THE SEDITIOUS CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY FARTHER
CONSIDERED.
Having proved the sedition of the American Anti-Slavery Society as a
political organization, which has usurped the business of the
Government, under a form prohibited by the Constitution, which of
course involves two points of criminality, we shall now proceed to
show, that it is seditious in another important and grave particular,
as having committed, and as continuing to commit, a trespass on the
political rights of the slave-holding States, as guaranteed to them by
the Federal Compact, and as recognized by the law of nations.
In the first place, the action of this Society, as a grand political
organization, on the social fabric of foreign States--for the slave
States are foreign in respect to it--with the intent to change it
against their consent, and thus disturbing their domestic tranquility,
is a violation of the law of nations. This is sedition in a higher and
more important sense, than any combined assault on the social
institutions of a community by its own members, inasmuch as the remedy
is more difficult to be attained, and more momentous in its
consequences. It can be settled only by the sword. The noninterference
of one nation in the domestic condition of another, is an established
doctrine, and a settled maxim, of international law. A trespass on
this principle is always considered tantamount to a declaration of
war. Just in proportion as the peace of nations, in their relations to
each other, is more important than the domestic tranquility of a
single State, and the breach of it more difficult to be healed, is the
criminality of such trespass increased. The action of the American
Anti-Slavery Society, therefore, on the slave-holding States, as an
interference of this kind, is much more responsible and more criminal,
than as a violation of the social fabric of the United States. It
matters not what may be the faults in the social condition of any
State or nation, in the judgment and conscience of the people of
another State or nation; such considerations, however aggravated and
serious, furnish no ground or justification for interference; but the
fact of interference is war begun.
The American Anti-Slavery Society, as we have seen, is a political
organization--unlawful, indeed, but yet such is its character--and as
such they have great power. They hold in their hands the peace and
well being of all the slave States. On the principle above
recognized--the soundness of which we dare to say will not be
questioned--its action on those States is war. It is impossible that
this Society should screen itself from this responsibility under the
plea, that they are only using that freedom of speech and of the
press, and other modes of social influence, which the Constitutional
law of the land has guaranteed. For we have shown, that in the
machinery they have set up, and in their modes of action, they have
transcended that law; and as a consequence it will follow, that they
have cast themselves beyond its protection. It will, moreover, be vain
for them to plead, that they are a part of the same nation, and that
however it may appear, that they have been guilty of sedition in
disturbing the tranquility, by violating the laws, of the Federal
Commonwealth, they have not trespassed on the law of nations. For, we
shall yet, and very soon, have occasion to see, that the sovereignty
of the States composing the American Union, is perfect and unimpaired,
in all that has not been resigned or prohibited in the Federal
Constitution for national purposes; and that, with these exceptions,
the several States occupy precisely the same position, in their
relations to each other, as do any other States or nations. And the
institution of slavery is not comprehended in these exceptions, but
remains the sovereign right of the States where it is established, so
far as it concerns other States, and other nations, and so far as
concerns the whole world out of their jurisdiction. It is therefore
true, that the American Anti-Slavery Society, being a political body,
incorporated in its own claimed and independent right, has made war on
the slave-holding States of the Union.
But as it happens, this Society is a nondescript organization, because
it is an unlawful one. It has no territorial jurisdiction, and no
political relations, apart from its own constituent elements; it is a
parvenu and stranger among recognised republics and nations--a mere
pirate, a brigand, that has broken loose from law, and invaded, from
inaccessible ambushes, the peace of whole communities, putting in
peril the lives of their citizens, and their institutions. It cannot,
therefore, be approached by the injured parties, under that _lex
talionis_ of nations, which is customarily resorted to, when their
honor has been insulted, their rights violated, or their interests
impaired, by a foreign foe. This Society protects itself under the
shield of that Government, of the laws of which its very existence is
a violation. That Government, therefore, is responsible for its
action, and the injured parties have a claim upon it for
indemnification and redress of the evils which they suffer. In
existing circumstances, this is the only medium by which a remedy can
be obtained. Nevertheless, the law of nations has been violated by
foreign interference in the domestic condition of the slaveholding
States--an interference, which, in any other case, would be regarded
as a just occasion for retaliation by a resort to arms.
