, to Korea in a Chinese
gunboat. The body of Kim Ok-kyun was dismembered on April fourteenth in
a most brutal manner and the different portions of his body were sent
about the country as a warning to traitors. This lapse into the worst
excesses of the old regime opened the eyes of Japan to the actual
situation and gave her just the impetus she needed to take the strong
position which she did later. Soon after this the Tong-hak took the town
of Chŭn-ju and defeated all the government troops sent against them. The
governor of the province, Kim Mun-hyŭn, made his escape from the place.
The government had at last become convinced of its inability to cope
with its enemies single-handed and it determined to have recourse to the
dangerous policy of asking China to throw troops into the peninsula to
aid in putting down the Tong-hak uprising. China immediately complied
and on June sixth 1,500 Chinese troops were embarked at Tientsin and
were sent to Chemulpo under the escort of three gunboats.
It must be remembered that according to the third article of the
Tientsin Convention China and Japan each agreed not to send troops into
Korea without first notifying the other. In this case the Chinese failed
to notify the Japanese until after the departure of the troops and there
can be no doubt that at this point lies the strength of Japan’s
contention. When, later, the Chinese agreed to leave Korea
simultaneously with the Japanese the latter naturally refused. The
Chinese broke the convention first; they must leave first. But there
were other important points involved. Korea was rapidly losing all
semblance of independence and Japan was being jeopardized. The Chinese
abrogation of the treaty gave Japan just the excuse she wanted for
throwing troops into Korea and compelling those reforms which she
believed could be effected in no other way. No sooner was she informed
of China’s action than the Japanese Minister Otori, then on leave of
absence, was recalled, and sent immediately to Seoul with 400 marines,
arriving June ninth.
The Chinese force did not approach the capital but landed at Asan some
eighty miles south of Seoul. This force was soon augmented till it
amounted to 2,000 men. But Japan was not idle. By the twelfth of June
she had approximately 8,000 troops in Korea. Matters stood thus when the
news came that the Tong-hak, either frightened by the rumor of the
approach of a Chinese army or being pressed by the government troops,
had suddenly retired and the south was at peace. This tended to hasten a
crisis between the Chinese and Japanese. There was no longer any cause
why foreign troops should remain in the peninsula. The Chinese had come
to put down the Tong-hak and the Japanese had come ostensibly to protect
their nationals. Now that the Tong-haks had retired it did not take long
to discover the real reasons underlying the actions of the Japanese. On
June 16th she landed 3,000 more troops at Chemulpo and matters began to
look so serious in Seoul that all the Chinese residents hastened away
from the city and sought safety by embarking for China. About a thousand
people thus made a hasty exit from the country.
On June 25th the Russian, British, French and American representatives
in Seoul, in the interests of peace, jointly requested the Chinese and
Japanese to simultaneously withdraw. But the Chinese refused to go until
the Japanese did and the Japanese refused to go until reforms had been
introduced which would clear the political atmosphere and give some
semblance of truth to the fiction of Korean independence. The Korean
government was thrown into consternation when on June 28th the Japanese
Minister demanded a formal statement from Korea as to whether she were
an independent state or not. She replied that she was an independent
power.
Early in July the Japanese Minister handed the government a list of the
reforms which it deemed necessary. As they were all incorporated in the
reforms inaugurated a little later it is unnecessary to enumerate them
here. Fifteen thousand Japanese troops had by this time landed on Korean
soil and the capital was thoroughly invested. The prospects of peace
seemed to be growing smaller each day. The people of Seoul fled in large
numbers leaving their houses and all their effects except such as could
be carried on their backs. Such was the terror that the very name of the
Japanese inspired.
On July 20th the Japanese Minister sent an ultimatum to the king
complaining of the introduction of Chinese troops whose coming was
undeniably to protect a dependent state. He gave the king three days to
accept Japanese reforms. If within that time he did not accede to them
they would be enforced. On the night of the 22nd the king returned an
evasive answer and this decided the immediate policy of the Japanese. On
the following morning two battalions of Japanese troops, feigning to
start out for Asan, turned suddenly and marched on the palace. They met
with a certain weak show of resistance at the gates but easily forced
their way in and soon had the king in their care. Every member of the
Min faction was forthwith driven out and the Prince Tai-wŭn was called
in to assume a leading part in the management of the government.
