THE Emperor’s decision was made known to the American government by a
letter[313] from Bassano to Russell, dated May 4, 1811, almost as curt
as a declaration of war:--
“I hasten to announce to you that his Majesty the Emperor has
ordered his Minister of Finance to authorize the admission of
the American cargoes which had been provisionally placed in
deposit on their arrival in France. I have the honor to send
you a list of the vessels to which these cargoes belong; they
will have to export their value in national merchandise, of
which two thirds will be in silks. I have not lost a moment in
communicating to you a measure perfectly in accord with the
sentiments of union and of friendship which exist between the
two Powers.”
This was all. No imperial decree of repeal was issued or suggested.
President Madison cared little for the released ships; he cared
only for the principle involved in the continued existence of the
decrees, and Bassano’s letter announced by silence, as distinctly as
it could have said in words, that the principle of the decrees was
not abandoned. Such were Napoleon’s orders; and in executing them
Bassano did not, like Cadore or Talleyrand, allow himself the license
of softening their bluntness. Russell knew the letter to be fatal to
any claim that the French decrees were withdrawn, but he could do
nothing else than send it to London as offering, perhaps, evidence of
the “actual relations growing out of the revocation of the Berlin and
Milan Decrees.”[314] He wrote to Bassano a letter asking the release of
the American vessels captured and brought into French ports as prizes
since November 1, but he obtained no answer.[315] A month afterward
he wrote again, remonstrating against the excessive tariff duties and
the requirement that American vessels should take two thirds of their
return cargoes in French silks; but this letter received as little
notice as the other. Russell had the mortification of knowing, almost
as well as Bassano himself, the motives that guided the Emperor; and
July 13 he recited them to the President in language as strong as
propriety allowed:[316]--
“The temper here toward us is professedly friendly, but
unfortunately it is not well proved to be so in practice. It
is my conviction, as I before wrote you, that the great object
of the actual policy is to entangle us in a war with England.
They abstain therefore from doing anything which would furnish
clear and unequivocal testimony of the revocation of their
decrees, lest it should induce the extinction of the British
orders and thereby appease our irritation against their enemy.
Hence, of all the captured vessels since November 1, the
three which were liberated are precisely those which had not
violated the decrees. On the other hand, they take care, by not
executing these decrees against us, to divert our resentment
from themselves. I have very frankly told the Duke of Bassano
that we are not sufficiently dull to be deceived by this kind
of management. He indeed pretends that they are influenced by
no such motive; and whenever I speak to him on the subject,
he reiterates the professions of friendship, and promises to
endeavor to obtain the release of the remainder of our vessels
captured since November 1. I fear, however, that he will not
succeed.”
Even in case of war with England, Russell warned the President to look
for no better treatment from Napoleon, who might then consider America
as “chained to the imperial car, and obliged to follow whithersoever it
leads.” He pointed out that concessions had never produced any return
from the Emperor except new exactions and new pretensions. If war with
England became inevitable, care must be taken to guard against the
danger that France should profit by it. French trade was not worth
pursuing. The tariff on imports, reinforced by the restrictions on
exports, created a practical non-intercourse.
Napoleon’s writings furnish evidence that the Emperor’s chief object
was not so much to entangle America in war with England as to maintain
the decrees which he literally overturned the world to enforce. When he
suspended their enforcement against American ships in his own ports, he
did so only because his new customs’ regulations had been invented to
attain by other means the object of the decrees. When he affirmed and
reaffirmed that these decrees were the fundamental law of his empire,
he told a truth which neither England nor America believed, but to
which he clung with energy that cost him his empire.
Russell made no more efforts, but waited impatiently for the arrival
of Joel Barlow, while Napoleon bethought himself only of his favorite
means for quieting Madison’s anger. August 23 the Emperor ordered[317]
Bassano to give his minister at Washington instructions calculated to
sharpen the cupidity of the United States. Serurier was to be active in
effecting the independence of Spanish America, was to concert measures
for that purpose with the President, promise arms and supplies, employ
the American government and American agents for his objects, and in
all respects give careful attention to what passed in the colonies;
yet in regard to Florida, the only Spanish colony in which Madison
took personal interest, Napoleon hinted other views to Bassano in a
message[318] too curious for omission.
“You spoke to me this morning,” he wrote August 28, “of
instructions received by the American _chargé_ on the
affair of Florida. You might insinuate the following idea,--that
in consideration of some millions of piastres, Spain in her
present condition of penury would cede the Floridas. Insinuate
this, while adding that though I do not take it ill that America
should seize the Floridas, I can in no way interfere, since
these countries do not belong to me.”
With this touch of character, the great Emperor turned from American
affairs to devote all his energies to matters about the Baltic. Yet
so deeply were American interests founded in the affairs of Europe
that even in the Baltic they were the rock on which Napoleon’s destiny
split; for the quarrels which in the summer of 1811 became violent
between France and the two independent Baltic Powers--Russia and
Sweden--were chiefly due to those omnipresent American ships, which
throve under pillage and challenged confiscation. Madison’s wisdom in
sending a minister to St. Petersburg was proved more quickly than he
could have expected. Between March 1 and Nov. 1, 1811, at one of the
most critical moments in the world’s history, President Madison had
no other full minister accredited in Europe than his envoy to Russia;
but whatever mortifications he suffered from Napoleon, were more than
repaid by means of this Russian mission.
The new minister to Russia, J. Q. Adams, sailed from Boston August 5,
1809, and on arriving at Christiansand in Norway, September 20, he
found upward of thirty masters of American vessels whose ships had
been seized by Danish privateers between April and August, and were
suffering trial and condemnation in Danish prize courts. He reported
that the entire number of American ships detained in Norway and Denmark
was more than fifty, and their value little less than five million
dollars.[319] The Danes, ground in the dust by England and France,
had taken to piracy as their support; and the Danish prize-courts,
under the pressure of Davout, the French general commanding at
Hamburg, condemned their captures without law or reason. Adams made
what remonstrance he could to the Danish government, and passed on to
Cronstadt, where he arrived Oct. 21, 1809. He found a condition of
affairs in Russia that seemed hopeless for the success of his mission.
The alliance between Russia and France had reached its closest point.
Russia had aided Napoleon to subdue Austria; Napoleon had aided Russia
to secure Finland. At his first interview with the Russian Foreign
Minister, Adams received official information of these events; and
when he called attention to the conduct of the Danish privateers,
Count Roumanzoff, while expressing strong disapprobation of their
proceedings, added that a more liberal system was a dream.[320]
The Foreign Minister of Russia, Count Roumanzoff, officially known
as Chancellor of the Empire, and its most powerful subject, favored
the French alliance. From him Adams could expect little assistance in
any case, and nothing but opposition wherever French interests were
involved. Friendly and even affectionate to America as far as America
was a rival of England, Roumanzoff could do nothing for American
interests where they clashed with those of France; and Adams soon
found that at St. Petersburg he was regarded by France as an agent of
England. He became conscious that French influence was unceasingly at
work to counteract his efforts in behalf of American interests.
