ERSKINE’S despatches were received by Canning May 22, and the
“Morning Post” of the next day printed the news with approval: “Upon
this pleasing event we sincerely congratulate the public.” The “Times”
of May 24 accepted the arrangement: “We shall not urge anything against
the concessions.” May 25, with “considerable pain though but little
surprise,” the same newspaper announced that Erskine was disavowed by
the Government.
Canning’s abrupt rejection of Erskine’s arrangement without explanation
must have seemed even to himself a high-handed course, at variance
with some of his late professions, certain to injure or even to
destroy British influence in America, and likely to end in war. To
the settlement as a practical measure no objection could be alleged.
No charge of bad faith could be supported. No shadow of law or reason
could be devised for enforcing against America rights derived from
retaliation upon France, when America enforced stronger measures of
retaliation upon France than those imposed by the Orders in Council.
Neither the Non-importation Act of 1806, nor the “Chesapeake”
proclamation of 1807, nor the embargo, nor the Non-intercourse Act of
March, 1809, could be used to justify the rejection of an arrangement
which evaded or removed every British grievance. Even the subject of
impressments had been suppressed by the American government. Madison
flung himself into Canning’s arms, and to fling him back was an effort
of sheer violence.
Perhaps the effort gave to Canning’s conduct an air that he would
not naturally have cared to betray; for his manner was that of a man
irritated by finding himself obliged to be brutal. In the want of
a reason for rejecting the American arrangement, he was reduced to
rejecting it without giving a reason. The process of disciplining
Erskine was simple, for Erskine had disregarded instructions to an
extent that no government could afford to overlook; but President
Madison was not in the employ of the British king, and had a right to
such consideration at least as one gentleman commonly owes to another.
Canning addressed himself first to the simpler task. May 22, a few
hours after receiving the despatches from Washington, he wrote a
despatch to Erskine in regard to the “Chesapeake” arrangement.[71]
He reminded Erskine that his instructions had required the formal
exclusion of French war-vessels and the formal withdrawal of the
“Chesapeake” proclamation before any arrangement should be concluded.
Not only had these conditions been neglected, but two other less
serious errors had been made.
Variations from the rigor of instructions might be ground for reproving
Erskine, but could hardly excuse a disavowal of the compact; yet the
compact was disavowed. An impression was general that the Ministry were
disposed to ratify it, but were withheld by the paragraph in Robert
Smith’s letter defining what was due from his Britannic Majesty to
his own honor. Milder Foreign Secretaries than George Canning would
have found themselves obliged to take notice of such a reflection, and
Canning appeared at his best when his adversaries gave him an excuse
for the lofty tone he liked to assume.
“It remains for me,” he continued, “to notice the expressions,
so full of disrespect to his Majesty, with which that note
concludes; and I am to signify to you the displeasure which his
Majesty feels that any minister of his Majesty should have shown
himself so far insensible of what is due to the dignity of his
sovereign as to have consented to receive and transmit a note in
which such expressions were contained.”
Canning was hardly the proper person to criticise Robert Smith’s
disrespectful expressions, which, whatever their intention, failed
to be nearly as offensive as many of his own; but this was a matter
between himself and Erskine. Even after granting the propriety of
his comment, diplomatic usage seemed to require that some demand of
explanation or apology from the American government should precede the
rejection of an engagement otherwise satisfactory; but no such step was
in this case taken through Erskine. His settlement of the “Chesapeake”
outrage was repudiated without more words, and the next day Canning
repudiated the rest of the arrangement.
