CHAPTER XXV

HOW GORDON DIED

When the news of the Sirdar’s splendid victory reached England, the

British nation may be said to have breathed again, and when the great

rush was made for the cheap edition of “Ten Years’ Captivity,” which

was extensively advertised with my portrait to catch attention, the few

known details of Gordon’s death became as fresh again in people’s minds

as they had been years before. I was constantly asked to relate all I

had heard concerning Gordon. When I had done so I was invariably met

with quotations and readings from “Mahdism,” “Ten Years’ Captivity,”

“Fire and Sword,” and other works; for what I had been told of Gordon’s

death by eye-witnesses was an entirely different history to those

published.

The first to relate the story of Gordon’s death was a man whose tongue

Gordon had threatened to cut out as the only cure for his inveterate

lying, and when he escaped and reached Cairo, in telling his tale

he sustained his reputation. All accounts of Gordon’s death have

apparently been based upon this first one received. Gordon, the world

has been |301| made to believe, died as a coward, for what other

construction may be placed on the assertion that he turned his back

upon his assailants, and in his back received his mortal wound? It is

an infamous lie; but, then, what was to be expected from a man whom

Gordon knew so well, and who, maybe, had good reason to invent the tale

he did? I quote, side by side, what may be called the three official

accounts of Gordon’s death:―

MAHDISM.

“He (Gordon) made a gesture of scorn with his right hand, and turned

his back, where he received another spear wound which caused him to

fall forward and was most likely his mortal wound. . . . He made no

resistance, and did not fire a shot from his revolver.”

“. . . One of them rushing up, stabbed him with his spear, and others

then followed, and soon he was killed. . . . He (Nejoumi) ordered the

body to be dragged downstairs into the garden, where his head was cut

off.”

OHRWALDER.

“_The first_ Arab _plunged his huge spear into his body_. _He fell

forward on his face_, was _dragged down_ the stairs, many stabbed him

with their spears, and _his head was cut off and sent to the Mahdi_.”

SLATIN.

“_The first_ man up the steps _plunged his huge spear into his body;

he fell forward on his face_ without uttering a word. His murderers

_dragged_ him _down_ the steps to the palace entrance, and here _his

head was cut off and_ at once _sent_ over _to the Mahdi_.” |302|

It will be noticed that Father Ohrwalder’s account appears to be a

condensation of the first given, while it is hard to believe that a

coincidence only accounts for Slatin giving the history in almost the

identical words used by Ohrwalder. It is still more extraordinary that

the first account should ever have been believed and published, and

still _more_ extraordinary that it was not corrected by Ohrwalder and

Slatin, for when I arrived in Omdurman, in 1887, the real details of

the death of Gordon were the theme of conversation whenever his name

was mentioned, and there are many eye-witnesses to his death—or were

until the battle of Omdurman, who could tell a very different tale.

[Illustration: KHALEEL AGHA ORPHALI.]

Those who knew Charles George Gordon, will believe me when I aver that

he died, as they must all have believed that he died—in spite of the

official and semi-official accounts to the contrary—as the soldier and

lion-hearted man he was. Gordon did not rest his hand on the hilt of

his sword and turn his back to his enemies to receive his mortal wound.

Gordon drew his sword, and used it. When Gordon fell, his sword was

dripping with the blood of his assailants, for no less than sixteen or

seventeen did he cut down with it. When Gordon fell, his left hand was

blackened with the unburned powder from his at least thrice-emptied

revolver. When Gordon fell, his life’s blood was pouring from a spear

and pistol-shot wound in his right breast. When Gordon fell, his boots

were slippery with the blood of the crowd of dervishes he shot and

hacked his way through, in his heroic attempt |303| to cut his way

out and place himself at the head of his troops. Gordon died as only

Gordon could die. Let the world be misinformed and deceived about

Soudan affairs with the tales of so-called guides and spies, but let it

be told the truth of Gordon’s death.

A week before the fall of Khartoum, Gordon had given up hopes. Calling

Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi, he ordered him to provision one of the steamers,

get all the Europeans on board, and set off for the north. To their

credit be it said, they refused to leave unless Gordon saved his own

life with theirs. Finding him obdurate, a plot was made to seize him

while asleep, carry him off, and save him in spite of himself; but he

somehow heard of the plot, smiled, and said it was his duty to save

their lives if he could, but it was also his duty to “stick to his

post.” As the troops must be near, then sail north, he told them, and

tell them to hurry up.

Each day at dawn, when he retired to rest, he bolted his door from the

inside, and placed his faithful body-servant—Khaleel Agha Orphali—on

guard outside it. On the fatal night, Gordon had as usual kept his

vigil on the roof of the palace, sending and receiving telegraphic

messages from the lines every few minutes, and as dawn crept into

the skies, thinking that the long-threatened attack was not yet to

be delivered, he lay down wearied out. The little firing heard a few

minutes later attracted no more attention than the usual firing which

had been going on continuously night and day for months, but when the

palace guards were heard firing it was known that something serious

|304| was happening. By the time Gordon had slipped into his old serge

or dark tweed suit, and taken his sword and revolver, the advanced

dervishes were already surrounding the palace. Overcoming the guards,

a rush was made up the stairs, and Gordon was met leaving his room. A

small spear was thrown which wounded him, but very slightly, on the

left shoulder. Almost before the dervishes knew what was happening,

three of them lay dead, and one wounded, at Gordon’s feet—the remainder

fled. Quickly reloading his revolver, Gordon made for the head of the

stairs, and again drove the reassembling dervishes off. Darting back to

reload, he received a stab in his left shoulder-blade from a dervish

concealed behind the corridor door, and on reaching the steps the third

time, he received a pistol-shot and spear-wound in his right breast,

and then, great soldier as he was, he rose almost above himself. With

his life’s blood pouring from his breast—not his back, remember—he

fought his way step by step, kicking from his path the wounded and

dead dervishes—for Orphali too had not been idle—and as he was passing

through the doorway leading into the courtyard, another concealed

dervish almost severed his right leg with a single blow. Then Gordon

fell. The steps he had _fought_ his way—not been dragged—down, were

encumbered with the bodies of dead and dying dervishes. No dervish

spear pierced the live and quivering flesh of a prostrate but still

conscious Gordon, for he breathed his last as he turned to face his

last assailant, half raised his sword to strike, and fell dead with his

face to heaven. |305|

Even had I not been specially requested, as the last of the Soudan

captives, to relate in my narrative all that I had heard and learned

concerning Gordon, I should have done so to a certain extent at all

events, for he was no more the hero of the British people than he was

mine, and the belief that he was still alive had no little to do with

my ill-starred journey in 1887. The truth about his death, which is now

published for the first time, is ample justification for what follows

concerning him while still alive. It is true, as I have been told, that

all I can have to say will be from “hearsay;” but then all the reports

published concerning Gordon’s last days are from hearsay. I have

the advantage over all others in this—that I was maybe the one man,

captive or not, in Omdurman whom Mahdist and “Government” man alike

could trust implicitly and confide in, for there was no questioning

what my attitude was towards Abdullahi and Mahdieh. The consequence

was that old “Government” people and the powerful men who from time

to time became my fellow-prisoners, and, as a consequence, enemies of

Abdullahi, gave me confidences which, if given in other quarters, might

have resulted in the loss of a head.

Again, almost all the tales told about the Soudan may be classed in

one of two categories; the first, tales like mine, related by people

interested in putting their own version upon events and incidents with

which they were personally connected, and the second, tales told by

people with versions for which they believed their questioners were

hankering, so that what |306| was white to “A” became black to “B,”

if it was considered that this colour pleased “B” best. The system

scarcely puts a premium on accuracy.

But before proceeding to my comments on the criticisms, a few

introductory remarks are called for to prevent misconceptions and

misunderstandings arising in the minds of my readers. As an evidence

that the following is not intended—far from it—to lacerate the feelings

of any of those who suffered with me, I might mention that I have read

over the notes of this chapter to many of my fellow-captives, and

have, at their suggestion, cut out a series of incidents well known

to Gordon, which influenced him in the stand he took towards certain

people, and other incidents which prove how clear and long-sighted he

was, and how events justified his taking up the stand which he did. One

incident ought to be written, to punish on this earth, if possible,

the man whose escape has not been recorded, and whose deserted and

broken-hearted wife lies by the side of their unshriven baby-boy in the

sands of the Soudan. However, maybe Gordon, had he come back alive to

meet all the calumnies directed against him, would have hesitated to

help his “clearance” by stabbing the living with a dead hand, and out

of respect to his memory this incident, with a number of others, has

been expunged.

I have already told Father Ohrwalder that, in commenting upon what he

says in “Ten Years’ Captivity,” when speaking of Gordon’s actions,

the remarks I may feel called upon to make are not intended for him

personally, and although I foresee |307| that I must in the main

have to speak as to the second person, I think Father Ohrwalder quite

understands that the second person in this instance is his book, not

himself. I do not, as I have told him, consider that he is directly

responsible for the opinions he is credited with in “Ten Years’

Captivity,” and this notwithstanding the remark, “The reader is

reminded that all opinions expressed are those of Father Ohrwalder.”

Considering that Father Ohrwalder is a priest and missionary, and has

ventured upon thin ice in attacking Gordon’s memory, such a statement

is hardly fair to him, as in the preface to the book it is stated,

that “Father Ohrwalder’s manuscript, which was in the first instance

written in German, was roughly translated into English by Yusef Effendi

Cudzi, a Syrian; this I entirely rewrote in narrative form; the work

therefore does not profess to be a literal translation of the original

manuscript. . . .”

I should have thought that when Gordon was being attacked the original

manuscript might have been treated a little differently. Of course

it is easily understandable that when a Syrian, with Arabic for his

mother tongue, translates from one difficult language which he has

picked up into another equally difficult, and translates roughly

too, when moreover this rough translation is handled in the manner

admitted, errors may have crept in or been passed unnoticed, whilst

salient points were lost sight of. It is also quite possible that the

peculiar idioms of the Arabic, German, and English languages |308|

got into a hopeless tangle, and were left so. Whatever the cause,

there is no gainsaying the fact that Father Ohrwalder is credited

with the expression of opinions which he, as a priest and missionary,

ought to be one of the last on this earth to give utterance to. That

he did not appreciate to the full the real import of the opinions he

is credited with, I feel certain of after my long interview with him,

when, with the Bible in one hand and a copy of “Ten Years’ Captivity”

in the other, we compared the opinions expressed in the latter with the

teachings of Christ in the former.

Father Ohrwalder may or may not have been ill-advised in omitting or

suppressing the relation of well-known incidents, which accounted for

Gordon’s attitude in certain cases. It was only by omitting to mention

these incidents that the criticisms on Gordon were rendered possible,

or I should say that, had those incidents been included, the criticisms

would not have lived a day. It would have been far better to tell

everything to the generous and sympathetic world which he and Slatin

met when they escaped, and to leave it to condone, if any condoning

was called for, and to sympathize with them in the parts force of

circumstances compelled them to act, which must have been so repugnant

to them; for to omit, when criticizing Gordon, the relation of the very

acts which compelled him also by force of circumstances to act as he

did, was, to say the least of it, very unwise.

In “Ten Years’ Captivity” the reader is led into a maze of opinions,

and left there. Once inside, you |309| discover that you can neither

gain the centre of the maze or return to the starting-point; you must

either wander round for an eternity, or do as I shall do, cut your way

through the hedges planted to bewilder you, and thank Heaven when on

the outside that you are clear of the tortuous passages. Compare, for

instance―

“He (Cudzi) added that Gordon should have no anxiety about Berber as

long as Hussein Pasha Khaleefa was Mudir,”

with,

“Gordon himself committed a mistake by which he gave a deathblow to

himself and his mission. On his way to Khartoum, he stopped at Berber,

and interviewed the Mudir Hussein Pasha Khaleefa; he _imprudently_

told him that he had come up to remove the Egyptian garrisons, as

Egypt had abandoned the Soudan.”

Gordon cannot be blamed for confirming, as Governor-General of the

Soudan, the news telegraphed to his subordinate, the Mudir of Berber,

_through whose hands the retiring garrisons must pass_, nor can he be

blamed if, when his suspicions were aroused, he deferred to the opinion

of the man who was acting British Consul, Government representative,

and his own agent, when he wrote and telegraphed as he did, “Trust in

Hussein Pasha.”

“The catastrophe which had overtaken Hicks filled the inhabitants of

Khartoum with indescribable dismay. Several of them returned to Egypt,

and the members of the Austrian Mission, with their blacks, quitted

Khartoum on the 11th December, 1883.”

I therefore take it for granted that Father Ohrwalder’s fellow-workers

saw that all was hopeless |310| _two months before Gordon’s name had

been suggested to the Egyptian Government_, yet, in the face of this,

we are first asked―

“What could Gordon do alone against the now universally worshipped

Mahdi?”

and then told―

“General Gordon’s arrival in Khartoum gave fresh life and hope to the

inhabitants.”