Adams’s surprise was the greater when, with the discovery of this
immense obstacle, he discovered also an equally covert influence at
work in his favor, and felt that the protection was stronger than
the enmity. Before many months had passed, he found himself winning
successes that could be explained only by the direct interposition of
the Czar against the resistance of Roumanzoff and the ambassador of
France. In the mysterious atmosphere of the Russian court, the effect
of wielding this astounding power might well have turned his head; but
Adams hardly realized his position. At the outset, obliged to ask the
Czar’s interference on behalf of the plundered American merchants in
Denmark, he could regard himself only as performing an official duty
without hope of more than a civil answer. This was in fact the first
result of the request; for when, Dec. 26, 1809, he opened the subject
to Roumanzoff, the chancellor gave him no encouragement. The Danes,
he said, had been forced by France to do what they were doing. France
viewed all these American ships as British; and “as this was a measure
emanating from the personal disposition of the Emperor of France, he
was apprehensive there existed no influence in the world of sufficient
efficacy to shake his determination.”[321] Adams resigned himself to
this friendly refusal of a request made without instructions, and
implying the personal interference of the Czar with the most sensitive
part of Napoleon’s system.
Three days afterward, December 29, Adams saw Roumanzoff again, who told
him, with undisguised astonishment, that he had reported to the Czar
the American minister’s request for interference in Denmark and his own
refusal; and that the Czar had thought differently, and had “ordered
him immediately to represent to the Danish government his wish that the
examination might be expedited, and the American property restored as
soon as possible; which order he had already executed.”[322]
If Adams had consciously intrigued for a rupture between France and
Russia, he could have invented no means so effective as to cause the
Czar’s interference with Napoleon’s control of Denmark; but Adams’s
favor was far from ending there. The winter of 1809–1810 passed
without serious incident, but when spring came and the Baltic opened,
the struggle between France and the United States at St. Petersburg
began in earnest. Adams found himself a person of much consequence.
The French ambassador, Caulaincourt, possessed every advantage that
Napoleon and Nature could give him. Handsome, winning, and in all ways
personally agreeable to the Czar, master of an establishment more
splendid in its display than had been before known even at the splendid
court of St. Petersburg, he enjoyed the privilege, always attached to
ambassadors, of transacting business directly with the Czar; while the
American minister, of a lower diplomatic grade, far too poor to enter
upon the most modest social rivalry, labored under the diplomatic
inferiority of having to transact business only through the worse than
neutral medium of Roumanzoff. Caulaincourt made his demands and urged
his arguments in the secrecy that surrounded the personal relation of
the two Emperors, while Adams could not even learn, except indirectly
after much time, what Caulaincourt was doing or what arguments he used.
Already in April, 1810, Adams reported[323] to his Government that the
commercial dispute threatened a rupture between France and Russia.
On one hand, Napoleon’s measures would prove ineffectual if Russia
admitted neutral vessels, carrying as they would cargoes more or
less to the advantage of England; on the other, Russia must become
avowedly bankrupt if denied exports and restricted to imports of French
luxuries, such as silks and champagnes, to be paid in specie. Russia,
at war with Turkey and compelled to maintain an immense army with a
depreciated currency, must have foreign trade or perish.
Napoleon wanted nothing better than to cripple Russia as well as
England, and was not disposed to relax his system for the benefit of
Russian military strength. During the summer of 1810 he redoubled his
vigilance on the Baltic. Large numbers of vessels, either neutral or
pretending to be neutral, entered the Baltic under the protection of
the British fleet. Napoleon sent orders that no such vessels should be
admitted. June 15 Denmark issued an ordinance prohibiting its ports to
all American vessels of every description, and August 3 another to the
same effect for the Duchy of Holstein. July 19 a similar ordinance was
published by Prussia, and July 29 Mecklenburg followed the example.
The same demand came from Caulaincourt to the Czar, and the French
ambassador pressed it without intermission and without disguising the
dangers which it involved to the peace of Europe. Alexander’s reply
never varied.
“I want to run no more risks,” he told Caulaincourt.[324] “To
draw nearer England I must separate from France and risk a new
war with her, which I regard as the most dangerous of all wars.
And for what object? To serve England; to support her maritime
theories which are not mine? It would be madness on my part!...
I will remain faithful to this policy. I will remain at war with
England. I will keep my ports closed to her,--to the extent,
however, which I have made known, and from which I cannot
depart. In fact I cannot, as I have already told you, prohibit
all commerce to my subjects, or forbid them to deal with the
Americans.... We must keep to these terms, for I declare to you,
were war at our doors, in regard to commercial matters I cannot
go further.”
Thus the American trade became the apparent point of irritation between
Alexander and Napoleon. The Russians were amused by Cadore’s letter
to Armstrong of August 5, saying that the decrees were revoked, and
that Napoleon loved the Americans; for they knew what Napoleon had
done and was trying to do on the Baltic. The Czar was embarrassed and
harassed by the struggle; for the American ships, finding themselves
safe in Russian ports, flocked to Archangel and Riga, clamoring for
special permission to dispose of their cargoes and to depart before
navigation closed, while Napoleon insisted on their seizure, and left
no means untried of effecting it. He took even the extravagant step of
publicly repudiating the very licenses he was then engaged in forcing
American ships to carry. July 10, 1810, the “Moniteur” published an
official notice that the certificates of French consuls in the United
States carried by American vessels in the Baltic were false, “and that
the possessors of them must be considered as forgers,” inasmuch as
the French consuls in America had some time before ceased to deliver
any such certificates; and not satisfied with this ministerial act,
Napoleon wrote with his own hand to the Czar that no true American
trade existed, and that not a single American ship, even though
guaranteed by his own licenses, could be received as neutral.