Nothing could be easier than to show that Erskine had violated his
instructions more plainly in regard to the Orders in Council than in
regard to the “Chesapeake” affair. Of the three conditions imposed by
Canning, not one had been fulfilled. The first required the repeal of
all Non-intercourse Acts against England, “leaving them in force with
respect to France;” but Erskine had doubly failed to secure it:[72]--
“As the matter at present stands before the world in your
official correspondence with Mr. Smith, the American government
would be at liberty to-morrow to repeal the Non-intercourse Act
altogether, without infringing the agreement which you have
thought proper to enter into on behalf of his Majesty; and
if such a clause was thought necessary to this condition at
the time when my instructions were written, it was obviously
become much more so when the Non-intercourse Act was passed for
a limited time. You must also have been aware at the time of
making the agreement that the American government had in fact
formally exempted Holland, a Power which has unquestionably
‘adopted and acted under the Decrees of France,’ from the
operation of the Non-intercourse Act,--an exemption in direct
contravention of the condition prescribed to you, and which of
itself ought to have prevented you from coming to any agreement
whatever.”
Here, again, sufficient reasons were given for punishing Erskine; but
these reasons were not equally good for repudiating the compact with
the United States. No American vessels could enter a Dutch port so long
as the British blockade lasted; therefore the exemption of Holland
from the non-intercourse affected England only by giving to her navy
another chance for booty, and to the Americans one more empty claim.
Canning himself explained to Pinkney[73] “that the exemption of Holland
from the effect of our embargo and non-intercourse would not have
been much objected to by the British government” if the President had
been willing to pledge himself to enforce the non-intercourse against
France; but for aught that appeared to the contrary, “the embargo and
non-intercourse laws might be suffered without any breach of faith
to expire, or might even be repealed immediately, notwithstanding
the perseverance of France in her Berlin and other edicts; and that
Mr. Erskine had in truth secured nothing more, as the consideration
of the recall of the Orders in Council, than the renewal of American
intercourse with Great Britain.”
Thus Canning justified the repudiation of Erskine’s arrangement by the
single reason that the United States government could not be trusted
long enough to prove its good faith. The explanation was difficult
to express in courteous or diplomatic forms; but perhaps its most
striking quality, next to its want of courtesy, was its evident want
of candor. Had the American government evaded its obligation, the
British government held the power of redress in its own hands. Clearly
the true explanation was to be sought elsewhere, in some object which
Canning could not put in diplomatic words, but which lay in the nature
of Perceval’s system. Even during the three days while the decision
was supposed to be in doubt, alarmed merchants threw themselves in
crowds on the Board of Trade, protesting that if American vessels with
their cheaper sugar, cotton, and coffee were allowed to enter Amsterdam
and Antwerp, British trade was at an end.[74] The mere expectation of
their arrival would create such a fall in prices as to make worthless
the accumulated mass of such merchandise with which the warehouses
were filled, not only in London, but also in the little island of
Heligoland at the mouth of the Elbe, where a system of licensed and
unlicensed smuggling had been established under the patronage of the
Board of Trade. Deputations of these merchants waited on Earl Bathurst
to represent the danger of allowing even those American ships to enter
Holland which might have already sailed from the United States on
the faith of Erskine’s arrangement. Somewhat unexpectedly ministers
refused to gratify this prayer. An Order in Council of May 24, while
announcing the Royal repudiation of Erskine’s arrangement, declared
that American vessels which should have cleared for Holland between
April 19 and July 20 would not be molested in their voyage.
The chief objection to Erskine’s arrangement, apart from its effect on
British merchants, consisted in the danger that by its means America
might compel France to withdraw her decrees affecting neutrals. The
chance that Erskine’s arrangement might involve America in war with
Napoleon was not worth the equal chance of its producing in the end
an amicable arrangement with Napoleon which would sacrifice the
last defence of British commerce and manufactures. Had the British
government given way, Napoleon, to whom the most solemn pledges cost
nothing, would certainly persuade President Madison to lean once more
toward France. The habit of balancing the belligerents--the first rule
of American diplomacy--required the incessant see-saw of interest. So
many unsettled questions remained open that British ministers could not
flatter themselves with winning permanent American favor by partial
concession.
To Canning’s despatch repudiating the commercial arrangement, Erskine
made a reply showing more keenness and skill than was to be found in
Canning’s criticism.
