INCIDENTS IN THE AFGHAN WAR.
[I would like to follow this brief and unpretentious narrative of my
life with a sketch of the operations of a British force, in which my
old regiment was brigaded, in the Afghan war.]
Just before sunset on the twentieth of November, 1878, the 2nd Brigade
of the Peshawur Valley Field Force, consisting of the Guides Infantry,
the 1st Sikhs, and the 17th Foot under Brigadier-General J. A.
Tytler--the strength being forty British officers, 1,700 men, of whom
600 were Europeans--left its camp at Jamrud to begin the flank march
which was to ensure the completeness of Sir Sam. Browne's victory over
the garrison of Masjid. The 17th Regiment had spent the summer in the
Murree Hills, where it had been carefully trained for the work that lay
before it. Evatt, in his Recollections, says: "It was about the last of
the long service battalions of that army which was just then
disappearing before the short system, and better specimens of that old
regime could not be seen than the men of the 17th, who for weight and
space occupied per man were probably thirty per cent. heavier and much
broader than the younger soldiers of to-day." Speed being essential to
success and the difficulties presented by the country to be traversed
very great, tents, bedding and baggage were left behind, to be sent up
later through the Pass; and the troops took with them only a small
hospital establishment, a reserve of ammunition, two days' cooked
rations, and a supply of water stored in big leather bags, known as
pukkals. In addition to their great coats, seventy rounds of ammunition
and one day's cooked rations was carried by each man.
Unfortunately the greater part of the transport allotted to the brigade
consisted of bullocks instead of mules--a mistake which was to leave
the men without food for over twenty-four hours. Darkness soon closed
in upon the column, and when the comparatively easy road across the Jam
plain gave place to an ill-defined track running up a deep ravine,
sometimes on one side of a mountain stream, sometimes on the other,
sometimes in its very bed, even the native guides, men of the district,
familiar with its every rock and stone, were often at fault. The
transport animals blundered into the midst of the troops. One corps
lost touch with another. A large part of the 17th Regiment wandered
away from the path, and was with difficulty brought back to it by the
shouting and whistling of its commander. There was so much confusion
and so many delays that it was ten o'clock before the force, tired and
cold, the men's boots and putties soaked through and through from
frequent crossing and recrossing of the Lashora River, arrived at the
little hamlet of the same name. Here it settled down to such rest as
could be obtained under these uncomfortable conditions, for fires were
out of the question where there was no certainty that hidden foes might
not be lurking close at hand.
The 1st Brigade, consisting of the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade, the 4th
Gurkhas, the 20th Punjab Infantry, and the Hazars Mountain Battery,
fared even worse than the 2nd, for it had to begin the day with
marching from Hari Singhka-Burg to Jamrud, where it arrived to find, to
the disgust of its commander, Brigadier-General Macpherson, that the
supplies and transports which ought to have been awaiting it were not
ready, and to be kept hanging about till 11 p.m. before it could get a
fresh start. What with the darkness, the difficulty of getting the
laden bullocks along, the practical absence of a road, the subsequent
march proved very trying, and the position of the troops throughout the
night was potentially one of great peril. If the Mohmands had come down
the eastern slopes of the Rhotas Heights and fallen upon them as they
stumbled and groped their way along the Lashora ravine, Macpherson
would have had to choose between a retreat or an advance up the steep
mountain side, three thousand feet high, in pursuit of an invisible
enemy, and exposed to a shower of rocks and stones--missiles which
every hill-man knows well how to handle.
Fortunately no such alternative was presented to him, and the head of
the column--the rear guard being still far behind--reached Lashora
between six and seven o'clock on the morning of the 21st, just as the
2nd Brigade was preparing to leave it, and halted to look up and give
Tytler a fair start. The latter did his best to get and keep well
ahead, but though his brigade, led by that active officer, Colonel F.
H. Jenkins, pushed on as fast as it could, its progress was painfully
slow. The column advancing in single file extended over a distance of
nearly three miles, and as the sun rose high in the heavens the
reflected heat from the bare slaty rocks became almost insupportable.
