WHEN Napoleon, Aug. 3, 1808, heard at Bordeaux that the Spaniards had
captured Dupont’s army at Baylen and Rosily’s ships at Cadiz, and had
thrown eighty thousand French troops back upon the Pyrenees, his anger
was great; but his perplexity was much greater. In a character so
interesting as that of Napoleon, the moments of perplexity were best
worth study; and in his career no single moment occurred when he had
more reason to call upon his genius for a resource than when he faced
at Bordeaux the failure of his greatest scheme. From St. Petersburg
to Gibraltar every shopkeeper knew that England had escaped, and all
believed that no combination either of force or fraud could again be
made with reasonable hope of driving her commerce from its channels.
On this belief every merchant, as well as every government in the
world, was actually shaping calculations. Napoleon also must shape
his calculations on theirs, since he had failed to force theirs into
the path of his own. The escape of England made useless the machinery
he had created for her ruin. Spain, Russia, and Austria had little
value for his immediate object, except as their control was necessary
for the subjection of England; and the military occupation of Spain
beyond the Ebro became worse than a blunder from the moment when Cadiz
and Lisbon, Cuba and Mexico, Brazil and Peru threw themselves into
England’s arms.[18]
More than once this history has shown that Napoleon never hesitated to
throw aside a plan which had miscarried. If he did not in the autumn of
1808 throw aside his Spanish schemes, the reason could only be that he
saw no other resource, and that in his belief his power would suffer
too much from the shock of admitting failure. He showed unusual signs
of vacillation, and of a desire to escape the position into which
his miscalculations had led him. Instead of going at once to Spain
and restoring order to his armies, he left his brother helpless at
Vittoria while he passed three months in negotiations looking toward
peace with England. In September he went to Germany, where he met the
Czar of Russia at Erfurt, and induced Alexander, or consented to his
inducement, to join in an autograph letter to the King of England,
marked by the usual Napoleonic character, and offering the principle of
_uti possidetis_ as the preliminary to a general peace. England
regarded this advance as deceptive, and George Canning was never more
successful than in the gesture of self-restrained contempt with which
he tossed back the letter that Napoleon and Alexander had presumed to
address to a constitutional King of England; but even Canning could
hardly suppose that Napoleon would invite an insult without a motive.
From whatever side Napoleon approached the situation he could invent
no line of conduct which did not imply the triumph of England. Study
the problem as he might, he could not escape from the political and
military disadvantages he incurred from the Spanish uprising. Without
the consent of England he could neither free his civil government from
the system of commercial restriction, nor free his military strength
from partial paralysis in Spain; and England refused to help him, or
even to hear reason from Alexander.
Thenceforward a want of distinct purpose showed itself in Napoleon’s
acts. Unable either to enforce or to abandon his Continental system, he
began to use it for momentary objects,--sometimes to weaken England,
sometimes to obtain money, or as the pretext for conquests. Unable
to hold the Peninsula or to withdraw from it, he seemed at one time
resolved on conquest, at another disposed toward retreat. In the autumn
of 1808 both paths ran together, for his credit required him to conquer
before he could honorably establish any dynasty on the throne; and
during the months of September and October he marched new French armies
across the Pyrenees and massed an irresistible force behind the Ebro. A
year before, he had thought one hundred thousand men enough to occupy
all Spain and Portugal; but in October, 1808, he held not less than two
hundred and fifty thousand men beyond the Pyrenees, ready to move at
the moment of his arrival.
October 25, after his return from Germany, the Emperor pronounced
a speech at the opening of his legislative chambers; and the
embarrassment of his true position was evident under the words in which
he covered it.
“Russia and Denmark,” he said, “have united with me against
England. The United States have preferred to renounce commerce
and the sea rather than recognize their slavery. A part of
my army marches against those that England has formed or
disembarked in Spain. It is a special benefit of that Providence
which has constantly protected our arms, that passion has so
blinded English councils as to make them renounce the protection
of the sea and at last present their armies on the Continent. I
depart in a few days to place myself at the head of my army, and
with God’s aid to crown the King of Spain in Madrid, and plant
my eagles on the forts of Lisbon.”
He left Paris October 29, and ten days later, November 9, began the
campaign which still attracts the admiration of military critics, but
which did not result in planting his eagles on the forts of Lisbon.
