"The integral restitution of our recollections," says Jean Reynaud,

"seems to us one of the inherent principal conditions of our future

happiness. We cannot fully enjoy life, until we become, like Janus,

kings of time, until we know how to concentrate in us, not only

the sentiment of the present, but that of the future and the past.

Then, if perfect life be one day given to us, perfect memory must

also be given to us. And now, let us try to think of the infinite

treasures of a mind enriched by the recollections of an innumerable

series of existences, entirely different from each other, and

yet admirably linked together by a continual dependence. To this

marvellous garland of metempsychoses, encircling the universe,

let us add, if the perspective seem worthy of our ambition, a

clear perception of the particular influence of our life upon

the ulterior changes of each of the worlds which we shall have

successively inhabited; let us aggrandize our life in immortalizing

it, and wed our history grandly with the history of the heavens.

Let us confidently collect together every material of happiness,

since thus the all-powerful bounty of the Creator wills it, and

let us construct the existence which the future reserves for

virtuous souls; let us plunge into the past by our faith, while we

are waiting for more light, even as by our faith we plunge into

the future. Let us banish the idea of disorder from the earth, by

opening the gates of time beyond our birth, as we have banished

the idea of injustice by opening other gates beyond the tomb; let

us stretch duration in every direction, and, notwithstanding the

obscurity which rests upon our two horizons, let us glorify the

Creator in glorifying ourselves, who are God's ministers on earth,

let us remember, with pious pride, that we are the younger brethren

of the angels."

Under what condition does the soul regain the remembrance of its entire

past? Jean Reynaud specifies two periods. 1. That which is fulfilled,

as the Druids hold, in the world of journeys and trials, of which the

earth forms a part. 2. The period during which the soul, set free from

the miseries and vicissitudes of the terrestrial life, pursues its

destinies in the ever widening and progressive circle of happiness; a

period which passes outside of the earth. In the first period there

is an eclipse of the memory at each passage into a new sphere; in the

second period, whatever may be the displacements and transfigurations

of the person, the memory is preserved full and entire. This theory of

Reynaud's is admitted by M. Pezzani.

With the exception of that _eclipse of the memory at each passage into

a new sphere_, which seems to us incomprehensible and useless, we

think, with Jean Reynaud, that the complete remembrance of our previous

existences will return to the soul when it shall inhabit the ethereal

regions, the sojourn of the superhuman being. In this manner only, in

our opinion, can the defect of man's memory, concerning his previous

existences, be explained. Thus, the argument from that defect of memory

does not remain without reply. Writers who have preceded us, and have

meditated on this question, had already found the solution which we

offer. This objection is not, then, of a nature to throw doubt on the

doctrine of plurality of existences. Let us conclude, with M. Pezzani,

that it is by a design of nature, that man, during this life, loses the

remembrance of what he formerly was. If we retained the recollection

of our anterior existences, if we had before our eyes, as if seen in a

mirror, all that we had done during our former lives, we should be much

troubled by the remembrance, which would harass the greater part of our

actions, and deprive us of our complete free will.

Why is an invincible dread of death common to all men? Death is not,

in reality, very dreadful, since it is not a termination, but a simple

change of condition. If man feels terror of death to such an extent,

we may be sure that nature imposes that sentiment upon him, in the

interests of the preservation of his species. Thus, in our belief,

the fear of death and the absence of memory of our former lives are

referable to the same cause. The first is a salutary illusion imposed

by God upon the weakness of humanity; the second is a means of securing

to man full liberty of action.

Another objection will be made to our doctrine. It will be said: The

re-incarnation of souls is not a new idea; it is, on the contrary, an

idea as old as humanity itself. It is the metempsychosis, which from

the Indians passed to the Egyptians, from the Egyptians to the Greeks,

and which was afterwards professed by the Druids.