In the discussion of this point of the subject, we have nothing to do
with the rights of the slave in relation to the authorities by which
he is held in bondage, any more than with those of the serfs of
Poland, or of Hungary, or of Prussia, in case the sympathies of this
Society should happen to take that direction, and make war on the
peace and social institutions of those countries. The two cases are
precisely parallel, and one is as justifiable as the other, by the law
of nations, and of human society as it exists. The authorities of
those countries would fairly hold the Government of the United States
responsible for such an invasion, in the same manner, as we are bound
by treaty with the British Government to maintain our obligations of
neutrality on the Canadian frontier, and to prevent our citizens from
invading the rights, and destroying the lives of British subjects in
their own territory. Even though it could be shown, that the Canadians
are oppressed, and deprived of their just rights, still it would be no
justification or apology for the interference of our citizens. The
same principle precisely applies to the action of the American
Anti-Slavery Society on the Southern States.
But this Society is even more criminal than these invaders of Canada,
because it has first violated the laws of the United States by the
erection of a systematic and unlawful polity, an unconstitutional and
powerful machinery, the plans and scope of which, if not abandoned or
suppressed, are adequate to protract, perpetuate, and forever to
augment the illegal and destructive powers they have set in operation,
till they shall upset the Government, and desolate the South; whereas
the invasion of Canada is nothing more than the mad enterprise of a
few deluded individuals. Had they followed the example of the American
Anti-Slavery Society,--which, doubtless, they had an equal right to
do--and set up a like political organization, under like immunities,
and with like strength of preparation, they would inevitably have
involved this country in a war with Great Britain. What sufferance,
therefore, has been practised towards this Society! And what
protracted injuries have the Southern States been compelled to endure!
As remarked in the previous chapter, it is the perfectly anomalous
character of this enterprise, which has so long embarrassed the public
mind. All not engaged in it, have felt it to be wrong; the wide spread
indignation, and the popular outbreaks it has occasioned in rebuke of
its designs and operations, show that it involves some great and
vitally important principle in our social fabric; but its distinct and
definite character, and its exact political position and relations,
have not heretofore been evolved and so exhibited, as to enable the
public to see it clearly, and to know how to treat it. It was the
suddenness and novelty of the movement, as a grand and unlawful
political transaction, that astounded the public mind, and threw it
from the balance of its wonted composure; but the agitation and
disturbance it occasioned are prima facie evidence of its aberration
from right principles--of its criminality. That cannot be regarded, by
sober minds, other than a highly responsible operation in society,
which breaks its peace, and puts in peril its political existence; and
we dare to aver, that the common impression of its criminality cannot
be without good reason. Even if no law had been violated, other than a
common and implied obligation of all good citizens to keep the peace,
and sustain the tranquil operation of our Constitution and laws, that
is enough to authorize a verdict of guilty against this Society on the
_general_ charge of a public nuisance. But in all points of view we
find there is recognised and written law for the case, and the common
feeling of the public mind is honored and sustained by the
investigation. We might fairly presume it impossible for this feeling
to be wrong, as it springs up spontaneously in the bosom of a
community where slavery is not only disapproved, but abhorred.
