FALSE POLICY IN OUR FRENCH WAR.

We have never put forth half the strength which we have exerted in

ordinary wars. In the fatal battles which have drenched the continent

with blood, and shaken the system of Europe to pieces, we have never

had any considerable army of a magnitude to be compared to the least of

those by which, in former times, we so gloriously asserted our place

as protectors, not oppressors, at the head of the great commonwealth

of Europe. We have never manfully met the danger in front: and when the

enemy, resigning to us our natural dominion of the ocean, and abandoning

the defence of his distant possessions to the infernal energy of the

destroying principles which he had planted there for the subversion

of the neighbouring colonies, drove forth, by one sweeping law of

unprecedented despotism, his armed multitudes on every side, to

overwhelm the countries and states which had for centuries stood the

firm barriers against the ambition of France; we drew back the arm of

our military force, which had never been more than half raised to oppose

him. From that time we have been combating only with the other arm of

our naval power; the right arm of England I admit; but which struck

almost unresisted with blows that could never reach the heart of the

hostile mischief. From that time, without a single effort to regain

those outworks, which ever till now we so strenuously maintained, as

the strong frontier of our own dignity and safety, no less than the

liberties of Europe; with but one feeble attempt to succour those brave,

faithful, and numerous allies, whom, for the first time since the days

of our Edwards and Henrys, we now have in the bosom of France itself;

we have been intrenching, and fortifying, and garrisoning ourselves at

home: we have been redoubling security on security, to protect ourselves

from invasion, which has now become to us a serious object of alarm and

terror. Alas! the few of us who have protracted life in any measure near

to the extreme limits of our short period, have been condemned to see

strange things; new systems of policy, new principles, and not only

new men, but what might appear a new species of men. I believe that any

person who was of age to take a part in public affairs forty years ago

(if the intermediate space of time were expunged from his memory)

would hardly credit his senses, when he should hear from the highest

authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in

this island, and that in the neighbouring island there were at least

fourscore thousand more. But when he had recovered from his surprise on

being told of this army, which has not its parallel, what must be his

astonishment to be told again, that this mighty force was kept up for

the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence, and that in its far

greater part, it was disabled by its constitution and very essence from

defending us against an enemy by any one preventive stroke, or any one

operation of active hostility? What must his reflections be on learning

further, that a fleet of five hundred men of war, the best appointed,

and to the full as ably commanded as any this country ever had upon the

sea, was for the greater part employed in carrying on the same system of

unenterprising defence? what must be the sentiments and feelings of

one who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to

understand that these two islands, with their extensive and everywhere

vulnerable coast, should be considered as a garrisoned sea-town; what

would such a man, what would any man think, if the garrison of so

strange a fortress should be such, and so feebly commanded, as never to

make a sally; and that, contrary to all which has hitherto been seen in

war, an infinitely inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost

annihilated navy, ill found and ill manned, may with safety besiege this

superior garrison, and, without hazarding the life of a man, ruin the

place, merely by the menaces and false appearances of an attack? Indeed,

indeed, my dear friend, I look upon this matter of our defensive system

as much the most important of all considerations at this moment. It has

oppressed me with many anxious thoughts, which, more than any bodily

distemper, have sunk me to the condition in which you know that I am.

Should it please Providence to restore to me even the late weak

remains of my strength, I propose to make this matter the subject of

a particular discussion. I only mean here to argue, that the mode of

conducting the war on our part, be it good or bad, has prevented even

the common havoc of war in our population, and especially among that

class whose duty and privilege of superiority it is to lead the way

amidst the perils and slaughter of the field of battle.

Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Edmund Burke · 第 333 / 361 题