By this time China and Japan were hurrying troops into the peninsula,
the former by way of Asan and the latter by Fusan and Chemulpo. On July
21st eleven steamers left Taku for Asan and the mouth of the Yalu with
8,000 troops. Those that came to Asan were ostensibly for the purpose of
aiding the government in the putting down of the Tong-hak. The Japanese
government was immediately apprised of the departure of the transports
from the Peiho and on July 25th the Akitsushima, Yoshino and Naniwa,
among the best of the Japanese navy, were ordered from Sasebo to Asan.
Two days later at six-thirty they encountered the Chinese men-of-war
Tsi-yuen and Kwang-ki in the vicinity of P’ung Island off Asan.
The Japanese were not aware of the sudden turn which affairs had taken
in Seoul but the Chinese were, and they expected the Japanese to take
the offensive. The Japanese became aware of the situation only when they
found the Chinese did not salute and that they were cleared for action.
The Japanese speedily put themselves in fighting trim. As the channel
narrowed and the vessels came within range the Chinese opened fire and
were answered with terrible effect by the Japanese. The Kwang-ki was
speedily disabled and beached. The Tsi-yuen, her bow-gun being disabled,
withdrew toward Wei-hai-wei. It is disputed as to which side began
firing first but it is quite immaterial. The fact that the Chinese knew
what had occurred at Seoul, that they were cleared for action and that
they failed to salute would seem to throw the burden of proof upon them.
While the Yoshino was pursuing the Tsi yuen, two more ships appeared on
the horizon. They proved to be the Chinese dispatch boat Tsao-kiang and
the British steamer Kowshing carrying about 1,500 Chinese troops. The
Akitsushima took the former in charge and the Naniwa took the latter.
The Naniwa signalled the transport to follow her, but the Chinese on
board of her would not let the English Captain obey. Two parleys were
held but the Chinese officers were obdurate and would not listen to
reason. When it became apparent that the Chinese were bent upon
self-destruction the Naniwa turned her battery upon her and blew her up.
More than a thousand of the Chinese troops were drowned. A large number
were picked up and held as prisoners of war. The sinking of the Kowshing
has been judged as hasty but the situation was a peculiar one. The
Chinese would neither surrender nor follow. They were plentifully
supplied with small arms and could keep a boarding party at bay
effectually. The better judgment of second thought proves that the
Japanese were fully justified in their action.
The results of the P’ung incident became apparent at once. It made
neutrals more careful, it proved that the sea was dangerous ground for
the Chinese, it kept over a thousand men from landing at Asan and it
proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that Japan was fully in earnest and
would fight to the bitter end. Moreover it changed the whole plan of
campaign for China. The Tong-hak were forgotten and the co-operation of
the force at the Yalu and that at Asan and a joint attack upon the
Japanese was the plan determined upon by the Chinese.
The Japanese forces in and about Seoul were now ready for a land
campaign. It was wisely determined to eliminate from the problem all the
Chinese forces south of Seoul before advancing against those in the
north along the Ta-dong River. The army in the north was being watched
by mounted spies. For the time being there was no danger to be
apprehended from these troops in the north but the two thousand at Asan,
if reinforced, might advance on the capital and make trouble unless they
were dispersed once and for all. Accordingly on the twenty-fifth of July
Gen. Oshima started for Asan with the greater part of the troops in
Seoul. The march was rapid. On the way the news of the P’ung incident
was received and applauded. The vicinity of Asan was reached in three
days. As the Japanese approached, the Chinese retreated a short distance
to a point which they could easily fortify. On the twenty-eighth the
Japanese army arrived within five miles of this position. A night attack
was determined upon by Gen. Oshima. It was not explained to the army
until midnight when it was aroused and informed of the intended
movement. The advance was made in two divisions. The right wing, four
companies of infantry and one of engineers under Lieutenant-colonel
Tadeka, sought the enemy’s left. The left wing under Gen. Oshima, and
comprising nine companies of infantry, one battalion of artillery and
one company of cavalry, swept forward in the dark to attack the flank
and rear of the enemy’s right.