In the heat of this controversy Adams was obliged to ask, as a favor to
the United States, that special orders might be given on behalf of the
American vessels at Archangel. As before, Roumanzoff refused; and once
more the Czar directed that the special orders should be given.[325]
This repeated success of the American minister in overriding the
established rules of the government, backed by the whole personal
influence of Napoleon, made Roumanzoff uneasy. Friendly and even
confidential with Adams, he did not disguise his anxiety; and while
he warned the American minister that Cadore’s letter of August 5 had
made no real change in Napoleon’s methods or objects, he added that
the Americans had only one support, and this was the Czar himself,
but that as yet the Czar’s friendship was unshaken. “Our attachment
to the United States is obstinate,--more obstinate than you are aware
of.”[326]
Adams then saw the full bearing of the struggle in which he was
engaged; his sources of information were extended, his social relations
were more intimate, and he watched with keen interest the effect of
his remonstrances and efforts. He had every reason to be anxious, for
Napoleon used diplomatic weapons as energetically as he used his army
corps. Only ten days after Roumanzoff made his significant remark about
the Czar’s obstinacy, Napoleon sent orders to Prussia, under threat of
military occupation, to stop all British and colonial merchandise; and
the following week, October 23, he wrote with his own hand to the Czar
a letter of the gravest import:[327]--
“Six hundred English merchant-vessels which were wandering in
the Baltic have been refused admission into Mecklenburg and
Prussia, and have turned toward your Majesty’s States.... All
this merchandise is on English account. It depends on your
Majesty to obtain peace [with England] or to continue the war.
Peace is and must be your desire. Your Majesty is certain to
obtain it by confiscating these six hundred ships or their
cargoes. Whatever papers they may have, under whatever names
they may be masked,--French, German, Spanish, Danish, Russian,
Swedish,--your Majesty may be sure that they are English.”
If Napoleon aimed at crippling Russia by forcing her into the
alternative of bankruptcy for want of commerce or invasion as the
penalty of trade, he followed a clear and skilful plan. Roumanzoff
answered his appeal by pleading that Russia could not seize neutral
property, and would not harm England even by doing so. November 4, two
days after President Madison proclaimed the revocation of the French
Decrees, Napoleon dictated his reply to Roumanzoff’s argument:[328]--
“As for the principle advanced,--that though wishing war on
England we do not wish to wage it on neutrals,--this principle
arises from an error. The English want no neutrals and suffer
none; they allow the Americans to navigate, so far as they
carry English merchandise and sail on English account; all the
certificates of French consuls and all other papers with which
they are furnished are false papers. In short, there is to-day
no neutral, because the English want none, and stop every vessel
not freighted on their account. Not a single vessel has entered
the ports of Russia with so-called American papers which has not
come really from England.”[329]
Armstrong, quitting Paris Sept. 10, 1810, wrote to Madison in his last
despatch a few significant words on the subject,[330] suggesting that
Napoleon’s true motive in reviving the energy of his restrictions
on commerce was, among others, the assistance it lent to his views
and influence on the Baltic. No other explanation was reasonable.
Napoleon intended to force Russia into a dilemma, and he succeeded.
The Czar, pressed beyond endurance, at last turned upon Napoleon with
an act of defiance that startled and delighted Russia. December 1
Roumanzoff communicated to Caulaincourt the Czar’s refusal to seize,
confiscate, or shut his ports against colonial produce.[331] At about
the same time the merchants of St. Petersburg framed a memorial to the
Imperial council, asking for a general prohibition of French luxuries
as the only means of preventing the drain of specie and the further
depreciation of the paper currency. On this memorial a hot debate
occurred in the Imperial council. Roumanzoff opposed the measure as
tending to a quarrel with France; and when overruled, he insisted on
entering his formal protest on the journal.[332] The Czar acquiesced in
the majority’s decision, and December 19 the Imperial ukase appeared,
admitting American produce on terms remarkably liberal, but striking a
violent blow at the industries of France.
Napoleon replied by recalling Caulaincourt and by sending a new
ambassador, Count Lauriston, to St. Petersburg, carrying with his
credentials an autograph letter to the Czar.[333]
“Your Majesty’s last ukase,” said this letter, “in substance,
but particularly in form, is directed specially against
France. In other times, before taking such a measure against my
commerce, your Majesty would have let me know it, and perhaps I
might have suggested means which, while accomplishing your chief
object, might still have prevented it from appearing a change of
system in the eyes of France. All Europe has so regarded it; and
already, in the opinion of England and of Europe, our alliance
exists no longer. If it were as entire in your Majesty’s heart
as in mine, this general impression would be none the less a
great evil.... For myself, I am always the same; but I am struck
by the evidence of these facts, and by the thought that your
Majesty is wholly disposed, as soon as circumstances permit it,
to make an arrangement with England, which is the same thing as
to kindle a war between the two empires.”
Adams’s diplomatic victory was Napoleonic in its magnitude and
completeness. Even Caulaincourt, whom he overthrew, good-naturedly
congratulated him after he had succeeded, against Caulaincourt’s utmost
efforts, in saving all the American ships. “It seems you are great
favorites here; you have found powerful protection,” said the defeated
ambassador.[334] The American minister felt but one drawback,--he could
not wholly believe that his victory was sure. Anxious by temperament,
with little confidence in his own good fortune,--fighting his battles
with energy, but rather with that of despair than of hope,--the younger
Adams never allowed himself to enjoy the full relish of a triumph
before it staled, while he never failed to taste with its fullest
flavor, as though it were a precious wine, every drop in the bitter cup
of his defeats. In this, the most brilliant success of his diplomatic
career, he could not be blamed for doubting whether such fortune could
last. That the Czar of Russia should persist in braving almost sure
destruction in order to defend American rights which America herself
proclaimed to be unassailed, passed the bounds of fiction.
Yet of all the facts with which Monroe, April 1, 1811, had to deal,
this was the most important,--that Russia expected to fight France
in order to protect neutral commerce. Already, Dec. 27, 1810, Adams
notified his Government that Russia had determined to resist to the
last, and that France had shown a spirit of hostility that proved
an intention to make war. A few weeks later he wrote that military
movements on both sides had begun on such a scale that the rumor of war
was universal.[335] Napoleon’s harangue of March 24, 1811, to the Paris
Chamber of Commerce was accepted in Russia as the announcement of a
coming declaration, and the Russians waited uneasily for the blow to be
struck which the Czar would not himself strike.
They waited, but Napoleon did not move. Hampered by the Spanish
war and by the immense scale on which a campaign in Russia must be
organized, he consumed time in diplomatic remonstrances which he
knew to be useless. April 1, 1811, a week after his tirade to the
Paris merchants, he dictated another lecture to the Czar, through
Count Lauriston:[336] “Doubtless the smugglers will try every means
of forming connections with the Continent; but that connection I will
cut, if necessary, with the sword. Until now I have been indulgent; but
this year I am determined to use rigor toward those who are concerned
in contraband.” A great convoy, he said, was at that moment collecting
in English ports for the Baltic; but the goods thus introduced would
be everywhere seized, “even in Russia, whatever might be said to the
contrary, because the Emperor Alexander has declared his wish to remain
at war with the English as the only means of maintaining the peace of
the Continent.” A few days afterward, April 5, Cadore was ordered to
write again:[337] “It is probable that the least appearance of a peace
with England will be the signal of war unless unforeseen circumstances
lead the Emperor to prefer to gain time.” Alexander wished the moral
advantage of appearing to be attacked, and he allowed Napoleon to
gain time in these pretended remonstrances. Roumanzoff replied to
them as seriously as though they were seriously meant. Once he quoted
the American minister as authority for the genuine character of the
admitted vessels. Napoleon treated the appeal with contempt:[338]
“Let him know that there are no American ships; that all pretended
American ships are English, or freighted on English account; that the
English stop American vessels and do not let them navigate; that if the
American minister sustains the contrary, he does not know what he is
talking about.”
