ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
_Monday, September 14th._ The equipment of the German soldier is in
every detail a marvel of perfection. This impresses me more than any
other single element of the war excepting only the bravery of the
French, and the imperturbable _sang froid_ of the English. A striking
example of this perfection is the spiked helmet. Contrary to
appearance, it is not heavy, weighing indeed scarcely more than a
derby hat. Everyone who picks one up for the first time exclaims in
astonishment, "How light it is!" These helmets are made of lacquered
leather, are nearly indestructible, shed water perfectly, and give
excellent ventilation to the head by means of a clever arrangement of
holes under the flange of the spike. They also shield the eyes and the
back of the head from the sun, and are strong enough to break a heavy
blow.
The German uniforms are of a light gray with a slight green tinge,
and are virtually invisible against the greenish mist-gray fields of
Europe, excepting only when the sun is behind to project a deep
shadow.
The German bayonet is a formidable weapon with a heavy double-edged
blade twenty inches long. Both edges are extremely sharp. I easily
sharpened pencils with one which I picked up.
The German knapsacks are made of cowhide with the hair left on, the
grain of the hair pointing downward to shed rain. The hair may get
wet, but the leather seldom and the contents never.
The German military boot comes half-way up the calf of the leg and the
trouser is tucked into its top. They are without laces and pull on to
the foot like the American "rubber boot." They are made of heavy,
undyed leather, singularly soft and pliable, and thoroughly
waterproof. The soles are shod with hobnails, but the boot is not very
heavy. We often noted dead Germans who were bootless, their footgear
having been appropriated by some victorious Frenchman, who had left
near-by his own less desirable shoes.
The three-compartment wicker shell-containers in which field-gun
shells are carried from caisson to gun are as carefully and neatly
made as an expensive tea-basket. We saw thousands of them lying about
the battlefields and carefully examined scores, sliding shells in and
out of them as a test. Invariably we found that the shells went in and
out smoothly and without effort, and yet always fitted snugly. There
was never either the slightest friction or the least loose-play. This
nicety meant that the variation in an interior diameter of three
inches was certainly less than one thirty-second of an inch.
Wicker-work constructed with such unvarying accuracy is truly
marvelous.
* * * * *
_Paris, Tuesday, September 15th._ Back in Paris, we are trying to
piece bits of evidence together into a clear picture and to draw sound
conclusions from what we have seen. We do not yet know what the battle
which we have studied will be named, but we ourselves call it the
Battle of Fère Champenoise. This is, however, an unsatisfactory title,
as it is too cumbersome and not comprehensive enough, for Fère
Champenoise was only the most intense and critical point in a series
of actions extending from Chantilly to Verdun, over a varied and
winding front of about one hundred and ninety miles. We have no
means of knowing how far the Germans have been driven back, but they
are across the Aisne and other Attachés tell us that frightful
fighting is going on at Soissons where the pursuing Allies are
attempting to throw large forces across the river. On our way home
yesterday, moreover, we ourselves heard much shooting in the direction
of Rheims.
[Illustration: "THE WOODS WERE ... DOTTED WITH THE BODIES OF THE
DEAD"]
My personal conclusions about the battle are based upon a thousand
bits of information carefully pieced together into a mosaic. First of
all we ourselves examined the territory included between the Marne,
the Seine, and a line from Méry-sur-Seine through Arcis to
Vitry-le-François, and made certain digressions across the Marne to
the northeast of Paris. We examined the battlefields while they were
comparatively fresh, and supplemented our observations by innumerable
conversations with the French troops and civilians, and with German
prisoners. At the Embassy we obtained from other Attachés many bits of
reliable information about the fighting directly north of Paris and
about the rearguard actions between the Marne and the Aisne.
Up to the time of this battle the German plan of campaign had worked
out almost perfectly. The Franco-German border is due east of Paris,
and the French mobilization took place there behind the fortresses of
Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort.
