RANDOLPH, who had been ill at home during the winter of 1809–1810,
appeared in public affairs only after the debates were mostly
ended. March 22 he moved a Resolution that the military and naval
establishments ought to be reduced. He wished to bring Madison’s
administration back to the point where Jefferson’s administration eight
years before had begun; and in truth the country could choose only
between the practices of 1801 and those of 1798. Randolph, who shunned
no assumption of fact which suited his object, asked the House whether
any one “seriously thought of war, or believed it a relation in which
we could be placed”:--
“With respect to war we have--thank God!--in the Atlantic a
fosse wide and deep enough to keep off any immediate danger
to our territory. The belligerents of Europe know as well
as we feel that war is out of the question. No, sir! if
our preparation was for battle, the State physicians have
mistaken the state of the patient. We have been embargoed and
non-intercoursed almost into a consumption, and this is not the
time for battle.”
Randolph easily proved the need of retrenchment. His statements
were not to be denied. President Washington, with a gross income of
fifty-eight million dollars in eight years, spent eleven millions
and a quarter on the army and navy. John Adams in four years spent
eighteen millions, and was supposed to have been driven from office
for extravagance. President Jefferson in his first four years cut down
these expenses to eight million, six hundred thousand dollars; in his
second term he raised them again to sixteen millions, or nearly to
the point reached by John Adams at a time of actual hostilities with
France,--although President Jefferson relied not on armaments, but
on peaceable coercion, which cost very large sums besides. At last
the country had reached a point where, after refusing either to fight
its enemies or resent its injuries, it had begun to run in debt for
armaments it would not use. This waste needed to be stopped.
Three fourths of the Republican party and all the Federalists were of
the same mind with Randolph,--that an army led by Wilkinson and a navy
of gunboats, when the country refused to fight under any provocation,
were not worth maintaining; and when Eppes of Virginia, April 14,
brought forward the budget for the coming year, he started by assuming
that the military and naval expenditure might be reduced three million
dollars, which would still leave a deficiency of two millions and
a half, and would require an increase of customs-duties. If three
millions and a half could be saved, members wanted to know why the
whole military and naval expenditure, which had required only six
millions in 1809, might not be cut off.
Macon, who supported Randolph with the ardor of 1798, urged nothing
less than this sweeping reform.
“If the army were disbanded and the navy sold,” he argued,[148]
“we should not perhaps want half a million,--not a million and
a half, on the outside. That might be obtained by loans payable
at short date.... You must get clear of the navy-yards; if you
do not put them down, unquestionably they will put you down. How
is it with the army? Has it been employed to more advantage? Its
situation is too melancholy to be spoken of; and if anything
could disgust the people of the territory we acquired some years
since, it must be the management of that army, for however much
they hear of our good government, after such a specimen they
must have a despicable opinion of it indeed.... I will not
raise a tax of a cent to support the present plan. I have no
hesitation in saying that I shall feel bound to vote down the
additional force of six thousand men whenever the subject shall
come before us. I voted for it; but found that then, as now, we
talk a great deal about war, and do nothing.”
Not a member supported Eppes’s motion for increased taxes. Democrats
and Federalists, one after another, rose to oppose an increase, and to
favor disbanding the additional army.
“I shall certainly vote to reduce the army of the United
States,” said Burwell of Virginia;[149] “and if the House should
decide that it will not employ the navy of the United States
in the protection of commerce, I shall certainly vote also
to reduce the naval establishment. I am perfectly convinced
that the circumstances under which I voted for the increase
of the army and navy have passed away; and as our revenue has
diminished, I shall vote for a reduction of our expenses.... So
far from considering the country in a deplorable situation, as
my colleague (Mr. Randolph) has represented it, I think that
in many points of view we have every reason to congratulate
ourselves. It is a singular phenomenon to see any nation
enjoying peace at this time. This exemption from the general lot
claims the gratitude of every man in the country. So far as I
am concerned in the affairs of the nation, I have but a single
object in view,--namely, to preserve peace; and my votes are
predicated on that ground.”