The American minister no longer needed to sustain the contrary; he had
passed that stage, and had to struggle only with the completeness of
his success. Although a large British squadron kept the Baltic open
to commerce, few British merchantmen visited those waters in 1811.
Their timidity was due to the violence with which Napoleon had seized
and destroyed British property in 1810 wherever he found it, without
respecting his own licenses. In consequence of British abstention,
American vessels swarmed in Russian ports. In July, 1811, Adams wrote
that two hundred American ships had already arrived,[339] and that
Russia was glutted with colonial goods until the cargoes were unsalable
at any price, while the great demand for return cargoes of Russian
produce had raised the cost of such articles to extravagance. America
enjoyed a monopoly of the Baltic trade; and Adams’s chief difficulty,
like that of Napoleon, was only to resist the universal venality which
made of the American flag a cover for British smuggling. Adams seemed
unable to ask a favor which the Czar did not seem eager to grant; for
in truth the result of admitting American ships pleased the friendly
Czar and his people, who obtained their sugar and coffee at half cost,
and sold their hemp and naval stores at double prices.
The Russians knew well the price they were to pay in the end, but in
the mean time Napoleon became more and more pacific. If war was to
come in 1811, every one supposed it would be announced in the French
Emperor’s usual address to his legislative body, which opened its
session June 16. The Address was brought in hot haste by special
courier to St. Petersburg; but to the surprise of every one it
contained no allusion to Russia. As usual, Napoleon pointed in the
direction he meant not to take, and instead of denouncing Russia, he
prophesied disaster to the victorious English in Spain:--
“When England shall be exhausted; when she shall have felt at
last the evils that she has for twenty years poured with so much
cruelty over the Continent; when half of her families shall be
covered by the funeral veil,--then a thunder-stroke will end the
peninsula troubles and the destinies of her armies, and will
avenge Europe and Asia by closing this second Punic war.”
This Olympian prophecy meant only that Napoleon, for military reasons,
preferred not to invade Russia until 1812. As the question of neutral
trade was but one of the pretexts on which he forced Russia into war,
and as it had served its purpose, he laid it aside. He closed the
chapter August 25 by directing his ambassador, Lauriston, to cease
further remonstrance.[340] One hundred and fifty ships, he said, under
false American colors had arrived in Russia; the projects of Russia
were unmasked; she wanted to renew her commerce with England; she no
longer preserved appearances, but favored in every way the English
trade; further remonstrance would be ridiculous and diplomatic notes
useless.
War for the spring of 1812 was certain. So much harm, at least, the
Americans helped to inflict on Napoleon in return for the millions he
cost them; but even this was not their whole revenge.
The example of Russia found imitation in Sweden, where Napoleon
was most vulnerable. Owing to a series of chances, Bernadotte, who
happened to command the French army corps at Hamburg, was made Prince
of Sweden in October, 1810, and immediately assumed the government of
the kingdom. Bernadotte as an old republican, like Lucien Bonaparte,
never forgave Napoleon for betraying his party, and would long since
have been exiled like Moreau had he not been the brother-in-law of
Joseph and a reasonably submissive member of the Imperial family.
Napoleon treated him as he treated Louis, Lucien, Joseph, Jerome,
Eugene, and Joachim Murat,--loading them with dignities, but exacting
blind obedience; and instantly on the new king’s accession, the French
minister informed him that he must within five days declare war on
England. Bernadotte obeyed. Napoleon next required the confiscation of
English merchandise and the total stoppage of relations between Sweden
and England.[341] As in the case of Holland and the Baltic Powers, this
demand included all American ships and cargoes, which amounted to one
half of the property to be seized. Bernadotte either could not or would
not drag his new subjects into such misery as Denmark and Holland were
suffering; and within five months after his accession, he already found
himself threatened with war. “Tell the Swedish minister,” said Napoleon
to Cadore,[342] “that if any ship loaded with colonial produce--be
it American or Danish or Swedish or Spanish or Russian--is admitted
into the ports of Swedish Pomerania, my troops and my customs officers
shall immediately enter the province.” Swedish Pomerania was the old
province still held by Sweden on the south shore of the Baltic, next to
Mecklenburg; and Stralsund, its capital, was a nest of smugglers who
defied the Emperor’s decrees.
In March, 1811, Davout, who commanded at Hamburg, received orders[343]
to prepare for seizing Stralsund at the least contravention of the
commercial laws. Bernadotte’s steps were evidently taken to accord
with those of the Czar Alexander; and at last Napoleon found himself
in face of a Swedish as well as a Russian, Spanish, and English war.
In the case of Russia, American commerce was but one though a chief
cause of rupture; but in the case of Sweden it seemed to be the only
cause. In August, Napoleon notified the Czar of his intentions against
Stralsund; in November, he gave the last warning to Sweden,--and
in both cases he founded his complaints on the toleration shown to
American commerce by Bernadotte. Nov. 3, 1811, he wrote to Bassano: “If
the Swedish government does not renounce the system of escorting by its
armed ships the vessels which English commerce covers with the American
flag, you will order the _chargé d’affaires_ to quit Stockholm
with all the legation.” He returned again and again to the grievance:
“If Sweden does not desist from this right of escorting American ships
which are violating the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, and maintains the
pretension to attack my privateers with her ships-of-war, the _chargé
d’affaires_ will quit Stockholm. I want to preserve peace with
Sweden,--this wish is palpable,--but I prefer war to such a state of
peace.”[344]
Once more the accent of truth sounded in these words of Napoleon.
He could not want war with Sweden, but he made it because he could
not otherwise enforce his Berlin and Milan Decrees against American
commerce. Although a part of that commerce was fraudulent, Napoleon,
in charging fraud, wished to condemn not so much the fraudulent as
the genuine. In order to enforce his Berlin and Milan Decrees against
American commerce, he was, as Cadore had threatened, about to overturn
the world.