Then,

“As it appeared to us in Kordofan, and to the Mahdi himself, Gordon’s

undertaking was very strange; it was just as if a man were attempting

to put out an enormous fire with a drop of water,”

and,

“I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that had the Egyptian

Government not sent Gordon, then undoubtedly the evacuation originally

ordered could have been carried out without difficulty.”

One is simply staggered by such an assertion. When Gordon arrived in

Khartoum, the whole of the western Soudan had fallen. The town was

overrun with the mourning women and children—the widows and orphans, I

should say—of the troops who, under Hicks Pasha, had been annihilated

a few months before on their way to extricate the garrisons. Slatin

had surrendered Dara to Zoghal. Said Bey Gumaa, the last man to fight

for the Government in the western Soudan, was compelled to capitulate

very shortly before Gordon’s arrival, and this only after a second

siege when his men were dying with thirst. |311| Bahr-el-Ghazal fell

before Gordon had had time to turn round, and, for all that he or the

Mahdi knew, the Equatorial province had fallen also. The town was

hemmed in by the Mahdists, and the commanders of the garrisons which

Gordon was expected to extricate were holding various commands in the

dervish army, while Slatin had taken part already as a Mahdist in

the subjugation of his subordinate, Said Bey Gumaa of El Fasher, who

had refused to surrender. Am I not justified in saying that only the

suppression of such facts made possible such attacks upon Gordon?

We are next told―

“Those who escaped massacre in Khartoum have often told me that they

were perfectly ready to leave, and it was only Gordon’s arrival

that kept them back, but Gordon’s arrival without troops had rather

disappointed them. Had he been accompanied by five hundred British

bayonets, his reputation in the Soudan might have been maintained, and

probably the Mahdi would never have left Kordofan.”

Why did not those perfectly ready to leave leave with the members of

the Austrian mission, or leave between the date of their departure,

December 11, and the early days of February, when the news of

Gordon’s mission first reached Khartoum? Who prevented their leaving

during that interval of at least two months from the moment when

they were all thrown into “indescribable dismay” until they heard

of Gordon’s appointment? And if, when he did arrive, they were so

bitterly disappointed at his not being accompanied with five hundred

British |312| bayonets—much good these would have been against the

“universally worshipped Mahdi” in extricating those who had surrendered

to him—why did they stay on? Did not Gordon beg them to leave? did

he not try and compel them to do so? did he not put boats at their

disposal to sail north or south as best suited them? And has not Gordon

himself given the real reason for their staying on?—though to this

should be added their unbounded faith and confidence in Gordon.

Gordon, I venture to believe, sustained his reputation in the Soudan

up to the end—up to the moment when, with the hand of Death on him,

he fell facing his last assailant. True, he lost his reputation for

telling the truth, but there are few men in this world whose telling

of an untruth would startle and astonish a community. The people of

Khartoum, their eyes dry and wearied with looking for a sign of the

returning steamers which Gordon had sent off three months before to

bring up the troops expected to arrive at the beginning of November,

turned to each other, and, in an amazed whisper, said, “Gordon has told

a lie,” and were startled and afraid at their own words.

Having dealt as tersely as possible with this curious collection of

contradictions, I proceed to the quotation of and replies to the

criticisms passed upon Gordon in the book I have already quoted from.

1. “Looking back on the events of the siege of Khartoum, I cannot

refrain from saying I consider Gordon carried his humanitarian views

too far, and this excessive forbearance on his part added to his

difficulties.”

2. “It was Gordon’s first and paramount duty to rescue the |313|

Europeans, Christians, and Egyptians, from the fanatical fury of the

Mahdi, which was especially directed against them. This was Gordon’s

clear duty, but unfortunately he allowed his kindness of heart to be

made use of to his enemy’s advantage.”

3. “Thus, in his kindness of heart, did Gordon feed and support the

families of his enemies. It was quite sufficient for a number of women

to appeal to Gordon, with tears in their eyes, that they were starving

for him to order that rations of corn should be at once issued to

them, and thus it was that the supplies in the hands of the Government

were enormously reduced.”

4. “Gordon should have recognized that the laws of humanity differ in

war from peace time, more especially when the war he was waging was

especially directed against wild fanatical savages, who were enemies

to all peace.”

5. “He was entirely deceived if he believed that by the exercise of

kindness and humanity he was likely to win over these people to his

side; on the contrary, they ridiculed his generosity, and only thought

it a sign of weakness. The Soudanese respect and regard only those

whom they fear, and surely those cruel and hypocritical Mahdists

should have received very different treatment to civilized Europeans.”

6. “I also think that Gordon brought harm on himself and his cause

by another action, which I am convinced led to a great extent to his

final overthrow. Such men as Slatin, Lupton, Wad-el-Mek, and others,

had offered, at the risk of their lives, to come and serve him. . . .

Gordon would not, however, vouchsafe an answer to the letters of

appeal these men wrote to him.”

In the first five extracts, Father Ohrwalder, from an initial mistake

in forgetting or being unaware of the presence in Khartoum of the

thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers of Hicks’ army,

flounders on until, as I have said, he is credited with opinions which

he should be the last to give utterance to. It is passing strange

that any missionary should place limits to the humanitarian views and

forbearance of a military commander in time of war, who may invariably

be |314| depended upon to err on the wrong side from the biblical

point of view. Gordon, in keeping in mind the Sermon on the Mount, and

acting up to its precepts as far as the exigencies of a state of war

permitted, performed no act derogatory to him as a military commander.

Gordon was no worse a Christian than he was a soldier—and the world

never saw a better soldier. And whatever Gordon’s paramount duty may

have been, it certainly was _not_ his paramount duty to weaken his

little garrison by sending an expedition into Kordofan to rescue, say,

a dozen people who, as far as Gordon and every one else in Khartoum

knew, had disavowed the Christian religion and adopted that of the

Mahdi.

There is another aspect to the case. Gordon’s troops were Muslims. The

“Christians” had adopted the “true faith” and become Muslims also.

Why, then, should Muslim lives be sacrificed to “rescue” them from

Islam and bring them back to Christianity? And it must not be forgotten

that Slatin, so far from denying his conversion, excused himself on

the ground that his religious education had been neglected at home.

Gordon is not to be blamed for having believed that the “Christians”

had sincerely adopted Islam, for apart from the mere adoption of

the religion, people sworn to celibacy and chastity had entered the

matrimonial state, which was considered a further evidence of their

conversion. While the gardener of the Khartoum Mission was bewailing

the money he had sent to the “apostates,” Consul Hansal wrote, asking

that the matter be kept secret, to the Austrian |315| Consul-General

in Cairo, informing him of what had occurred. Had there been any

“Christians” to rescue from the Mahdi, doubtless Gordon’s paramount

duty would have exhibited itself in some action. Nor is there any

evidence that the Mahdi’s “fanatical fury” was in any single instance

especially directed against the “Christians,” but there is a great deal

of evidence to the contrary. With the exception of putting Slatin in

chains, when he believed that he was playing him false, I know of no

case of wanton cruelty practised by the Mahdi towards the “Christians,”

and I am not sure whether “clemency” would not be the proper word to

use in Slatin’s case, when it is remembered what happens to prisoners

of war who break their parole, for Slatin and the others had sworn the

oath of allegiance.

Extract No. 3, apart from the extraordinary censure on Gordon for

feeding the families of his enemies, and being moved to pity at the

sight of the tears of starving women, calls for a more detailed reply

to the criticism. Gordon, according to “Ten Years’ Captivity,” ought

to have turned these women out of the town to be at the tender mercies

of the “wild fanatical savages” and been responsible for the rehearsal

under his own eyes of the hunt for lust which followed on the fall of

Khartoum. Father Ohrwalder can never have heard of England’s proud roll

of heroes who on land and sea have given their lives to save those of

helpless women and children. In feeding these women—even had all been

the wives of his enemies, which they were not—Gordon committed |316|

no graver military crime than did the commander of the troops on board

the _Birkenhead_, when, instead of seeing first to the safety of the

soldiers for whose lives he was responsible, he placed the women and

children in the boats which could have saved the troops, and called

upon his men to present arms as the boats left the side of the ship—and

to stand to attention as the vessel sank under them. So much for

British principle, apart from Christ’s teachings, in peace and war; now

for the facts in Gordon’s case.

When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, he found wandering—hungry and

helpless—the thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers who a

few months before constituted Hicks Pasha’s army. Throughout his

journals you will discover constant reference to the food question,

with accounts of his successful search for the _stolen_ biscuits, which

had “enormously reduced” the supplies in the hands of the Government.

Gordon had calculated that the relieving army would reach him at the

beginning of November, so that we find him writing on the 2nd of that

month that he has six weeks’ food supplies. In making this estimate he

was allowing for full rations to the troops (who were also in receipt

of the money with which to buy those rations), and the wants of the

poor. On the 11th of that month he discovers nearly a million pounds of

stolen biscuits. On the 21st he writes, “I do not believe one person

has died of hunger during the months we have been shut up.” On December

14—that is a month after the latest date he had estimated for the

arrival of the relief expedition, he |317| says that unless the troops

come in ten days the town may fall, and this because he had on November

12 written, “Omdurman fort has one and a half months’ supply of food

and water.” With the fall of this fort, he knew that the end would soon

come.

But up to this date the soldiers, who were not entitled to rations

since they received money for their purchase, were given full rations,

and there is every reason to believe that the pinch only came when

Omdurman fort fell on January 14 or 15, and the town was completely

hemmed in. Food was short, no doubt, but, eight days before the fall

of the town, Gordon could spare from the stores fifteen hundred pounds

of biscuits to provision a boat for the Europeans. One should only be

filled with amazement that Gordon held out so long after the date when

he had expected relief, and it is not only ridiculous but monstrous to

attack him, because he did not calculate that the expedition would only

arrive _seventy-eight_ instead of seventy-six days late, when we know

for certain that his troops were receiving full rations which they were

not entitled to for at least a month after the date of the expected

arrival of the expedition.

It is true that Gordon, seeing the food supplies giving out,

recommended people to leave him and join the Mahdi, but this was only

after more days had slipped away after the “ten days from December

14.” He had then abandoned all hope, and saw that his prophecy was to

come true—the expedition would arrive just “too late.” In comparison

with the number of widows whom Gordon had had to support |318| for

ten months, without the slightest assistance or aid from outside,

the number of wives of his “enemies” in the Mahdi’s camp was so

insignificant as to be unworthy of notice. But even supposing that all

the starving women who went to Gordon crying for the bread which Father

Ohrwalder suggests should have been represented by a stone, were the

wives of his enemies, his own writing justifies Gordon’s feeding of

them, for he says, “These crafty people thus assured themselves that,

should the Mahdi be victorious, their loyalty to him would ensure the

safety of their families and property in Khartoum, while, on the other

hand, should Gordon be victorious, then their wives and families would

be able to mediate for them with the conquerors.”

It is quite evident, then, that these people who went over to the

Mahdi’s camp did so, not from conviction of his divine mission, but to

save the lives of their wives and families, whom by preference they

entrusted to Gordon even at the last hour, and nearly a year after the

date when his arrival without five hundred British bayonets is supposed

to have ruined his reputation in the Soudan. I am inclined to think

that the “craftiness” displayed by some in trying to secure their wives

and daughters against violation and death, was no less justifiable than

the “craftiness” displayed by others for an entirely different purpose.

What a tribute these “crafty” people paid to Gordon! I mean the crafty

people who left Khartoum in January, 1885, and trusted Gordon with

the lives of their wives and children. |319| In discussing this food

question with Khartoum survivors, I laid particular stress upon the

feeding of the women and children, and I can do no better than give

the summing-up of it in the words of a native survivor, after I had

translated to him the criticisms I am replying to—“What! Would Gordon

Pasha send away the hungry women and children of soldiers who had been

killed fighting for the Government?”

I pass over extract No. 5 for the moment to refer to No. 6. The use

of my portrait in advertising the book I am quoting from led most to

believe that I approved of the criticisms it contained, and I have

taken this opportunity of showing how thoroughly I disagree with them.

To say that Slatin and others had offered, at the risk of their lives,

to join Gordon is hardly correct, and if Gordon did not vouchsafe a

written answer to the letters he received, he probably had good reason

for not doing so, especially as it appears likely that some of Said

Bey Gumaa’s letters addressed to the Governor-General before Gordon’s

appointment had succeeded in getting through to Khartoum, and from

these and deserters from the Mahdi, Gordon must have learned all.

Under pretence of intending to submit, Gumaa gained time, and tried

to hurry up reinforcements, but this having been suspected, Zoghal

ordered Slatin, Tandal, the President of the Civil Court, Aly Bey

Ibrahim-el-Khabir, Slatin’s head-clerk Ahmad Riad, and a few others,

to send in an ultimatum to Gumaa, |320| and await his reply. The

reply travelled quickly; as soon as he read the letter, Gumaa opened

fire upon the spot where Slatin and his companions were awaiting him.

During the first siege of El Fasher, Gumaa must have accounted for at

least fifteen thousand dervishes, and utterly defeated the army which

retired to Walad Birra, from whence a party was sent off to Dara to

bring up the ammunition which, as appears from Gordon’s Journal, was

handed over to the Mahdists by Slatin when he surrendered the province.

