Y.M. The world’s philanthropists—

O.M. I honor them, I uncover my head to them—from habit and training;

and _they_ could not know comfort or happiness or self-approval if they

did not work and spend for the unfortunate. It makes _them_ happy to

see others happy; and so with money and labor they buy what they are

after—_happiness, self-approval_. Why don’t miners do the same thing?

Because they can get a thousandfold more happiness by _not_ doing it.

There is no other reason. They follow the law of their make.

Y.M. What do you say of duty for duty’s sake?

O.M. That _it does not exist_. Duties are not performed for duty’s

_sake_, but because their _neglect_ would make the man _uncomfortable_.

A man performs but _one_ duty—the duty of contenting his spirit, the

duty of making himself agreeable to himself. If he can most

satisfyingly perform this sole and only duty by _helping_ his neighbor,

he will do it; if he can most satisfyingly perform it by _swindling_

his neighbor, he will do it. But he always looks out for Number

One—_first_; the effects upon others are a _secondary_ matter. Men

pretend to self-sacrifices, but this is a thing which, in the ordinary

value of the phrase, _does not exist and has not existed_. A man often

honestly _thinks_ he is sacrificing himself merely and solely for some

one else, but he is deceived; his bottom impulse is to content a

requirement of his nature and training, and thus acquire peace for his

soul.

Y.M. Apparently, then, all men, both good and bad ones, devote their

lives to contenting their consciences.

O.M. Yes. That is a good enough name for it: Conscience—that

independent Sovereign, that insolent absolute Monarch inside of a man

who is the man’s Master. There are all kinds of consciences, because

there are all kinds of men. You satisfy an assassin’s conscience in one

way, a philanthropist’s in another, a miser’s in another, a burglar’s

in still another. As a _guide_ or _incentive_ to any authoritatively

prescribed line of morals or conduct (leaving _training_ out of the

account), a man’s conscience is totally valueless. I know a

kind-hearted Kentuckian whose self-approval was lacking—whose

conscience was troubling him, to phrase it with exactness—_because he

had neglected to kill a certain man_—a man whom he had never seen. The

stranger had killed this man’s friend in a fight, this man’s Kentucky

training made it a duty to kill the stranger for it. He neglected his

duty—kept dodging it, shirking it, putting it off, and his unrelenting

conscience kept persecuting him for this conduct. At last, to get ease

of mind, comfort, self-approval, he hunted up the stranger and took his

life. It was an immense act of _self-sacrifice_ (as per the usual

definition), for he did not want to do it, and he never would have done

it if he could have bought a contented spirit and an unworried mind at

smaller cost. But we are so made that we will pay _anything_ for that

contentment—even another man’s life.

Y.M. You spoke a moment ago of _trained_ consciences. You mean that we

are not _born_ with consciences competent to guide us aright?

O.M. If we were, children and savages would know right from wrong, and

not have to be taught it.

Y.M. But consciences can be _trained_?

O.M. Yes.

Y.M. Of course by parents, teachers, the pulpit, and books.

O.M. Yes—they do their share; they do what they can.

What Is Man? and Other Essays · 第 9 / 84 题