I am not possessed of an exact common measure between real service and
its reward. I am very sure that states do sometimes receive services
which it is hardly in their power to reward according to their worth. If
I were to give my judgment with regard to this country, I do not think
the great efficient offices of the state to be overpaid. The service of
the public is a thing which cannot be put to auction, and struck down
to those who will agree to execute it the cheapest. When the proportion
between reward and service is our object, we must always consider of
what nature the service is, and what sort of men they are that must
perform it. What is just payment for one kind of labour, and full
encouragement for one kind of talents, is fraud and discouragement to
others. Many of the great offices have much duty to do, and much expense
of representation to maintain. A secretary of state, for instance, must
not appear sordid in the eyes of the ministers of other nations; neither
ought our ministers abroad to appear contemptible in the courts where
they reside. In all offices of duty, there is, almost necessarily,
a great neglect of all domestic affairs. A person in high office can
rarely take a view of his family house. If he sees that the state takes
no detriment, the state must see that his affairs should take as little.
I will even go so far as to affirm, that if men were willing to serve in
such situations without salary, they ought not to be permitted to do it.
Ordinary service must be secured by the motives to ordinary integrity.
I do not hesitate to say, that that state which lays its foundations in
rare and heroic virtues, will be sure to have its superstructure in the
basest profligacy and corruption. An honourable and fair profit is the
best security against avarice and rapacity; as in all things else, a
lawful and regulated enjoyment is the best security against debauchery
and excess. For as wealth is power, so all power will infallibly draw
wealth to itself by some means or other: and when men are left no way of
ascertaining their profits but by their means of obtaining them, those
means will be increased to infinity. This is true in all the parts
of administration, as well as in the whole. If any individual were
to decline his appointments, it might give an unfair advantage to
ostentatious ambition over unpretending service; it might breed
invidious comparisons; it might tend to destroy whatever little unity
and agreement may be found among ministers. And, after all, when an
ambitious man had run down his competitors by a fallacious show of
disinterestedness, and fixed himself in power by that means, what
security is there that he would not change his course, and claim as an
indemnity ten times more than he has given up?