This was the situation when Joel Barlow, the new American minister to
France, arrived at Paris Sept. 19, 1811, bringing instructions dated
July 26, the essence of which was contained in a few lines.[345]
“It is understood,” said the President, “that the blockade
of the British Isles is revoked. The revocation having been
officially declared, and no vessel trading to them having been
condemned or taken on the high seas that we know of, it is fair
to conclude that the measure is relinquished. It appears, too,
that no American vessel has been condemned in France for having
been visited at sea by an English ship, or for having been
searched or carried into England, or subjected to impositions
there. On the sea, therefore, France is understood to have
changed her system.”
Of all the caprices of politics, this was the most improbable,--that
at the moment when the Czar of Russia and the King of Sweden were
about to risk their thrones and to face the certain death and ruin of
vast numbers of their people in order to protect American ships from
the Berlin and Milan Decrees, the new minister of the United States
appeared in Paris authorized to declare that the President considered
those decrees to be revoked and their system no longer in force!
END OF VOL. V.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Diary of J. Q. Adams, March 4, 1809; i. 544.
[2] Diary of J. Q. Adams, i. 544.
[3] W. C. Nicholas to ----. Nicholas MSS.
[4] Robert Smith’s Address to the People, June 7, 1811.
[5] First Administration of Jefferson, vol. i. p. 188.
[6] Gallatin to Jefferson, Nov. 8, 1809; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 408.
[7] Madison to Henry Lee, February, 1827; Works, iii. 562, 564.
[8] National Intelligencer, July, 1811.
[9] Gallatin to Samuel Smith, June 26, 1809; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 402.
[10] Henry to Craig, March 13, 1809; State Papers, iii. 550.
[11] State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, pp. 897, 898.
[12] Gallatin’s Report, April 17, 1810; State Papers, Finance, ii. 427.
[13] Gallatin’s Report, April 17, 1810; State Papers, Finance, ii. 435.
[14] Gallatin’s Report, April 17, 1810; State Papers, Finance, ii. 436.
[15] Gallatin’s Report, April 17, 1810; State Papers, Finance, ii. 428.
[16] Gallatin’s Report, April 17, 1810; State Papers, Finance, ii. 439.
[17] History of First Administration of Jefferson, i. 224.
[18] Correspondance de Napoléon, xxxii. 265, 272, 359–370.
[19] Correspondance de Napoléon, xxxii. 366.
[20] Napoleon to Jerome, 16 Janvier, 1809; Correspondance, xviii. 237.
[21] Correspondance, xviii. 225.
[22] Correspondance, xviii. 227.
[23] Armstrong to Madison, Oct. 25, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[24] Armstrong to Madison, Nov. 24, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[25] Gallatin’s Writings, ii. 490.
[26] Armstrong to Madison, Jan. 2, 1809; MSS. State Department Archives.
[27] Champagny to Turreau, Dec. 10, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[28] Turreau to Champagny, 19 March, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[29] Erskine to Canning, March 17, 1809; MSS. British Archives.
[30] Turreau to Champagny, 15 April, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[31] Turreau to Champagny, 20 April, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[32] Turreau to Champagny, 22 April, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
[33] Turreau to Champagny, 1 June, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
Cf. Madison to Jefferson, May 1, 1809; Writings, ii. 440.
[34] Act of Geo. III. 1808; Cap. xxvi. American State Papers, iii. 274.
[35] Pinkney to Madison, Dec. 25, 1808; Wheaton’s Pinkney.
[36] Pinkney to Canning, Dec. 28, 1808; State Papers, iii. 240.
[37] Canning to Perceval, Dec. 31, 1808; Perceval MSS.
[38] Tooke’s History of Prices, i. 274–279.
[39] Brougham to Grey, Nov. 25, 1809, Brougham’s Memoirs, i. 417;
Temple’s Courts and Cabinets, iv. 276, 283; Canning to the Duke of
Portland, March 24, 1809; Walpole’s Spencer Perceval, i. 347, 350.
[40] Canning to Erskine, Jan. 23, 1809; Cobbett’s Debates, xvii, cxix.
[41] Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 23, 1809; Wheaton’s Pinkney, p. 420.
[42] Cobbett’s Debates, xii. 25.
[43] Cobbett’s Debates, p. 69.
[44] Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 23, 1809; Wheaton’s Pinkney, p. 423.
[45] Brief Account, etc., Jan. 23, 1809; State Papers, iii. 299.
[46] Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 23, 1809; Wheaton’s Pinkney, p. 424.
[47] Pinkney to R. Smith, June 6, 1809; State Papers, iii. 303.
[48] Canning to Erskine, Jan. 23, 1809; American State Papers, iii. 300.
[49] Second Administration of Jefferson, vol. iv. pp. 388–389.
[50] Pinkney to R. Smith, June 23, 1809; State Papers, iii. 303.
[51] W. H. Fremantle to the Marquis of Buckingham, Feb. 16, 1809;
Courts and Cabinets of George III., iv. 318.
[52] Cobbett’s Debates, xii. 771–803.
[53] Cobbett’s Debates, xiii. App. no. 2, xxxi.
[54] Order in Council of April 26, 1809; State Papers, iii. 241.
[55] Pinkney to Madison, May 3, 1809; Wheaton’s Pinkney, p. 428.
[56] Pinkney to R. Smith, May 1, 1809. MSS. State Dep. Archives.
[57] Erskine to Canning, April 18, 1809; Cobbett’s Debates, xvii.
Appendix, cxlvii.
[58] Erskine to R. Smith, April 17, 1809; State Papers, iii. 295.
[59] Robert Smith’s Address to the People, 1811.
[60] Erskine to Canning, Aug. 3, 1809; Cobbett’s Debates, xvii. clvi.
[61] Erskine to Canning, April 30, 1809; Aug. 7, 1809. Erskine to
Robert Smith, Aug. 14, 1809. Cobbett’s Debates, xvii. cli. clxx. State
Papers, iii. 305.
[62] Turreau to Champagny, 1 June, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[63] Madison to Jefferson, April 24, 1809; Madison’s Writings, ii. 439.
[64] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 210.
[65] Madison to Jefferson, June 12, 1809; Madison’s Writings, ii. 443.
[66] Message of June 15, 1809; State Papers, iii. 297.
[67] Madison to Jefferson, June 20, 1809; Madison’s Writings, ii. 443.
[68] Turreau to Smith, June 14, 1809. John Graham to the editors of the
Federal Republican, Aug. 31, 1813. Niles, v. 37–40.
[69] Turreau to Champagny, 14 June, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[70] Ryland to Henry, May 1, 1809; State Papers, iii. 552.
[71] Canning to Erskine, May 22, 1809; Cobbett’s Debates, xvii. App.
cxxvii.