It is morally certain, therefore, that it is not a feeling of
complacency in slavery, nor any desire, nor even willingness, to see
it perpetuated, that has arrayed itself so generally in the North
against the Abolition movement. But it is a conviction, that the
supreme law of the land has been invaded, and the certain knowledge,
that the public peace has been disturbed, and the stability and
permanence of our social and political institutions put in peril. It
is a correct view of the nature of our political fabric, which leads
the public mind, in such an exigency, to the conclusion, that the
people of one State have no right to interfere with the domestic
condition of another, unless that right has been _specified_ and
conferred in the Federal compact; and that even then, it can be
employed only in general concert by a representation of all the States
in Congress assembled. The people know, as they are bound to know, so
long as they claim the privilege of self-government, that the rights
of the several States, not transferred or prohibited by the general
Constitution, are sacred in their own keeping, and ought to be sacred
from foreign interference and invasion. And although they may not have
discovered, and as would appear, have not, as a body, that the
_organization_ of the American Anti-Slavery is an open and flagrant
violation of law, yet they have felt and been convinced, that its
_transactions_ are of this character. Hence the public feeling of
remonstrance and indignation, that has been manifested. It is not
unprovoked and wanton; it is not an opposition to the principle of
Abolition in itself considered, for all the early and abiding
prejudices of the North are on that side; it is not persecution,
however such a clamour may be raised, for there is no adequate moral
cause; but it is an attachment to the existing, and long tried,
institutions of the country, which, though they may not be perfect,
are yet deemed too valuable to be suddenly and ruthlessly broken down
by a faction--by an organized sedition. This feeling, therefore, is
worthy of some respect--nay, of the greatest respect--for it proves to
be based on sound Constitutional principles. We hold it to be
impossible, that a lawful enterprise could produce so great an
excitement, under a Constitution and Government so good, and so well
approved, as ours.
But, having disposed of this subject, as a violation of the law of
nations, which involves the highest criminality, because it is liable
to work mischief on the largest scale, and of the deepest die, let us
consider it as a violation of the Federal Compact, in an Article not
yet introduced: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” This is the Tenth Article of
the Constitution of the United States; and although it involves
precisely the same principle of international law, as that we have
just been considering, it presents itself here in the character and
with the sanction of a corporate element of our own political fabric.
It draws the line, in black and white, between the powers of the
nation and those of the States respectively. It leaves the States in
absolute and uncontrolled possession of all the sovereign powers,
customarily asserted and employed by sovereign States, which are not
delegated or prohibited in the general Constitution; and one of those
powers is a sovereign right of legislation and control over the
institution of slavery. Another, of course, is the common and national
right, universally recognized, of claiming the unrestricted scope and
benefit of the law of noninterference in regard to this matter. This
Article of the Federal Constitution places every State precisely on
the footing, and in the position, of nations entirely independent of
each other, in all particulars not surrendered or prohibited by this
instrument. Its language is, that all other powers--“the powers not
delegated, &c. are _reserved_ to the States _respectively_, or to the
people.” Whatever may have been intended by this alternative of “_the
people_,” it cannot be construed to qualify or restrict the object of
our present remarks. We suppose it points to the principle of general
sovereignty, as appears to be recognized in the Ninth Article, as
follows: “The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people;” that is--if we may be allowed the privilege of interpretation
here--those general rights of sovereignty, which belong to all
nations, acting in their Constitutional modes, authorizing measures
adapted to unforeseen exigencies. Certainly, this rule cannot be
construed to authorize a minority, or a faction, to do what they
please, or to depart from the constituted forms of law. And that is
all the bar we have any occasion, for our present purpose, to
introduce, whatever other interpretation may be given to it.