There were no trees to give the men shade, or springs to slake their
thirst. For the first four miles the road continued to ascend the
Lashora ravine between hills on the right hand and rocky, overhanging
spurs a thousand feet high on the left. On issuing thence it dwindled
to a mere goat track which ran uphill and downhill, scaling cliffs and
dropping into gorges, the shaly soil at every step slipping away from
under the feet of men, mules and bullocks, retarding the advance of the
two former and almost bringing the latter to a standstill. It was two
o'clock in the afternoon when the column, having crossed the Sapparia,
or grassy flats, leading up to the watersheds, arrived at Pani Pal at
the foot of the pass connecting the Rhotas Heights with the Tartara
Mountain, the highest peak in this group of hills. Here a wide and
varied view became suddenly visible. Far away to the north the
snowcapped Himalayas gleamed in the sunshine; to the south the broad
Indus washed the base of Fort Attock, and wound through the salt hills
and plains of the Derajat; whilst to the west, almost immediately below
the wilderness of rocks in which the invaders had halted, lay, in deep
shadow, the yawning chasm of the Khyber--a magnificent prospect; but a
spring of cool fresh water which was soon discovered had more
attractions for the hot and thirsty troops, and Tytler's whole
attention was absorbed in scanning the country for a possible enemy and
trying to trace the course of the three paths which branched off from
this commanding point. One of these runs northward by a circuitous and
comparatively easy route, through Mohmand territory to the Khyber. The
second descends abruptly to the same pass through the gorge which
separates the Tartara Mountain from the Rhotas Heights. The third
follows the crest of those heights to their highest point, just over
Ali Masjid. It was by the second of these roads that the column was to
find its way down to Kata Kushtia, and Tytler, though hard pressed for
time, felt so strongly that he must not entangle his troops in such
difficult ground without first ascertaining whether danger would
threaten their left flank and rear, that he decided to halt his force,
whilst Jenkins and a company of the Guides reconnoitred towards the
heights. Scarcely had this party left Pani Pal when a strange
reverberation filled the air, which Jenkins, on laying his ear to the
ground, at once pronounced to be the booming of heavy guns, and as the
reconnoiterers drew near to the edge of the ridge overlooking Ali
Masjid, the sound of artillery fire became more and more clear and
distinct. Though cave dwellings and patches of cultivation had
occasionally been passed, with here and there the tower of some robber
chieftain, the country, but for one small band of marauders which
exchanged shots with the head of the column, had appeared to be
entirely deserted by its inhabitants. Now a large number of armed
Mohmands came suddenly into sight, rushing down the hillside, and
Jenkins fell back upon Pani Pal to report what he had seen and heard.
The news that the main body of the division was engaged with the enemy
quickly spread through the ranks, and the men, forgetting fatigue and
hunger--the last of the food carried by them had been eaten before
leaving Lashora, and the bullocks carrying the rest of the rations had
long since parted company with the troops--were eager to push on. But
Tytler saw clearly that the circumstances in which he now found himself
demanded a change in the original plan, by which the whole of his force
was to take up its position across the Khyber defile.
As the Mohmands were evidently present in great strength and hostilely
inclined, and as his hospital establishment and commissariat were six
miles in rear, and the brigade which ought to have covered his left
flank was also behind--by abandoning Pani Pal he would not only lose
his communications with the latter and expose the former to danger and
the risk of being cut off and captured, but would leave open the road
by which the Mohmand contingent in Ali Masjid might retire from that
fortress after its fall, or by which it could be reinforced in case
that fall should be delayed. Very reluctantly, therefore, though with
soldier-like promptness, he made up his mind to send Jenkins with the
Guides and the major portion of the 1st Sikhs to Kata Kushtia, whilst
he himself, with a detachment of the latter corps and Her Majesty's
17th Regiment, remained at Pani Pal to guard Jenkins' rear and keep in
touch with Macpherson. That general, having detached the 20th Punjaub
Infantry under Major H. W. Gordon to cover his left, had resumed his
march at 8 a.m., and following in Tytler's wake had soon overtaken that
officer's commissariat bullocks, which so blocked the narrow path that
the troops had considerable difficulty in forcing their way through
them.
Between two and three o'clock the column arrived at the lower edge of
the flats (Sapparia) previously mentioned, where it was fortunate
enough to find a little water. By this time the men, who had been over
thirty hours under arms, were so worn out that Colonels Newdigate and
Turton reported their respective regiments, the Rifle Brigade and the
4th Gurkhas, unfit to go farther, and Macpherson, like Tytler, had to
accept the responsibility of modifying the part assigned to him in the
common programme, and to some extent for the same reason, viz., the
danger to which his hospital and commissariat transport would be
exposed if, by pushing on to the summit of the Rhotas Heights, he were
to put it out of his power to protect them during the dark hours which
were close at hand.