[72] Canning to Erskine, May 23, 1809; MSS. British Archives.
[73] Pinkney to Robert Smith, June 23, 1809; State Papers, iii. 303.
[74] The Courier, May 26, 1809.
[75] Erskine to Canning, Aug. 7, 1809; Cobbett’s Debates, xvii App.
clx.-clxiii.
[76] Pinkney to R. Smith, May 28, 1809; MSS. State Department Archives.
[77] Pinkney to Madison, Dec. 10, 1809; Wheaton’s Pinkney, p. 434.
[78] Pinkney to R. Smith, June 23, 1809; MSS. State Department Archives.
[79] Bath Archives; Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson, ii. 447.
[80] Bath Archives; Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson, Second
Series, i. 109.
[81] Bath Archives; Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson, Second
Series, i. 24, 46.
[82] Canning to F. J. Jackson, Nos. 1–5, July 1, 1809; MSS. British
Archives, America, vol. xcv.
[83] Gallatin to Montgomery, July 27, 1809; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 395.
[84] Gallatin to Montgomery, July 27, 1809; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 395.
[85] Madison to Galatin, July 28, 1809; Gallatin’s Works, i. 454.
[86] Madison to Jefferson, Aug. 3, 1809; Madison’s Works, ii. 449.
[87] Bath Archives; Second Series, i. 9.
[88] Gallatin to Madison, Sept. 11, 1809; Works i. 461.
[89] Gallatin’s Works, i. 462.
[90] F. J. Jackson to Mrs. Jackson, Oct. 7, 1809; Bath Archives, Second
Series, i. 17.
[91] Jackson to Canning, Oct. 17, 1809; MSS. British Archives.
[92] Madison’s Works, ii. 499.
[93] Secretary of State to Mr. Jackson, Oct. 9, 1809; State Papers,
iii. 308.
[94] Jackson to Canning, Oct. 18, 1809; MSS. British Archives.
[95] Jackson to Canning, Oct. 18, 1809; MSS. British Archives.
[96] Jackson to Canning, Oct. 18, 1809; MSS. British Archives.
[97] Jackson to the Secretary of State, Oct. 23, 1809; State Papers,
iii. 315.
[98] Bath Archives, Second Series. i. 28.
[99] Armstrong to R. Smith, Feb. 16, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[100] Armstrong to Champagny, April 29, 1809; State Papers, iii. 324.
[101] Champagny to Decrès, 17 May, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[102] Armstrong to R. Smith, April 27, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[103] Correspondance, xix. 21.
[104] Champagny to Napoleon, May 26, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[105] Napoleon to Champagny, June 10, 1809; Correspondance, xix. 95.
[106] Champagny to Hauterive, June 13, 1809; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[107] Armstrong to R. Smith, July 22, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[108] Armstrong to R. Smith, July 24, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[109] Rapport a l’Empereur par le Ministre de la Marine, 7 Juin, 1809.
Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[110] Décret Impérial; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. vol. lxii. (États
Unis), pièce 166.
[111] Armstrong to R. Smith, July 24, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[112] Correspondance, xix. 261.
[113] Correspondance, xix. 261.
[114] Napoleon to Champagny, 21 August, 1809; Correspondance, xix. 375.
[115] Correspondance de Napoléon, xix. 374; State Papers, iii. 325.
[116] Armstrong to R. Smith, Nov. 18, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[117] Mémoires de Mollien, iii. 133–135.
[118] Bath Archives, Second Series, i. 44.
[119] Jackson to Bathurst, Nov. 16, 1809; MSS. British Archives.
[120] Mr. Oakeley to the Secretary of State, Nov. 13, 1809; State
Papers, iii. 319.
[121] National Intelligencer, Nov. 22, 1809.
[122] Bath Archives, i. 56.
[123] Works, ii. 499.
[124] Jefferson to Gallatin, Oct. 11, 1809; Works, v. 477.
[125] Grigsby’s Tazewell, p. 87.
[126] Jefferson to Madison, Nov. 30, 1809; Works, v. 481. Cf. Monroe to
Colonel Taylor, Feb. 25, 1810; Monroe MSS. State Department Archives.
[127] Madison to Jefferson, Dec. 11, 1809; Works, ii. 460.
[128] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 1263.
[129] _Infra_, chap. x.
[130] Secretary Hamilton to Joseph Anderson, June 6, 1809; State
Papers, Naval Affairs, p. 194.
[131] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, ii. 344.
[132] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, ii. 346.
[133] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, ii. 351.
[134] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, ii. 358.
[135] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 269.
[136] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 269.
[137] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, ii. Appendix cvii.
[138] Deposition of John Darrington, Captain Third Infantry; State
Papers, Military Affairs, i. 282.
[139] Randolph to Nicholson, Dec. 4, 1809; Nicholson MSS.
[140] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 509.
[141] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 544.
[142] Resolution approved Jan. 12, 1810; Annals of Congress, 1809–1810,
p. 2590.
[143] Madison’s Works, ii. 498.
[144] Walter Jones to Jefferson, Feb. 19, 1810; Jefferson MSS.
[145] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 602.
[146] Nicholson MSS.
[147] Macon to Nicholson, April 21, 1810; Nicholson MSS.
[148] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 1828.
[149] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, pp. 1855–1857.
[150] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, pp. 1862.
[151] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 1864.
[152] Annals of Congress, 1809–1810, p. 1933.
[153] Nicholson MSS.
[154] Madison to Pinkney, May 23, 1810; Works, ii. 474.
[155] Madison to Jefferson, April 23, 1810; Works, ii. 472.
[156] Bath Archives, Second Series, i. 78.
[157] Bath Archives, Second Series, i. 82.
[158] Bath Archives, Second Series, i. 118.
[159] Upham’s Life of Pickering, iv. 172.
[160] Bath Archives, Second Series, i. 109.
[161] Napoleon to the Prince of Neuchatel, Dec. 19, 1809;
Correspondence, xx. 78.
[162] Napoleon to Maret, Dec. 19, 1809; Correspondance, xx. 77.
[163] Note pour le Comte de Montalivet, 16 Nov. 1809; Correspondance,
xx. 35.
[164] Napoleon to Fouché, Sept. 29, 1809; Correspondance, xix. 535.
[165] Mémoires, iii. 134.
[166] Mémoires de Marmont, iii. 336.
[167] Note pour le Ministre de l’Intérieur, 21 Dec. 1809;
Correspondance, xx. 81.
[168] Armstrong to R. Smith, Jan. 6, 1810; MSS State Department
Archives.
[169] Armstrong to R. Smith, Jan. 10, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives. Cf. Thiers’ Empire, xii. 45
[170] Thiers, xii. 48, 49.