The war men voted with the peace men for reasons given by Troup of
Georgia:[150]--
“I am as well convinced of the fact as that I am now addressing
you, that the people will not consent to pay an additional
tax for the support of armies and navies raised to oppose the
injurious acts of the belligerents against our rights, after we
have abandoned those rights and dishonorably withdrawn from the
contest.”
After much contradictory talk of this kind, Nelson of Maryland told the
House that they were behaving like schoolboys.
“It is a perfect child’s game,” said he.[151] “At one session we
pass a law for raising an army, and go to expense; in another
year, instead of raising money to pay the expense by the means
in our power, we are to disband the army we have been at so
much pains to raise. We shall well deserve the name of children
instead of men if we pursue a policy of this kind.”
The warning had no perceptible weight with the House, where the peace
party were in a majority and the war party were in a passion, not with
the foreign enemy, but with their neighbors and friends. Richard M.
Johnson almost avowed that he should vote for reducing army and navy in
order to punish the men who had made them useless:--
“To our humiliation and everlasting degradation we have refused
to use the means in our power to induce foreign nations to do
us justice.... The annals of human nature have not given to
the world the sad example of a nation so powerful, so free,
so intelligent, so jealous of their rights and at the same
time so grossly insulted, so materially injured, under such
extraordinary forbearance.... We are afraid to trust ourselves,
and we pretend that we are afraid to trust the people. My
hopes have rested and always will rest upon the people; they
constitute my last hope. We may disgrace ourselves, but the
people will rise in the majesty of their strength, and the world
will be interested in the spectacle.”
With the advocates of war in a temper so unmanageable, and the
advocates of peace in a majority so decisive, the House showed
unanimity by passing in committee, without a dissenting voice, a
Resolution that the military and naval establishments ought to be
reduced. April 16 this vote was reached in committee; and the next day,
by a vote of sixty to thirty-one, the Resolution was formally adopted
by the House. Of the minority, two thirds were Northern men and all
were Republicans.
In obedience to the order, Randolph promptly reported a bill for
reducing the navy.[152] All the gunboats, all but three of the
frigates, and all other armed vessels--three only excepted--were to
be sold, their officers and crews discharged; the navy-yards, except
at Boston, New York, and Norfolk, to be disused, and the marine corps
reduced to two companies. A few days later, April 24, Smilie of
Pennsylvania reported a bill for a similar reduction of the military
establishment to three regiments. These measures seemed to carry out
the express will and orders of the House; but no sooner did the House
go into committee than the members astonished themselves by striking
out each section in succession. Gunboats, frigates, navy-yards, and
marines, each managed in turn to obtain a majority against reduction.
Then Randolph rose,--not in wrath, for he spoke with unusual calm, but
with a force which warranted the sway he so often exercised over men
whose minds were habitually in doubt. He had ever believed, he said,
that the people of the United States were destined to become a great
naval power, but if anything could prevent this result it would be the
premature attempts of the last two Administrations to force it. A naval
power necessarily grew out of tonnage and seamen, but both tonnage and
seamen had been systematically discouraged:--
“It has always been understood, according to my view of the
subject, that one of the principal uses of a navy was to protect
commerce; but our political rule for some time past has been
that of inverse proportion, and we have discovered that commerce
is the natural protector of a navy.”
The inconsistency of Jefferson’s principles and practice was a target
which could be hit by the most inexperienced marksman, but Randolph
struck it with something more solid than an epigram when he discussed
its expense.
“Against the administration of Mr. Adams,” he said, “I, in
common with many others, did and do yet entertain a sentiment
of hostility, and have repeatedly cried out against it
for extravagance and for profusion and for waste--wanton
waste--of the public resources. I find, however, upon
consideration,--whether from the nature of men, or from the
nature of things, or from whatever other cause,--that that
Administration, grossly extravagant as I did then and still
do believe it to have been, if tried by the criterion of the
succeeding one, was a pattern of retrenchment and economy.”