“To my great astonishment,” he afterward said,[19] “I had to fight the
battles of Tudela, Espinosa, Burgos, and Somo Sierra, to gain Madrid,
which, in spite of my victories, refused me admission during two
days.” After disposing in rapid succession of all the Spanish armies,
he occupied Madrid December 4, and found himself at the end of his
campaign. The conquest of Lisbon and Cadiz required more time, and
led to less military result than suited his objects. At that moment
he learned that an English army under Sir John Moore had ventured
to march from Portugal into the north of Spain, and had already
advanced so far toward Burgos as to make their capture possible. The
destruction of an English army, however small, offered Napoleon the
triumph he wanted. Rapidly collecting his forces, he hurried across the
Guadarrama Mountains to cut off Moore’s retreat; but for once he was
out-generalled. Sir John Moore not only saved his own army, but also
led the French a long and exhausting chase to the extreme northwestern
shore of Spain, where the British fleet carried Moore’s army out of
their reach.
Napoleon would not have been the genius he was had he wasted his
energies in following Moore to Corunna, or in trying to plant his
eagles on the forts of Lisbon or Cadiz. A year earlier, Lisbon and
Cadiz had been central points of his scheme; but in December, 1808,
they were worth to him little more than any other seaports without
fleets or colonies. For Spain and Portugal Napoleon showed that he had
no further use. The moment he saw that Moore had escaped, which became
clear when the Emperor reached Astorga, Jan. 2, 1809, throwing upon
Soult the task of marching one hundred and fifty miles to Corunna after
Moore and the British army, Napoleon stopped short, turned about, and
with rapidity unusual even for him, quitted Spain forever. “The affairs
of Spain are finished,” he wrote January 16;[20] although Joseph had
the best reason to know and much cause to tell how his brother left
nothing finished in Spain. “The circumstances of Europe oblige me to
go for three weeks to Paris,” he wrote to Joseph early in the morning
of January 15; “if nothing prevents, I shall be back again before the
end of February.”[21] With characteristic mixture of harshness and
tenderness toward his elder brother, he wrote at noon the same day
another account, equally deceptive, of his motives and intentions:--
“You must say everywhere, and make the army believe, that I
shall return in three or four weeks. In fact, my mere presence
at Paris will make Austria shrink back to her nullity; and then,
before the end of October, I will be back here. I shall be in
Paris in five days. I shall go at full speed, day and night, as
far as Bordeaux. Meanwhile everything will go on quieting itself
in Spain.”[22]
Giving out that the conduct of Austria required his presence at Paris,
he succeeded in imposing this fiction upon Europe by the empire of his
will. Europe accepted the fable, which became history; but although
the Emperor soon disposed of Austria, and although Spain was a more
difficult problem than Austria ever was, Napoleon never kept his word
to Joseph, and never again ventured within sight of the mistakes he
could no longer correct.
Meanwhile Armstrong, disgusted with the disappointments and annoyances
of his residence at Paris, had become anxious to escape without
further loss of credit. His letters to Madison, published by Congress,
returned to terrify his French acquaintance, and to close his sources
of information. He could see no hope of further usefulness. As early as
Oct. 25, 1808, when the Emperor was addressing his legislative chambers
before setting out for Spain, Armstrong wrote to Madison that no good
could come from keeping an American minister at Paris.[23] Yet in the
enforced idleness of the month when Napoleon was in Spain, Armstrong
found one ally whose aid was well worth seeking. After the Czar
Alexander accepted, at Tilsit, the ascendency of Napoleon, he appointed
as his minister of foreign relations the Count Nicholas Roumanzoff. The
Czar was still a young man in his thirty-first year, while Roumanzoff,
fifty-four years old, had the full powers of maturity. Together they
shaped a Russian policy, in the traditional direction of Russian
interests, founded upon jealousy of British maritime tyranny. Lord
Howick’s and Spencer Perceval’s Orders in Council served to sharpen
Russian as well as American antipathies, and brought the two distant
nations into a sympathy which was certainly not deep, but which
England had reason to fear. In the autumn of 1808 Count Roumanzoff
came to Paris to arrange with Champagny the details of their joint
diplomacy; and at the same time, in the month of November, William
Short arrived in Paris secretly accredited as minister plenipotentiary
at St. Petersburg, but waiting confirmation by the Senate before
going to his post. When Armstrong told Roumanzoff that an American
minister would soon be on his way to St. Petersburg, the count was
highly pleased, and promised at once to send a full minister to replace
André Daschkoff, the chargé at Washington. “Ever since I came into
office,” he said to Armstrong,[24] “I have been desirous of producing
this effect; for in dissolving our commercial connections with Great
Britain it became necessary to seek some other power in whom we might
find a substitute; and on looking round I could see none but the United
States who were at all competent to this object.” So far as concerned
England, the alliance promised great advantages; but Armstrong’s chief
anxiety affected France, and when he attempted to enlist Roumanzoff
in resistance to Napoleon’s robberies, he found no encouragement.