[171] Thiers, xii. 50.
[172] Napolean to Champagny, Jan. 10, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 109.
[173] Armstrong to R. Smith, Jan. 28, 1810; Document G. MSS. State
Department Archives.
[174] Napoleon to Champagny, Jan. 19, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 132.
[175] Note Pour le Général Armstrong, 25 Jan., 1810. Correspondance,
xx. 141.
[176] Projet de Note, Jan. 25, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 141.
[177] Armstrong to R. Smith, Feb. 25, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[178] Armstrong to Cadore, March 10, 1810; State Papers, iii. 381.
[179] Napoleon to Cadore, March 20, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 273.
[180] State Papers, iii. 324. See _supra_, p. 135.
[181] Mémoires, ii. 77.
[182] State Papers, iii. 384.
[183] Empire, xii. 45.
[184] Armstrong to R. Smith, Jan. 10, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[185] Thiers, xii. 126.
[186] Armstrong to R. Smith, July 18, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives. Cf. Correspondance de Napoleon, xx. 450, 451, _note_.
[187] Thiers, xii. 117.
[188] Napoleon to Champagny, Feb. 22, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 235.
[189] Thiers, xii. 117.
[190] Napoleon to Decrès, 8 July 1810. Correspondance, xx. 450.
[191] Note, July 5, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 444.
[192] Rapport à l’Empereur, 25 Août, 1810; Archives des Aff. Étrs. MSS.
[193] Gallatin to the Speaker, Feb. 7, 1810; State Papers, Commerce and
Navigation, i. 812.
[194] Notes pour le Ministre de l’Intérieur, 25 Juin, 1810;
Correspondance, xx. 431.
[195] State Papers, iii. 400.
[196] Napoleon to Prince Lebrun, Aug. 20, 1810; Correspondance, xxi. 53.
[197] Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, Sept. 19, 1810; Correspondance, xxi.
134.
[198] Napoleon to Montalivet, Aug. 10, 1810; Correspondance, xxi. 29.
[199] Napoleon to Montalivet, Aug. 11, 1810; Correspondance, xxi. 35.
[200] Robert Smith to Armstrong, Dec. 1, 1810; State Papers, iii. 326.
[201] Armstrong to Robert Smith, July 10, 1810; MSS State Department
Archives.
[202] Napoleon to Champagny, 19 July, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 505.
[203] Napoleon to Champagny, 13 July, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 554.
[204] Correspondance, xxi. 1.
[205] Cadore to General Armstrong, Aug. 5, 1810; State Papers, iii. 386.
[206] Notes, etc., June 25, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 431.
[207] Napoleon to Caulaincourt, July 1, 1810; Correspondance, xx. 158.
[208] Gallatin’s Writings, ii. 211.
[209] Gallatin’s Writings, ii. 198.
[210] Armstrong to Cadore, Sept. 7, 1810; State Papers, iii. 388.
[211] Cadore to Armstrong, Sept. 12, 1810; State Papers, iii. 388.
[212] Gallatin to J. Q. Adams, Sept. 15, 1821; Gallatin’s Writings, ii.
196.
[213] State Papers, iii. 387.
[214] Rapport à l’Empereur, Août, 1810; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
vol. lxiv. pièce 81.
[215] Armstrong to Pinkney, Sept. 29, 1810; State Papers, iii. 386.
[216] Memoirs of R. Plumer Ward, i. 424.
[217] Buckingham Memoirs, iv. 390.
[218] Wellington to Wellesley, Oct. 5, 1809; Supplementary Despatches,
vi. 386.
[219] Buckingham Memoirs, iv. 392.
[220] Pinkney to Wellesley, Jan. 2, 1810; State Papers, iii. 352.
[221] State Papers, iii. 355.
[222] Cobbett’s Debates, Nov. 30, 1812; xxiv. 33, 34.
[223] Buckingham Memoirs, iv. 438.
[224] Cobbett’s Debates, xvii. 742.
[225] Armstrong to Pinkney, Jan. 25, 1810; State Papers, iii. 350.
[226] Pinkney to Wellesley, Feb. 15, 1810; State Papers, iii. 350.
[227] Wellesley to Pinkney, March 2, 1810; State Papers, iii. 350.
[228] Pinkney to Wellesley, March 7, 1810; State Papers, iii. 350.
[229] Wellesley to Pinkney, March 26, 1810; State Papers, iii. 356.
[230] Pinkney to Armstrong, April 6, 1810; State Papers, iii. 355.
[231] Pinkney to Wellesley, April 30, 1810; State Papers, iii. 357.
[232] Memorandum; Supplementary Despatches, vii. 264.
[233] Cf. Lewis’s Administrations, 323, _note_.
[234] Buckingham Memoirs, iv. 435.
[235] Statement, etc.; Cobbett’s Debates, xxiii. 367, _note_.
[236] Pellew’s Sidmouth, ii. 507.
[237] Walpole’s Perceval, ii. 114.
[238] Wellington’s Supplementary Despatches, vi. 583.
[239] Tooke’s History of Prices.
[240] Pinkney to Robert Smith, Aug. 14, 1810; State Papers, iii. 363.
[241] Memorandum; Supplementary Despatches of Lord Wellington, vii. 266.
[242] State Papers, iii. 366.
[243] Wellesley to Pinkney, Aug. 31, 1810; State Papers, iii. 366.
[244] Pinkney to Wellesley, Sept. 21, 1810; State Papers, iii. 368.
[245] Buckingham Memoirs, iv. 482.
[246] Statement, etc., Dec. 16, 1811; State Papers, Commerce and
Navigation, i. 876.
[247] Gallatin to the Speaker, Feb. 6, 1811; State Papers, Commerce and
Navigation, i. 866.
[248] Statement, etc., Dec. 16, 1811; State Papers, Commerce and
Navigation, i. 929.
[249] Statement, etc., Feb. 28, 1812; State Papers, Commerce and
Navigation, ii. 542–552.
[250] Report on the Finances, Nov. 25, 1811; State Papers, Finance, ii.
495.
[251] Madison’s Works, ii. 477.
[252] State Papers, iii. 384.
[253] Madison’s Works, ii. 480.
[254] State Papers, iii. 385.
[255] Cf. Speech of Mr. Eppes, Feb. 2, 1811; Annals of Congress,
1810–1811, 866.
[256] Robert Smith to Armstrong, Nov. 2, 1810; State Papers, iii. 389.
[257] Works, ii. 484.
[258] Turreau to Champagny, 1 November, 1810 (No. 1); Archives des Aff.
Étr. MSS.