This occupied eleven days, and then the second siege was laid. The

wells were filled up, thus depriving the garrison of water; but for

seven or eight days they held out, dying of thirst, while the town was

constantly bombarded with Government ammunition. Said Bey Gumaa has

always protested that had it not been for the ammunition handed over by

Slatin to the Mahdists he could have held out—and more.

The knowledge of these things must have influenced Gordon, especially

when Slatin writes to him, through Consul Hansal, offering to place

his services at his disposal, but only on condition that Gordon

should guarantee never to surrender, for, if he did, Slatin would

be maltreated by the Mahdists when they laid hands upon him. Gordon

was the best judge as to the value of services offered under such

conditions. For “moral and political reasons,” Gordon considered

it unadvisable to have anything whatever to do with what he called

“apostate” Europeans in the Mahdi’s camp, but appreciating the

enormous responsibility |321| thrown upon his shoulders, he appealed

to the Ulema for their advice, as these apostates were now their

co-religionists, and they decided to have nothing whatever to do with

their “proposals of treachery,” as no good could come of it. Matters

were made still worse by Slatin writing to Gordon asking him to be a

party to proceedings very foreign indeed to Gordon’s nature at all

events. Slatin’s request to Gordon was to write to him personally one

letter in French, and another letter in Arabic, “asking him to obtain

permission from his Master to come to Omdurman and discuss with him the

conditions of his (Gordon’s) surrender,” which letter he could use in

order to obtain permission to come to Omdurman. If Gordon had written

that Arabic letter. . . .

If all these facts were not known to Father Ohrwalder before 1892, six

years is quite long enough time to have learned them, and now I have

no hesitation in saying that to assert that Gordon brought about his

downfall by refusing the services of people willing to risk their lives

in reaching him is, to put it charitably, pure fiction.

Irrespective of the opinions expressed in the first four extracts

given, extract No. 5 makes out a very good case for the Sirdar to write

in large letters at the Soudan Frontier, “No Missionaries Admitted,”

for Father Ohrwalder proves conclusively that they can do no good.

Honestly I believe that for many years to come the only religious

teachers allowed to penetrate into the Soudan should be enlightened

exponents of the Quoran. Consider that for sixteen years the |322|

Soudan has been in the throes—is still in the throes of one of the

greatest religious upheavals known. While this revival of Islam has

been in progress in the Soudan proper, the converts at Uganda and

elsewhere have been snicking each other’s throats to evidence their

zeal for the rival Christian creeds. In the Soudan, missionaries have

openly avowed to thousands their acceptance of the “true faith”—Islam,

the very religion from which they had gone out to convert the Blacks.

I have not the slightest hesitation in saying myself that for some

time to come religious revivalism in the Soudan will, if permitted to

take place, very soon spell REBELLION. Time must be given for the bad

(?) effect produced on the native mind by the conversion of the Soudan

missionaries to die out, and goodness knows the poor country requires

a rest. If missionaries must be sent, then let them be honest traders,

the best missionaries for savage countries. When the Soudan has again

been opened up, and the natives have become a little more civilized

through their contact with trade, and so Europeanized that their simple

faith, “There is one God, and He is God,” is not sufficient for them,

but they must needs snarl and fight over creeds, then and only then

remove the “No Admittance” signboard.

I trust that no religious body or society of earnest Christians will

think from the foregoing that I am either sneering or scoffing at

religion, or that their disinterested efforts to spread the gospel of

peace to the remotest ends of the earth have not my sincerest sympathy.

I have spoken plainly and to the point, |323| for I consider that the

occasion calls for it. The missionaries required in the Soudan now are

clean-minded, honest traders, who will do more for you by a few years’

preparing the ground for “talking” missionaries than the missionaries

can do in a score of years of preaching. It is men like Gordon who,

though not preaching religion, yet practise it in their every act, whom

the Soudan requires. Ask any one in the Soudan what is his opinion

about Gordon, and he will reply, “Gordon was not a Christian; he was a

true Muslim; no Christian could be so good and just as he was,” and I

believe that this saying, or estimate of him, emanated from the Mahdi

himself. I draw your particular attention to the word “just,” which

proves that, in the eyes of the Mahdists and Soudanese alike, his

justice ranked with his goodness. If any Soudanese or Mahdist ridiculed

to Father Ohrwalder Gordon’s generosity, and considered it a sign of

weakness, it must have been done for a purpose. During my twelve years

amongst all shades of people of the Soudan, I never heard a single word

against Gordon, nor did I hear one until I came amongst his own flesh

and blood. I cannot do better than relate another example of the esteem

he was held in, and this example is from a Christian source.

My friend Nahoum Abbajee, when he reached Cairo, prepared a petition

which he had intended forwarding to her Majesty the Queen, asking that

the British Government should restore part of the fortune accumulated

by him during his twenty-three years’ residence in the Soudan. His

argument was that, trusting to |324| Gordon, he had delayed in

Khartoum until Stewart’s departure was arranged for, when, acting on

the advice of Gordon, he sold off his goods, realizing but half their

value, accepted Gordon Bonds in payment, bought a boat, as no one then

would hire one out, set off with Stewart, and was captured by the

dervishes. This would not have happened, had not the commander of the

gunboat disobeyed Gordon’s orders by steaming off to Khartoum, instead

of bombarding Berber for three days, and Gordon was consequently

responsible for the delinquencies of his subordinate.

On being asked what his personal impressions of Gordon were, he said

that his thoughtfulness for every one, his goodness, justice, and

innumerable virtues would take years to relate; and then when he was

told that his claim could only be sustained on his proving that Gordon

was to blame for the loss of Stewart’s party, ill as he was, he rose

from his couch, tore up the petition, and, with his hand raised, prayed

Heaven that if the bit of bread to save him from starvation should be

purchased with money obtained through laying a fault upon Gordon, it

might choke him. One had to witness the scene really to appreciate it.

Ruined, broken down in health, too old to make a new start in life, his

eyes lost their dulness and glistened as he breathed his prayer and

fell back on his couch exhausted with the effort. Nahoum, I am afraid,

will have joined Gordon by the time this appears in print.

[Illustration: HASSAN BEY HASSANEIN.]

|325|

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

HASSAN BEY HASSANEIN

When Gordon heard of the murder of Colonel Stewart and his companions,

he held a sort of court-martial on himself, and, after reviewing all

the arrangements which he had made for their safety, he came to the

conclusion that Stewart must have been invited on shore and murdered.

Then, as if endowed with second sight, he almost exactly described

what actually happened. The _Abbas_, drawing less than two feet of

water, ought not to have stranded, as it was High Nile. Treachery on

the part of the crew he had guarded against by sending a bodyguard

of highly paid Greeks. The cutting adrift of their boats just after

passing Berber contributed to the catastrophe, for had they been with

the steamer at the time she struck, it is hardly likely that the

inhabitants of the village would have planned the treachery they did.

As interpreter to the party, Gordon gave them the man he could least

spare, and one in whom he had every confidence—Hassan Bey Hassanein.

Gordon himself writes, “thus the question of treachery was duly weighed

by me and guarded against,” yet, in “Ten Years’ Captivity,” we find the

contrary stated. “It is said that the interpreter, Hassan, arranged

the betrayal.” Moreover, to clinch the matter, and to show that

Gordon had selected a traitor in the very man whom the |326| lives

of the party might depend upon, it is added, “And I was afterwards

told that, when he got into difficulties later, he sent a petition to

Mohammad-el-Kheir, in which he said that he was entitled to reward for

having secured Colonel Stewart’s death. He is still living in Omdurman.”

Hassan Bey Hassanein has lived to come back to Egypt and bear witness

to the goodness and virtues of the heroic defender of Khartoum.

The only bit of treachery Hassan Bey acknowledges is that—with his

fellow-clerk, Sirri—he cut the Khaleefa’s telegraph and telephone

communications as the troops were advancing, to prevent communication

between Omdurman and Khartoum and the outpost at Khor Shambat. It was

Hassan Bey who ran out of the telegraph-hut as the gunboats advanced

and attempted to get on board in order to warn them of the mines. He

succeeded in attracting attention, and barely got off with his life,

for his shouts in English were drowned by the report of the rifles as

the men “potted” at his dervish dress.

Hassan Bey Hassanein, speaking English, French, and Arabic, was sent

to Khartoum in July, 1883, for telegraphic work. When Gordon arrived,

in 1884, he wrote an official letter detailing him for his special

service. Orders were given that he was to have access to him at all

hours of the day and night. It was Hassan Bey who used to mark the

words Gordon required to use at a forthcoming interview, in his Arabic

dictionary. Before giving his version of the murder of Stewart’s

party, a few words concerning him and his relations with Gordon will

prove that, in selecting him as interpreter to the party, Gordon

“well-guarded against treachery.”

One of Hassan Bey’s first missions after the arrival of Gordon was to

seek out the widow of Bussati Bey; for, on arrival at Berber, he had

telegraphed to Bussati Bey, not knowing that he had been killed with

Hicks. Having found the widow and her children in dire straits, he

returned with one of the children to Gordon, and then took the child

back carrying a handkerchief containing a hundred pounds. “Bis |327|

dat qui cito dat” was certainly Gordon’s motto in Khartoum, from the

hundreds of tales which I have heard. On handing the money to the

widow, she brought out her husband’s uniform and sword, and, handing

them to Hassan Bey, said, “As you take the place of my husband at

Gordon’s side, then take his sword and uniform.” Hassan Bey took it

to Gordon, who asked what it was worth, and being told “perhaps ten

pounds,” sent twenty pounds to the widow to make sure, and told Hassan

Bey to keep the uniform, as it might yet come in useful.

Later on, when Hassan Bey, who was then but “effendi,” had had a

particularly hard spell of night and day work, Gordon asked him which

he would prefer—an increase of pay or a rank. Hassan Bey left the

matter to Gordon, and he gave him both, writing the “firman” himself.

On the Friday following, Hassan Bey presented himself to Gordon in

Bussati’s uniform—for uniform was worn on Fridays and feast days.

Gordon was evidently much amused at his interpreter and telegraph-clerk

appearing in the uniform of a lieut.-colonel, although the rank he

had bestowed upon him was nothing more nor less. Telling Hassan Bey

that such a uniform did not look well without a decoration, he pinned

on to his right breast one of the decorations he had had struck to

commemorate the siege of Khartoum, and Hassanein walked off a proud

man to delight the eyes of his wife, then nearing her confinement.

Fifteen days before the departure of the _Abbas_, he presented himself

to Gordon, and told him that he was the father of a boy. “No, I am

the father,” replied Gordon, and, knowing Hassan Bey’s house, he

hurried off at a quick walk, which Hassan Bey had to run to keep up

with. Pushing his way through the women assembled in the outer room,

he tapped gently on the door where mother and child were lying, and

asked, “Mary, tyeeb-tyeeb?” (“Is all well?”) and then, as the child’s

“father,” he insisted upon entering, took the child in his arms,

crooned to it, kissed it, and then hurried off and wrote a note to the

Finance Office to pay a hundred pounds _from his salary_ “to his boy.”

Mother and child were to meet with a tragic death. |328|

Two days before the departure of the _Abbas_, Gordon told Hassan Bey

that he had selected him to accompany Colonel Stewart as interpreter.

He was to accompany the party as far as Dongola, at all events, but

there was the possibility of Stewart requiring him as far as Cairo,

therefore his wife collected a number of presents for her relatives

in Cairo, which Hassan Bey was to present in uniform and decorations,

so that all should understand how highly she had married. I must now,

having given an idea of the relations existing between Gordon and

the man who “betrayed” Colonel Stewart, and who had left with Gordon

his wife and fifteen-day-old boy, give his account of what actually

occurred. I purposely leave out all the incidents of the voyage until

the boats reach the island opposite the village of El Salamanieh.

A discussion arose between the two Reises (pilots) as the island was

neared, as to what course to take; the river was running strong,

and between the island and mainland resembled a mill race. One reis

contended for the left bank and the other for the right. Stewart, who

spoke Turkish and Arabic, asked what was the matter, and decided that

judgment was to rest with the oldest of the reises, and he selected

the right bank. Instead of coming through the race stern first, it

was decided to put on full steam and “shoot” what might be called the

rapids. While the decision was being given, the steamer had come end on

with the island, and when full steam ahead was signalled, she steamed

ahead at an angle of about seventy-five degrees to the southern spit,

and before reaching the race proper, struck—swung round, and struck

again. Colonel Stewart took down his revolver, and threatened to shoot

both reises, upon which they dived overboard and swam to the right bank

of the Nile, but thirty or forty yards distant. Colonel Stewart did

not fire at them as they swam off. This occurred about an hour before

mid-day.