It would have been a difficult undertaking even by daylight but in the
dark it was fourfold more trying. The Chinese outposts in the
neighboring village gave the signal, and, posted among the houses,
offered a stubborn resistance. The assaulting column was repulsed and
was compelled to lie down to hold the ground already taken. At last
however the Chinese had to withdraw. They crowded slowly out into the
neighboring, rice fields.
This preliminary struggle was followed by a brief breathing space. It
had lasted less than an hour but had proved a stiff encounter. At five
the Japanese attached the redoubts. The left wing now came into action
and under the smoke of the artillery the troops stormed the forts at
either extremity. In half an hour the Chinese were dislodged and the
rising sun looked down upon its flaming image on Japanese banners flying
victoriously from the Chinese ramparts.
The escape of the Chinese general, Yeh Chi-chao has given ground for the
alleged Chinese victory at A-san. It often happened during the Japan
China war that, unless the Chinese force was almost utterly annihilated,
they claimed a victory. It is still a puzzle to many, however, that in
the Asan skirmish as well as in the battle of the Yalu the victorious
Japanese permitted even a remnant of the enemy to escape. Although
thoroughly defeated Gen. Yeh brought a remnant of his force around the
city of Seoul and arrived safety at P’yŭng-yang, undoubtedly a difficult
and brilliant movement.
This first battle won by Japan in a foreign land, for a period of three
centuries, illustrated two points. Not only had the Japanese soldiers
learned their lesson from instructors but the officers proved themselves
worthy of the steadfastness of the men under them. One man out of every
twelve killed was an officer. Nor, when elated by the victory, did the
Japanese forget the ends for which they were working. They did not
undertake any further subjugation of the south, not even attempting to
exterminate the Tong-haks. It was the Chinese in the peninsula with whom
they were measuring swords. The forces at A-san being destroyed or
dispersed and danger from that quarter was consequently removed, and the
banners of rising sun turned northward.
The northern division of the Chinese army, which had been landed on
Korean soil near the mouth of the Yalu River and had advanced southward
from that point, had now held the city of P’yŭng-yang for upwards of a
month. In anticipation of a Japanese advance they had fortified it as
best they knew how, but as is usual with Chinese they had forgotten to
guard their rear. On three occasions in this war they were attacked in
their unprotected rear and utterly routed.
During the second week of August the commander of the Japanese fleet,
Admiral Ito, with twenty men-of-war took a cruise into the mouth of the
Gulf of Pechili. The feint had its desired effect, though wholly
misunderstood by the world at large. It attracted the attention of the
Chinese and transport after transport made its way safely across from
Japan to Korea with its complement of troops.
On August tenth Major Ichinohe with the vanguard started northward from
Seoul. It was the first step toward Peking. Songdo was reached the
following day. The next few days were spent in reconnoitering the
Ta-dong River, but this part retired eventually to Song-do and there
awaited reinforcements.
On the nineteenth Lieutenant-general Nodzu arrived from Japan with the
reinforcements for which Gen. Oshima had been growing impatient. The
latter immediately forwarded a detachment by another route toward
P’yŭng-yang. This was ordered to occupy an important position known as
Sak Pass and was reinforced on September eighth by a battalion of
infantry and a company of artillery. This became known as the Sak
Division.
On the twenty-third Gen. Oshima set out from Seoul for the north with a
Mixed Brigade. This was the name given to the Japanese army which
participated in all the operations in the peninsula, so called because
it was made up of various portions of the grand army. On the
twenty-fifth Oshima joined the forces at Song-do. A few days before this
Gen. Tadzumi had landed at Chemulpo and had been put in command of the
Sak Division. On the twenty-sixth another division under Gen. Sato
landed at Wun-san on the east coast nearly opposite P’yŭng-yang, and was
immediately put under the command of Gen. Nodzu. This is best known as
the Wun-san (Gensan) Division.
These three bodies of troops slowly converged upon P’yŭng-yang by three
routes, and made as if they were about to surround the entire city. But
the commanders knew the weak point in Chinese tactics too well to begin
trying new methods.