The metempsychosis is, in fact, the most ancient of philosophical

conceptions; it is the first theory imagined by men, in order to

explain the origin and the destiny of our race. We do not recognize an

argument against our system of nature in this remark, but rather indeed

a confirmation of it. An idea does not pass down from age to age, and

find acceptance during five or six centuries, by the picked men of

successive generations, unless it rests upon some serious foundation.

We are not called upon to defend ourselves because our opinions

harmonize with the philosophical ideas which date from the most distant

time in the history of the peoples. The first observers, and the

oriental philosophers in particular, who are the most ancient thinkers

of all whose writings we possess, had not, like us, their minds warped,

prejudiced, turned aside by routine, or trammelled by the words of

teachers. They were placed very close to nature, and they beheld its

realities, without any preconceived ideas, derived from education in

particular schools. We cannot, therefore, but applaud ourselves when

we find that the logical deduction of our ideas has led us back to the

antique conception of Indian wisdom.

There is, however, a profound difference between our system of the

plurality of lives, and the oriental dogma of the metempsychosis. The

Indian philosophers, the Egyptians, and the Greeks, who inherited the

maxims of Pythagoras, admitted that the soul, on leaving a human body,

enters into that of an animal, to undergo punishment. We entirely

reject this useless step backward. Our metempsychosis is upward and

onward, it never steps down, or back.

A brief sketch of the dogma of the animal metempsychosis, such as it

was professed by the different philosophical sects of antiquity will

not be out of place here. We shall explain in what particulars the

oriental dogma differs from our system, and show, at the same time,

how popular the metempsychosis was among the peoples of antiquity, in

Europe as well as in Asia.

The most ancient known book is that of the _Védas_, which contains

the religious principles of the Indians or Hindoos. In this code of

the primary religions of Asia is found the general dogma of the final

absorption of souls in God. But, before it reaches its final fusion

with the great All, it is necessary that the human soul should have

traversed all the active orders of life. The soul, therefore, performed

a series of transmigrations and journeys, in various places, in

different worlds, and passed through the bodies of several different

animals. Men who had not done good works went into the moon or the

sun; or else they came back to the earth, and assumed the bodies of

certain animals, such as dogs, butterflies, adders, &c. There were

also intermediary places between the earth and the sun, whither souls

who had only been partly faulty, went to pass a period of expiation. We

find the following in the _Védas_:--

"If a man has done works which lead to the world of the sun, his

soul repairs to the world of the sun; if he has done works which

lead to the world of the Creator, his soul goes to the world of the

Creator."

The book of the _Védas_ says, very distinctly, that the animal, as well

as the man, has the right of passing to other worlds, as a recompense

for his good works. The oriental wisdom felt none of that uncalled-for

contempt for animals which is characteristic of modern philosophy and

religion.

"All animals, according to the degree of knowledge and intelligence

which they have had in this world, go into other worlds. The man

whose object was the recompense of his good works, being dead,

goes into the world of the moon. There he is at the service of the

overseers of the half of the moon in its crescent. They welcome

him joyfully, but he is not tranquil, he is not happy; all his

recompense is to have attained for a while to the world of the

moon. On the expiration of this time, the servant of the overseers

of the moon descends again into hell; and is born as a worm, a

butterfly, lion, fish, dog, or under any other form (even under a

human form)."[19]

"At the last stages of his descent, if one asks, who are you? he

replies: I come from the world of the moon, the wages of the deeds

done during my life merely for the sake of reward. I am again

invested with a body; I have suffered in the womb of my mother,

and in leaving it; I hope finally to acquire the knowledge of Him

who is all things, to enter into the right way of worship and of

meditation without any consideration of reward.

"In the world of the moon, one receives the reward of good works

which are done without renunciation of their fruits, of their

merits; but this reward has only a fixed time, after which one is

born again in an inferior world, a wicked world, a world which is

the recompense of evil.

