THAT PRESCIENCE IS USEFUL
It appears, then, that prescience by astronomy is possible under
certain adaptation; and that alone it will afford premonition, as far
as symptoms in the Ambient enable it to do so, of all such events
as happen to men by the influence of the Ambient. These events are,
from their commencement, always in conformity with the spiritual and
corporeal faculties, and their occasional affections; as well as with
the shorter or longer duration of those affections. They are also
conformable with other things which, although not actually in man’s
immediate person, are still absolutely and naturally connected with
him: in connection with his body they are applicable to his estate, and
his conjugal cohabitations; in connection with his spirit, they relate
to his offspring[24] and his rank; and they are also connected with all
fortuitous circumstances which may occasionally befall him.
[24] The Greek word for this, γοναι, though found in the Elzevir
edition from which this translation is made, does not appear in other
copies; the Basle edition of 1553 says merely, η τε τιμη και το αξιωμα,
“_honour and rank_,” which is the sense also given in the Latin
translation of Perugio, 1646, without any mention of “_offspring_.”
That the foreknowledge of these can be attained has already been
demonstrated; and it remains to speak of the utility of the attainment.
First, however, let it be said in what respect and with what view it
is proposed to draw advantage from this science; if it be considered
in its tendency to promote the good of the mind, no object more
advantageous can surely be wanting to induce the world to rejoice and
delight in it, since it offers an acquaintance with things divine and
human: if it be considered in respect to the benefits it is capable
of conferring on the body, its utility in this view also, will be
found on comparison to excel that of all other arts conducive to the
comforts of life, for it is of more general application and service
than all the others together. And, although it may be objected to the
art of prescience, that it does not co-operate towards the acquirement
of riches or glory, let it also be remembered that the same objection
attaches to every other art and science; since there is not one which
can of itself produce either riches or glory, not yet is there one
which is on that plea deemed useless: it seems, therefore, that the
science of prognostication, with its high qualifications and its
aptitude to the most important objects, does not, in any greater
degree, deserve to be condemned.
In general, however, the persons who attack and reprobate it as being
useless, do not pay due regard to the manner in which it becomes
necessary; but deny its utility on the specious argument that it
is superfluous and puerile to attempt to foreknow things which
must inevitably come to pass: thus considering it in a mode at once
abstracted, unlearned, and unfair. For, in the first place, this fact
ought to be kept in view, that events which necessarily and fully
happen, whether exciting fear or creating joy, if arriving unforeseen,
will either overwhelm the mind with terror or destroy its composure by
sudden delight; if, however, such events should have been foreknown,
the mind will have been previously prepared for their reception,
and will preserve an equable calmness, by having been accustomed to
contemplate the approaching event as though it were present, so that,
on its actual arrival, it will be sustained with tranquillity and
constancy.
In the next place, it must not be imagined that all things happen to
mankind, as though every individual circumstance were ordained by
divine decree and some indissoluble supernal cause; nor is it to be
thought that all events are shown to proceed from one single inevitable
fate, without being influenced by the interposition of any other
agency. Such an opinion is entirely inadmissable; for it is on the
contrary most essential to observe, not only the heavenly motion which,
perfect in its divine institution and order, is eternally regular and
undeviating; but also the variety which exists in earthly things,
subjected to and diversified by the institutions and courses of nature,
and in connection with which the superior cause operates in respect to
the accidents produced.
It is further to be remarked that man is subject, not only to events
applicable to his own private and individual nature, but also to others
arising from general causes. He suffers, for instance, by pestilences,
inundations, or conflagrations, produced by certain extensive changes
in the Ambient, and destroying multitudes at once; since a greater and
more powerful agency must of course always absorb and overcome one
that is more minute and weaker. In great changes, therefore, where
a stronger cause predominates, more general affections, like those
just mentioned, are put in operation, but affections which attach to
one individual solely are excited when his own natural constitution
peculiar to himself may be overcome by some opposing impulse of the
Ambient, however small or faint. And in this point of view it is
manifest that all events whatsoever, whether general or particular, of
which the primary cause is strong and irresistible, and against which
no other contrary agency has sufficient power to interpose, must of
necessity be wholly fulfilled; and that events indicated by a minor
cause must of course be prevented and annihilated, when some other
agency may be found contending for an opposite effect; if, however,
no such opposing agency can be found, they also must be fulfilled, in
due succession to the primary cause. Nevertheless, the fulfilment of
events thus indicated must not be ascribed solely to the vigour of the
cause producing them, nor to any inevitable fate, but rather to the
absence of any opposing influence capable of prevention. And thus,
with all things whatsoeverwhich trace their causes and origin to
nature, the case is exactly similar; for stones,[25] plants, animals,
wounds, passions, and diseases, all will of necessity operate on man
to a certain degree; and they fail to do so, if antidotes be found and
applied against their influence.
