Shepherds of people had need know the calendars of tempests in state,
which are commonly greatest when things grow to equality; as natural
tempests are greatest about the equinoctia,[156] and as there are
certain hollow blasts of wind and secret swellings of seas before a
tempest, so are there in states:—
“Ille etiam cæcos instare tumultus
Sæpe monet, fraudesque et operta tumescere bella.”[157]
Libels and licentious discourses against the state, when they are
frequent and open; and in like sort false news, often running up and
down, to the disadvantage of the state, and hastily embraced, are
amongst the signs of troubles. Virgil, giving the pedigree of Fame,
saith she was sister to the giants:—
“Illam Terra parens, irâ irritata Deorum,
Extremam (ut perhibent) Cœo Enceladoque sororem
Progenuit.”[158]
As if fames were the relics of seditions past; but they are no less
indeed the preludes of seditions to come. Howsoever, he noteth it
right, that seditious tumults and seditious fames differ no more but
as brother and sister, masculine and feminine; especially if it come
to that, that the best actions of a state, and the most plausible, and
which ought to give greatest contentment, are taken in ill sense, and
traduced; for that shows the envy great, as Tacitus saith, “Conflatâ
magnâ, invidiâ, seu bene, seu male, gesta premunt.”[159] Neither doth
it follow, that because these fames are a sign of troubles, that
the suppressing of them with too much severity should be a remedy
of troubles; for the despising of them many times checks them best,
and the going about to stop them doth but make a wonder long-lived.
Also that kind of obedience, which Tacitus speaketh of, is to be held
suspected: “Erant in officio, sed tamen qui mallent imperantium mandata
interpretari, quam exsequi;”[160] disputing, excusing, cavilling upon
mandates and directions, is a kind of shaking off the yoke, and assay
of disobedience; especially if, in those disputings, they which are for
the direction speak fearfully and tenderly, and those that are against
it audaciously.
Also, as Machiavel noteth well, when princes, that ought to be
common parents, make themselves as a party, and lean to a side; it
is as a boat that is overthrown by uneven weight on the one side, as
was well seen in the time of Henry the Third of France; for first
himself entered league[161] for the extirpation of the Protestants,
and presently after the same league was turned upon himself; for when
the authority of princes is made but an accessary to a cause, and that
there be other bands that tie faster than the band of sovereignty,
kings begin to be put almost out of possession.
Also, when discords, and quarrels, and factions are carried openly and
audaciously, it is a sign the reverence of government is lost; for the
motions of the greatest persons in a government ought to be as the
motions of the planets under “primum mobile,”[162] according to the old
opinion, which is, that every of them is carried swiftly by the highest
motion, and softly in their own motion; and therefore, when great
ones in their own particular motion move violently, and as Tacitus
expresseth it well, “liberius quam ut imperantium meminissent,”[163]
it is a sign the orbs are out of frame; for reverence is that
wherewith princes are girt from God, who threateneth the dissolving
thereof: “Solvam cingula regum.”[164]
So when any of the four pillars of government are mainly shaken or
weakened (which are religion, justice, counsel, and treasure), men
had need to pray for fair weather. But let us pass from this part of
predictions (concerning which, nevertheless, more light may be taken
from that which followeth), and let us speak first of the materials of
seditions; then of the motives of them; and thirdly of the remedies.
Concerning the materials of seditions, it is a thing well to be
considered, for the surest way to prevent seditions (if the times do
bear it), is to take away the matter of them; for if there be fuel
prepared, it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that shall
set it on fire. The matter of seditions is of two kinds, much poverty
and much discontentment. It is certain, so many overthrown estates, so
many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth well the state of Rome before the
civil war:—
“Hinc usura vorax, rapidumque in tempore fœnus,
Hinc concussa fides, et multis utile bellum.”[165]
This same “multis utile bellum,”[166] is an assured and infallible
sign of a state disposed to seditions and troubles; and if this
poverty and broken estate in the better sort be joined with a want and
necessity in the mean people, the danger is imminent and great; for
the rebellions of the belly are the worst. As for discontentments,
they are in the politic body like to humors in the natural, which are
apt to gather a preternatural heat and to inflame; and let no prince
measure the danger of them by this, whether they be just or unjust;
for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable, who do often
spurn at their own good; nor yet by this, whether the griefs whereupon
they rise be in fact great or small; for they are the most dangerous
discontentments where the fear is greater than the feeling: “Dolendi
modus, timendi non item.”[167] Besides, in great oppressions, the same
things that provoke the patience, do withal mate[168] the courage;
but in fears it is not so; neither let any prince or state be secure
concerning discontentments, because they have been often or have been
long, and yet no peril hath ensued; for as it is true that every vapor
or fume doth not turn into a storm, so it is nevertheless true that
storms, though they blow over divers times, yet may fall at last; and,
as the Spanish proverb noteth well, “The cord breaketh at the last by
the weakest pull.”[169]
The causes and motives of seditions are, innovation in religion,
taxes, alteration of laws and customs, breaking of privileges, general
oppression, advancement of unworthy persons, strangers, dearths,
disbanded soldiers, factions grown desperate, and whatsoever in
offending people joineth and knitteth them in a common cause.
For the remedies, there may be some general preservatives, whereof we
will speak; as for the just cure, it must answer to the particular
disease, and so be left to counsel rather than rule.