[259] Turreau to Champagny, 2 November, 1810 (No. 6); Archives des Aff.
Étr. MSS.
[260] State Papers, iii. 396.
[261] State Papers, iii. 395.
[262] Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 19, 1810; Works, ii, 484.
[263] Proclamation, etc., Oct. 27, 1810; State Papers, iii. 397.
[264] Secretary of State to Governor Claiborne, Oct. 27, 1810; State
Papers, iii. 396.
[265] Secretary of State to Governor Holmes, Nov. 15, 1810; State
Papers, iii. 398.
[266] Turreau to Champagny, 1 Nov. 1810 (No. 2); Archives des Aff. Étr.
MSS.
[267] Morier to Robert Smith, Dec. 15, 1810; State Papers, iii. 399.
[268] Speech of Mr. Tallmadge of Connecticut, Jan. 23, 1811; Annals of
Congress, 1810–1811, p. 784.
[269] Speech of Jonathon Fisk of New York, Jan. 17, 1811; Annals of
Congress, 1810–1811, p. 612.
[270] Adam’s Gallatin, p. 598.
[271] Adam’s Gallatin, p. 430.
[272] Address to Constituents; Annals of Congress, 1815–1816, p. 1193.
[273] State Papers, iii. 390.
[274] Robert Smith’s Address to the People, June 7, 1811.
[275] Serurier to Maret, Feb. 17 1811; archives des. Aff. Étr. MSS.
[276] State Papers, iii. 393.
[277] Madison to Jefferson, March 18, 1811; Works, ii. 490.
[278] Address to the People of the United States, by Robert Smith, 1811.
[279] Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 27, 1810; Works, v. 548.
[280] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 430.
[281] Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 20, 1811; Nicholson MSS.
[282] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 431.
[283] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 432.
[284] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 434.
[285] Adams’s Randolph, p. 243.
[286] Monroe to Randolph, Feb. 13, 1811; Monroe MSS.
[287] Monroe to Tazewell, Feb. 6, 1811; Monroe MSS.
[288] Colonel Taylor to Monroe, March 24, 1811; Monroe MSS. State
Department Archives.
[289] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 435; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 497.
[290] Madison to Monroe, March 26, 1811; Monroe MSS State Department
Archives.
[291] Serurier to Champagny, March 26, 1811; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[292] Madison’s Works, ii. 494.
[293] Madison’s Works, ii. 513.
[294] Russell to Robert Smith, Dec. 4, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[295] Russell to Pinkney, Dec. 1, 1810; State Papers, iii. 390.
[296] Russell to Cadore, Dec. 10, 1810; State Papers, iii. 391.
[297] Napoleon to Champagny, Dec. 13, 1810; Correspondance xxi. 316.
[298] Smith to Armstrong, Nov. 2, 1810; State Papers, iii. 389.
[299] Russell to Cadore, Dec. 17, 1810; MSS. State Department Archives.
[300] Russell to Robert Smith, Dec. 29, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[301] Russell to Pinkney, Dec. 30, 1810; State Papers, iii. 417.
[302] Russell to Robert Smith, Jan. 28, 1811; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[303] Russell to Robert Smith, Feb. 13, 1811; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[304] State Papers, iii. 501.
[305] Ibid.
[306] Champagny to Serurier, Feb. 9, 1811; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[307] Russell to Robert Smith, March 15, 1811; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[308] Correspondance, xxi. 284.
[309] Russell to Robert Smith, April 4, 1811; MSS. State Department
Archives. Cf. Thiers’s Empire, xiii. 27–33.
[310] Robert Smith to Russell, March 5, 1811; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[311] Maret, Duc de Bassano; Par Ernouf., 285–299.
[312] Note dictée en Conseil, 29 avril, 1811; Correspondance xxii 122.
[313] Duke of Bassano to Mr. Russell, May 4, 1811; State Papers, iii.
505.
[314] Russell to J. S. Smith, May 10, 1811; State Papers, iii. 502.
[315] Russell to Bassano, May 11, 1811; State Papers, iii. 506.
[316] Russell to Monroe, July 13, 1811; MSS. State Department Archives.
[317] Napoleon to Maret, Aug. 23, 1811; Correspondance, xxii. 432.
[318] Napoleon to Maret, Aug. 28, 1811; Correspondance, xxii. 448.
[319] J. Q. Adams to R. Smith, Oct. 4, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[320] J. Q. Adams to R. Smith, Oct. 26, 1809; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[321] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Dec. 26, 1809, ii. 83, 87. Adams to R.
Smith, Jan. 7, 1810; MSS. State Department Archives.
[322] Diary, ii. 88.
[323] Adams to R. Smith, April 19, 1810; MSS. State Department Archives.
[324] Thiers’s Empire, xiii. 56.
[325] Diary, ii. 143–160. Adams to R. Smith, Sept. 5, 1810; MSS. State
Department Archives.
[326] Diary, Oct. 9, 1810, ii. 180–181. Adams to R. Smith, Oct. 12,
1810; MSS. State Department Archives.
[327] Correspondance, xxi. 233, 234.
[328] Napoleon to Champagny, Nov. 4, 1810; Correspondance, xxi. 252.
[329] Cadore to Kourakine, 2 Dec., 1810; Correspondance, xxi. 297.
[330] Armstrong to Smith, Sept. 10, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[331] Adams to Robert Smith, Dec. 17, 1810; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[332] Adams to Robert Smith, Jan. 27, 1811; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[333] Napoleon to Alexander, Feb. 28, 1811; Correspondance, xxi. 424.
[334] Diary, Feb. 15, 1811, ii. 226.
[335] Adams to Robert Smith, Feb. 12, 1811; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[336] Napoleon to Champagny, April 1, 1811; Correspondance, xxii. 3.
[337] Napoleon to Champagny, April 5, 1811; Correspondance, xxii. 28.
[338] Napoleon to Maret, July 15, 1811; Correspondance, xxii. 327.
[339] Adams to Monroe, July 22, 1811; MSS. State Department Archives.
[340] Napoleon to Maret, Aug. 25, 1811; Correspondence, xxii. 441.
[341] Napoleon to Alquier, Dec. 22, 1810; Correspondance, xxi. 328.
[342] Napoleon to Champagny, March 25, 1811; Correspondance, xxi. 510.
[343] Correspondance, xxi. 506.
[344] Napoleon to Maret, Nov. 3, 1811; Correspondance, xxii. 552.
[345] Monroe to Barlow, July 26, 1811; State Papers, iii. 510.
Transcriber’s Notes:
1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been
corrected silently.
2. Where hyphenation is in doubt, it has been retained as in the
original.
3. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have
been retained as in the original.
4. Italics are shown as _xxx_.