THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN
Governor Dinwiddie's zeal had increased in inverse ratio to the success
of Virginian arms. After Washington's repulse at Fort Necessity he
redoubled his energies, incited by a letter received from one of
Washington's hostages at Fort Duquesne. Colonel Innes was appointed to
command the Virginia troops and superintend the erection of Fort
Cumberland, while Washington was ordered to fill up his depleted
companies by enlistments and to move out again to Fort Cumberland.
Indeed it was only by objections urged in the very strongest manner that
the inconsiderate Governor was deterred from launching another destitute
and ill-equipped expedition into the snow-drifted Alleghenies.
But there was activity elsewhere than in Virginia during the winter of
1754-5. Contrecoeur, commanding at Fort Duquesne, sent clear reports of
the campaign of 1754. The French cause was strengthening. The success of
the French had had a wonderful effect on the indifferent Indians;
hundreds before only half-hearted came readily under French domination.
All this was of utmost moment to New France, possibly of more importance
than keeping her chain of forts to Quebec unbroken. As Joncaire, the
drunken commander on the Allegheny, had told Washington in 1753, the
English could raise two men in America to their one--but not including
their Indians.
It is, probably, impossible for us to realize with what feelings the
French anticipated war with England on the American continent. The long
campaigns in Europe had cost both nations much and had brought no return
to either. Even Marshal Saxe's brilliant victories were purchased at a
fabulous price, and, at the end, Louis had given up all that was gained
in order to pose "as a Prince and not as a merchant." But in America
there was a prize which both of these nations desired and which was
worth fighting for--the grandest prize ever won in war! Between the
French and English colonies lay this black forest stretching from Maine
through New York and Pennsylvania and Virginia to the Gulf of Mexico. It
seemed, to the French, the silliest dream imaginable for the English to
plan to pierce this forest and conquer New France. To reach any of the
French forts a long passage by half-known courses through an
inhospitable wilderness was necessary; and the French knew by a century
of experience what a Herculean task it was to carry troops and stores
over the inland water and land ways of primeval America. But for the
task they had had much assistance from the Indians and were favored in
many instances by the currents of these rivers; the English had almost
no Indian allies and in every case were compelled to ascend their rivers
to reach the French. However, the formation of the Ohio Company and the
lively days of the summer of 1754 in the Alleghenies aroused France as
nothing else could; here was one young Virginian officer who had found
his way through the forests, and there was no telling how many more
there might be like him. And France, tenfold more disturbed by
Washington's campaign than there was need for, performed wonders during
the winter of 1754-5. The story of the action at Fort Necessity was
transmitted to London and was represented by the British ambassadors at
Paris as an open violation of the peace, "which did not meet with the
same degree of respect," writes a caustic historian, "as on former
occasions of complaint: the time now nearly approaching for the French
to pull off the mask of moderation and peace."[1] As if to confirm this
suspicion, the French marine became suddenly active, the Ministry
ordered a powerful armament to be fitted at Brest; "in all these
armaments," wrote the Earl of Holderness's secret agent, "there appeared
a plain design to make settlements and to build forts; besides, that it
was given out, they resolved to augment the fortifications at Louisburg,
and to build more forts on the Ohio."[2]
But there was activity now in England, too. Governor Sharpe of
Maryland, but lately appointed Commander-in-chief in America, had only a
hint of what was being planned and was to have even less share in its
accomplishment; in vain his friends extolled him as honest--"a little
less honesty," declared George II, characteristically, "and a little
more ability were more to be desired at the moment." And the rule worked
on both sides of the Atlantic. American affairs had long been in the
hands of the Secretary of the Board of Trade, the Duke of Newcastle, as
perfect an ass as ever held high office. He had opposed every policy
that did not accord with his own "time serving selfishness" with a
persistency only matched by his unparalleled ignorance. Once thrown into
a panic, it is said, at a rumor that a large French army had been thrown
into Cape Breton, he was asked where the necessary transports had been
secured.
"Transports," he shrieked, "I tell you they marched by land!"
"By land, to the island of Cape Breton?" was the astonished reply.