“It appears from the general tenor of your despatches,” wrote
Erskine[75] on receiving these letters of May 22 and 23, “that
his Majesty’s government were not willing to trust to assurances
from the American government, but that official pledges were to
have been required which could not be given for want of power,
some of them also being of a nature which would prevent a formal
recognition. Had I believed that his Majesty’s government were
determined to insist upon these conditions being complied with
in one particular manner only, I should have adhered implicitly
to my instructions; but as I collected from them that his
Majesty was desirous of accomplishing his retaliatory system by
such means as were most compatible with a good understanding
with friendly and neutral Powers, I felt confident that his
Majesty would approve of the arrangement I had concluded as
one likely to lead to a cordial and complete understanding
and co-operation on the part of the United States, which
co-operation never could be obtained by previous stipulations
either from the government of the United States, who have no
power to accede to them, or from Congress, which would never
acknowledge them as recognitions to guide their conduct.”
This reply, respectful in form, placed Secretary Canning in the dilemma
between the guilt of ignorance or that of bad faith; but the rejoinder
of a dismissed diplomatist weighed little except in history, and long
before it was made public Erskine and his arrangement had ceased
to interest the world. Canning disposed of both forever by a third
despatch, dated May 30, enclosing to Erskine an Order in Council
disavowing his arrangement and ordering him back to England.
When the official disavowal appeared in the newspapers of May 25,
Canning had an interview with Pinkney.[76] At great length and
with much detail he read the instructions he had given to Erskine,
and commented on the points in which Erskine had violated them. He
complained of unfriendly expressions in the American notes; but he
did not say why the arrangement failed to satisfy all the legitimate
objects of England, nor did he suggest any improvement or change which
would make the arrangement, as it existed, agreeable to him. On the
other hand, he announced that though Erskine would have to be recalled,
his successor was already appointed and would sail for America within a
few days.
If Canning showed, by his indulgence to American vessels and his haste
to send out a new minister, the wish to avoid a rupture with the United
States, his selection of an agent for that purpose was so singular as
to suggest that he relied on terror rather than on conciliation. In
case Erskine had obeyed his instructions, which ordered him merely
to prepare the way for negotiation, Canning had fixed upon George
Henry Rose as the negotiator.[77] Considering the impression left in
America by Rose on his previous mission, his appointment seemed almost
the worst that could have been made; but bad as the effect of such a
selection would have been, one man, and perhaps only one, in England
was certain to make a worse; and him Canning chose. The new minister
was Francis James Jackson. Whatever good qualities Jackson possessed
were overshadowed by the reputation he had made for himself at
Copenhagen. His name was a threat of violence; his temper and manners
were notorious; and nothing but his rank in the service marked him as
suitable for the post. Pinkney, whose self-control and tact in these
difficult circumstances could hardly be too much admired, listened in
silence to Canning’s announcement, and rather than risk making the
situation worse, reported that Jackson was, he believed, “a worthy man,
and although completely attached to all those British principles and
doctrines which sometimes give us trouble will, _I should hope_,
give satisfaction.” The English press was not so forbearing. The
“Morning Chronicle” of May 29 said that the appointment had excited
general surprise, owing to “the character of the individual;” and
Pinkney himself, in a later despatch, warned his Government that “it
is rather a prevailing notion here that this gentleman’s conduct will
not and cannot be what we all wish, and that a better choice might have
been made.”[78]
Jackson himself sought the position, knowing its difficulties. May
23, the day of his appointment, he wrote privately to his brother in
Spain: “I am about to enter upon a most delicate--I _hope_ not
desperate--enterprise.”[79] At a later time, embittered by want of
support from home, he complained that Canning had sent him on an errand
which he knew to be impossible to perform.[80] So well understood
between Canning and Jackson was the nature of the service, that Jackson
asked and received as a condition of his acceptance the promise that
his employment should last not less than twelve months.[81] The
delicate enterprise of which he spoke could have been nothing more than
that of preventing a rupture between England and America; but until he
studied his instructions, he could hardly have known in its full extent
how desperate this undertaking would be.