On the flats, then, the main body of the turning party bivouacked on
the evening of November 21st, whilst the flanking regiment, after many
hours of stiff climbing, during the course of which it had been
threatened by a large number of Mohmands, established itself at dusk on
the top of Turhai, a ridge parallel to and immediately under the Rhotas
Heights.
No sooner had the Guides and the 1st Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Jenkins, taken up a position on the hill opposite the village of Kata
Kushtia, which completely commanded the Khyber Pass, here some 600
yards broad, than a party of the enemy's cavalry, about fifty in
number, was perceived at 4:30 p.m., leisurely making their way up the
pass. To make the garrison of Ali Masjid realise that their retreat was
cut off, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins ordered his men to open fire upon
these Afghan horsemen at a range of about 500 yards. Several were
dismounted and the rest galloped away, some back to Ali Masjid and some
up the Khyber Pass. As it began to grow dusk a larger body of the
enemy's cavalry, accompanied by a small party of infantry, came from
the direction of Ali Masjid riding hard for their lives as they passed
the place where the troops were posted, from which it was evident that
the retreat from Ali Masjid had commenced. This body of Afghans came
under fire of 200 or 300 rifles within 300 to 500 yards' range and
suffered some loss. As darkness closed in the Guides and the 1st Sikhs
lay down on the rocks about one hundred feet above the level of the
stream, and no large body of the enemy passed during the night,
although, doubtless, men moving singly or in small parties escaped.
Meanwhile, at 2:15 a.m., on the 21st of November, the 1st Infantry
Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, C.B.,
V.C., marched from the camp at Jamrud and followed in the track of the
2nd Brigade, which preceded them by eight hours and forty minutes. The
fighting strength of the brigade amounted to 43 British officers, 569
British rank and file, and 1,345 natives of all ranks.
Marching under the same conditions, as regards equipment and supplies,
as the 2nd Brigade, this column reached Lashora in four and a quarter
hours, although the 20th Punjaubis made a slight detour by mistake.
On reaching the foot of the Tabai spur leading to the Rhotas ridge,
about six miles from Jamrud, four companies of the 20th Punjaub
Infantry, amounting to 243 men, commanded by Major Gordon, were
detached to occupy the Tabai ridge below the Rhotas summit, and there
to await the arrival of the remainder of the brigade on the main ridge
leading to the enemy's sangars on the summit, when a simultaneous
attack would be made on it about noon. The Rhotas peak was to be
occupied, if possible, and heliographic communication established with
Jamrud, for which purpose four signalers were attached to this
detachment.
As has been seen, the 2nd Brigade was just moving off as the 1st
Brigade arrived at Lashora, and it became necessary for the 1st Brigade
to halt for an hour to allow Tytler's column to get clear. But at 7:30
a.m. Macpherson's force resumed its march, ascending a tolerably easy
path from the bed of the river and crossing the ridge to the left into
the Lashora Nala. Above Lashora the path wound through a narrow, rocky
ravine, overhung by precipitous and rugged hills, where the progress of
the column was much impeded by the baggage animals of the 2nd Infantry
Brigade, many of which (bullocks and buffaloes) were quite unfit for
such service. These animals can never move but at a very slow pace, and
in difficult places often come to a complete standstill.
The 17th Regiment and the 27th Punjaub Infantry were ordered to
advance, and they were met by a determined resistance, the flags of the
Afghans keeping well to the front in spite of the heavy fire of our
infantry.
Here Lieutenant N. C. Wiseman, 17th Foot, followed by two or three of
his men, charged one standard bearer and ran him through, but the
gallant officer was instantly surrounded and cut to pieces. The enemy
now showed signs of giving way, upon which an order was sent to the
cavalry on the right to attack on the first favorable opportunity. But
before this order was received both regiments charged successfully. The
troops were then ordered to retire to camp, as the enemy was completely
dispersed. The action commenced about 2 p.m. and by 4:30 p.m. the
enemy's position was captured. The estimated loss of the Afghans was
between 300 and 400 men, while the casualties among the troops amounted
to two British officers, one native officer, twenty horses and three
men killed and four native officers and thirty-six men wounded.