About an hour later, the two reises—Mohammad el Dongolawi and Ali el

Bishtili—returned to the vessel, said they had spoken to the people

of the village, who had declared they acknowledged the authority of

Mustapha Pasha Yawer, the |329| Mudir of Dongola; they at the same

time begged that Stewart would not molest them in any way, and they

would provide camels to take the whole party to Dongola. Colonel

Stewart spiked the cannon, and threw it overboard along with the

ammunition. He then ordered Hassan Bey, with one of Gordon’s cavasses,

and the clerk Mahmoud Ghorab, to go on shore and interview the people.

At first they demurred, as, being Egyptians, they felt sure they would

be murdered, and asked that the small boat should be sent as far as a

village near Derawi, where it was certain “friends” would be met with.

Colonel Stewart, after first threatening to throw them into the river,

took his revolver again and threatened to shoot all three if they did

not obey instantly. They obeyed, and went on shore to meet the men

awaiting them—a blind man named Osman, and two men of the Wadi Kamr

tribe. On reaching the reception-room of the Sheikh-el-Belad (headman

of the village), a copy of the Quoran was produced, and upon this Osman

and his companions swore loyalty to the Government. Osman remained

behind while the other two accompanied Hassan Bey and the others to the

island where Stewart’s party had then landed. Here again the oath of

allegiance to the Government was taken, and the men left, promising to

send for camels to be ready on the following morning.

At about ten o’clock the next day they returned, and suggested that all

should come to the right bank and pack up their effects, to be ready

for the camels when they arrived. About two hours after mid-day, while

all were either seated on the bank or fastening up their effects, a

man came, said that the Sheikh-el-Belad had arrived, and invited the

“Pasha” and the Consuls to his house. Colonel Stewart ordered Hassan

Bey to accompany him as interpreter. On reaching the reception-room,

they found about forty or fifty people assembled to receive them. The

Sheikh-el-Belad was seated in the centre of the room on the left. Two

angareebs were placed at each side of the doorway: Stewart and Power

seated themselves on the |330| angareeb on the right, and Hassan Bey

and Herbin on the angareeb to the left. Some minutes were taken up in

the usual salutations, and before they had time to speak about the

journey, the natives rose, and, saying the camels were approaching,

left the room, only to rush back a few minutes later shouting,

“Salaamoo tisslaamoo ya kaffarah” (“Become Muslims, you infidels,

and you will be spared”); but at the same moment Herbin had his head

smashed in with an axe, and Hassan Bey was stabbed in the right arm

with a crease knife, and, as he was falling, received a large spear

wound in the left leg. He fell unconscious, and did not see how Stewart

and Power were killed. While the bodies were being dragged out of the

room, some time after sunset, Hassan Bey was found to be still alive;

it was proposed to kill him, but the brother of the Sheikh-el-Belad, he

heard afterwards, pleaded for him, as his “stomach felt sick.”

After the murder of Stewart and the others, the party made their way

to the river, and a long fight ensued between them and the crew of

the vessel, the latter being killed to a man. Hassan Bey was given

some engine-oil from the steamer with which to dress his wounds, and,

when he recovered, was sent to attend the flocks of the tribe. About

fifty to sixty days later, he was sent to Berber on the orders of

Mohammad-el-Kheir, and there imprisoned for four months, and, on the

death of the Mahdi, was, with other prisoners, sent to Omdurman, to

take the oath of allegiance to Khaleefa Abdullahi.

In 1889–90 he was sent to Kassala, and, on the breaking out of the

famine, he, with his wife and child, and many others, made up a party

to return to Omdurman. Hassan Bey’s group consisted of his family, a

man named Ismail, with his wife and daughter, and a man with two women.

They ran short of water, and, leaving the others, who were worn out,

to rest under some shrubs, Hassan Bey and Ismail set off in search

of water. In about four hours’ time they reached some pools near the

Atbara, and filling their water-skins, set off to rejoin |331| their

families. On reaching the spot, they found that they had been devoured

by lions; the heads of Hassan’s wife and boy—then between six and

seven years of age—and the heads of Ismail’s wife and daughter were

all that remained. No trace was left of the heads of the man and the

other two women, and it is surmised that they must have escaped, for

the lion never eats the head of its victim. Half mad, the two wandered

on, living on roots and leaves, until, on reaching the village of

El-Mughetta, on the banks of the Atbara, they were taken prisoners and

made slaves. Ismail had to work at the ferry, but Hassan Bey, being

weak and ill, was allowed to wander about until, meeting with a caravan

bound for Geddaref, he joined it, and then made his way to Omdurman,

being employed, first, as clerk under Abdallah Sulieman, the head of

the cartridge-factory, and then transferred to the telegraph service.

|332|

APPENDIX II

ORPHALI

The account which I have given of how Gordon died differs so very

little in essentials from the account which I have since received from

Khaleel Agha Orphali, and which has been read to Khartoum survivors

with the idea of comparing the statements made with what was related

at the time, that I think it advisable to allow my account to stand,

and to append that of Orphali, giving a few details concerning Orphali

himself. I might mention that Gordon was credited with having killed

a much greater number of dervishes than I have given, but the error

arose from his being credited with the killing of the dervishes on the

“Gouvernorat” (E) staircase; but these were killed by the guards. The

fact of his having killed so many as he did, is to be accounted for

in two ways; first, the people who first assailed him on the private

staircase were unaccustomed to the use of the small spears they

carried—indeed, it is safe to say that they had only been dervishes

outwardly for half an hour or so; and, secondly, as they were packed on

a narrow staircase, every shot told on the mass. To assist the reader

in following Orphali’s narrative, I have drawn from memory a rough plan

of the palace as I remembered it while it stood intact, and, with the

assistance of Fauzi Pasha and others, have been able to name each of

the rooms.

Khaleel Agha Orphali joined the army for service in the Soudan in

the Coptic year 1591 (1873–74). After taking part in a number of

engagements, he was promoted to the rank of Bulok Bashi (commander of

twenty-five men), and when |333| Gordon reached Kulkul, in 1878–79,

Orphali and his men had been without pay for months. They presented

themselves to Gordon and clamoured for their pay; he recommended them

to go to Khartoum for it, upon which they became abusive, and Gordon

drew his revolver. Orphali followed suit, but neither fired. Gordon

quietly ordered the cavasses to remove their chief in custody, which

they did. Shortly afterwards, Gordon sent for Orphali, told him he

was a “man,” gave him a present of money, and offered him the post of

cavass to himself, which Orphali at once accepted, accompanying Gordon

to Khartoum, and remaining with him until he left.

On Gordon’s return, in 1884, he found Orphali then in Khartoum, and

made him his chief cavass. Orphali is one of those men who know but

one master, and believe that master to be the ruler of the universe.

He, therefore, was no great favourite with some in the administration,

as, during the siege, he was never away from Gordon’s side, and his

cavasses were allowed to do nothing but keep their arms clean, and

be ready to surround Gordon in case of trouble. They were strictly

forbidden to leave their posts to carry coffee, bread, run messages, or

perform all the other little services which they had been accustomed

to perform for the katibs (clerks). Orphali’s ideas as to the duty of

his cavasses were the cause of constant bickerings, which came to a

climax about twenty days before the fall of Khartoum, when he espied

one of them carrying an ink-bottle behind Geriagis Bey—the head-clerk,

who succeeded Rouchdi Bey. This was too much for Orphali. Grasping the

brass inkstand, he drove it with all his force against Geriagis’ chest,

and this assault Gordon could not pass over. Orphali was in disgrace

for eight days, and “confined to barracks,” that is to say, the palace

precincts, but he slept at Gordon’s door as usual. Twelve days before

the fall, he was re-instated in favour, and never again left Gordon’s

side for a moment.

Orphali—as Gordon is not alive to speak for him, and as so many knew

from Gordon himself of his threat to shoot him many years before—has

been afraid, since his return, to talk |334| about his relations with

Gordon, and was not a little surprised when I assured him that, if he

appeared in “Londra,” he need have nothing to be afraid of from the

English people. Having introduced the man, I now give his description

of the night of the 25th January, keeping as much as possible to

his own words, and only, to give a complete account, mentioning the

incidents occurring in other parts of the palace while Gordon and he

fought the upper floor:―

[Illustration: PLANS OF PALACE AT KHARTOUM ILLUSTRATING THE DEATH OF

GORDON.]

His excellency was not an early sleeper, and on the night the dervishes

entered Khartoum he was in his room. At eight o’clock, Consul Hansall,

Consul Leontides and the Doctor, Abou Naddara (he of the spectacles),

came to see him, and remained until midnight. After their departure,

he did not go to sleep, but sat reading and writing letters, and

sometimes pacing the room. At one o’clock in the morning, he sent me

to the telegraph-office to inquire about the enemy’s movements, as he

had received confirmed news of the intended attack, and his excellency

had issued general orders to the soldiers and employés to be on guard

to attack and withstand the dervishes. Ali Effendi Riza, Mohammad

Effendi Fauzi, and Youssef Effendi Esmatt were on duty, also the

messenger Mohammad Omar. They reported all was quiet, and this news I

gave his excellency. Half an hour later, perhaps, firing was heard from

the land side (_i.e._ to the south); I was sent to seek information.

Bakhit Bey, from Buri, telegraphed that a few dervishes had attacked,

but had been driven off, and when I told his excellency, he prepared

to sleep, and gave me the customary order to bolt his door, and this

I did. Then I closed the door of the terrace (I, plan), then the door

of the Gouvernorat (H), near Rouchdi Bey’s room, and returning along

the corridor leading to the private apartments, closed the door in

the middle (B), and then went down the private staircase (D), gave

the usual orders to the guards, and returned to my sleeping place

opposite the pasha’s room (K), after I had told the telegraph-clerks

to bring information as soon as any news came from the lines. About

three o’clock, Mohammad Omar, the messenger, with Cavass Ali |335|

Agha Gadri, roused me and said that an attack was being made at

Kabakat (boats) on the White Nile. I informed the Pasha, who told me to

run to the telegraph-office for more news, and there I met Hassan Bey

Bahnassawi, who was on duty, and we heard that an attack had been made,

but had been repulsed.[13] On informing the Pasha, he told me to close

the door of his room again, which I did, and sat down to make coffee.

Then we heard more firing from the White Nile, and the cavasses,

having run to the terrace, called to me that the dervishes were coming

into the town. I ran down to Buluk Bashi Ibrahim El Nahass, who had

twenty-four men; fifteen we placed at the windows (rooms on right

ground-plan), and nine on the terrace overlooking the garden (G). There

were also twenty-four cavasses and ferrashes; thirteen were placed at

the windows (left of ground-plan) under my second, Niman Agha, eight

on the terrace (F), and three at the door of the palace (B). Each man

had ten dozen cartridges, besides which, each party had a spare case

of ammunition. All these arrangements did not take five minutes, as

each knew his place. I then ran up to the Governor-General’s room,

and informed him of the arrangements. The day had now come (dawned).

The dervishes who ran to the front of the palace were killed by the

fire from the steamer. About seventy were killed in the garden by the

soldiers firing on them from the terrace, and then we saw the dervishes

coming over the rukooba (vine-trellis A), and they were met with the

fire from the windows and terraces. They came in great numbers very

quickly. Some ran to the entrance (B), killed the guards and opened

the door; then they all ran to the Gouvernorat door and killed the

telegraph-clerks, all except Esmatt, who hid among the sacks in the

storeroom; they then went to the terrace (G) and killed the soldiers,

and Nahass, seeing the massacre, jumped from the window. Four men were

on guard at the private stairs, but when the |336| dervishes came

back from the Gouvernorat door (E) they were soon killed, and some of

the dervishes ran to the terrace (F), and killed the soldiers there;

others came up the steps to the private apartment, and broke the door;

Gordon Pasha met them with his sword in his right hand and his pistol

(revolver) in his left, and killed of them two who fell at the door,

and one who fell down the stairs,[14] and the others ran away. Then

we heard the dervishes breaking the private door (B), while the Pasha

was loading his revolver. I went forward and received a little wound

in the face, and when the Pasha came, he received a wound in the left

shoulder; the man who wounded him was a half-blood slave. We followed

them to Rouchdi Bey’s room, killing three and wounding many, and the

others ran away and fell down the stairs. We went back to the Pasha’s

room and reloaded, but the dervishes came back, and I received a slight

wound in my right leg from a sword, but I warded the blow, and the

cut was nothing. We attacked the dervishes on the private stairs (D),

and while we were passing the door a native of Khartoum, dressed as a

dervish, stabbed the Pasha with a spear on the left shoulder; seeing

this man’s hand coming from behind the door, I cut at it, and he ran

and fell on a spear held by one of his companions on the steps, and

was killed. At this time more dervishes were coming along the corridor

(from H), and we returned to meet them; I received a thrust in the

left hand, but the Pasha cut the man down with his sword, and kicked

him on the head and he died; then the dervishes ran into the clerks’

offices (5, 6, 7, upper-floor plan), and while we were standing in the

corridor, a tall negro fired a shot from the door (H) near Rouchdi

Bey’s room, and the bullet struck the Pasha in the right breast, and

the Pasha ran up and shot the man dead. The dervishes then came out of

the offices, and we turned, and they ran to the private stairs, and we

fired into them, but the Pasha was getting weak from loss of blood. We

fought these dervishes down the stairs till we reached the last one,

and a native of |337| Katimeh speared the Pasha in the right hip, but

I shot him, and the Pasha fell down on the cavasses’ mat at the door,

and he was dead, and as I turned to seek refuge in the finance-office

(F plan), I was struck down and lost my senses, and I was lying down

with the dead. In the afternoon, a man of El Katimeh—Abd-el-Rahman,

whom I knew, helped me to go to the river for water, and I saw the body

of the Pasha at the door (D), but the head was not there. I was helped

to my house, and found my wife and children and property all missing.

