LEGISLATION AND REPUBLICANS.

The legislators who framed the ancient republics knew that their

business was too arduous to be accomplished with no better apparatus

than the metaphysics of an undergraduate, and the mathematics and

arithmetic of an exciseman. They had to do with men, and they were

obliged to study human nature. They had to do with citizens, and they

were obliged to study the effects of those habits which are communicated

by the circumstances of civil life. They were sensible that the

operation of this second nature on the first produced a new combination;

and thence arose many diversities amongst men, according to their birth,

their education, their professions, the periods of their lives, their

residence in towns or in the country, their several ways of acquiring

and of fixing property, and according to the quality of the property

itself, all which rendered them as it were so many different species

of animals. From hence they thought themselves obliged to dispose their

citizens into such classes, and to place them in such situations in the

state as their peculiar habits might qualify them to fill, and to allot

to them such appropriated privileges as might secure to them what their

specific occasions required, and which might furnish to each description

such force as might protect it in the conflict caused by the diversity

of interests that must exist, and must contend, in all complex society;

for the legislator would have been ashamed that the coarse husbandman

should well know how to assort and to use his sheep, horses, and oxen,

and should have enough of common sense not to abstract and equalize them

all into animals, without providing for each kind an appropriate food,

care, and employment; whilst he, the economist, disposer, and shepherd

of his own kindred, subliming himself into an airy metaphysician, was

resolved to know nothing of his flocks but as men in general. It is

for this reason that Montesquieu observed, very justly, that in their

classification of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity made

the greatest display of their powers, and even soared above themselves.

It is here that your modern legislators have gone deep into the negative

series, and sunk even below their own nothing. As the first sort of

legislators attended to the different kinds of citizens, and

combined them into one commonwealth, the others, the metaphysical and

alchemistical legislators, have taken the directly contrary course. They

have attempted to confound all sorts of citizens, as well as they could,

into one homogeneous mass; and then they divided this their amalgama

into a number of incoherent republics. They reduce men to loose

counters, merely for the sake of simple telling, and not to figures

whose power is to arise from their place in the table. The elements of

their own metaphysics might have taught them better lessons. The troll

of their categorical table might have informed them that there was

something else in the intellectual world besides SUBSTANCE and QUANTITY.

They might learn from the catechism of metaphysics that there were eight

heads more, in every complex deliberation, which they have never thought

of; though these, of all the ten, are the subjects on which the skill

of man can operate anything at all. So far from this able disposition of

some of the old republican legislators, which follows with a solicitous

accuracy the moral conditions and propensities of men, they have leveled

and crushed together all the orders which they found, even under the

coarse, unartificial arrangement of the monarchy, in which mode of

government the classing of the citizens is not of so much importance as

in a republic. It is true, however, that every such classification, if

properly ordered, is good in all forms of government; and composes a

strong barrier against the excesses of despotism, as well as it is the

necessary means of giving effect and permanence to a republic. For want

of something of this kind, if the present project of a republic should

fail, all securities to a moderated freedom fail along with it; all the

indirect restraints which mitigate despotism are removed; insomuch that

if monarchy should ever again obtain an entire ascendancy in France,

under this or under any other dynasty, it will probably be, if not

voluntarily tempered at setting out by the wise and virtuous counsels of

the prince, the most completely arbitrary power that has ever appeared

on earth. This is to play a most desperate game.

Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Edmund Burke · 第 229 / 361 题