[25] In allusion to the sympathetic powers anciently attributed to
certain stones.
In exercising prognostication, therefore, strict care must be taken
to foretell future events by that natural process only which is
admitted in the doctrine here delivered; and, setting aside all vain
and unfounded opinions, to predict that, when the existing agency is
manifold and great, and of a power impossible to be resisted, the
corresponding event which it indicates shall absolutely take place;
and also, in other cases, that another event shall not happen when
its exciting causes are counteracted by some interposing influence.
It is in this manner that experienced physicians, accustomed to the
observation of diseases, foresee that some will be inevitably mortal,
and that others are susceptible of cure.
Thus, when any opinion is given by the astrologer with respect to
the various accidents liable to happen, it should be understood that
he advances nothing more than this proposition; viz. that, by the
property inherent in the Ambient, any conformation of it, suitable
to a particular temperament, being varied more or less, will produce
in that temperament some particular affection. And it is also to be
understood that he ventures this opinion with the same degree of
confidence, as that with which a physician may declare that a certain
wound will increase or grow putrid; or a man acquainted with metals
say that the magnet[26] will attract iron. But neither the increase
nor putrefaction of the wound nor the magnet’s attraction of iron,
is ordained by any inevitable law, although these consequences must
necessarily follow, in due obedience to the first principles of the
existing order of nature, when no means of prevention can be found
and applied. But, however, neither of these consequences will take
place, when such antidotes shall be presented as will naturally prevent
them—and a similar consideration should be given to the predictions of
the astrologer—because, if garlick be rubbed on the magnet, iron will
experience no attraction;[27] and if proper medicines be applied to
the wound, it will cease to increase or to putrefy. And therefore all
events which happen to mankind take place also in the regular course
of nature, when no impediments thereto are found or known: but again,
on the other hand, if any impediments or obstructions be found in the
way of events which may be predicted by the regular course of nature
to happen, such events will either not take place at all, or, if they
should take place, will be much diminished in their force and extent.
[26] Whalley, in translating this chapter, makes the following remark
on this mention of the magnet: “However much later it was that the
loadstone became known in Europe, what is mentioned of it in this
chapter makes it evident that it was known in Ægypt, where Ptolemy
lived, in his time.”—That worthy translator forgot (if indeed he ever
knew) that the loadstone’s property of attracting iron was known to
Thales, and commented on by Plato and Aristotle, all of whom lived
some centuries, more or less, before Ptolemy. It is its polarity that
was not known until the 11th or 12th century; and the French say that
the earliest notice of that polarity is found in a poem of Guyot
of Provence, who was at the Emperor Frederick’s Court at Mentz in
1181.—See the French Encyclopædia, &c.
[27] Respecting the effect here asserted to be produced on the magnet
by garlick, I have found the following mention in a book called
“The Gardener’s Labyrinth,” printed at London in 1586. “Here also I
thought not to ouerpasse the maruellous discord of the adamant-stone
and garlike, which the Greeks name to be an Antipatheia or naturall
contrarietie betweene them; for such is the hatred or contrarietie
between these two bodies (lacking both hearing and feeling), that
the adamant rather putteth away, than draweth to it, iron, if the
same afore be rubbed with garlike; as Plutarchus hath noted, and,
after him, Claudius Ptolemæus. Which matter, examined by divers
learned, and founde the contrarie, caused them to judge, that those
skilful men (especially Ptolemie) ment the same to be done with the
Egyptian Garlike; which Dioscorides wrote to be small garlike, and
the same sweete in taste, possessing a bewtifull head, tending unto
a purple colour. There be which attribute the same to Ophioscoridon,
which Antonius Microphonius Biturix, a singular learned man, and wel
practised in sundry skilles, uttered this approoued secrete to a friend
whom he loued.”
In the same book, the “Ophioscoridon” is thus spoken of: “There is
another wild garlike which the Greeks name Ophioscoridon; in English
Ramsies; growing of the owne accord in the fallow fieldes.”