"By the renunciation of all pleasure, and of all reward by seeking

God only, with unshaken faith, we reach the sun which has no end,

the great world, whence we return no more to a world which is the

recompense of evil."[20]

The Egyptians, having borrowed this doctrine from the Hindoos, made

it the basis of their religious worship. Herodotus informs us,[21]

that, according to the Egyptians, the human soul, on issuing from a

completely decomposed body, enters into that of some animal. The soul

takes three thousand years to pass from this body through a series of

others, and at the conclusion of this interval, the same soul returns

to the human species, entering the form of a newly-born infant.

The Egyptians employed excessive caution in the preservation of human

bodies. They embalmed the corpses of their relatives or of personages

of importance to the state, and thus prepared the mummies which are

to be seen in all our museums. The universal practice of embalming

was not intended, as has been supposed, to keep the human body ready

to receive the soul, returning at the end of three thousand years,

to seek its primitive abode. It had another object. It was supposed

that the soul did not commence its migrations after the death of the

human body, while any portion of the corpse remained entire. Hence the

efforts made by the Egyptians, to retard the moment of separation by

the preservation of the corpse as long as possible. Servius says:

"The Egyptians, renowned for their wisdom, prolonged the duration

of corpses, that the existence of the soul, attached to that of

the body, might be preserved, and might not pass away quickly to

others. The Romans, on the contrary, burn corpses, so that the

soul, resuming its liberty, might immediately re-enter nature."

The most ancient and remarkable of the Greek philosophers, Pythagoras,

found out the doctrine of the metempsychosis, in his travels in Egypt.

He adopted it in his school, and the whole of the Greek philosophy

held, with Pythagoras, that the souls of the wicked pass into the

bodies of animals. Hence the abstinence from flesh meat, prescribed

by Pythagoras to his disciples, a precept which he also derived from

Egypt, where respect for animals was due to the general persuasion that

the bodies of beasts were tenanted by human souls, and, consequently,

that by ill-treating animals, one ran the risk of injuring one's own

ancestors. Empedocles, the philosopher, adopted the Pythagorean system.

He says, in lines quoted by Clement of Alexandria:--

"I, too, have been a young maiden,

A tree, a bird, a mute fish in the seas."

Plato, the most illustrious of the philosophers of Greece, accords a

large place to the views of Pythagoras, even amid his most sublime

conceptions of the soul, and of immortality. He held that the human

soul passes into the body of animals, in expiation of its crimes. Plato

said that on earth we remember what we have done during our previous

existences, and that to learn is to remember one's self.

"Cowards," he says, "are changed into women, vain and frivolous

men into birds, the ignorant into wild beasts, lower in kind and

crawling upon the earth, in proportion as their idleness has

been more degrading; stained and corrupt souls animate fishes

and aquatic reptiles." Again, he says: "Those who have abandoned

themselves to intemperance and gluttony enter into the bodies of

animals with like propensities. They who have loved injustice,

cruelty, and rapine assume the bodies of wolves, hawks, and

falcons. The destiny of souls has relation to the lives which they

have led."

Plato held that the soul took only one thousand years to complete

its journey through the bodies of animals; but he believed that this

journey repeated itself ten times over, which gives a total of 10,000

years for the completion of the entire circle of existences. Between

each of these periods the soul made a brief sojourn in Hades. During

this sojourn it drank of the waters of the river Lethe, in order to

lose the recollection of its previous existence, before re-commencing

its new life.

Plato exalted the dogma of the animal metempsychosis by his grand

views upon spiritual immortality and the liberty of man, ideas which

even at the present time are quoted with admiration, but for whose

recapitulation we have not space.

The metempsychosis holds less rank in the Platonic doctrine than in

the Pythagorean and Egyptian systems. All its importance was resumed

among the philosophers of the Alexandrian school, who continued, in

Egypt, the traditions of the Platonic philosophy, and revived the

days of the schools of Athens on the soil of the Pharaohs. Plotinus,

the commentator of Plato, says, concerning the doctrine of the

transmigration of souls:

"It is a dogma recognized from the utmost antiquity, that if the

soul commits errors, it is condemned to expiate them by undergoing

punishment in the Shades, and then it passes into new bodies to

begin its trials over again."

