In a Christian commonwealth the church and the state are one and the
same thing, being different integral parts of the same whole. For the
church has been always divided into two parts, the clergy and the laity;
of which the laity is as much an essential integral part, and has as
much its duties and privileges, as the clerical member; and in the rule,
order, and government of the church has its share. Religion is so far,
in my opinion, from being out of the province of the duty of a Christian
magistrate, that it is, and it ought to be, not only his care, but the
principal thing in his care; because it is one of the great bonds of
human society; and its object the supreme good, the ultimate end and
object of man himself. The magistrate, who is a man, and charged with
the concerns of men, and to whom very specially nothing human is
remote and indifferent, has a right and a duty to watch over it with
an unceasing vigilance, to protect, to promote, to forward it by every
rational, just, and prudent means. It is principally his duty to prevent
the abuses, which grow out of every strong and efficient principle, that
actuates the human mind. As religion is one of the bonds of society, he
ought not to suffer it to be made the pretext of destroying its peace,
order, liberty, and its security. Above all, he ought strictly to look
to it when men begin to form new combinations, to be distinguished by
new names, and especially when they mingle a political system with their
religious opinions, true or false, plausible or implausible.
It is the interest, and it is the duty, and because it is the interest
and the duty, it is the right of government to attend much to opinions;
because, as opinions soon combine with passions, even when they do not
produce them, they have much influence on actions. Factions are formed
upon opinions; which factions become in effect bodies corporate in the
state;--nay, factions generate opinions in order to become a centre
of union, and to furnish watch-words to parties; and this may make it
expedient for government to forbid things in themselves innocent and
neutral. I am not fond of defining with precision what the ultimate
rights of the sovereign supreme power in providing for the safety of the
commonwealth may be, or may not extend to. It will signify very little
what my notions, or what their own notions, on the subject may be;
because, according to the exigence, they will take, in fact, the steps
which seem to them necessary for the preservation of the whole; for as
self-preservation in individuals is the first law of nature, the same
will prevail in societies, who will, right or wrong, make that an object
paramount to all other rights whatsoever.