"What, is Cape Breton an island? Are you sure of that?" and he ran away
with an "Egad, I will go directly and tell the King that Cape Breton is
an island!" It is not surprising that a government which could ever have
tolerated such a man in high office should have neglected, then abused,
and then lost its American colonies.
But Newcastle gave way to an abler man. The new campaign in North
America was the conception of the Captain-general of the British Army,
the Duke of Cumberland, hero of Culloden.
On November 14, 1754, King George opened Parliament with the statement
that "His principal view should be to strengthen the foundation, and
secure the duration of a general peace; to improve the present
advantages of it for promoting the trade of his good subjects, and
protecting those possessions which constitute one great source of their
wealth and commerce." Only in this vague way did His Majesty refer to
the situation in America, lest he precipitate a debate; but Parliament
took the cue and voted over four million pounds--one million of which
was to be devoted to augmenting England's forces "by land and sea."
Cumberland's plan for the operations against the French in America had,
sometime before, been forwarded to the point of selecting a
Generalissimo to be sent to that continent. Major-General Edward
Braddock was appointed to the service, upon the Duke of Cumberland's
recommendation, on September 24.
Edward Braddock was a lieutenant-colonel of the line and a major of the
Foot Guards, the choicest corps of the British army--a position which
cost the holder no less than eighteen thousand dollars. He was born in
Ireland but was not Irish, for neither Scot, Irish, nor Papist could
aspire to the meanest rank of the Foot Guards. He was as old as his
century. His promotion in the army had been jointly due to the good name
of his father, Edward Braddock I, who was retired as Major-general in
1715, to his passion for strict discipline, and to the favor of His
Grace the Duke of Cumberland. Braddock's personal bravery was
proverbial; it was said that his troops never faced a danger when their
commander was not "greedy to lead." In private life he was dissolute; in
disposition, "a very Iroquois," according to Walpole. Yet certain of
his friends denied the brutality which many attributed to him. "As we
were walking in the Park," one of Braddock's admirers has recorded, "we
heard a poor fellow was to be chastized; when I requested the General to
beg off the offender. Upon his application to the general officer, whose
name was Dury, he asked Braddock, How long since he had divested himself
of brutality and the insolence of his manner? To which the other
replied, 'You never knew me insolent to my inferiors. It is only to such
rude men as yourself that I behave with the spirit which I think they
deserve.'"[3] And yet, when his sister Fanny hanged herself with a
silver girdle to her chamber door, after losing her fortune at the
gaming tables, the brute of a brother observed, "I always thought she
would play till she would be forced to tuck herself up." On the other
hand it need not be forgotten that Braddock was for forty-three years in
the service of the famed Coldstream Guards; that he probably conducted
himself with courage in the Vigo expedition and in the Low Countries,
and was a survivor of bloody Dettingen, Culloden, Fontenoy, and
Bergen-op-Zoom. In 1753 he was stationed at Gibraltar where, "with all
his brutality," writes Walpole, "he made himself adored, and where
scarce any governor was endured before."[4]
Two months and one day after Braddock's commission was signed he
received two letters of instructions, one from the King and one from the
Duke of Cumberland. "For your better direction in discharge of y^e Trust
thereby reposed in You," reads the King's letter, "We have judged it
proper to give You the following Instructions." The document is divided
into thirteen heads:
1. Two regiments of Foot commanded by Sir Peter Halket and Colonel
Dunbar, with a train of artillery and necessary ships were ordered to
"repair to North America."
2. Braddock ordered to proceed to America and take under his command
these troops, cultivating meanwhile "a good understanding &
correspondence with Aug. Keppel Esq^r." who was appointed commander of
the American squadron.
3. Orders him also to take command of and properly distribute 3000 men
which the Governors of the provinces had been ordered to raise to serve
under Governor Shirley and Sir William Pepperell; informs him that Sir
John St. Clair, deputy Quarter Master General, and Jas. Pitcher Esq^r.,
"our commissary of y^e musters, in North America," had been sent to
prepare for the arrival of the troops from Ireland and for raising the
troops in America. Upon Braddock's arrival he should inform himself of
the progress of these preparations.