This passage proves that the ancients held the sojourn of the soul in

hell to be only temporary, and that it was always followed by fresh

trials, terrible and painful in proportion to the errors which were to

be repaired.

"When," says Plotinus, "we have gone astray in the multiplicity

of our corporal passions, we are punished, first by the straying

itself, and afterwards, when we resume a body, by finding ourselves

in worse conditions. The soul, on leaving the body, becomes that

power which it has most developed. Let us, then, fly from base

things here below, and raise ourselves to the intelligent world, so

that we may not fall into the purely sensational life, by following

images which are merely of the senses, or into the vegetative life,

by indulging in mere physical pleasure and gluttony; let us raise

ourselves to the intelligent world, to intelligence, to God.

"Those who have exercised human faculties are born again as men.

Those who have used their senses only pass into the bodies of

brutes, and especially into the bodies of wild beasts, if they

have been accustomed to yield to violent impulses of anger; so

that the different bodies which they animate are conformable to

their various propensities. Those who have done nothing but indulge

their appetites pass into the bodies of luxurious and gluttonous

animals. Others, who, instead of indulging concupiscence or anger,

have degraded their senses by sloth, are reduced to vegetate in the

plants, because in their previous existences they have exercised

nothing but vegetative power, and have only worked to become trees.

Those who have loved the enjoyment of music over much, but have

led lives otherwise pure, pass into the bodies of melodious birds.

Those who have governed tyrannically, but have no other vice,

become eagles. Those who have spoken lightly of celestial things

are changed into birds which fly towards the higher regions of the

air. He who has acquired civil virtues becomes a man again, but

if he does not possess these virtues to a sufficient extent, he

is transformed into a sociable creature, such as the bee, or some

other being of that species."

Every one knows that among our own ancestors, and the Druids or

high-priests of the Gauls, the metempsychosis was held almost in the

same sense as among the Egyptians and the Greeks. It is, so to speak,

a national faith to us, for it has been held in honour, its dogmas

have flourished, in the same countries in which we now dwell. We

have recalled these facts, and collected these passages from ancient

writers, only in order to define the manner in which the Egyptians,

as well as the Greeks, and, in later times, the Gauls, understood the

metempsychosis. Our system differs from the old oriental conception,

which was embraced by the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Druids, in our

denial that the human soul can ever return to the body of an animal. We

believe that the human soul has already passed through this probation,

and that it never can be renewed. In nature, in fact, the animal has a

part inferior to that of man; it is below our species in its degree of

intelligence, and it cannot have either merit or demerit. Its faculties

do not invest it with the entire responsibility of its actions. It is

but an intermediate link between the plant and man; it has certain

faculties, but we cannot pretend that those faculties assimilate it to

moral man.

Thus, we reject this doctrine of the return of the human soul to

conditions through which it has already passed. Retrogression has no

place in our system. The soul, in its progressive march, may pause for

an instant, but it never turns back. We admit that man is condemned to

re-commence an ill-fulfilled existence, but this new experience is made

in a human body, in a new covering of the same living type, and not in

the form of an inferior being. The oriental dogma of the metempsychosis

misapprehended the great law of progress, which is, on the contrary,

the foundation of our doctrine.

Fourth objection. It will be said to us: You maintain that our souls

have already existed in the bodies of animals; do you, then, share the

belief of those naturalists who derive man from the monkey?

No, certainly not. The French and German naturalists, who, applying

Darwin's theory of the transformation of species to man, have declared

man to be derived from the monkey, rely entirely on anatomical

considerations. Vogt, Bruchner, Huxley, and Broca compare the skeleton

of the monkey with that of primitive man; they study the form of the

skull of each respectively, they measure the width and the prominence

of the jaws, &c., &c. From the results, they draw the conclusion that

man is anatomically derived from a species of quadrumane. The soul is

not taken into any consideration by these men of science, who argue

precisely as if nothing of the thinking kind existed in the anatomical

cavities which they explore and measure. It is, on the contrary, by

comparing the faculties of the human soul with the faculties of animals

that we arrive at our conclusion. The animal forms signify nothing to

us; the spirit, in its various manifestations, is our chief object.