. . . I was taken by a friend and Abd-el-Rahman to El Dem-el-Darawish,

and left on the plain all night, and in the morning I was taken before

Wad en Nejoumi . . . and I was stripped to see if I had any money and

papers, but I had not; and when I said that I was ignorant of any

treasure, I was heavily beaten, though much wounded, and was very ill

for seventeen days, and my wife found me.

[13] This is a literal translation. What Orphali intends to

convey is, that on telegraphing to the lines, Bahnassawi Bey,

who was on duty, was at his post, and replied to the inquiries

sent by telegraph. The distance between the palace and

Bahnassawi’s post was about two and a half miles.

[14] That is to say, fell dead or wounded.

* * * * *

All who were taken to see the steps where Gordon fell remarked upon the

number and extent of the blood stains, for they could not believe that

all had come from one body. These stains were shown to me in 1887. It

has been stated on good authority that “Stains of blood marked the spot

where this atrocity took place, and the steps from top to bottom for

weeks bore the same sad traces.” Here is what I choose to consider not

only a confirmation of Gordon having died fighting, but a confirmation

of Orphali’s narrative, for there were only two people on the upper

floor—Gordon and Orphali, and all the fighting must have been done by

them. It is quite impossible that the steps “from top to bottom”—four

flights-could have been stained as they were stained with large patches

of blood left by a body which had been dragged downstairs some time

after death. The steps _were_ stained with the blood of the dervishes

through whom I have said Gordon shot and hacked his way in his heroic

attempt to reach his troops.

|338|

APPENDIX III

Translation of the letter which the Khaleefa dictated in reply to the

letter given me by General Stephenson, in Cairo, before leaving for

Kordofan.

“In the name of God the Most Merciful, and thanks to God the

Omnipotent and Generous, with prayers on Mohammad our Lord and his

descendants; Greeting.

“From the servant of his Lord Abdallah-el-Muslimani-el-Brussi (the

Prussian), formerly named Karl Neufeld, to Stephenson the Englishman,

at Cairo.

“We have to inform you that, in conformity with your letter, dated

March 1, 1887, addressed to us, and recommending us to Sheikh Saleh

Fadlallah-el-Kabashi with regard to your projects,

“We started from Halfa, with his men bearing the arms and ammunition

and other things sent him by the Government.

“We proceeded on our course, and were constantly on guard on ourselves

and our property, until we arrived at a well called Selima, from where

we took the water supply, and continued our way to our destination.

“It was our fate to be met in the desert by six fakirs, followers of

the Mahdi, who attacked us, so that we and Saleh’s men had to defend

ourselves, our number being fifty-five men.

“The six fakirs were later reinforced by others, all of them being

men of Abd-el-Rahman en Nejoumi. Thus there remained for us no way of

escape, and in the space of half an hour we were defeated, many being

killed, and the rest taken prisoners. The rifles, ammunition, and

things destined for Saleh were seized, and I, my servant Elias, and

my slave-girl, Hasseena, were among the prisoners, and |339| we were

thus conducted to Abd-el-Rahman en Nejoumi, to Ordeh or Dongola.

“From this place we were sent to the Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be

peace, at Omdurman, to whom we were presented. We were certain that we

were to be killed, taking into consideration our great crime against

him.

“The Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, however, pitied our

condition, and proposed to us to avow the Mohammedan faith. We

accepted, and became Muslims by pronouncing the two declarations in

his presence, and by publicly professing that there is no God but

God, and that Mohammad is the Prophet of God, and I then added that

I believed in God and his Prophet Mohammad, and in the Khaleefa of

the Mahdi. We then asked him for his clemency and pardon, which was

granted. He thereupon embraced me, and named me Abdallah. I was then

accepted of the Mohammedan religion.

“It was on these conditions that the Khaleefa of the Mahdi, on whom be

peace, pardoned me and spared my life, which was already forfeited.

“This was done to the honour and glory of the Mohammedan religion.

“We further inform you that although Dufa'Allah Hogal deceived us,

notwithstanding his perfidy, we cannot sufficiently thank and reward

him, as his treachery turned to our great benefit, and he has allowed

us to enjoy great prosperity.

“Finally, we inform you confidentially that Saleh Fadlallah Salem has

lost all his power and influence, and has taken refuge in the desert.

This is the truth. I write this for your advice.

“The 17th Shaaban, 1304.”

|340|

APPENDIX IV

IBRAHIM PASHA FAUZI-GORDON’S FAVOURITE OFFICER

When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, in 1874, Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi was then

a second-lieutenant. Gordon had applied to the then Governor-General

of the Soudan, Ismail Pasha Ayoub, for four companies of soldiers to

accompany him to the Equatorial Provinces. Ayoub was not at all pleased

at Gordon’s mission, as he took it as a slight upon his administration,

so that when Gordon’s application for troops was received, Ayoub

selected for the purpose his most worthless men, with the double object

of getting rid of them, and making Gordon’s mission a failure. Fauzi,

anxious to see some service, had volunteered to accompany Gordon, and,

for doing so, Ayoub placed him under arrest. Gordon, hearing of the

matter, sent to Ayoub demanding that the officer who had volunteered

his services should be sent to him immediately. Fauzi was sent to

Gordon’s head-quarters, when Gordon first asked him, “Are you the

officer who volunteered your services?” following up the question,

when Fauzi in reply said, “Yes, sir,” the only two words he then knew

of English, by asking why he had done so. On learning that Fauzi

wished to see service, he promised that his wish should be gratified.

“But,” added Gordon, “I wish you to answer me as an officer—why did

the Governor place you under arrest?” Fauzi gave the reason—Ayoub was

afraid that |341| Gordon would discover, before departure, that he

had been sent the worst troops. Sending back the four companies, he

requisitioned four companies indicated by Fauzi, and, Fauzi being too

young for a command, he appointed him commandant of his body-guard, and

a sort of adjutant-major to the little force.

[Illustration: FAUZI PASHA IN UNIFORM.]

Fauzi accompanied Gordon to the Albert Nyanza, returned with him to

Khartoum, was gazetted major in consideration of his services, and

appointed Mudir (Governor) of Bohr, but given two months’ leave of

absence before taking up his post. Gordon left for England, and Fauzi

came to Cairo for his leave, on the expiration of which he set out for

the Soudan, but, on reaching Berber, he found a telegram awaiting him

from Gordon telling him not to go further than Khartoum, as he (Gordon)

was returning as Governor-General. When Gordon reached Khartoum, it

was to hear that Darfur was in revolt, and that the Bahr-el-Ghazal

province was joining the rebels. A council of war was held, when Gordon

asked the officers present to select one of themselves to head an

expedition to the Bahr-el-Ghazal province, while he took another into

Darfur; he had expected all of them to volunteer for the command, but

they believed that such an expedition had more the elements of defeat

and death in it than of glory and distinction. Told that they must

name an officer, they named Fauzi, who was not present, and Gordon at

once accepted him, sending him off with 4000 troops and the clerks

for the civil administration. Fauzi succeeded in setting the province

to rights without fighting, and while travelling about setting the

administration right in the districts, he often met, and assisted with

food and money, a holy man then living as a sort of hermit at Abba and

the neighbourhood. The man’s name was Mohammed Ahmed—whom the world was

to hear of six years later as the Mahdi.

Breaking down in health, Gordon ordered Fauzi to Khartoum, for rest,

promoted him to the rank of full colonel, and named him Governor

of Equatoria, in which province he spent about a year carrying out

Gordon’s instructions to the |342| letter, and making a host of

enemies amongst the officials whose peculations and interest in the

slave-trade he put a stop to. He accompanied Gordon to Cairo in 1879,

and when Gordon decided upon resigning, he asked Fauzi whether he would

prefer to remain in Cairo or return to the Soudan. Fauzi saw that,

without Gordon to back him up, his tenure of office would be but of

short duration, unless he engaged himself in the maladministration

of the provinces; he elected to remain in Cairo, where, at Gordon’s

request, he was gazetted Colonel commanding the 1st Regiment of the 3rd

Brigade. Gordon made it a point to be present at Fauzi’s first parade,

congratulated him on the handling of his men, and bidding him farewell,

gave him three hundred pounds as a souvenir of their days together in

the Soudan. At the outbreak of the Arabist rebellion, Fauzi’s regiment,

with others under the command of Kourschid Pasha, was ordered to

Rosetta, and after the defeat of Arabi, at Tel-el-Kebir, he was, with

other colonels, ordered to surrender to Sir Evelyn Wood at Kafr Dawar.

Sent to Alexandria, he was tried, degraded, and then dismissed in

disgrace.

Some days before the arrival of Gordon, in 1884, H. E. Nubar Pasha and

Sir Evelyn Wood sent for Fauzi, and told him to be in readiness to

proceed to the Soudan, as Gordon had asked for his services. When Fauzi

said that he had been dismissed, and was no longer on the army-list,

Nubar Pasha replied, “General Gordon will see to the matter.” It had

not been Gordon’s intention to call at Cairo, and Fauzi was to have

gone to Suez or viâ the Nile, as Gordon might decide. However, Gordon

was stopped at Port Said, and asked to come through Cairo; Fauzi went

to the station to meet him, and Gordon, on alighting, went up to

his old Soudan lieutenant, and asked how it was that he was not in

uniform. Fauzi detailed his dismissal, upon which Gordon turned to Sir

Evelyn Wood, and asked him how it was. It appears that when Gordon saw

Fauzi’s name amongst the names of the colonels to be tried, he wired,

or wrote—or both—to Sir Evelyn Wood, asking him to look after Colonel

|343| Ibrahim Fauzi. General Wood did do so, but there was another

Colonel Ibrahim Fauzi; and while Gordon’s Fauzi was dismissed in

disgrace, the other Fauzi retired in glory and with a pension.

Gordon had some difficulty in seeing Fauzi reinstated, for his enemies

were powerful; but, not to be thwarted, he took Fauzi direct to His

Highness the Khedive, and carried his point. Two days later, Fauzi

took his seat in the carriage with Gordon and Stewart, and left Bulac

Dacroor station on that journey from which he only was to return alive,

and that fourteen years later.

On the way to Khartoum, Gordon named Stewart sub-Governor-General

of the Soudan, and Fauzi Director of Military and Marine, and, in

communicating these appointments to Cairo, he wrote of Fauzi, “I

especially recognize in Fauzi Bey the desired activity which he has

displayed with me while previously in the Soudan; he has already given

proof of his abilities, and I am more than ever satisfied with him.”

Soon after his arrival at Khartoum, Fauzi was entrusted with the

clearing out of the rebels from Khor Shambat and Halfeyeh, and the

restoring of the telegraphic communications which they had cut. Fauzi

won his dual victory, and restored the line, but, in leading his men,

he was hit in the right leg with a bullet fired from an elephant-gun,

which split and shattered the bone. Owing to want of skill on the

part of the Greek doctor, the broken bone was allowed to overlap,

and a suppurating wound set in from the unextracted fragments, which

kept Fauzi confined to his official residence for about six months,

although he was able to transact the executive part of his duties. On

the departure of Stewart, Gordon named Fauzi Governor of Khartoum and

Commandant of Troops, calling a special parade for the occasion. Fauzi

Pasha must be left to relate, at some future date, the incidents of the

siege of Khartoum; I pass on to January 25, 1885.

About three o’clock in the afternoon, Gordon called Fauzi to the roof

of the palace, to see the activity taking place in |344| the dervish

camp. He had a large tripod telescope fixed on the roof immediately

over his room.[15]

[15] It has been repeatedly stated that Gordon had a gun on the

roof of the palace, with which he used to shell the dervish

camp. In one account of the fall of Khartoum, it is averred

that Gordon, in his sleeping suit, served this gun for an hour

until it was rendered useless, as it could not be depressed

sufficiently to bear upon the dervishes surrounding the palace.

There never was a gun on the roof of the palace, for the roof

would not have supported its dead weight, much less the shock

of its recoil.

About 3.30, Fauzi, riding a donkey, accompanied Gordon on what proved

to be his last visit to the lines. Most of the troops were lying down

exhausted and hungry; as they saw Gordon approach, they wished to

present arms, but he kept calling out to them, “Rest, rest; but keep

your eyes open.” At sunset they regained the palace, and walked up

and down for some time discussing the situation. As the dinner-hour

approached, Gordon told Fauzi that he was sorry he could not invite him

to dinner, as he had nothing to eat. Fauzi said he had, for himself

and guards, the hearts of four date trees, and would send one to the

palace, upon which Gordon ran in and brought out his dinner—also the

heart of a date tree. This was the last Fauzi was to see of Gordon.