P’yŭng-yang was fortified beyond the expectations of the Japanese and it
should have held out indefinitely. The Ta-dong River flows before its
walls giving it defense on the south. On the north stands a high
eminence called Peony Mountain. To the west there are no special natural
defenses. The plan of attack was to take advantage of the proverbial
Chinese weakness, make a feint in the front but send the main body of
troops around the city and attack in the rear. The capture of
P’yŭng-yang was very much like that of Quebec. The plan of attack was
the same in each case. The Japanese made a feint in front of the town as
Wolfe did from the shores of Levis, and sent the real attacking party
around behind the town. The capture of Peony Mountain like the capture
of the Heights of Abraham determined the struggle.
On the morning of the fifteenth the Japanese army was in position. The
Sak and Gensan divisions lay before Peony and the other five heights to
the north of the city. The Mixed Brigade lay beyond the river along the
Seoul road which led by six fortified redoubts to the bridge of boats
before the River Gate of the town. The main body had crossed the river
at Iron Island below the city and under cover of the cannonading of the
Mixed Brigade had crept nearer and nearer the enemy from the west—the
rear.
At half past four on the morning of the fifteenth a terrific cannonading
was begun. Under cover of this the Sak Division took the fort nearest
the river, on the northeast of the city. At the same time the Gensan
Division took by assault the fort at the other end, on the north. From
its vantage ground the Gensan Division planted its guns and poured a
destructive fire on Peony Mountain. The Chinese commander being killed,
the defenders became discouraged and demoralized and this strategic
position was carried by the Sak Division by a single assault. The guns
of the enemy, being turned upon the city from the summit of this hill,
determined the contest. The main body trained its guns on the fifteen
redoubts which guarded the western approach and thus cut off all hope of
retreat from the city.
While the Japanese were having it all their own way on the north and
west the Mixed Brigade across the river was suffering severely. Five
Chinese forts guarded this main approach to P’yŭng-yang. The Japanese
troops, though ordered to make merely a feint, were carried away by the
inspiration of the hour and rashly attempted to capture these forts by
assault, but they were greatly outnumbered and were compelled at last to
retire having lost heavily. But the fall of Peony Mountain settled the
day, and that night the Chinese soldiers, following in the wake of their
despicable commanders sought safety in flight toward the Yalu by such
avenues as the Japanese left open for them. It is generally believed
that the Japanese purposely left open a loophole of escape, not caring
to have so many prisoners on their hands.
The feint made by Admiral Ito during the first week in August has been
mentioned. During the P’yŭng-yang campaign the Japanese fleet had been
patrolling the Yellow Sea about the Korean archipelego. Finally the last
company of Japanese troops were landed on Korean soil and the order was
given, “On to Peking.” Never was an invasion undertaken with such relish
since the days when, three centuries before, the hordes of Hideyoshi had
landed on the coast of Korea and raised this same cry. The outcome now
was destined to be far different from that of the former invasion.
Marshall Yamagata arriving in Korea on Sept. 12th with 10,000
reinforcements began the new campaign as Commander-in-chief.
During the P’yŭng-yang engagement the Japanese fleet had been stationed
at the mouth of the Ta-dong River, forty miles from the scene of the
battle, ready to be used in any emergency. On the sixteenth, the
campaign in Korea being settled by the flight of the Chinese army toward
the Yalu, the main and first flying squadrons weighed anchor and
departed for the supposed scene of Chinese activity at the mouth of the
Yalu, where it was believed that Chinese troops were being landed. Two
days previous 4,000 Chinese troops had left Taku to reinforce the new
army, being gathered on the banks of the Yalu for an invasion of Korea.
The transports which contained this detachment were protected by six
cruisers and four torpedo boats and were reinforced at Talien Bay by the
Peiyang squadron. On the sixteenth the transports landed their burden
and on the following day departed again for Taku, attended, as on the
trip over, by six cruisers and the Peiho squadron.