In order to prove this charge he attacked Robert Smith’s administration
of the navy, asserting that while in 1800 each seaman cost about four
hundred and seventy-two dollars a year, in 1808 each seaman cost nearly
nine hundred dollars a year; and that the same excess existed in regard
to officers, marines, clothing, and provisions:--
“Yes, sir! we have economized until we absolutely have reduced
the annual cost of a seaman from $472--as it was under the very
wasteful expenditure of Mr. Adams’s administration--down to the
moderate sum of $887. We have economized until a paltry fleet
consisting of vessels built to our hand, to say nothing of
those that have been sold, and the warlike stores of which have
been retained and preserved,--which fleet was built, equipped,
and every cannon and implement of war purchased under the old
Administration,--has cost us twelve million dollars, when it
cost the preceding Administration but nine millions.”
Only one member replied on behalf of the Government to these
criticisms. Burwell Bassett of the naval committee ventured somewhat
timidly to defend, not so much Robert Smith as Secretary Hamilton, who,
he said, had reduced expenses at the navy-yard about one third. Most
of the frigates had been so thoroughly repaired as to be more valuable
than when first built. In the navy-yard itself everything was in good
condition and well conducted. Bassett’s testimony hardly met Randolph’s
charges, but the House sustained him on every point; and Boyd of New
Jersey so far forgot the respect due to a former vote, in which the
House had resolved by a majority of two to one that the army and navy
ought to be reduced, as to say that never since the government was
formed had so preposterous a proposition been offered. The end of the
session arrived before the discussion ceased.
The same inability to act, even where no apparent obstacle existed,
was shown in regard to the United States Bank, whose charter, granted
for twenty years by the First Congress in February, 1791, was to
expire March 4, 1811. In the days of Federalist sway the Republicans
had bitterly opposed the Bank and denied the constitutional power
of Congress to grant the charter; but during the eight years of
Jefferson’s rule the Bank had continued without a question to do the
financial work of government, and no other agency existed or could be
readily created capable of taking the place of this machine, which,
unlike any other in the government, worked excellently well.
If its existence was to be continued, public interest required that
the Act should be passed at this session, since the actual charter was
to expire in ten months. If a new charter was to be refused, public
interest required even more urgently that ample warning of so radical
a change should be given, that the Treasury might not be suddenly
crippled or general bankruptcy be risked without notice.
No complaint of any kind was at that time made against the Bank; no
charge was brought against it of interference in politics, of corrupt
influence, or of mismanagement. Gallatin was known to favor it; the
President was not hostile, nor was any influence in the government
opposed; the Federalists who had created were bound to support it; and
except for the principles of some Southern Republicans who regarded
functions of government as germs of despotism, every political faction
in the country seemed consenting to the charter. January 29 the
subject was referred to a special committee. The committee reported a
Resolution, and in due course John Taylor of South Carolina brought in
a bill, the result of negotiations between the Treasury and the Bank,
granting a new charter on condition that the Bank should increase its
capital two-and-a-half million dollars, half of which should be paid
outright to the government; that, further, the Bank should bind itself
to lend the government at three months’ notice any amount not exceeding
in the whole five million dollars at a rate not exceeding six per cent;
that on all government deposits above the sum of three millions, which
should remain for one year, the Bank should pay interest at the rate
of three per cent; and that the government should have the right at
any time to increase the capital stock, and subscribe and own the new
stock to a fixed amount. These terms were especially valuable at the
moment, because they assisted the Treasury to meet an actual deficit,
and provided, as far as human foresight went, for financial dangers
that might rise from further foreign troubles. No serious opposition
showed itself. April 21 the House, by a majority of seventy-five to
thirty-five, voted to accept the price fixed for the charter; but the
session closed without further action.