The first remedy, or prevention, is to remove, by all means possible,
that material cause of sedition whereof we spake, which is, want and
poverty in the estate;[170] to which purpose serveth the opening and
well-balancing of trade; the cherishing of manufactures; the banishing
of idleness; the repressing of waste and excess by sumptuary laws;[171]
the improvement and husbanding of the soil; the regulating of prices of
things vendible; the moderating of taxes and tributes, and the like.
Generally, it is to be foreseen that the population of a kingdom
(especially if it be not mown down by wars) do not exceed the stock of
the kingdom which should maintain them; neither is the population to
be reckoned only by number; for a smaller number, that spend more and
earn less, do wear out an estate sooner than a greater number that live
lower and gather more. Therefore the multiplying of nobility and other
degrees of quality, in an over-proportion to the common people, doth
speedily bring a state to necessity; and so doth likewise an overgrown
clergy, for they bring nothing to the stock;[172] and in like manner,
when more are bred scholars than preferments can take off.
It is likewise to be remembered, that, forasmuch as the increase of any
estate must be upon the foreigner[173] (for whatsoever is somewhere
gotten is somewhere lost), there be but three things which one nation
selleth unto another; the commodity, as nature yieldeth it; the
manufacture; and the vecture, or carriage; so that, if these three
wheels go, wealth will flow as in a spring tide. And it cometh many
times to pass, that, “materiam superabit opus,”[174] that the work and
carriage is more worth than the material, and enricheth a state more;
as is notably seen in the Low Countrymen, who have the best mines[175]
above ground in the world.
Above all things, good policy is to be used, that the treasure and
moneys in a state be not gathered into few hands; for, otherwise,
a state may have a great stock, and yet starve. And money is like
muck,[176] not good except it be spread. This is done chiefly by
suppressing, or, at the least, keeping a strait hand upon the devouring
trades of usury, engrossing[177] great pasturages, and the like.
For removing discontentments, or, at least, the danger of them, there
is in every state (as we know) two portions of subjects, the nobles
and the commonalty. When one of these is discontent, the danger is not
great; for common people are of slow motion, if they be not excited by
the greater sort; and the greater sort are of small strength, except
the multitude be apt and ready to move of themselves; then is the
danger, when the greater sort do but wait for the troubling of the
waters amongst the meaner, that then they may declare themselves. The
poets feign that the rest of the gods would have bound Jupiter, which
he hearing of, by the counsel of Pallas, sent for Briareus, with his
hundred hands, to come in to his aid; an emblem, no doubt, to show how
safe it is for monarchs to make sure of the good-will of common people.
To give moderate liberty for griefs and discontentments to evaporate
(so it be without too great insolency or bravery), is a safe way; for
he that turneth the humors back, and maketh the wound bleed inwards,
endangereth malign ulcers and pernicious imposthumations.
The part of Epimetheus[178] might well become Prometheus, in the case
of discontentments, for there is not a better provision against them.
Epimetheus, when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the lid,
and kept Hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly, the politic and
artificial nourishing and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men
from hopes to hopes, is one of the best antidotes against the poison
of discontentments; and it is a certain sign of a wise government and
proceeding, when it can hold men’s hearts by hopes, when it cannot by
satisfaction; and when it can handle things in such manner as no evil
shall appear so peremptory, but that it hath some outlet of hope; which
is the less hard to do, because both particular persons and factions
are apt enough to flatter themselves, or at least to brave that which
they believe not.
Also the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head
whereunto discontented persons may resort, and under whom they may
join, is a known but an excellent point of caution. I understand a fit
head to be one that hath greatness and reputation, that hath confidence
with the discontented party, and upon whom they turn their eyes, and
that is thought discontented in his own particular: which kind of
persons are either to be won and reconciled to the state, and that in
a fast and true manner; or to be fronted with some other of the same
party that may oppose them, and so divide the reputation. Generally,
the dividing and breaking of all factions and combinations that are
adverse to the state, and setting them at distance, or, at least,
distrust amongst themselves, is not one of the worst remedies; for it
is a desperate case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the
state be full of discord and faction, and those that are against it be
entire and united.
I have noted, that some witty and sharp speeches, which have fallen
from princes, have given fire to seditions. Cæsar did himself infinite
hurt in that speech—“Sylla nescivit literas, non potuit dictare,”[179]
for it did utterly cut off that hope which men had entertained, that
he would, at one time or other, give over his dictatorship. Galba
undid himself by that speech, “Legi a se militem, non emi;”[180] for
it put the soldiers out of hope of the donative. Probus, likewise,
by that speech, “Si vixero, non opus erit amplius Romano imperio
militibus;”[181] a speech of great despair for the soldiers, and many
the like. Surely princes had need, in tender matters and ticklish
times, to beware what they say, especially in these short speeches,
which fly abroad like darts, and are thought to be shot out of their
secret intentions; for as for large discourses, they are flat things,
and not so much noted.
Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great
person, one or rather more, of military valor, near unto them, for the
repressing of seditions in their beginnings; for without that, there
useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of
troubles than were fit, and the state runneth the danger of that which
Tacitus saith: “Atque is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus
auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur:”[182] but let such
military persons be assured, and well reputed of, rather than factious
and popular; holding also good correspondence with the other great men
in the state, or else the remedy is worse than the disease.