4. Provisions for the troops from Ireland had been prepared lest, upon
arrival in America, they should be in want.
5. "Whereas, We have given Orders to our said Gov^{rs} to provide
carefully a sufficient Quantity of fresh victuals for y^e use of our
Troops at their arrival, & y^t they should also furnish all our officers
who may have occasion to go from Place to Place, with all necessaries
for travelling by Land, in case there are no means of going by Sea; &
likewise, to observe and obey all such orders as shall be given by You
or Persons appointed by you from time to time for quartering Troops,
impressing Carriages, & providing all necessaries for such Forces as
shall arrive or be raised in America, and y^t the s^d several Services
shall be performed at the charge of y^e respective Governments, wherein
the same shall happen. It is our Will & Pleasure y^t you should,
pursuant thereto, apply to our s^d Governors, or any of them, upon all
such Exigencies."
6. The Governors had been directed "to endeavor to prevail upon y^e
Assemblies of their respective Provinces to raise forthwith as large a
sum as can be afforded as their contribution to a common Fund, to be
employed provisionally for y^e general Service in North America."
Braddock was urged to assist in this and have great care as to its
expenditure.
7. Concerns Braddock's relations with the colonial governors; especially
directing that a Council of War which shall include them be formed to
determine, by majority vote, matters upon which no course has been
defined.
8. "You will not only cultivate y^e best Harmony & Friendship possible
with y^e several Governors of our Colonies & Provinces, but likewise
with y^e Chiefs of y^e Indian Tribes ... to endeavor to engage them to
take part & act with our Forces, in such operations as you shall think
most expedient."
9. Concerns securing the alliance and interest of the Indians and giving
them presents.
10. Orders Braddock to prevent any commerce between the French and the
English provinces.
11. Concerning the relative precedency of royal and colonial
commissions.
12. Describes the copies of documents enclosed to Braddock concerning
previous relations with the colonies for defense against French
encroachment; "... And as Extracts of Lieut Gov^r Dinwiddie's Letters of
May 10^{th}, June 18^{th}, & July 24^{th}, relating to the Summons of
the Fort which was erecting on y^e Forks of y^e Monongahela, and y^e
Skirmish y^t followed soon after, & likewise of y^e action in the Great
Meadows, near the River Ohio, are herewith delivered to you, you will be
fully acquainted with what has hitherto happened of a hostile Nature
upon the Banks of that River."
13. Concerns future correspondence between Braddock and the Secretaries
of State to whom his reports were to be sent.
The communication from the Duke of Cumberland written by his Aide,
Colonel Napier, throws much light upon the verbal directions which
Braddock received before he sailed:
"His Royal Highness the Duke, in the several audiences he has given you,
entered into a particular explanation of every part of the service you
are about to be employed in; and as a better rule for the execution of
His Majesty's instructions, he last Saturday communicated to you his own
sentiments of this affair, and since you were desirous of forgetting no
part thereof, he has ordered me to deliver them to you in writing. His
Royal Highness has this service very much at heart, as it is of the
highest importance to his majesty's American dominions, and to the
honour of his troops employed in those parts. His Royal Highness
likewise takes a particular interest in it, as it concerns you, whom he
recommended to his majesty to be nominated to the chief command.
"His Royal Highness's opinion is, that immediately after your landing,
you consider what artillery and other implements of war it will be
necessary to transport to Will's Creek for your first operation on the
Ohio, that it may not fail you in the service; and that you form a
second field train, with good officers and soldiers, which shall be sent
to Albany and be ready to march for the second operation at Niagara. You
are to take under your command as many as you think necessary of the two
companies of artillery that are in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as soon
as the season will allow, taking care to leave enough to defend the
Island. Captain Ord, a very experienced officer, of whom his Royal
Highness has a great opinion, will join you as soon as possible.