At midnight, Fauzi Pasha, as usual, went his rounds of the posts in

the town, reaching his guards at about 2 a.m. While giving orders in

the courtyard of his official residence, a sound as of shouts in the

distance was heard. This was towards dawn. Fauzi went to the roof, and,

through his binoculars, could faintly make out hand-to-hand fighting

going on in the lines. Hurrying down, he drew up his men, and set off

for the palace, being joined by ten Greeks who had been on duty. On

coming in sight of the palace, they were met by two bands of dervishes,

but succeeded in cutting their way through one, only to be met by a

troop of dervish horse. The little party was forced back, fighting

every step, and when close to his house all rushed inside, closed the

doors, and commenced to fight through the windows, but for every shot

they fired, a score came back in reply. The little garrison assembled

in the courtyard for a last stand as the dervishes were then beating

down the doors. Fortunately, the sight of other dervishes rushing

past with loot drew the |345| besiegers off on a similar errand, and

the party was able to hold its own against successive parties until

the Mahdi sent word to stop the massacre. When Fauzi was taken before

the Mahdi, he was asked, “Why is it that you, a good Muslim, have

never written to me when every one else has done so, expressing their

loyalty? Have you forgotten the days at Abba, and the instruction I

gave you? If you have, I have not;” and, kissing him, the Mahdi told

him to “go in peace.” The Mahdi was very wroth at the death of Gordon,

for he really admired and respected him, and he had given strict orders

that he was not to be harmed in any way.

As, during his captivity, Fauzi used to receive moneys from Cairo, he

had, to explain his being able to live, to engage in some occupation,

and took to lime-burning, a business which cost him more than he ever

got out of it. As an Egyptian, he was under the surveillance of Youssef

Mansour, who, after the escape of Slatin, refused to be responsible for

Fauzi any longer. Failing to get him executed for having assisted in

Slatin’s escape, he succeeded in getting him committed to the Saier,

where he remained as a prisoner for four years, until released by the

Sirdar.

|346|

APPENDIX V

AHMED YOUSSEF KANDEEL

Ahmed Youssef Kandeel, though actually a civilian employé, held the

rank in Khartoum, where he was born, of Lieutenant in the 3rd Soudan

Artillery. He took part in many of the attacks on the dervishes during

the siege, and fought with Bakhit Bey on the night the town was taken.

He managed to fight his way to his house, and held out until the

Mahdi’s orders came to stop the massacre of the inhabitants, when he

gave himself up. His father, uncle, and brother had already been killed

fighting. For some time he supported himself at Omdurman by cutting

firewood, living in a state of semi-starvation. Being a good clerk, he

offered his services to Wad Nejoumi, who, it appears, would employ no

one but old Egyptian employés as “katibs” (clerks). He was with Wad

Nejoumi when I was taken prisoner to Dongola, and throws an interesting

light upon Nejoumi’s attitude towards Mahdieh, which more than confirms

the impressions I had formed, and which I have given expression to in

Chapter VI.: “Dongola to Omdurman.”

[Illustration: AHMED YOUSSEF KANDEEL.]

Kandeel tells me that, on the arrival of our party at Dongola,

Nejoumi called a meeting of emirs, and asked what should be done

with us. All voted for instant execution, but this Nejoumi would

not sanction. Among the emirs was a Taaishi wakil (spy or agent of

Abdullahi)—a similar wakil being appointed to each army not actually

led by one of the Khaleefa’s relatives. This wakil’s name was Messaad

Geydoom-el-Taaishi. When Nejoumi insisted upon saving |347| my

life, and, as an alternative, sending me to the Khaleefa, leaving him

to decide what should be done with me, he instructed Kandeel to write

a letter saying that, as I was a “hakeem” (doctor), I might be useful

to him (Nejoumi) and also to the army. Geydoom, having his suspicions

about Nejoumi’s loyalty to Mahdieh, used his sparing of my life as a

proof of his sympathies with the Government, and Nejoumi was ordered to

Omdurman, and kept a prisoner in his house for some months.

Geydoom’s treatment of the army during Nejoumi’s absence caused so much

discontent that Abdullahi determined to send Nejoumi back to Dongola,

but with strict instructions to at once commence the march for the

conquest of Egypt. He was given a hundred and twenty rifles only, and

very little ammunition.

When General Grenfell sent the letter to Nejoumi, calling upon him

to surrender, Nejoumi called a council of emirs, said that the army

could not possibly fight, as they were tired, hungry, and thirsty, and

suggested surrender, for they must either be killed upon the field or

die in the desert on the way back. The emirs, being of the Taaishi

family, first accused Nejoumi of cowardice and then of treachery. They

threatened to report him to the Khaleefa when the fight was _won_, and

to ask that one of themselves should be given the command when the

further advance into Egypt was ordered. There appears to be but little

doubt that, had it not been for the Taaishi emirs, the army would have

followed Nejoumi unarmed to the lines of the Government troops. The

emirs dictated the reply which Nejoumi was to send to General Grenfell,

and when Nejoumi dashed down into the plain as the dervish army was in

retreat, it was doubtless with the object of reaching the Government

lines, but under pretence of rallying the few remaining troops, so

that they should not shoot him down if they thought he was deserting

them—or follow him if they thought he was charging, for this would have

drawn the fire of the brigades upon them. After the death of Nejoumi,

spies reported to the Khaleefa that he had |348| attempted to open up

negotiations with the Government troops, and Kandeel, being suspected

as Nejoumi’s “katib,” was loaded with chains and sent to Omdurman,

where he was imprisoned for fourteen months, and then released to

become the clerk of Yacoub, the brother of Abdullahi.

|349|

APPENDIX VI

THE SOUDAN: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

To the present generation the history of the Soudan may be said to

commence with the date of its partial conquest by Mohammad Ali Pasha,

the Viceroy of Egypt. To go further back than this is to compile from

various sources, all more or less inaccurate, a mass of information

which, where not misleading, would be next to useless to the would-be

correct historian. Even the recent history of the benighted country has

from force of circumstances been compiled from sources not the most

reliable, and it is extremely difficult for the moment to sift the

facts from the legends. The Soudan is still an unknown and unconquered

land. Small tribes have been magnified into nations, and petty chiefs

and sheikhs into kings and sultans who evidenced their exalted position

in the possession of a few more sheep, goats, donkeys, and slaves, than

their neighbours. No single tribe or sheikh ever held general supremacy

over the others; Zubeir was within an ace of making himself the Sultan

of the Soudan, when he accepted an invitation to visit Cairo; that was

twenty-five years ago, and he is still here. The Soudan was nothing

more nor less than a collection of little commonwealths; occasionally

a number of these would acknowledge allegiance to one particular

headman, and, in such instances, the “nation” might have boasted almost

as great a population as some small and obscure provincial town. But

that such instances were rare |350| is proved by the facility with

which Mohammad Ahmed and Abdullahi set the various sections of tribes

fighting among themselves.

When Mohammad Ali established his government, and when later Ismail

Pasha attempted to extend his empire, they each took advantage of the

chronic anarchy reigning in the Soudan to further their schemes, but

the tribes soon found that they had but stepped from the frying-pan

into the fire, and waited patiently for the strong man who was to

rid them of the thraldom of the now hated and detested Turks, from

whom they had hoped so much. From the time when, what the Soudanese

call the “Turk” rule, was established, until the rebellion of 1882,

nothing whatever was done to develop the natural resources of the

country—indeed, the reverse. The only trade the officials fostered

was that of slaves, and these were invariably drawn from peaceful and

agricultural districts; the adult male population of whole districts

was swept away in those raids organized to supply the hareems of

Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey, with eunuchs and concubines. The

mineral wealth of Sennar, Darfur and Kordofan was neglected, as when

the soldiers reached the gold, silver and copper mines, they discovered

that the precious metals did not exist in the pure blocks they had

expected to find, and that to extract the metals meant work.

The population of the half-conquered provinces was robbed in every

conceivable manner by tax-collectors, who were seldom or never paid

their salaries of from twenty-five to thirty shillings a month, and

they were assisted in the duties of tax collecting by companies of

irregular soldiers whose salaries also were never paid. Where money

was not forthcoming, the taxes were collected in kind, and it may be

imagined what the result of tax collecting was. The people were driven

farther and farther away from the cultivated lands and watercourses.

The “Sudd,” that rank growth of weeds which obstruct the navigation of

the Nile and its tributaries, was left to accumulate year after year,

the little clearances which the inhabitants themselves made formerly,

|351| being abandoned as they but aided the passage of boats conveying

soldiers on tax collecting or conquest of territory expeditions.

Admitting, for the sake of argument, that some of the Soudan tribes may

have risen to the dignity of independent kingdoms, their history may

be written with one word—“anarchy,” and when the “Turk” government was

established, general rebellion was rife from the beginning until it

culminated in the rising of Mohammad Ahmed.

The population of the Soudan was, and still is, divided into three

great classes, (1) the pure Arab to whom manual labour has been unknown

since the day his ancestor Ishmael mixed the mortar with which to

cement the stones of the Kaaba or House of God, which Abraham built at

Mecca; (2) the Negroid, who will perform a few light duties, but who

has absorbed all the worst to the exclusion of the few better qualities

of his progenitors,—and, (3) the Black—naturally indolent and too lazy

to work,—without ambition, and whose presumed avarice only extends to

the possession of a little more than he can eat. For centuries the

Black has been the slave of the Arab, and performed all the manual

labour, such as the collection of gum and senna leaves, indiarubber,

ivory, the cultivation of cereals, and the navigation of the rivers;

but taking it all in all, the lot of the black slave might be envied by

millions of workers in other parts of the world. With the introduction

of the “Turk” government, all three classes were considered as “prey”;

the slave proper had to work harder so that his master might be able to

satisfy the rapacity of _his_ master—the official, and the slave knew

this; the negroid, who believed in cultivating only so much dourra as

was requisite for his needs, found that he had to cultivate enough to

feed the soldiers quartered in his province, and to pay taxes not only

on what he grew for himself, but on what he grew for nothing for the

soldiers. It is no wonder, then, that the three waited the coming of

some strong man to rid them of the common enemy.

Although a religious element was introduced into |352| Mohammad

Ahmed’s movement, many fail to grasp the fact that religion here takes

the place of politics in Europe, and when the Arabs rise against the

powers that be, they are backed up by some “religious” question, for

their laws are based entirely upon the Quoran. Mohammad Ahmed had for

years been preaching against the extortions of the Turk officials, and

had it not been suggested to him, it is unlikely that he would ever

have assumed the _rôle_ of Mahdi, though as a holy man only, it is

almost certain that his crusade would have succeeded equally as well

as it did. The country was ripe for rebellion, and when the followers

of Mohammad Ahmed overcame the first “Turk” sent against him, and

against whom he had been preaching for years, success was assured, and

thousands flocked to him. His crusade, therefore, in the beginning,

was not a religious movement pure and simple as we understand such; it

was the rising of an oppressed people against a government that had

but lately tried to establish its authority over them. It is true that

once having had the _rôle_ of Mahdi forced upon him, Mohammad Ahmed

did his best to act up to it; his miracles—in the way of annihilating

successive armies sent against him were very real indeed, and if

thousands flocked to his banner in consequence of them, they should not

be too severely criticized and charged with fanaticism and unreasoning

superstition, for while they flocked to see the worker of these very

real miracles, just as many thousands of people in more enlightened

climes were making pilgrimages to caves, grottoes and shrines in the

belief that the miracles they were praying for would be performed.

Nor, considering that the faith in dreams and visions is almost as

strong in the east as it was when Pharaoh had his dreams interpreted by

Joseph, should Mohammad Ahmed and his successor be blamed for taking

advantage of the credulity of the most credulous people on earth in the

relating of visions, when but a little time since thousands of people

in a highly civilized country were flocking to the doors of one who

pretended to be the mouthpiece on earth of the angel Gabriel—a much

more mythical being than either the prophet Mohammad or the Mahdi.

|353|

Had Mohammad Ahmed lived, there is no doubt but that he would have

succeeded in establishing some form of government which, if not better,

would certainly have been no worse than the one he had overturned. With

the Mahdi’s death, Abdullahi found himself with a trust which, as he

saw immediately, only a powerful military despotism could enable him

to keep. Threatened with attack from all points of the compass, he

had also internal dissensions to combat, and met them unflinchingly.