Canning made no haste. Nearly two months elapsed before Jackson
sailed. After correcting Erskine’s mistake and replacing the United
States in their position under the Orders in Council of April 26,
Canning, June 13, made a statement to the House of Commons. Declining
to touch questions of general policy for the reason that negotiations
were pending, he contented himself with satisfying the House that
Erskine had acted contrary to instructions and deserved recall. James
Stephen showed more clearly the spirit of Government by avowing the
opinion “that America in all her proceedings had no wish to promote
an impartial course with respect to France and this country.” The
Whigs knew little or nothing of the true facts; Erskine’s conduct
could not be defended; no one cared to point out that Canning left to
America no dignified course but war, and public interest was once more
concentrated with painful anxiety on the continent of Europe. America
dropped from sight, and Canning’s last and worst acts toward the United
States escaped notice or knowledge.
The session of Parliament ended June 21, a week before the special
session of Congress came to an end; and while England waited
impatiently for news from Vienna, where Napoleon was making ready for
the battle of Wagram, Canning drew up the instructions to Jackson,--the
last of the series of papers by which, through the peculiar qualities
of his style even more than by the violence of his acts, he embittered
to a point that seemed altogether contrary to their nature a whole
nation of Americans against the nation that gave them birth. If the
famous phrase of Canning was ever in any sense true,--that he called
a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old,--it was
most nearly true in the sense that his instructions and letters forced
the United States into a nationality of character which the war of the
Revolution itself had failed to give them.
The instructions to Jackson[82]--five in number--were dated July 1,
and require careful attention if the train of events which brought the
United States to the level of war with England is to be understood.
The first instruction began by complaint of Erskine’s conduct, passing
quickly to a charge of bad faith against the American government,
founded on “the publicity so unwarrantably given” to Erskine’s
arrangement:--
“The premature publication of the correspondence by the
American government so effectually precluded any middle course
of explanation and accommodation that it is hardly possible
to suppose that it must not have been resorted to in a great
measure with that view.
“The American government cannot have believed that such an
arrangement as Mr. Erskine consented to accept was conformable
to his instructions. If Mr. Erskine availed himself of the
liberty allowed to him of communicating those instructions on
the affair of the Orders in Council, they must have known that
it was not so; but even without such communication they cannot
by possibility have believed that without any new motive, and
without any apparent change in the dispositions of the enemy,
the British government could have been disposed at once and
unconditionally to give up the system on which they have been
acting, and which they had so recently refused to relinquish,
even in return for considerations which though far from being
satisfactory were yet infinitely more so than anything which can
be supposed to have been gained by Mr. Erskine’s arrangement.”
Canning attributed this conduct to a hope held by President Madison
that the British government would feel itself compelled, however
reluctantly, to sanction an agreement which it had not authorized. In
this case the American government had only itself to blame for the
consequences:--
“So far, therefore, from the American government having any
reason to complain of the non-ratification of Mr. Erskine’s
unauthorized agreement, his Majesty has on his part just ground
of complaint for that share of the inconvenience from the
publication which may have fallen upon his Majesty’s subjects,
so far as their interests may have been involved in the renewed
speculations of their American correspondents; and his Majesty
cannot but think any complaint, if any should be made on this
occasion in America, the more unreasonable, as the government
of the United States is that government which perhaps of all
others has most freely exercised the right of withholding its
ratification from even the authorized acts of its own diplomatic
agents.”
In this spirit Jackson was to meet any “preliminary discussion” which
might arise before he could proceed to negotiation. Canning did not
touch on the probability that if Jackson met preliminary discussion in
such a spirit as this, he would run something more than a risk of never
reaching negotiation at all; or if Canning considered this point, he
treated it orally. The other written instructions given to Jackson
dealt at once with negotiation.
The “Chesapeake” affair came first in order, and was quickly dismissed.