On the same morning the Japanese fleet crossed the path of the returning
transports. At nine o’clock the smoke of the Chinese fleet was first
discovered and about twelve the fleet came into full view. The battle
opened with the main and flying squadrons leading in a single line
across the track of the Chinese fleet, which was advancing at half the
pace set by the enemy. This formation, the ironclads in the center and
the weakest ships on either wing, had been assumed as soon as it
appeared that the Japanese line was coming head on as if to pierce the
Chinese fleet. At a range of 5,200 meters the battle was opened by the
starboard barbette of the iron-clad Ting-yeun. The whole fleet soon
joined in the fight but the Japanese did not answer for some minutes. As
the Yoshino came on, the course was changed and the enemy was passed
from left to right. The comparatively helpless ships of the right flank
received the severest fire. The two old cruisers on the extreme right,
which were of wood and very inflamable, at once took fire and were
thenceforth useless. The Yang-wei took fire at the outset and retired.
The Chao-yung was not more fortunate and sank about half past two, the
battle having begun at one P.M. Japanese time.
Two of the twelve Chinese ships were thus disposed of at once. Two more,
the Tsi-yuen and Kwang-chia, deserted the battle immediately on various
excuses and departed for Port Arthur.
When the Japanese line had passed the Chinese fleet the flying squadron
had begun to port, when the two Chinese ships, which until then had
remained in the mouth of the Yalu, were seen making their way toward the
remainder of the fleet. Instantly the flying squadron began to starboard
and the oncoming vessels prudently retired. These two ships, the
Kwan-ping and Ping-yuen, not having come into action, and two, the
Yang-wei and Chao-yung, having retired from the battle in flames, and
two, the Tsi-yuen and Kwan-chia, having deserted, we find six ships of
23,000 tons bearing the brunt of the battle.
When the flying squadron began to starboard, the main squadron, which
was following in fine order, kept to port. The feint against the
Kwan-ping and Ping-yuen proving successful, the flying squadron kept to
starboard and followed the main squadron. Soon, however, it was seen
that the slower vessels of the main squadron were being left exposed and
Admiral Ito signalled for the flying squadron to starboard again and
intervene between the distressed vessels and the enemy. Thus the main
and flying squadrons moved about the Chinese fleet in opposite
directions, the former on the inner track.
This second round proved a severe one for the Chinese fleet. The contest
now assumed a desperate phase. During the opening of the struggle
attention on either side had been paid to the enemy’s weaker ships. The
two slow and defenseless ships of the Japanese fleet, the Akagi and
Saikio, caused the Admiral much trouble, if indeed they did not alter
entirely his plan of attack. That he brought them out of the battle at
all is a great credit to his ability to manoeuver at short notice and
under fire. It is, however, inexplicable that such ships were allowed to
follow the main squadron into the engagement.
By two o’clock the ranks of the two struggling fleets were considerably
thinned out and the battle became simplified though more desperate than
ever, as the main squadron began to close in on the powerful iron-clads
and as the flying squadron separated the remainder of the Chinese fleet
from their only hope of safety and scattered them broadcast over the
sea. The Akagi was now out of the fight and, under the protection of the
flying squadron, was making for the Ta-dong River. The Hiyei, also
disabled and protected by the main squadron, was making for the same
destination. The Saikio having come as it were from the very jaws of
death, when attempting to attack the burning Yang-wei, lay between the
object of her deadly mission and the fleets, watching how the battle
fared.
On the Chinese side there was far more destruction, because of the
larger number of slow and inflamable ships. Of the total, two, the
Tsi-yuen and Kwan-chia, had long since deserted as we have already said.
The Yang-wei and Chao-yung were both desperately burning. The Chih-yuen,
having passed from the Admiral’s wing to the right wing, had attempted
the most ridiculous feat of attacking the flying squadron as the latter
come to relieve the Akagi and Saikio. Being severely hit in her
foolhardy course, her commander, evidently as revenge for going under,
attempted to ram. The guns of the fleet were instantly brought to bear
upon the ill-starred ship and, riddled with the fire of the heavy and
machine guns alike, she went under, flinging her crew into the air as
she listed the last time. A similar fate overtook the Ping-yuen upon
whom the flying squadron bore. A terrible fire from the Yoshino riddled
her burning hulk and she too, went down like a monstrous bonfire into
the tawny waters of Yellow Sea.