While his atrocities have been made much of, he invariably went

through the farce of trying people for disobedience during his reign

of martial law before carrying out the capital sentence; perhaps, if

Abdullahi’s atrocities were placed side by side with those associated

with revolutions in other countries, his list would be found not the

longest. Oppression doubtless was great, but it was concentrated in

one place, and being more seen, was as a consequence more felt. Still

opinions may be said to be equally divided as to whether oppression

was any greater during the worst days of the reign of Abdullahi than

it had been under the old government. The foregoing is not written in

defence of Mohammad Ahmed or Abdullahi—and I have little reason to

say a single good word for the latter, but it is time that the Soudan

should be seen through clear glasses. Jealousy of power was Abdullahi’s

besetting sin, and to this must be attributed the swift punishment

meted out to those who in the slightest degree exhibited disobedience

of orders. To this jealousy must be added vanity of his power also. I

have heard since my release, from people of the Muslimanieh quarter,

some of the reasons for Abdullahi’s sparing of my life. I had forgotten

the incident, but am reminded that when on my arrival at Omdurman I

was taken to the gallows in chains to be hanged, I turned to the Emirs

and shouted “Has your Mahdi (I used this name at the time) no other

way of exhibiting his power but by hanging a bound man before all his

soldiers? Take off my chains, and I will fight you, or else get on with

your work.” Abdullahi was told this while I was still being played

with, and said, “A man who will |354| talk like that when he is going

to be hanged is a man! He is a big man; I will not hang him; a man who

is not afraid of me is not to be hanged; I will keep him.” This was

said to the Muslimanieh and others. Abdullahi had not made up his mind

whether I was a merchant, spy, medicine man or general. Then, again, he

kept me alive in order to prove that he was more powerful than my Malek

(the Emperor of Germany). I am told that he very often said to people,

“You have heard of Abdalla Nufell; he is not afraid of me; his Malek

has millions of soldiers like him, but he dare not bring his armies to

release him; he is afraid to meet my ansar.”

There are other stories of Abdullahi’s many references to me, but, as

they are of a complimentary nature, I must leave others to relate them;

the above are only given for the purpose of affording a slight insight

into the man’s complex character, and to give an idea of the small

actions which could influence him.

The Past of the Soudan may be said to close with the battle of

Omdurman; the Present may be given in one word—Transition. Its Future

is still in the future; but from what I have written, those intending

to make a rush to the Soudan as soon as it is declared open for trade,

will understand that a settled government has yet to be established.

The Soudan has had but one government, and I have given an idea of

what that government was to the inhabitants; the next government

established will, as a matter of course, be looked askance at. Although

the Khaleefa’s army was smashed up at Omdurman, his influence still

remains with great numbers, and time must be given for the Soudanese

to learn that there are governments _and_ governments. All they are

conscious of now is, that the Government they turned out has come back

again, and they expect from it no better treatment than they received

formerly, if they do not expect worse as a punishment for their

rebellion. The possession of slaves will be forbidden, and this will

give umbrage to the Arabs, while the slaves will no more appreciate or

enjoy their freedom than would so many cage-bred birds theirs. There

is a |355| considerable amount of ignorance in Europe on the subject

of slavery in Mohammedan countries, but I must confine myself to the

Soudan on this question. Slave raiding should of course be put down

with a strong hand, and there should be, when a raider is captured, no

other formality than that of loading the rifles or affixing the rope;

the trial might take place at some future date, so that the fact of his

execution might be recorded. I wish to speak now only of those who are

already _called_ “slaves,” for, in the majority of cases, it is but a

name.

I have remarked that the Black is naturally lazy, and will do no more

work than he is compelled to; if liberated unconditionally, he will,

unless drafted into regiments, loaf about, and occasionally do a little

work for the sake of a meal; but he will refuse to keep to any work

long unless some sort of pressure is brought to bear, and he will be

only too glad if it is. As a slave, his master must keep him in food

and clothes, and also support his wife and children in return for his

services, and, being “property,” he is well looked after; he is, as

I have said, a slave but in name, but the name has an ugly sound to

Europeans. The new Government might open a slave register, have a few

inspectors to go round and “ask for complaints,” and either give an

age, or name a date, when all holding of slaves would be a breach of

a law yet to be made. Treaties are all very well when dealing with

countries boasting a civilized Government, but it is not an easy matter

to compel petty chieftains in the heart of Africa to agree to laws

which upset the whole political economy of their domains—and this only

to please people who know nothing of the existing conditions. However

the whole question bristles with difficulties and with arguments for

and against leaving matters as they are—only suppressing raiding as

I have said already—but as those difficulties do exist, it would be

well not to be rash, or to burden the still unconquered and unsettled

country with revolutionary laws. Far better to make haste slowly, for

laws are of little use unless a breach of them is quickly punished, and

the Soudan Arabs have yet to be taught to respect laws emanating from a

“Government.” |356|

These few remarks on the unsettled state of the country are intended

for those who may be going out as entire strangers to the Soudan.

They must be prepared to meet with difficulties great and small,

disappointments, much discomfort, and many annoyances big and little;

but it is to be hoped that they will endure these for a time, and

not pester the little and still half-formed new administration with

big complaints about petty quarrels or troubles. Any reprisals asked

for in case of small annoyances or unpleasantnesses, can but bring

in their train much bigger ones; you want but to earn the respect of

both Arab and Soudanese to earn his devotion, and you may have both

by at least treating him as a man and not as a beast. When speaking

of my having borrowed money from the guides whom I entrusted with the

arrangements I made for my escape, I drew attention to the strange

fact of my borrowing money from them. This was putting the principle I

have pointed out into practice; I required their aid. I went further,

and gave evidence that I was entirely in their hands—a weakling, but

they understood that if they helped me in my weakness, I would help

or protect them in my strength; above all, they valued my trust and

confidence. There are limits, I know, to both, but you must learn those

limits.

The great want of the Soudan at the present time is means of

communication; there are enormous tracts of land on which cereals can

be raised with the minimum of cost and labour, but without means of

transport they might as well not exist. Some talk has been made of a

line of rail connecting Khartoum with the Red Sea, and this, certainly,

would provide the means of transport and enable the Soudan to compete

with almost any other country in cereals, but it is a question whether

it would be worth while to construct a railway for the sake of the

grain trade, if the trucks which take it to the seaboard have to be

hauled back empty, and, maybe, left idle for the greater part of the

year. It is possible that during the last fifteen years Nature has to

a great extent repaired the enormous damage done to indiarubber and

gum trees, |357| when the plants and trees were destroyed in order

to obtain a big enough crop to satisfy the rapacity of the “Turk”

officials. The forests abound in ebony and other hard woods, but power

to saw them into beams or planks of suitable dimensions for transit

is requisite before this valuable industry can be developed. From

what prisoners from the south told me, in places an almost pure iron

is found on or near the surface; this the Shilluks and Dinkas smelt

in mud furnaces about six to eight feet high and three to four feet

in diameter. The spear heads of the Shilluks and Dinkas, beside their

shape being different from all others, are readily distinguishable

from their peculiarly deep black shade, while the spear heads made

from imported iron are many shades lighter, and in comparison, when

polished, have a tinny appearance. If coal is found, and I believe it

will be, if the description I was given of “black stones” which took

fire is correct, then one might say that there is no limit to the

development of the country. Should the Nile and its tributaries be

cleared of the “sudd,” considerable development would be immediately

possible, but the whole country must first be studied, and its present

condition with its existing means of transport thoroughly grasped,

before people will be justified in subscribing for big ventures, for

the failure of one means the failure of others, and a retarding, for

want of new capital, of present possibilities in the way of development.

It is quite impossible to compile any statistics of the former import

and export trade of the Soudan, that is to say reliable statistics, and

as the whole trade of the country was governed by the slave trade—now

abolished—a new condition of things has been introduced but not yet

established. Barter must, for some time to come, be the medium of

trade and exchange, and, here again, new conditions are certain to

be met with. Formerly the principal imports were cheap cotton goods,

earthenware, ironware, dried and preserved provisions, sugar, perfumes,

and such like, which generally came in the category of things which

are “cheap and nasty.” There are two great reasons why all this must

now be changed; with almost |358| 20,000 regularly paid troops in

the country, and troops, too, who have, in a measure, been living in

the lap of luxury, since 1882, their demands must be met. The sight

of well-fed, well-housed, and well-clothed troops, will excite the

admiration and cupidity of the Soudanese for similar luxuries, and a

demand for articles formerly unknown to them will at once be created.

I hesitate to specify some of the goods which I know there will be a

demand for, not that I am in any way interested in the subject for the

moment, but only to guard against numbers of people exporting large

quantities of merchandise of the same class far in excess of the actual

demand. I cannot too strongly advise manufacturers to study on the spot

the requirements of the people, and to comply with their requirements,

whatever the article might be. Disappointment and loss can only

ensue if articles they do not want, or which do not meet with their

requirements, are attempted to be forced upon them, for while engaged

upon this suicidal policy, some one else will certainly be studying the

question with the intention of meeting the wishes of his prospective

customers. I would strongly deprecate the formation of big syndicates

and companies for the exploitation of the Soudan; the country, granted

certain facilities for transport, has a great future, but it would be

very unwise to lock up large capitals, the greater part of which would

be lying unused. Small companies, with all the capital employed, will

pay best for the time being, and the pioneers of such companies might

be accompanied by a mineralogist, to examine the gold, silver, copper,

lead, and other mineral deposits. That gold exists is well known, but

the richness of the quartz I cannot speak of; one thing, though, is

certain, gold can be obtained with little or no difficulty and labour,

otherwise the small bags of gold I saw at Khartoum and Omdurman would

not have been brought in. Lead and copper will be found to the west and

south-west of Darfur—and possibly silver also, but whether it would pay

to work the mines can only be ascertained after an examination of the

districts. |359|

To sum up. The Soudan is a country which for nearly a century has

been fighting against the establishment of any foreign government;

its experience of a “benevolent” administration is of the very worst;

the inhabitants sank all or nearly all differences between them when

they rose to turn out the hated Turks; their experience of Christians

has evidently not been of the best, else why the saying concerning

Gordon? Large numbers are still loyal to the Khaleefa Abdullahi, and it

will require but a very little mistake to make the inhabitants flock

to his banner, or, what is worse, they will retire to the west and

leave the country denuded of the population it stands in so much need

of. Strangers are not wanted—they will be looked upon with suspicion

until they have given evidence of their honest intentions towards the

villagers; traders, before they may look for success, must overcome

the prejudice of the people against European traders, a prejudice

based upon experience of them formerly. And it is necessary for me

to say that, after recent experience, it will take some time before

the Muslim will believe that the Christian religion is anything but

what he believes it to be, and he will be convinced that the boasted

superiority of the European over the Arab does not hold good in the

Soudan at all events. If those going to the Soudan will bear these

points in mind, they will save themselves and others an infinity of

trouble, and all barriers will be surmounted, if they keep in mind

always the reputation Gordon made for himself for “Goodness and

Justice,” and make Goodness and Justice their motto.

|361|

INDEX

A

Abbas, 246

_Abbas, The_, 325–328

Abdalla Rouchdi, 232, 333–336

Abdallah Sulieman, 236, 331

Abd el Kader Bey, 161, 189

Abd es Semmieh, 181, 209, 234

Abou-el-Gassim, 276

Abou Hamad, 232, 248

Abyssinian embassy, 246

Abyssinian expedition, 155, 221

Adultery, punishment of, 136, 137

Ahmed Abdel Maajid, 86, 121

Ahmed Youssef Kandeel, 346–348

Aid to wounded, 286–288

Ajjab Abou Jinn, 84, 102, 121

Ali Khaater, 180–182, 209

Alti, 182

Ansar, the, 42, 60, 97, 100–102, 130, 354

Arab tribes―

Ababdeh, 9, 153

Alighat, 10, 23, 30, 31, 50, 60

Baggara, 212, 217, 230, 264–269, 276, 277, 281–283

Bedawi, 40, 55

Dabaanieh, 83

Danagli, 48

Dar Hamad, 8, 13, 54, 55

Digheem, 276

Dinkas, 357

Fellati, 171, 176, 209

Gawaamah, 98, 139, 188

Habbanieh, 276

Hadendowas, 88, 89

Hammadah, 84

Jaalin, 37, 59, 231, 244, 260, 266

Kabbabish, 2, 5, 8, 11, 22, 53, 54, 105, 167

Rhizaghat, 276

Shilluks, 357

Shukrieh, 84

Taaishi, 264, 267, 276, 346

Ardagh, Colonel, 5

Arsenal, 89, 178, 212, 226, 237–239

Assouan, 4–8, 52, 65, 77, 160–162

Atbara, battle of, 248, 249, 271

Austrian Consulate-general, 164, 168, 314

Austrian mission, 164, 233, 309

Awad el Kerim, 84; his three sons, 85

Awwad el Mardi, 226–239, 242, 244

B

Bakah Wells, 53

Bakhita, 240

Beit-el-Amana, 264, 273

Beit-el-Mal (Treasury), 13, 33, 34, 36, 51, 85, 87, 100, 125, 155,

157, 171, 174, 179, 206, 210, 214, 241, 276; Amin or Director

of, 46, 49, 64, 145, 147, 175, 210, 226, 234

Berber, 86, 155, 165, 193, 198, 237, 309

Blackmail (_see_ Nebbi Khiddr)