Jackson was to require from the President a written acknowledgment
that the interdict on British ships was annulled before any settlement
could be made. The Orders in Council came next, and were the subject
of a long instruction, full of interest and marked by many of
Canning’s peculiarities. Once more he explained that Erskine had
inverted the relation of things by appearing to recall the orders as
an inducement to the renewal of trade,--“as if in any arrangement,
whether commercial or political, his Majesty could condescend to barter
objects of national policy and dignity for permission to trade with
another country. The character even more than the stipulations of such
a compact must under any circumstances have put out of question the
possibility of his Majesty’s consenting to confirm it.” He related the
history of the orders, which he called “defensive retaliation,” and
explained why Erskine’s arrangement failed to effect the object of that
system:--
“In the arrangement agreed to by Mr. Erskine the incidental
consequence is mistaken for the object of the negotiation. His
Majesty is made by his minister to concede the whole point in
dispute by the total and unconditional recall of the Orders in
Council; and nothing is done by the United States in return
except to permit their citizens to renew their commercial
intercourse with Great Britain. Whereas, before his Majesty’s
consent to withdraw or even to modify the Orders in Council was
declared, the United States should have taken upon themselves
to execute in substance the objects of the Orders in Council by
effectually prohibiting all trade between their citizens and
France, or the Powers acting under her decrees, and by engaging
for the continuance of that prohibition so long as those decrees
should continue unrepealed.”
As in the “Chesapeake” affair, so in regard to the orders,--Canning’s
objection to Erskine’s arrangement was stated as one of form. That
the “Chesapeake” proclamation was no longer in force; that Congress
had effectually prohibited trade with France; and that the President
had engaged as far as he could to continue that prohibition till the
French Decrees were repealed,--these were matters of notoriety. England
took the ground that the United States were liable to the operation of
the British retaliatory orders against France, even though Congress
should have declared war upon France, unless the declaration of war was
regularly made known to the British minister at Washington, and unless
“the United States should have taken upon themselves,” by treaty with
England, to continue the war till France repealed her decrees.
Canning was happy in the phrase he employed in Parliament, March 6,
to justify the course of ministers toward America. “Extension of the
law of nations” described well the Orders in Council themselves; but
the instruction to Jackson was remarkable as a prodigious extension
of the extended orders. The last legal plea was abandoned by these
instructions, and the subject would have been the clearer for that
abandonment were it not that owing to the rapidity of events the new
extravagance was never known; with Canning himself the subject slipped
from public view, and only the mystery remained of Canning’s objects
and expectations.
Another man would have temporized, and would have offered some
suggestion toward breaking the force of such a blow at a friendly
people. Not only did Canning make no new suggestion, but he even
withdrew that which he had made in February. He told Jackson to propose
nothing whatever:--
“You are to inform the American Secretary of State that in the
event of the government of the United States being desirous
now to adopt this proposal, you are authorized to renew the
negotiation and to conclude it on the terms of my instructions
to Mr. Erskine; but that you are not instructed to press upon
the acceptance of the American government an arrangement which
they have so recently declined, especially as the arrangement
itself is become less important, and the terms of it less
applicable to the state of things now existing.”
The remainder of this despatch was devoted to proving that, the late
order of April 26 had so modified that of November, 1807, as to remove
the most serious American objections; and although the blockade was
more restrictive than the old orders as concerned French and Dutch
colonies, yet the recent surrender of Martinique had reduced the
practical hardship of this restriction so considerably that it was
fairly offset by the opening of the Baltic. America had the less
inducement to a further arrangement which could little increase the
extent of her commerce, while England was indifferent provided she
obtained her indispensable objects:--
“I am therefore not to direct you to propose to the American
government any formal agreement to be substituted for that which
his Majesty has been under the necessity of disavowing. You are,
however, at liberty to receive for reference home any proposal
which the American government may tender to you; but it is
only in the case of that proposal comprehending all the three
conditions which Mr. Erskine was instructed to require.”
The fourth instruction prescribed the forms in which such an
arrangement, if made, must be framed. The fifth dealt with another
branch of the subject,--the Rule of 1756. Canning declined to accept
a mere understanding in regard to this rule. Great Britain would
insist on her right to prohibit neutral trade with enemies’ colonies,
“of which she has permitted the exercise only by indulgence; ... but
the indulgence which was granted for peculiar and temporary reasons
being now withdrawn, the question is merely whether the rule from
which such an indulgence was a deviation shall be established by the
admission of America or enforced as heretofore by the naval power of
Great Britain.” As a matter of courtesy the British government had
no objection to allowing the United States to sanction by treaty the
British right, so that legal condemnations should be made under the
authority of the treaty instead of an Order in Council; “but either
authority is sufficient. No offence is taken at the refusal of the
United States to make this matter subject of compact. The result is
that it must be the subject of an Order in Council.”