Roumanzoff had already tried his influence with Napoleon on behalf
of the Danes, who wanted compensation for their plundered commerce.
“Give them a civil answer,” replied Napoleon,[25] “but of course one
never pays for this sort of thing,--_On ne paye jamais ces choses-là,
n’est-ce pas?_” From Roumanzoff’s refusal, Armstrong inferred that
no change need be hoped in Napoleon’s conduct.
“On the contrary,” he wrote to Madison, the day when Napoleon
abandoned the pursuit of Sir John Moore,[26] “their anti-neutral
system is more rigidly observed; the embargo on ships of the
United States found here before the imperial decrees were issued
is continued; every ship of ours coming into a port of France
or of her allies is immediately seized and sequestered; cargoes
regularly admitted to entry by the custom-houses are withheld
from their owners; ships most obviously exceptions to the
operation of the Decrees have been recently condemned; and--what
in my view of the subject does not admit of aggravation--the
burning of the ship ‘Brutus’ on the high seas, so far from being
disavowed, is substantially justified.”
Had this been all, perhaps President Madison and Congress might have
waited with courtesy, if not with hope, for Napoleon’s pleasure; but
grievances equally serious ran back to the year 1803, and not one of
them had been redressed by France.
“It is now three years since one of her admirals, on the
principle of self-preservation, burnt four of our ships at sea,
and the Emperor immediately acknowledged the debt and repeatedly
promised to discharge it; but not a shilling has yet been paid,
nor is it probable that a shilling ever will be paid. Besides
this breach of justice in the first instance and of promise
in the last, we have to complain that bills of exchange drawn
to the order of citizens of the United States by the public
functionaries of France, to the amount of many millions of
dollars, and for articles of the first necessity, and drawn many
years ago, are not only not paid, but are officially denounced
as not payable.”
Armstrong’s temper, bad in the winter, became worse in the spring,
until his letters to the Department of State seemed to leave no
remedy but war for the grievances he described. The angry tone of his
despatches was not counteracted by fair words in the instructions sent
by Champagny to Turreau, which were calculated to irritate President
Madison beyond patience.
“You cannot too much call attention to the grievances of the
Americans against England in order to make them more sensibly
felt,” wrote Champagny to Turreau, after the Emperor went to
Spain.[27] “The Americans would like France to grant them
commercial privileges which no nation at present enjoys....
But ... hitherto it has not seemed proper, in the execution
of general measures, to introduce exceptions which would have
really destroyed their effect. If the rules adopted against
English commerce had not been made common, that commerce would
continue through every opening left to it; England would
preserve the same resources as before for supporting the war. A
system of exception for one people would turn the rule into an
injustice toward all others; all would have right to complain of
a privilege granted to the Federal government which themselves
would not enjoy.”
Unanswerable as this reasoning was from the Napoleonic standpoint, it
was open to the objection of placing Madison among the belligerents
at war with England, and of obliging him not only to accept the rules
imposed by Napoleon on the allies of France, but also to admit the
corresponding right of British retaliation, even to the point of war.
Until President Madison made up his mind to war with England, he could
hardly be induced by Napoleon’s diplomacy to overlook his causes of war
with France.
Had Napoleon acted according to rules of ordinary civilization, he
would at least have softened the harshness of his commercial policy
toward America by opening to the American President some vista of
compensation elsewhere. Florida seemed peculiarly suited for this
object, and no one so well as Napoleon knew the anxiety of the late
Administration to obtain that territory, which, for any legitimate
purpose, was useless and worthless to France. In December, 1808,
Napoleon could have retained little or no hope of controlling the
Spanish colonies by force; yet he ordered the American government
to leave them alone, as he ordered it to adopt the French system of
commercial restraint. “I venture to presume,” continued Champagny
to Turreau, “that if his Majesty has no reason to complain of the
disposition shown by the United States toward him, he will show
himself more and more inclined to treat them favorably. What will
most influence his course will be the conduct pursued by the United
States toward the Spanish colonies, and the care that shall be taken
to do nothing in regard to them which can contravene the rights of the
mother-country.”