Black population of Soudan, 351, 355

Burleigh, Bennet, 244, 279

Bussati Bey, 326

C

Cairo, start from, 2–7; return to, 1, 290

Caravan, constitution of, 4, 8, 11, 12; betrayal of, 2, 3, 21, 22,

60, 61, 68, 106, 167, 168

Catarina, 114, 116

Coinage, 171, 210–215, 223

Cromer, Lord, 247

D

Dara, 310

Darfur, 181, 203, 350, 358

Derawi, 7–10, 245, 329

Dervishes, horsemanship of, 41, 44, 49; treachery of, 285, 288

Desert routes, 12, 15–23

Divorce laws, 123, 180, 190–192

Dongola, 10, 39–43, 54, 59, 66, 67, 328, 329; capture of, 232, 248,

249, 346

E

Earle, General, 3

Egyptian War Office (Intelligence Department), 105, 167, 168, 197,

291, 295, 298

El Agia, 15, 16, 19–22

El Etroun, 15, 23

El Fasher, 203, 311

El Fun, 143, 144

El Kiyeh, 15, 22, 23

El Obeid, 10, 220

Elias, clerk to Neufeld, 8, 12, 14, 24–29, 35, 36, 43, 50, 66

Elias Pasha, 4

Emirs―

Abd-el-Baagi, 257, 261, 264

Ahmed Fedeel, 176, 243

Ali Wad Saad, 91

Makin en Nur, 37, 59

Mohammed Hamad'na Allah, 176–179, 186

Mohammed Hamza, 27, 37–40, 43, 44, 59

Mohammed Taher, 88

Nur Angara, 70, 76

Wad Bessir, 59, 121

Wad en Nejoumi, 27–34, 39, 46–59, 64–67, 78, 118, 132, 139, 155,

337, 346–348

Wad Eysawee, 59

Wad Farag, 27–35, 44, 59–61, 173, 174

Wad Umma, 59

Yacoub, 148, 175, 176, 186, 216, 221, 235, 242, 249, 257, 263, 267,

271, 273, 348

F

Famine, 112, 116–119, 147

Fettering, method of, 72, 79, 80, 91, 93, 229, 235, 279

Fitton, Major, 261

Flogging, 41–43, 126, 127, 129–132

Forts, 239, 243, 244, 254, 266

G

Gebel Ain, 8, 15

Gebel Ragaf, 111, 220

Gebel Roiyan, 68

German Consulate, 154, 160, 162–165, 168, 291

Germany, Emperor of, 354

Gordon, 68, 89, 212, 218, 228, 300–324, 325–328, 332–337, 340–345;

relief expedition, 3, 65, 132, 229, 247, 316–321

“Gordonizing,” 159

Grenfell, General, 347

Guides―

Abdallah, 197–201, 214

Ali el Amin, 8, 12, 17–24, 31, 36, 49, 60, 67

Darb es Safai, 21–29, 49, 50

Hassan, 12–24, 30, 50, 60–62, 67

Hassib el Gabou, 8–16, 22, 48, 52–58, 64, 106, 107, 255

Hawanein, 196, 201, 207, 214

Ismail, 11–26, 57, 61

Mohammad Ali, 153, 154, 156, 163

Moussa Daoud Kanaga, 54, 154, 156, 163–166

Onoor Issa, 223, 226, 233, 239–244, 254

Zecki, 220

Gunboats, 240, 250–256, 257, 265, 270, 290, 326

Gunpowder manufacture, 175–182, 209, 224, 232–241, 289, 296

H

Halfeyeh, 176–178, 198, 261, 265, 270

Hamad Wad el Malek, 246

Hamaida, 234, 237

Hanafi, 110, 151

Hassan Bey Hassanein, 325–331

Hassan Hosny, 181, 209, 234

Hassan Zecki, 174, 177, 232

Hasseena, 4, 8–12, 25–29, 32–36, 40–46, 50–52, 68, 72, 81, 102, 103,

108, 109, 118, 135, 185–194, 195

Hassib Allah, 59, 60

Hicks Pasha, 88, 101, 178, 309, 310, 313, 326

Hogal Dufa'allah, 4–14, 54, 58, 62, 78, 245, 255

Hunter, General, 293

Hussein Pasha Khaleefa, 308, 309

I

Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi, 167, 208, 218, 224, 244, 260, 263, 266, 277,

303, 332, 340–345

Ibrahim Wad Adlan, 121, 143, 145–159, 165, 166, 170, 216

Ibrahim Wad Hamza, 246, 260

Ismail Pasha Ayoub, 340, 350

J

Jinns (spirits), 170–174

Joseppi, 141, 156, 157, 179, 200

K

Kadis Hassein Wad Zarah, 222

Ahmed 221

Kassala, 181

Kerreri, 248, 258, 260, 274

Khaleefa, Abdullahi―

His cruelty, 69, 73–75, 84, 85, 110, 353; his superstition, 99,

103, 120, 249, 257, 263, 267; respect for Neufeld, 132, 143, 204,

230, 353; objection to traders, 149, 155; encouragement of

marriage, 123, 139, 186–189, 224; relations with Slatin, 204–208;

his flight, 274–277; opposition to him among Mahdists, 66, 85,

146–148, 245–247, 254–256, 305, 345, 346

Ali Wad Helu, 44, 264, 273

Shereef, 146, 264, 273

Khaleel Agha Orphali, 303, 332–337

Khaleel Hassanein, 89, 98, 178, 182, 212, 216, 235, 242, 249, 252

Khartoum, 29, 47, 83, 89, 175, 178, 181, 212, 218, 228, 266, 284, 303,

309, 310

Khedive, 247

Kirbekan, battle of, 3, 89, 286

Kordofan, 2, 4, 7, 61, 146, 289, 310, 350

Korosko, 65

L

Lupton, 295, 313

M

Macdonald, Colonel, 271, 274

Mahdi, 3, 66, 69, 78, 86, 98, 103, 273, 309–318, 330, 341, 345,

351–353

Mahdieh, 70, 85, 88, 99, 101, 110, 145, 205, 257, 260, 262, 273

Mahdi’s Ratib, 94, 271

Mahdi’s Tomb, 44, 70, 151, 155–157, 267

“Mahdism,” 300

Makkieh, 141, 178, 185, 192

Mankarious Effendi, 77, 152–154, 160, 195

Marriage customs, 86, 121–123, 126, 135–138, 189

Maxwell, Colonel, 281

Mecklenburg, Duke of, 291

Mehkemmeh, the, 105, 110, 163

Metemmeh, 68, 247

Mihrab, 267

Mimbar, 267

Mohammad Ali Pasha, 349, 350

Mohammad Effendi Rafai, 167

Möller, 68, 153, 154, 160

Moxley, Hewett, 298

N

Nahoum Abbajee, 114, 186, 188–190, 209, 226–232, 323

Nebbi Khiddr, 101–104, 112, 113, 120, 128, 173, 216

Negroid population, 351

Neufeld―

Official accounts, 1–4, 53, 61, 68, 167; newspaper accounts, 1,

79, 134, 166, 169, 291–299; as trader, 3, 9, 10, 46, 47, 76,

105, 149, 168; as Government spy, 37, 46, 47, 53, 145, 156, 239;

letters to his manager and Mankarious, 77, 152–154, 160–165, 199;

letter to General Stephenson, 294, 338, 339; named Abdallah, 77,

91, 102, 151, 269; interview with the Khaleefa, 76, 79, 90, 92;

practises medicine, 106, 124, 130, 175, 197, 224, 240, 250, 272;

plans to escape, 107, 143, 152–157, 160–169, 198–201, 227, 293;

floggings, 127, 131; relations with Hasseena, 4, 10, 40, 108, 109,

118, 135–139, 185–194, 290; conversion, 132, 150, 167, 205, 224;

not a German subject, 162, 293; native wives, 139, 167, 186–189;

English wife, 4, 163, 166–169, 194, 289; furnishes information

to Government, 239, 243–245, 254, 261, 289; employed under the

Khaleefa (_see_ Coinage, Arsenal, and Gunpowder Manufacture);

offers from publishers, 291, 299; reception in Cairo, 290–299;

relations with Gordon, 3, 132, 228, 305; views on missionaries,

321–323; views on trade, 356–359

Newnes, Sir George, 299

Nubar Pasha, 342

O

Ohrwalder, 6, 114–116, 119, 182, 187, 223; his escape, 183, 280,

295; his book, “Ten Years’ Captivity,” 300, 306–323; criticisms of

Gordon, 306–323, 325

Ombeyehs (war-trumpets), 72, 73, 76, 158, 257, 275, 277

Omdurman, 1–3, 54, 62–65, 67, 69, 71; battle of, 44, 258, 265–277,

281, 326, 354; looting of, 281

Osman Digna, 243, 248, 254, 264

Osta Abdallah, 224, 235–239, 242, 249, 252

P

Perdikaki, 177–181

Pink, Colonel, 274

Prison (Saier)―

Horrors of, 2, 81, 93–96, 116–119, 218; Idris es Saier, 82, 91,

98–105, 112, 121, 127, 130, 135, 138, 158, 171–174, 216, 262, 266,

272, 277, 278; the Umm Hagar, 94, 95, 106, 113, 128, 218, 262, 266,

269; the Bint Umm Hagar, 221; escape from, 96, 107, 120–123; food,

112, 113, 116–119, 143; subordinate gaolers, 123, 127–129, 173,

174, 262; women’s prison, 125, 126

R

Rossignoli, 132, 134, 197–201, 205

S

Sabalooka, 243, 249, 257

Said Abdel Wohatt, 175, 178–182, 209

Said Gumaa, 91, 203

Selima Wells, 11–15, 19–23, 59, 78

Sennar, 84, 350

Shayba (yoke), 38, 219

Sheiks―

Ahmed Nur ed Din, 54, 105–109, 111, 127

Ed Din, 130, 233, 264, 271, 273, 274

Hamad El Nil, 85, 102, 103

Mahmoud Wad Said, 83, 90, 118, 121, 247

Saleh Bey Wad Salem, 2–6, 11–22, 28, 31, 46–49, 55–57, 61, 68, 77, 105

Shereef Hamadan, 201, 216, 231–233

Shwybo, 171–174, 228

Sirdar, 225, 228, 262, 271, 276–279, 290, 321, 345; rumours

concerning, 97, 155, 232, 233, 259; advance of, 240, 245, 247;

charges against, 284, 286

Sirri, 230, 233, 251, 326

Slatin, 6, 70, 71, 76, 79, 91, 110, 280; his escape, 87, 201–207,

214, 220, 223, 295, 315, 345; kindness to Neufeld, 119; Austrian

Consul’s letter, 164; his letter to the Khaleefa, 202, 295;

position with the Khaleefa, 204; conversion, 205; his wives, 206;

reception at Cairo, 295, 308; his book, “Fire and Sword,” 300;

relations with Said Bey Gumaa, 203, 310

Slave Trade, 350, 354

Soudan, future of, 322, 323, 349–359

Spies―

Government, 62, 106, 150, 158, 244, 250, 255, 256, 261, 305

Mahdist, 62, 65, 66, 82, 97, 150, 244, 259, 305, 346

Stanley, Emin, expedition of, 139

Stephenson, General, 2–6, 47, 48, 56, 76, 145, 261, 294, 338

Stewart, Colonel, 324, 325–330, 343

Sulieman Haroun, 153

Surghani hill, 273

T

Toki, battle of, 139, 156

Torpedoes, 243, 249, 251–256, 280

Tuti island, 228, 243, 265

Typhus fever, 108

U

Umm es Shole, 188–190, 193, 198, 217, 222, 224, 239, 242

W

Wadi El Kab, 8, 15, 19, 22, 23, 33, 56–60, 67

Wadi Halfa, 5–13, 30, 31, 42, 48–51, 57, 61, 65, 71, 77, 89, 141, 280

Wakih Idris, 3, 135

Wass, Count, 164

Wilson, Sir Charles, 69

Wingate, Major, 223

Wood, Sir Evelyn, 342

Worrak, 245, 261

Y

Youssef Jebaalee, 114, 116

Youssef Mansour, 205, 220, 244, 250, 252, 256

Yunis, 264, 274

Z

Zecki Tummal, 221

Zobheir Pasha, 176, 202

Zoghal, 203, 310

Zubeir, 349

THE END

PRINTED BY

WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,

LONDON AND BECCLES.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

This transcription is based on the first edition of this book,

page scans of which are available from archive.net; search for

_prisonerofkhalee00neuf_, for example. Original spelling and grammar

are generally retained, with a few exceptions noted below. Original

italics _looks like this_. The original page numbers are shown like

this: |97|. Illustrations have been moved from within paragraphs to

between. Blank pages, numbered or not, have been removed. Footnotes

have been renumbered 1–15, and moved from within paragraphs to between

paragraphs. Ditto marks have been removed, with associated text

rearranged as necessary to retain the same meaning.

Page 78. In “is his prophet; and then, ‘I believe”, a right single

quotation mark was added after _prophet_, to match the earlier left

mark.

Page 165 note. The double quotation marks do not seem to be balanced,

but have been retained as printed.

Page 294. The author refers to a translation of a letter appearing on

“p. 336”. This seems to be an error, and has been corrected to point to

page 338, Appendix III.

Page 352. In original “to the doors of one who pretented to be the

mouthpiece”, _pretented_ is changed to _pretended_.