The sovereignty of the States, in and over their own respective
jurisdictions, in all that is not taken out of their hands by the
National Constitution, is recognized and settled by the Tenth Article;
and the power to claim the privilege of _noninterference_ from foreign
quarters, as to their domestic condition, is a part of that
sovereignty. Consequently, if the people, or any association of
people, in one State, should interfere with the domestic concerns of
another, they are guilty of sedition in and against the Republic; and
on the principles of international law, if it be a seriously
disturbing movement--of which the injured party is constituted
judge--they have made war upon that State, and furnished a just
occasion of resort to arms, if remedy and redress can be obtained in
no other way. We speak not the language of advice, but of the law
simply--of recognized and established principles of civilized and
political society;--and so far as the question of sedition is
concerned, we speak of the supreme law of this land. In the condition
and relations of the members of our Confederacy, the remedy for such
interference is doubtless to be sought through the medium, and by the
action, of the General Government. If that Government should prove
incompetent, or be unwilling, to perform the duty claimed by the
injured party, and devolving upon it in such an exigency, the natural
consequence would be a dissolution of the Union, and a probable resort
to arms. And this is the result to which our country is now imminently
exposed by the seditious and criminal interferences of the American
Anti-Slavery Society, with the domestic condition of the slave-holding
States. They have no more right to meddle with Southern slavery, than
with that of the Irish peasantry, or of the miserable beings immured
in British Manufactories, or of Hungarian, or Polish, or Russian
boors, which, in each of these instances, is far more worthy of
commiseration and relief, than the slavery of the Southern States, and
calls louder for the offices of humanity, if any such interferences
would be tolerated.
But the case is even stronger than has yet been stated. The General
Government itself cannot interfere in this matter, except to keep the
peace, and _prevent_ interference; and this they are bound to do. The
Federal Constitution has recognized the validity of slave property,
and established a law to maintain and defend it, throughout the
jurisdiction of the United States, as follows: “No person held to
service, or labor, in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping to
another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be
discharged from such service, or labor; but shall be delivered up on
claim of the party to whom such labor or service may be due.” Art. IV,
Sect. II, Clause 3d. The Tenth Article of the Constitution cuts off
all interference of the General Government, in the matter of slavery,
as it exists in any of the States. Next, it debars interference to all
the States, in relation to each other. Much more does it debar such
interference to private citizens, or to any combinations of citizens,
in any State, or States, with the slavery of other States. For,
surely, that right of property, which the public authorities may not
infringe, may not be infringed by those who are not invested with
authority. Neither can a private citizen, or any combinations of
citizens, lawfully disturb or weaken the possession of property, which
is sanctioned and upheld by the laws of the land.
Moreover, the General Government is bound by an express law of the
Federal Constitution to protect and defend this species of property
against invasion, conspiracy, insurrection, and violence: “The United
States shall protect every State in this Union _against invasion_; and
on application of the legislature, or of the executive, when the
legislature cannot be convened, _against domestic violence_.” Of
course, this is a general and comprehensive rule for all possible
exigencies of the kind; but it is generally understood--the last
clause, particularly, respecting “domestic violence”--to have been
enacted in anticipation of _servile_ insurrections, and such other
disturbances as are liable to occur under a system of slavery. Any
how, the rule applies to these cases, and comprehends them; and that
is enough. The General Government is bound to keep the peace under its
own laws; and whenever the slave-holding States shall have occasion
for its services, in consequence of “domestic violence,” or of
“invasion,” they have a right to demand them, under this law of the
Constitution; and they would no doubt be promptly afforded.
We see, therefore, that slavery is protected and defended at all
points by the political fabric of this country. We profess, that we
have no complacency in slavery, and never had: and that we have no
gratification in coming to this conclusion, so far as it presents the
prospect of the perpetuity of this acknowledged evil. But the time has
come when a far greater evil, than that of slavery, threatens this
land, in the unlawful measures which have been concerted, and which
are being unlawfully urged, to do it away. The time has come, when it
is important for the public to know what the law is, in relation to
this movement; that they may know how to appreciate it, and how to
act. The time has come, when it would be treason to the country
wilfully to conceal the law, or to misinterpret it; for the law is the
only power, that can settle this question in the public mind, on this
side of that fearful resort, which brings despotism first, and
barbarism last. Whatever the law is, we want to know it; the people of
this country want to know it; and we believe they will abide by it,
till, in peaceable times, they can make a better, if a better can be
made.
The Abolitionists of this country are fast driving the people to the
law--to a law, which has long been asleep and forgotten, because there
was no demand for its authority; to a law, which we think, will
assuredly work against the Agitators; to a law, which may yet have
occasion to say to the tempest they have raised--“Hitherto shalt thou
come, but no further.”