When Congress adjourned, May 2, 1810, the result attained during
five months passed in continuous labor amounted to little more than
the constitutional necessities of government,--the appropriation
bills; a loan for five million dollars; an Act for taking a census of
persons; an Act appropriating sixty thousand dollars toward making
the Cumberland Road; an appropriation of five thousand dollars for
experiments on Fulton’s torpedoes; in regard to foreign affairs,
Giles’s Resolution blaming the conduct of the British minister,
and Macon’s or Taylor’s Act, which condoned that conduct. The old
Non-intercourse Act of March 1, 1809, expired by limitation with the
expiring Congress May 1, 1810.
“We adjourned last night,” wrote Randolph to Nicholson the next
day,[153] “a little after twelve, having terminated a session of
more than five months by authorizing a loan of as many millions,
and--all is told. The incapacity of Government has long ceased
to be a laughing matter. The Cabinet is all to pieces, and the
two Houses have tumbled about their own ears.”
With all Randolph’s faults, he had more of the qualities, training,
and insight of a statesman than were to be found elsewhere among the
representatives in the Eleventh Congress; and although himself largely
the cause of the chaos he described, he felt its disgraces and dangers.
Society in general troubled itself little about them. The commercial
class, pleased to be freed from restraints, and the agricultural
class, consoled by the fair prices of their produce, thought as little
as possible about their failure in government; what was called good
society for the most part drew a bitter pleasure from it. Yet beneath
the general physical contentment almost equally general moral disgust
existed and made itself felt. President Madison, who was in the
best position to gauge popular opinion, began to suspect the hardly
perceptible movement of a coming tide. After the adjournment he wrote
to William Pinkney at London:[154]--
“Among the inducements to the experiment of an unrestricted
commerce now made were two which contributed essentially to
the majority of votes in its favor,--first, a general hope,
favored by daily accounts from England, that an adjustment
of differences there, and thence in France, would render the
measure safe and proper; second, a willingness in not a few
to teach the advocates for an open trade the folly as well
as degradation of their policy.... It will not be wonderful,
therefore, if the passive spirit which marked the late session
of Congress should at the next meeting be roused to the opposite
point, more especially as the tone of the nation has never been
so low as that of its representatives.”
Madison still held to his favorite doctrine, and meant no more by his
warning than that the Eleventh Congress might be expected to reimpose
measures of commercial restriction:--
“The experiment [of free commerce] about to be made will
probably open too late the eyes of the people to the expediency
and efficacy of the means [the embargo] which they have suffered
to be taken out of the hands of the Government and to be
incapacitated for future use.”[155]
This condolence with Jefferson over the fate of their experiment
showed the direction toward which Madison’s eyes were still turned;
but, though a firm believer in his own theory of peaceable coercion,
he was ready and had always been ready to accept and carry out any
stronger scheme that Congress might prefer. He had no definite plan of
his own; he clung to the idea that England and France could be brought
by patience to respect neutral claims of right; but he felt that the
actual submission made by Congress was apparent rather than real, and
might be followed within a year by renewed resistance.
Meanwhile nothing could be more dangerous to the Americans than the
loss of self-respect. The habit of denouncing themselves as cowards
and of hearing themselves denounced as a race that cared only for
money tended to produce the qualities imputed. Americans of 1810
were persuaded that they could not meet Englishmen or Frenchmen
on equal terms, man against man, or stand in battle against the
veterans of Napoleon or Nelson. The sense of national and personal
inferiority sank astonishingly deep. Reasonable enough as regarded
the immense superiority of Europe in organization, it passed bounds
when it condemned everything American as contemptible, or when the
Federalist gentry refused to admit the Democrats of Pennsylvania or
the Republicans of Virginia or the Government at Washington into the
circle of civilized life. Social self-abasement never went so far as in
its efforts to prove to Francis James Jackson, the British minister,
that he was right in treating the national government with contempt.
Englishman as Jackson was, and ready to assume without question every
claim of superiority that might be made for his country or his class,
he was surprised at the force of American allegiance to himself. As he
travelled northward, after his dismissal from Washington, his private
letters gave a strange idea of the chaos in American society. He wrote
from Philadelphia,--
“The tide has turned completely in our favor. At Washington
they are in a state of the most animated confusion, the Cabinet
divided, and the Democratic party going various ways.... Their
foreign politics embarrass them even more than home ones.