Why, indeed, should we seek to derive man from the monkey, rather than

from any other mammiferous animal, rather than from the wolf, or the

fox? Is there much difference between the skeleton of the monkey and

that of the wolf, the fox, or any other carnivorous beast? Put three

or four of those skeletons together, and you will not find it easy to

distinguish one from the other, if, instead of selecting a monkey of a

superior species, you take an inferior quadrumane, a striated monkey, a

lemur, or a macao.

Interrogate the physiological functions of the monkey. You will find

them, and the organs which serve those functions, perfectly similar

in all animals, and those organs identical in their structure. Why,

then, should you derive man from the monkey, rather than from the

wolf or the fox? Is it because the monkeys in our menageries have a

distant resemblance to man, in their occasional vertical attitude,

and in certain features which are caricatures of those of the human

face? How many of the species among the immense simial family of the

two hemispheres present this resemblance? Hardly five or six. All the

others have the bestial snout in its fullest development, and are

very inferior in intelligence to most of the other mammifers. If it be

from the organic point of view that you derive man from the monkey,

because certain species of quadrumanes are caricatures of men in their

physiognomy, why may he not be derived as reasonably from the parrot,

which emits articulate sounds, the caricature of the human voice, or

even the nightingale, because that melodious songster of the woods

modulates his notes like our singers?

The consideration of animal forms is of very little importance in our

estimation, when the matter in hand is to determine the place occupied

by a living being in the scale of creation, for these forms are similar

in type among all the superior animals, the body varying very slightly

in structure in all the great class of mammifers; and also because the

physiological functions are discharged in a similar manner by all.

The basis on which we ground our researches is quite different, it is

the spiritual basis; we ask the faculties of the mind to supply our

materials of comparison.

It must not be supposed, therefore, that we espouse the doctrines of

Darwin and those who agree with him, because we hold that the soul has

a previous dwelling in the bodies of several animals, before it reaches

the human body; because we admit that the spiritual principle begins

in the germ of plants, and that this germ grows and develops itself in

passing through the bodies of a progressive series of animal species,

to issue at length in man, the end of its elaboration and perfection.

The Darwinists take into consideration only the anatomical structure,

and put aside the soul. We consider its faculties only. We are guided,

not by the materialistic idea which directs and inspires these men of

science, but on the contrary, on a reasoned-out spiritualism.

Our system of nature may be criticised, or rejected. We offer it merely

as a personal view, and would not impose it on any reader. The merit of

this philosophical and scientific conception, if it has any, consists

in the vast synthesis by which it binds together all the living

creatures which people the solar world, from the minute plant in which

the germ of organization first appears, to the animal; from the animal

to the man; and from the man to the series of superhuman and archhuman

beings who inhabit the ethereal spheres; and finally, from them to the

radiant dwellers in the solar star. In collecting together, on the

one hand, all that modern chemistry has learned of the composition of

plants, and the physical phenomena of their respiration, and on the

other hand, everything which is known of the physical and chemical

properties of solar light, the idea struck us that the rays of the sun

form the vehicle by whose means the animated germs are placed in the

plants. While meditating upon what has been written by the philosophers

Charles Bonnet, Dupont de Nemours, and Jean Reynaud, upon the physical

condition of resuscitated human beings, and dwelling upon the destiny

of men beyond the formidable barrier of the tomb, in short, while

drinking at the most various springs of philosophical and scientific

knowledge, we have composed this attempt at a new philosophy of the

universe.

The Day After Death; Or, Our Future Life According to Science (New Edition) · 第 15 / 19 段