Meanwhile the struggle between the two iron-clads and the Japanese main
squadron had been raging until both the contestants were nearly
exhausted. The former, knowing well that in them rested China’s only
hope on the sea, and equally desperate because of the cowardliness and
incompetency displayed throughout the battle by their own comrades as
well as by the determined wrath of their ancient foe, fought to their
last charge save three with undaunted heroism. Nothing in the conflict
which raged so many hours could have equalled the sight of the crews of
the two battered iron-clads, their ammunition far spent, meeting the
last onslaught of the main squadron as it bore down upon them for the
last time on that memorable afternoon, with perfect calm and a purpose
to go down with the ships when the ammunition gave out.
The last onslaught was made and met, but before another could be made
night had begun to fall and the Japanese, themselves not far from
exhaustion, deemed it wise to withdraw. This battle has been called a
Japanese victory and probably with reason, though according to the
dictum of modern naval warfare a decided Japanese victory could have
been achieved only by capturing or disabling the two Chinese iron-clads
which were the soul of the Chinese fleet. Technically the failure to do
this made it a drawn battle, each side retiring unconquered. But there
is every reason to believe that this battle, in reality, decided the
Japanese supremacy over the Yellow Sea.
The land battle at P’yŭng-yang and the naval battle off the mouth of the
Yalu opened the eyes of the world to the fact that Japan was a power to
be reckoned with. The incident at P‘ung Island and the battle of Asan
had proved nothing except the fact that Japan was fully prepared to go
to extremities and that the war was actually begun. It is probable that
a majority of intelligent people thought the Japanese would fall an easy
victim to the Chinese forces. On the sea China had several war-vessels
that far out-matched anything which Japan possessed and on land she had
unlimited population from which to recruit her armies. She had enjoyed
the assistance of many foreign military and naval men in getting her
army and navy into shape, and in addition to this she had the sympathy
of Great Britain in the struggle. It was freely predicted that the
superior quickness of the Japanese might bring her certain small
victories at first but that as time went on and China really awoke to
the seriousness of the situation a Chinese army would be put in the
field which would eventually drive the Japanese off the mainland. The
Japanese invasion of 1592 was cited to show that though momentarily
successful, the Japanese would be ultimately defeated.
The battles of P’yŭng-yang and Yalu changed all this. In the first place
it was discovered that the Chinese, with equal or superior numbers,
could not hold a strongly defensive position against their assailants.
The Chinese had everything in their favor so far as natural surroundings
went. They lacked the one essential and it was the demonstration of this
lack at P’yŭng-yang that made the world begin to doubt whether the
Chinese would really do what was expected of them.
The battle of the Yalu, while technically a drawn battle, proved that
the Japanese could stand up against superior ships and hold them down to
a tie game. The Chinese ammunition was exhausted and if darkness had not
come on the Japanese would have discovered this and the big Chinese
vessels would have been captured. From that day the progress of the
Japanese was an unbroken series of victories. The myth of China’s
strength was shattered and the whole history of the Far East, if not of
the world, entered upon a new and unexpected phase.
We have already mentioned that 4,000 Chinese troops had been landed at
the mouth of the Yalu to reinforce the army that had been gathered there
for the invasion of Korea. That invasion was destined not to be carried
out, for the routed Chinese army from P’yŭng-yang came streaming north
in headlong flight and the Japanese followed them up just fast enough to
worry them but without making it necessary to encumber themselves with
prisoners. It shows how perfectly the Japanese had gauged the calibre of
the Chinese that they should have driven them on in this contemptuous
manner. When the Japanese arrived at the Yalu they found that the
Chinese had occupied an advantageous position on the further side and
would attempt to block the advance but it was too late to stem the tide
of Japanese enthusiasm. The passage was made with ease, the Chinese
quickly put to flight and the war left Korean territory, not to return.
The subsequent operations of war are of surpassing interest to the
general historian but they cannot be called a part of Korean history, so
we shall be compelled to leave them and go back to the peninsula, where
the results of Japan’s victories were to be keenly felt.