"As soon as Shirley's and Pepperel's regiments are near complete, his
Royal Highness is of opinion you should cause them to encamp, not only
that they may sooner be disciplined, but also to draw the attention of
the French and keep them in suspense about the place you really design
to attack. His Royal Highness does not doubt that the officers and
captains of the several companies will answer his expectation in forming
and disciplining their respective troops. The most strict discipline is
always necessary, but more particularly so in the service you are
engaged in. Wherefore his Royal Highness recommends to you that it be
constantly observed among the troops under your command, and to be
particularly careful that they be not thrown into a panic by the
Indians, with whom they are yet unacquainted, whom the French will
certainly employ to frighten them. His Royal Highness recommends to you
the visiting your posts night and day; that your Colonels and other
officers be careful to do it; and that you yourself frequently set them
the example; and give all your troops plainly to understand that no
excuse will be admitted for any surprise whatsoever.
[Illustration: VIEW OF FORT CUMBERLAND IN 1755]
"Should the Ohio expedition continue any considerable time, and
Pepperell's and Shirley's regiments be found sufficient to undertake in
the mean while the reduction of Niagara, his Royal Highness would have
you consider whether you could go there in person, leaving the command
of the troops on the Ohio to some officer on whom you might depend,
unless you shall think it better for the service to send to those troops
some person whom you had designed to command on the Ohio; but this is a
nice affair, and claims your particular attention. Colonel Shirley is
the next commander after you, wherefore if you should send such an
officer he must conduct himself so as to appear only in quality of a
friend or counsellor in the presence of Colonel Shirley: and his Royal
Highness is of opinion that the officer must not produce or make mention
of the commission you give him to command except in a case of absolute
necessity.
"The ordering of these matters may be depended on, if the expedition at
Crown Point can take place at the same time that Niagara is besieged.
"If after the Ohio expedition is ended it should be necessary for you to
go with your whole force to Niagara it is the opinion of his Royal
Highness that you should carefully endeavour to find a shorter way from
the Ohio thither than that of the Lake; which however you are not to
attempt under any pretense whatever without a moral certainty of being
supplied with provisions, &c. As to your design of making yourself
master of Niagara, which is of the greatest consequence, his Royal
Highness recommends to you to leave nothing to chance in the prosecution
of that enterprize.
"With regard to the reducing of Crown Point, the provincial troops being
best acquainted with the country, will be of the most service.
"After the taking of this fort his Royal Highness advises you to consult
with the Governors of the neighboring provinces, where it will be most
proper to build a fort to cover the frontiers of those provinces.
"As to the forts which you think ought to be built (and of which they
are perhaps too fond in that country), his Royal Highness recommends the
building of them in such a manner, that they may not require a strong
garrison. He is of opinion that you ought not to build considerable
forts, cased with stone, till the plans and estimates thereof have been
sent to England and approved of by the Government here. His Royal
Highness thinks that stockaded forts, with pallisadoes and a good ditch,
capable of containing 200 men or 400 upon an emergency, will be
sufficient for the present.
"As Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence, who commands at Nova Scotia, hath long
protracted the taking of Beau-Sejour, his Royal Highness advises you to
consult with him, both with regard to the time and the manner of
executing that design. In this enterprise his Royal Highness foresees
that his majesty's ships may be of great service, as well by
transporting the troops and warlike implements, as intercepting the
stores and succors that might be sent to the French either by the Baye
Françoise, or from Cape Breton by the Baye Verte on the other side of
the Isthmus.
"With regard to your winter quarters after the operations of the
campaign are finished, his Royal Highness recommends it to you to
examine whether the French will not endeavor to make some attempts next
season and in what parts they will most probably make them. In this case
it will be most proper to canton your troops on that side, at such
distances, that they may easily be assembled for the common defence. But
you will be determined in this matter by appearances, and the
intelligence, which it hath been recommended to you to procure by every
method immediately after your landing. It is unnecessary to put you in
mind how careful you must be to prevent being surprised. His Royal
Highness imagines that your greatest difficulty will be the subsisting
of your troops. He therefore recommends it to you to give your chief
attention to this matter, and to take proper measures relative thereto
with the Governors and with your quartermasters and commissaries.
"I hope that the extraordinary supply put on board the fleet, and the
1000 barrels of beef destined for your use, will facilitate and secure
the supplying of your troops with provisions.