Cornelius Agrippa (according to the English translation) has stated
that the presence of the diamond also neutralizes the attractive power
of the magnet. But as that great magician was somewhat inclined to
quibbling, it is not impossible that by the word he uses for “diamond”
(viz. _adamas_) he may mean the adamant or loadstone; which would
reduce his assertion merely to this, that one magnet will counteract
another.
The same order and consequence exist in all cases, whether the events
have a general or only a particular operation; and it may therefore
well be demanded, why prescience is believed to be possible as far as
it regards general events, and why it is allowed to be serviceable in
preparing for their approach; while in particular instances its power
and use are altogether denied. That the weather and the seasons, and
the indications of the fixed stars, as well as the configurations
of the Moon, afford means of prognostication, many persons admit;
and they exercise this foreknowledge for their own preservation and
comfort, adapting their constitutions to the expected temperature, by
cooling and refreshing things for the summer, and by warm things for
the winter. They also watch the significations of the fixed stars, to
avoid dangerous weather, in making voyages by sea; and they notice
the aspects of the Moon, when at the full, in order to direct the
copulation of their herds and flocks, and the setting of plants or
sewing of seeds: and there is not an individual who considers these
general precautions as impossible or unprofitable. Still, however,
these same persons withhold their assent to the possibility of applying
prescience to particular cases; such, for instance, as any particular
excess or diminution of cold or heat, whether arising out of the
peculiar temperament producing the original cold or heat, or from the
combination of other properties; nor do they admit that there are any
means of guarding against many of these particular circumstances.
And yet, if it be clear that persons, who prepare themselves by
cooling things, are less affected by any general heat of the weather,
there seems no reason for supposing that a similar preparation
would not be equally effectual against any particular conjuncture
oppressed by immoderate heat. It appears, however, that this idea,
of the impracticability of attaining foreknowledge of particular
circumstances, must originate solely in the mere difficulty of the
acquirement; which difficulty is certainly rendered peculiarly arduous
by the necessity of conducting the enquiry with the greatest accuracy
and precision: and to this it must be added, that, as there is rarely
found a person capable of arranging the whole subject so perfectly
that no part of the opposing influence can escape his attention, it
frequently happens that predictions are not properly regulated by
due consideration of that opposing influence, and that the effects
are at once considered fully liable to be brought to pass, agreeably
to the primary agency and without any intervention. This defect, of
not sufficiently considering the opposing influence, has naturally
induced an opinion that all future events are entirely unalterable and
inevitable. But, since the foreknowledge of particular circumstances,
although it may not wholly claim infallibility, seems yet so far
practicable as to merit consideration, so the precaution it affords, in
particular circumstances, deserves in like manner to be attended to;
and, if it be not of universal advantage, but useful in few instances
only, it is still most worthy of estimation, and to be considered
of no moderate value. Of this, the Ægyptians seem to have been well
aware; their discoveries of the great faculties of this science have
exceeded those of other nations, and they have in all cases combined
the medical art with astronomical prognostication. And, had they been
of opinion that all expected events are unalterable and not to be
averted, they never would have instituted any propitiations, remedies,
and preservatives against the influence of the Ambient, whether present
or approaching, general or particular. But, by means of the science
called by them Medical Mathematics, they combined with the power of
prognostication the concurrent secondary influence arising out of the
institutions and courses of nature, as well as the contrary influence
which might be procured out of nature’s variety; and by means of these
they rendered the indicated agency useful and advantageous: since
their astronomy pointed out to them the kind of temperament liable to
be acted upon, as well as the events about to proceed from the Ambient,
and the peculiar influence of those events, while their medical skill
made them acquainted with everything suitable or unsuitable to each of
the effects to be procured. And it is by this process that remedies for
present and preservatives against future disorders are to be acquired:
for, without astronomical knowledge, medical aid would be most
frequently unavailing; since the same identical remedies are not better
calculated for all persons whatsoever, than they are for all diseases
whatsoever.[28]
The practicability and utility of prescience having been thus far
briefly explained, the ensuing discourse must be proceeded with. It
commences, introductorily, with an account of the efficient properties
of each of the heavenly bodies, taken from the rules of the ancients,
whose observations were founded in nature. And, first, of the
influences of the planets and of the Sun and Moon.
[28] This seems to explain the origin of the old alliance between
medicine and astrology, so universally preserved until almost within
the last century.