There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1)
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
勇而無慮 “Bravery without forethought,” as Ts‘ao Kung analyses it,
which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad
bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yü, “must not be encountered
with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain.” Cf.
Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV _ad init._: 凡人論將常觀於勇勇之於將乃數分之一耳夫勇者
必輕合輕合而不知利未可也 “In estimating the character of a general,
men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting
that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general
should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly;
and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is
expedient, must be condemned.” The _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, too, makes the
incisive remark 上死不勝 “Simply going to one’s death does not bring
about victory.”
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
必生 is explained by Ts‘ao Kung of the man “whom timidity prevents
from advancing to seize an advantage,” and Wang Hsi adds, “who is
quick to flee at the sight of danger.” Mêng Shih gives the closer
paraphrase 志必生反 “he who is bent on returning alive,” that is,
the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing
is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks.
T‘ai Kung said: 失利後時反受其殃 “He who lets an advantage slip will
subsequently bring upon himself real disaster.” In 404 A.D., 劉裕
Liu Yü pursued the rebel 桓𤣥 Huan Hsüan up the Yangtsze and fought
a naval battle with him at 崢嶸洲 the island of Ch‘êng-hung. The
loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents
were in great force. But Huan Hsüan, fearing the fate which was in
store for him should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast to
the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary,
at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting
spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the
loyalists made an attack from windward with fireships, all
striving with the utmost ardour to be first in the fray, Huan
Hsüan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled
for two days and nights without stopping. [_See_ 晉書, chap. 99,
fol. 13.] Chang Yü tells a somewhat similar story of 趙嬰齊 Chao
Ying-ch‘i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with
the army of Ch‘u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him
on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get
across.
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
I fail to see the meaning of Capt. Calthrop’s “which brings
insult.” Tu Mu tells us that 姚襄 Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357
A.D. by 黃眉 Huang Mei, 鄧羌 Têng Ch‘iang and others, shut himself
up behind his walls and refused to fight. Têng Ch‘iang said: “Our
adversary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make
constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry
and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed
to be our prey.” This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to
fight, was lured on as far as 三原 San-yuan by the enemy’s
pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.
(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;
This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really
a defect in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an
exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned
man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch‘ên
truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: 徇名不顧 “The seeker
after glory should be careless of public opinion.”
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and
trouble.
Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be
careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise
is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to
the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy,
because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the
defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be
the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce
a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a
hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It
is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve
Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical
blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief
came through the very man who started out with the distinct
resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to
sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our
generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I
remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always “so
good to his men.” By this plea, had he but known it, he was only
condemning him out of Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.