"I think I have omitted nothing of all the points wherein you desired
to be informed: if there should be any intricate point unthought of, I
desire you would represent it to me now, or at any other time; and I
shall readily take it upon me to acquaint his Royal Highness thereof,
and shall let you know his opinion on the subject.
"I wish you much success with all my heart; and as this success will
infinitely rejoice all your friends, I desire you would be fully
persuaded that no body will take greater pleasure in acquainting them
thereof, than him, who is, &c."
If excuse is needed for offering in such detail these orders, it is that
few men have ever suffered more heavily in reputation and in person
because of the failures, misconceptions, and shortcomings of others than
the man who received these orders and attempted to act upon them.
These instructions and the letter from the Duke of Cumberland make two
things very clear: it is clear from the King's instructions (item 12)
that the campaign to the Ohio Valley from Virginia was to be the
important _coup_ of the summer; the documents mentioned were to acquaint
Braddock "with what has hitherto happened of a hostile Nature upon the
Banks of that River." This is made more certain by one of the first
sentences in the Duke of Cumberland's letter, "that immediately after
your landing, you consider what artillery and other implements of war it
will be necessary to transport to Will's Creek for your first operation
on the Ohio." It is also clear that Braddock was helplessly dependent
upon the success with which the American governors carried out the royal
orders previously sent to them. They had been ordered to raise money and
troops, provide provisions, open the necessary roads, supply carriages
and horses, and conciliate and arm the Indian nations on the frontier.
How far they were successful it will be proper to study later; for the
moment, let us consider the destination of the little army that set
sail, after innumerable delays, from the Downs December 21, 1754, led by
the famed "Centurian" whose figure-head adorns Greenwich Hospital
today.
Sending Braddock and his army to Virginia against the French on the Ohio
was a natural blunder of immeasurable proportions. It was natural,
because all eyes had been turned to Virginia by the activity of the Ohio
Company, Washington's campaign of the preceding year, and the erection
of Fort Cumberland on the farthest frontier. These operations gave a
seeming importance to the Virginia route westward which was all out of
harmony with its length and the facilities offered. "Before we parted,"
a friend of Braddock wrote concerning the General's last night in
London, "the General told me that he should never see me more; for he
was going with a handful of men to conquer whole nations; and to do this
they must cut their way through unknown woods. He produced a map of the
country, saying, at the same time, 'Dear Pop, we are sent like
sacrifices to the altar.'" This gloomy prophecy was fulfilled with a
fatal accuracy for which the choice of the Virginia route was largely
responsible. Braddock's campaign had been fully considered in all its
bearings in the royal councils, and the campaign through Virginia to
Fort Duquesne seems to have been definitely decided upon. Even before
Braddock had crossed half of the Atlantic his Quartermaster-General, St.
Clair, had passed all the way through Virginia and Maryland to Fort
Cumberland in carrying out orders issued to him before Braddock had
reached England from Gibraltar. "Having procured from the Governors of
Pennsylvania and Virginia and from other sources," writes Mr. Sargent,
"all the maps and information that were obtainable respecting the
country through which the expedition was to pass, he [St. Clair]
proceeded in company with Governor Sharpe of Maryland upon a tour of
inspection to Will's Creek." He inspected the Great Falls of the Potomac
and laid plans for their being made passable for boats in which the army
stores were to be shipped to Fort Cumberland, and had made contracts for
the construction of the boats. He laid out a camp at Watkin's Ferry. It
is doubtful whether Braddock had ever had one word to say in connection
with all these plans which irrevocably doomed him to the almost
impossible feat of making Fort Cumberland a successful base of supplies
and center of operations against the French. Moreover the Virginia
route, being not only one of the longest on which Braddock could have
approached the French, was the least supplied with any manner of wagons.