Thus from Turreau’s attitude as well as from Armstrong’s letters, the
government at Washington was advised that neither favor nor justice
need be expected from Napoleon. This impression, strengthened by
all the private advices which arrived from France during the winter
of 1808–1809, even though partly balanced by the bulletins of the
Emperor’s splendid Spanish campaign, had much to do with the refusal of
Congress to declare a double war, which, however general in terms, must
in effect be waged against England alone. Anger with France affected
Republicans almost as strongly as fear of Napoleon excited Federalists.
When the final struggle took place in Congress over the embargo,
no small share of the weakness shown by the Administration and its
followers was due to their consciousness that the repeal of the embargo
would relieve them from appearing to obey an imperial mandate.
Turreau understood the repeal in no other light, and was extremely
irritated to see the decline of his influence. Men who had given him
pledge upon pledge that the embargo should be withdrawn only when
war against England should be declared, could plead no better excuse
for failing to keep their promise than that Napoleon had forfeited
his claim to their support. March 19, two weeks after Congress rose,
Turreau wrote from Baltimore to Champagny,[28]--
“You will have judged from my last despatches that the Embargo
Law would be repealed. It has been so, in fact, despite my
efforts to maintain it, and notwithstanding the promise of quite
a large number of influential Representatives, especially among
the senators, who had guaranteed to me its continuance till
the next Congress, and who have voted against their political
conscience. I had informed your Excellency of the disunion
projects shown by some of the Northern States. Their avowed
opposition to the continuance of the embargo, and their threats
to resist its execution, terrified Congress to such a degree
that the dominant party became divided, and the feebleness
(_faiblesse_) of Mr. Jefferson sanctioned the last and
the most shameful act of his Administration.... I say it with
regret,--and perhaps I have said it too late,--I am convinced
there is nothing to hope from these people.”
Erskine, whose persistent efforts to conciliate had also something
to do with the action of Congress, made Turreau’s anger the subject
of a despatch, doubtless hoping it might guide Canning’s thoughts
toward the wisdom of conciliation.[29] “The French minister it seems
is so much offended at the Non-intercourse Law which has been lately
passed, and is so little pleased with the general disposition, as he
conceives it, of the new Administration of the United States toward
France, that he has quitted this city, having previously given up his
house and removed all his furniture, without calling either upon the
new President or any of the members of the Administration, as was
his uniform custom in former years, and as is always done by foreign
ministers.” Robert Smith informed Erskine that the Government would
consider it to be their duty, which he was sure they would feel no
disposition to shrink from, to recommend to the new Congress to enter
upon immediate measures of hostility against France in the event of
Great Britain giving way as to her Orders so far as to afford an
opportunity to the United States to assert their rights against France.
During the month of March, Turreau watched the workings of the
Non-intercourse Act, but found little encouragement. “Generally the
ventures have not been so numerous as was to be expected from the
well-known avidity of American merchants, and the privations they
have suffered from the embargo.”[30] Most of the outgoing vessels had
cleared for the West Indies or the Azores, “but the French government
may rest assured that among a hundred ships leaving the ports of the
Union for the high seas, ninety of them will have the real object of
satisfying the wants and demands of England.” Such a commerce was in
his opinion fair prey. England had gained the upper-hand in America;
English superiority could no longer be contested; and to France
remained only the desperate chances of the political gambler.
“To-day not only is the separation of New England openly talked
about, but the people of those five States wish for this
separation, pronounce it, openly prepare it, will carry it
out under British protection, and probably will meet with no
resistance on the part of the other States. Yet this project,
which is known and avowed; the last proceedings of Congress,
which are blamed; the progress of the Federalists; the alarms
of commerce; the feebleness of the highest authorities (_des
premiers pouvoirs_), and the doubts regarding the capacity
and the party views of the new President,--cause a ferment of
public opinion; and perhaps the moment has come for forming a
party in favor of France in the Central and Southern States,
whenever those of the North, having given themselves a separate
government under the support of Great Britain, may threaten the
independence of the rest.”[31]
Turreau’s speculations might show no great sagacity, but they opened a
glimpse into his mind, and they were the chief information possessed
by Napoleon to form his estimate of American character. Nothing
could more irritate the Emperor than these laments from his minister
at Washington over the victory of English interests in the United
States. The effect of such reports on Napoleon was likely to be the
more decided because Turreau saw everything in darker colors than the
facts warranted. Deceived and defeated in the case of the embargo,
he imagined himself also in danger on the other main point of his