One moment they want another embargo; the next, to take off
the restrictions; then, to arm their merchantmen; and next,
to declare war. In short, they do not know what to be at....
Notwithstanding all that has passed,--which would fill volumes
to relate in full,--and the Government being at open war with
me, ‘the respectability’ has been both here and at Baltimore so
anxious to show that they did not share the sentiments of the
Democrats that we have had throngs of visitors and innumerable
invitations that we could not accept, though we have dined at
home but twice during the month we have been here. To prevent
this, the savages have threatened in one of their papers to tar
and feather every man who should ask me to his house.”[156]
Pleased with his social success at Baltimore and Philadelphia, Jackson
found New York and New England fairly delightful. His vogue in
Baltimore and Philadelphia meant little more than curiosity to see his
wife and her toilettes; but as he approached New England he became a
personage in politics, and received attentions such as he could hardly
have expected even from those European courts whose civility lingered
in his mind. February 25 he wrote from New York:[157]--
“As we get farther north and east, the said Yankees improve very
much. New York is a fine town, unlike any other in America,
and resembling more the best of our country towns, with the
additional advantage of the finest water that can be imagined.
There is as much life and bustle as at Liverpool or any other
of our great commercial towns; and like them New York has
inhabitants who have made and are making rapid and brilliant
fortunes by their enterprise and industry.... We have met with
unbounded civility and good-will, and may be said to live here
in triumph. We are now engaged to dinner every day but two,
till the end of the first week in March.... The governor of
Massachusetts has written to me to invite me to Boston, where,
he says, he and many others will be happy to receive me. That
State, which is one of the most populous and enlightened of the
States of the Union, and, as you know, is the birthplace of
American independence, has done more toward justifying me to the
world than it was possible from the nature of things that I or
any other person could do in the present stage of the business.
The legislature, which is not a mob like many that have passed
resolutions, has agreed to a report of a joint committee,
and passed resolutions in conformity with it, exculpating me
altogether, and in the most direct manner censuring the conduct
of the President and of the general government.”
Boston newspapers of Feb. 9, 1810, contained the report and resolutions
in which the Massachusetts legislature, by a vote of two hundred
and fifty-four to one hundred and forty-five, declared that “they
can perceive no just or adequate cause” for breaking relations with
the British minister, F. J. Jackson; and this challenge to their
own Government, backed by Governor Gore’s invitation of Jackson to
Boston, was intended to carry political weight, even to the extent of
forcing Madison to renew political relations, as he had been forced to
resume commercial relations, with England. Had public opinion taken
the intended course, Jackson’s visit to Boston would have marked a
demonstration of popular feeling against the national government; nor
were the Federalists in any way parties consenting to the defeat of
the scheme. The measures adopted by the Massachusetts legislature in
February came before the people at the State election early in April,
only six weeks after the General Court and Governor Gore had condemned
Madison. More than ninety thousand votes were cast, and the Republican
party, by a majority of about two thousand, not only turned Governor
Gore out of office, but also chose a General Court with a Republican
majority of twenty. At the same time similar changes of public opinion
restored New Hampshire to Republican control, and strengthened the
Republicans in New York and the Middle States. Not a doubt could exist
that the country sustained Madison, and that Jackson was not only an
object of decided unpopularity in America, but was far from being
favored in England. The advantage to be derived from his visit to
Boston was no longer evident, and after Governor Gore ceased to hold
office, the good taste of acting on an invitation thus practically
withdrawn seemed doubtful; but Jackson was not daunted by doubts.
Holding the promise of his Government that his mission should last
at least a year, Jackson beguiled the interval by such amusements as
offered themselves. In May he retired to a country-house on the North
River, about eight miles above New York, where he caught a glimpse of
an American invention which, as he had the good sense to suspect, was
more important than all the diplomatic quarrels in which he had ever
engaged:--
“One of the curiosities that we daily see pass under our windows
is the steamboat,--a passage-vessel with accommodation for near
a hundred persons. It is moved by a steam-engine turning a wheel
on either side of it, which acts like the main wheel of a mill,
and propels the vessel against wind and tide at the rate of four
miles an hour. As soon as it comes in sight there is a general
rush of our household to watch and wonder till it disappears.