"For such is the attention," wrote Entick, "of the Virginians towards
their staple trade of tobacco, that they scarce raise as much corn, as
is necessary for their own subsistence; and their country being well
provided with water-carriage in great rivers an army which requires a
large supply of wheel-carriages and beasts of burden, could not expect
to be furnished with them in a place where they are not in general
use."[5] "Their Produce is Tobacco," wrote one of Braddock's army, of
the Virginians, "they are so attached to that, and their Avarice to
raise it, makes them neglect every Comfort of Life." As has often been
said, Carlisle in Pennsylvania would have made a far better center of
operations than Fort Cumberland, and eventually it proved to be
Pennsylvania wagons in which the stores of the army were
transported--without which the army could not have moved westward from
Fort Cumberland one single mile. "Mr. Braddock had neither provisions
nor carriage for a march of so considerable a length, which was greatly
increased and embarrassed by his orders to take the rout of Will's
Creek; which road, as it was the worst provided with provisions, more
troublesome and hazardous, and much more about, than by way of
Pennsylvania."[6]
Not to use superlatives, it would seem that the American colonial
governors and St. Clair might have presented to Braddock the
difficulties of the Virginia route as compared with the Pennsylvania
route early enough to have induced the latter to make Carlisle his base
for the Ohio campaign; but there is no telling now where the blunder was
first made; a writer in _Gentleman's Magazine_ affirmed that the
expedition was "sent to _Virginia_ instead of _Pennsylvania_, to their
insuperable disadvantage, merely to answer the lucerative views of a
friend of the ministry, to whose share the remittances would then fall
at the rate of 2-1/2 _per cent_ profit."[7]
Even the suspicion of such treachery as sending Braddock to Virginia to
indulge the purse of a favorite is the more revolting because of the
suggestion in the letter from the Duke of Cumberland that Braddock,
personally, favored an attack on Fort Niagara--which, it has been
universally agreed, was the thing he should have done. "As to _your
design_ of making yourself master of Niagara"--the italics are
mine--wrote Cumberland; and, though he refers at the beginning to their
numerous interviews, this is the sole mention throughout the letter of
any opinion or plan of Braddock's. "Had General _Braddock_ made it his
first business to secure the command of lake Ontario, which he might
easily have done soon enough to have stopt the _force_ that was sent
from _Canada_ to _Du Quesne_, that fort must have been surrendered to
him upon demand; and had he gone this way to it, greater part of that
vast sum might have been saved to the nation, which was expended in
making a waggon road, through the woods and mountains, the way he
went."[8] Yet Cumberland's orders were distinct to go to Niagara by way
of Virginia and Fort Duquesne.
Horace Walpole's characterization of Braddock is particularly graphic
and undoubtedly just--"desperate in his fortune, brutal in his behavior,
obstinate in his sentiments, intrepid and capable."[9] The troops given
him for the American expedition were well suited to bring out every
defect in his character; these were the fragments of the 44th and 48th
regiments, then stationed in Ireland. Being deficient (even in time of
peace), both had to be recruited up to five hundred men each. The
campaign was unpopular and the recruits secured were of the worst
type--"who, had they not been in the army, would probably have been in
Bridewell [prison]." Walpole wrote, "the troops allotted to him most
ill-chosen, being draughts of the most worthless in some Irish
regiments, and anew disgusted by this species of banishment."[10] "The
mutinous Spirit of the Men encreases," wrote an officer of Braddock's
army during the march to Fort Duquesne, "but we will get the better of
that, we will see which will be tired first, they of deserving
Punishments, or we of inflicting them ... they are mutinous, and this
came from a higher Spring than the Hardships here, for they were
tainted in _Ireland_ by the factious Cry against the L-- L-- Ld G--,
and the Primate; the wicked Spirit instilled there by Pamphlets and
Conversation, got amongst the common Soldiers, who, tho' they are
_Englishmen_, yet are not the less stubborn and mutinous for that."
Thus the half-mutinous army, and its "brutal," "obstinate," "intrepid,"
and "capable" commander fared on across the sea to Virginia during the
first three months of the memorable year of 1755. By the middle of March
the entire fleet had weighed anchor in the port of Alexandria, Virginia.
The situation could not be described better than Entick has done in the
following words: "Put all these together, what was extraordinary in his
[Braddock's] conduct, and what was extraordinary in the way of the
Service, there could be formed no good idea of the issue of such an
untoward expedition."