The result was that it became the subject of a much higher tribunal
than his Majesty’s Council, and that the British people, and Canning
himself, took great offence at the refusal of the United States to
make it a subject of one-sided compact; but with this concluding touch
Canning’s official irony toward America ended, and he laid down his
pen. About the middle of June, Jackson with three well-defined _casus
belli_ in his portfolio, and another--that of impressments--awaiting
his arrival, set sail for America on the errand which he strangely
hoped might not be desperate. With his departure Canning’s control
of American relations ceased. At the moment when he challenged for
the last time an instant declaration of war from a people who had no
warmer wish than to be permitted to remain his friends, the career of
the Administration to which he belonged came to an end in scandalous
disaster.
Hardly had the Duke of York stopped one source of libel, by resigning
May 16 his office of commanderin-chief, when fresh troubles from
many directions assailed ministers. As early as April 4, Canning had
satisfied the Duke of Portland that he must dismiss Castlereagh for
incompetence, and every Cabinet minister except Castlereagh himself
was acquainted with this decision; but contrary to Canning’s wishes no
action was taken, and the conduct of the war was left at a critical
moment in the hands of a man whose removal for incompetence had been
decreed by his own colleagues. The summer campaign was then fought.
April 9 Austria had begun another war with Napoleon. At Essling, May
21, she nearly won a great victory; at Wagram, July 6, she lost a
battle, and soon afterward entered on negotiations which ended, October
20, in the treaty of Vienna. While this great campaign went on, Sir
Arthur Wellesley drove Soult out of Portugal much as Napoleon had
driven Sir John Moore out of Spain; and then marching up the valley of
the Tagus scared Joseph a second time from Madrid, and fought, July
28, the desperate battle of Talavera. In any case the result of the
Austrian war would have obliged him to retreat; but the concentration
of the French forces in his front quickly drove the British army
back toward Lisbon, and ended all hope of immediate success in the
Peninsula. A third great effort against Napoleon was directed from
London toward the Scheldt and Meuse. The Cabinet, June 14, decided
that Castlereagh should attempt this experiment; for raids of the kind
had charms for a naval power, and although success could affect the
war but little, it might assist smuggling and destroy a naval depot
of Napoleon. Castlereagh sent to the Scheldt forty thousand soldiers
who were grievously wanted on the Tagus. July 28, while Wellington
fought the battle of Talavera, Lord Chatham’s expedition started from
the Downs, and reaching the mouth of the Scheldt occupied itself until
August 15 with the capture of Flushing. In gaining this success the
army was worn out; nearly half its number were suffering from typhoid,
and September 2 the Cabinet unanimously voted to recall the expedition.
Talavera and Flushing closed Castlereagh’s career in the War Office,
as Jackson’s mission closed that of Canning in American diplomacy.
Defeat abroad, ruin at home, disgrace and disaster everywhere were
the results of two years of Tory administration. August 11 the Duke
of Portland was struck by paralysis; and deprived of its chief, the
Cabinet went to pieces. September 7 Castlereagh was gently forced to
resign. Canning, refusing to serve under Perceval or under any one whom
Perceval suggested, tendered his own resignation. In the course of the
complicated negotiations that followed, Perceval showed to Castlereagh
letters in which for a year past Canning had pressed Castlereagh’s
removal from office. Then at last Castlereagh discovered, as he
conceived, that Canning was not a gentleman or a man of honor, and
having called him out, September 21, in a duel on Putney Heath shot him
through the thigh.
Such an outcome was a natural result of such an Administration; but
as concerned the United States Canning had already done all the harm
possible, and more than three generations could wholly repair.