They don’t at all know what to make of the unnatural monster
that goes steadily careering on, with the wind directly in its
teeth as often as not. I doubt that I should be obeyed were I to
desire any one of them to take a passage in her.”[158]
After thus entertaining himself on the Hudson, the British minister
made his triumphal trip to Boston early in June, where he found
a gratifying welcome from society if not from the governor and
legislature:--
“At Boston, ‘the headquarters of good principles,’ we were
feasted most famously, and I made there many interesting
acquaintances. After living nine days in clover at about
eighteen of the principal houses,--having never less than
two engagements per day,--they gave me on the 10th a public
dinner, at which near three hundred persons were present, and
where we had toasts and cheering and singing in the best style
of Bishopsgate Street or Merchant Taylor’s Hall. A party of
gentlemen met me at the last stage on entering Boston, and
accompanied me to the first on my departure. At another public
dinner I was invited to on the 4th of June (the Ancient and
Honorable Artillery election dinner), and at which the governor,
who is a Democrat, was present, the clergy, the magistrates, the
heads of the University of Cambridge, and the military came to
the top of the room in their respective bodies to be introduced
to and to compliment me. There is at Washington in consequence
much ‘wailing and gnashing of teeth.’”
At the public dinner given to Jackson June 11, after the guest of the
evening had retired, Senator Pickering gave a toast which became a
party cry: “The world’s last hope,--Britain’s fast-anchored isle!”[159]
From the moment the State officials withdrew from the reception, little
importance attached to the private acts of a society which might easily
look with interest at the rare appearance of a British minister in
Boston; but the political and social feeling was the same as though
Governor Gore were still in power, and created natural disgust among
Republicans, who believed that their Federalist opponents aimed at a
dissolution of the Union and at a retreat within the protection of
Great Britain. If such ideas existed, they showed themselves to Jackson
in no recorded form. His visit to Boston was a social amusement; and he
regarded it, like the conduct of Congress, as a triumph to himself only
because it increased the mortifications of President Madison, which
counterbalanced in some degree his own want of energetic support from
Canning’s successor at the Foreign Office.
The history of Jackson and his mission did not quite end with his
departure from Boston in June, 1810, under escort of a mounted
procession of Boston Federalists. He thence went to Niagara,--a
difficult journey; and descending to Montreal and Quebec, returned to
Albany, where he had the unusual experience of seeing himself burned in
effigy.
During all these wanderings he was a victim to the constant annoyance
of being able to quarrel neither with President Madison nor with his
new official chief, who showed a wish to quarrel as little as possible.
Jackson was as willing to find fault with one Government as with the
other.
“I look forward with full confidence,” he wrote to his
brother,[160] “for a full approbation of what I have done.
Ministers cannot disapprove of though they may be sorry for it;
and if they are sorry, it must be for the trouble it occasions
them, for as I have told them there is no loss of any adjustment
of difficulties, that being impracticable with this country upon
the principles of my instructions. I hope they are adopting the
line that I recommended to them,--that of procrastinating any
decision whatever; but they might as well have told me so for
my own guidance and information, instead of leaving me a prey
to all the lies and misrepresentations which the Democrats have
found it necessary to propagate on the subject for election
purposes. It would be an absolute disgrace to the country, and
would produce an impression never to be got over here,--the ill
effects of which in all future transactions we should not fail
to be made sensible of,--if another minister were to be sent out
without some sort of satisfaction being taken or received for
the treatment I have experienced. They ought to insist on my
being reinstated.”
The British government held a different opinion; and accordingly, at
the expiration of his stipulated twelve months, Sept. 16, 1810, Jackson
set sail for Europe, leaving J. P. Morier in charge of the British
legation at Washington.