diplomacy,--the Spanish colonies. The old Spanish agents, consular
and diplomatic, mostly patriots, were still officially recognized
or privately received at Washington. Rumor said that troops were
collecting at New Orleans to support a movement of independence
in Florida; that General Wilkinson, on his way to take command in
Louisiana, had stopped at Havana and Pensacola; that President
Jefferson, on the eve of quitting the Presidency, had been heard to
say, “We must have the Floridas and Cuba.” Anonymous letters, believed
by Turreau to be written by one of the clerks in the State Department,
warned him against the intrigues of the Federal government in the
Spanish colonies. So much was he troubled by these alarms, that April
15 he addressed an unofficial note on the subject to Robert Smith.[32]
The President, having no wish to quarrel with the French minister,
and probably aware of his irritation, asked Gallatin, on his way
northwards, to call on Turreau at Baltimore and make to him such
soothing explanations as the case seemed to require. The interview took
place during the last week of April, and Turreau’s report threw another
ray of light into the recesses of Jefferson’s councils.[33]
“‘I am specially charged,’ said Gallatin, ‘to assure you that
whatever proceedings of General Wilkinson may seem to warrant
your suspicions must not be attributed to the Executive, but
solely to the vanity, the indiscretion, and the ordinary
inconsistencies of that General, whom you know perhaps as
well as we.... We are and we wish to be strangers to all that
passes in the Floridas, in Mexico, and also in Cuba. You
would be mistaken if you supposed that Mr. Madison wishes the
possession of the Floridas. That was Mr. Jefferson’s hobby
(_marotte_),--it has never been the wish of his Cabinet;
and Mr. Madison values to-day the possession of the Floridas
only so far as they may be thought indispensable to prevent
every kind of misunderstanding with Spain, and to secure an
outlet for the produce of our Southern States. We have had no
part in the meetings which have taken place in the Floridas, and
we could not know that General Wilkinson has been ill received
there.’ (This is true.) ‘As for the possession of Cuba, this was
also a new idea of Mr. Jefferson which has not been approved
by the Executive council; and I am authorized to protest to
you that even if Cuba were offered us as a gift, we would not
accept it. We are also opposed to every step which would tend,
under the pretext of commerce, to involve us in the politics
of France and Spain, and we shall see to it that any persons
undertaking such enterprises are properly dealt with. I flatter
myself therefore that you will believe the Cabinet to be firmly
resolved carefully to avoid every disturbance of the good
understanding between the United States and France.’”
Gallatin was a persistent enemy of the Florida intrigue, and doubtless
believed that Madison held opinions like his own; but Madison’s
opinions on this subject, as on some others, were elusive,--perhaps
no clearer to himself than to readers of his writings; and Gallatin
had yet to learn that the instinct which coveted Florida could not
be controlled by a decision of the Cabinet. Yet he said only what he
seemed authorized to say; and his reference to the _marotte_ of
President Jefferson was significant. For the moment the weakness seemed
cured. Gallatin gave Turreau to understand that President Madison
would not intrigue in Florida or Cuba, and to that extent he was
doubtless expressly authorized by the President. Perhaps only on his
own authority he went a step further, by hinting that Napoleon need no
longer dangle Florida before Madison’s eyes.
A rupture with France seemed certain. Turreau expected it and hoped
only to delay it. In his eyes the Emperor had suffered an indignity
that could not be overlooked, although he asked that retaliation
should be delayed till autumn. “However dissatisfied the French
government may be by the last measures adopted by Congress, I believe
it would be well to await the result of the next session two months
hence before taking a severer course against the Americans. This
opinion, which I express only with doubt, is yet warranted by advices
which I have received within a few days, and which have been given me
by men who know the Executive intentions, and who at least till now
have not deceived me.” Turreau believed that when the Emperor learned
what the late Congress had done, he would strike the United States
with the thunderbolt of his power. Doubtless the same impression was
general. Even after Napoleon’s character has been the favorite study of
biographers and historians for nearly a hundred years, the shrewdest
criticism might fail in the effort to conjecture what shape the
Emperor’s resentment took. This story has shown many of his processes
from the time when he met the resistance of the Haytian negroes in 1803
to the time when he met the uprising of the Spanish patriots in 1809;
but even with the advantage of his own writings as a guide, neither
friend nor enemy could test theories of his character better than by
attempting to divine the conduct he was to pursue toward the United
States after their defiance of his wishes in the repeal of the embargo.
As though to remove the last doubt of rupture with Napoleon, the
President startled the country by suddenly announcing a settlement of
his disputes with England. April 7 Erskine received new instructions
from London, and during the next two weeks he was closeted with the
President and the Cabinet. April 21 the “National Intelligencer”
announced the result of their labors.