The Belgian frontier is north of Paris and the unexpected and
treacherous advance of the German armies through that neutral country
brought them immediately behind the French line of mobilization. The
violation of Belgium permitted the Germans to advance into France
before the Allies could reorganize into an effective resistance
against this unexpected attack. It is to be remembered that a
mobilization which it has taken years to plan out and which involves
millions of men and their equipment cannot be changed at a moment's
notice. Had the Germans attacked across the Franco-German border, they
would have found the French army awaiting them behind the fortresses
of Verdun, Toul, and Epinal, and it is almost certain that they would
never have arrived within two hundred marching miles of Paris. No one
knew this better than the German General Staff.
Had it not been for the unexpected and heroic resistance of Belgium,
and the masterly retreat of the small British army, Germany's foul
blow might have resulted in the capture of Paris toward the end of
August. These two things, combined with a desperate retarding action
executed along the Aisne by several French corps, delayed the Germans
long enough to enable General Joffre to organize and fight a single
battle upon which everything was staked. To lose it would have meant
utter ruin, for France has faced no such crisis since Charles Martel
repelled the Saracens at Tours in 732. To win would mean that
the Teutons' blow-below-the-belt had been survived and that a
recommencement of the war upon something like even terms would be
possible.
In preparing for the battle the French placed powerful forces in the
great fortress of Verdun, and also in and around the entrenched camp
of Paris. Their field army extended between the two from Paris through
La Ferté, Esternay, Sézanne, and Sommesous to Vitry-le-François, and
from thence bent northeastward to Verdun. Thus their two flanks were
strong and menacing and their center, about one hundred and eighty
miles in length, bent southward and was slightly concave.
It is evident that in this battle the Germans could gain nothing by
making their main attack against Paris or Verdun, but that if they
could rout the field army between the two, they might as an aftermath
sweep round behind each city and attack it from all sides, using for
the purpose the heavy artillery which had under similar circumstances
and with such celerity battered down Liège, Namur, Longwy, and
Maubeuge. Therefore, the logical thing was for the Germans to attempt
to break the French center. This operation was somewhat hazardous as
there was danger that the French might launch a powerful flank attack
from either Verdun or Paris. To attack the center was, in effect,
something like thrusting a dagger into a lion's mouth in the effort to
cut his throat. It was necessary to hold back the jaws Verdun and
Paris, whilst attacking the vulnerable throat at Fère Champenoise.
To accomplish this, Verdun was kept so busy by violent attacks made
upon three sides that its army had no time to think of any offensive
movement. The German defense against the French right thus in reality
took the form of an active attack, a feasible method because Verdun is
near the Franco-German frontier, being in fact less than forty miles
from the German fortress and mobilization center of Metz.
To protect their right from any flank attacks which might be hurled
against it from Paris, the Germans placed a strong army under von
Kluck in front of that city to hold the French left in check, as a
boxer in a clinch holds back his opponent's left arm. Von Kluck fought
his way to a position approximately defined by a line through Creil,
Senlis, Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, and Lizy-sur-Ourg. His cavalry advanced
even to Chantilly and Crécy. His army was not intended to have any
part in the main German offensive, its sole duty being to protect the
German right from any attack in flank which might be prepared and
launched from the entrenched camp of Paris. Von Kluck was not to
attack Paris, but to protect the Germans from Paris, and this he
successfully did.
No greater mistake can be made than to suppose that the German retreat
to Soissons and Rheims was precipitated by any victory over von Kluck.
A violent and heavy attack was, it is true, launched against him on or
about the evening of September 6th and was steadily maintained from
that time forward. At first he was pushed back for a number of miles
by the violence of this assault, but his counter attacks soon regained
most of the ground lost. Thus he advanced on the 5th, was pushed back
a little on the 7th, but advanced again on the 8th, driving the Allies
before him. On the 9th his left flank was threatened by the British
and he again retreated a little to consolidate his position. While so
doing he received news that the German army assigned to carry out the
main offensive in the neighborhood of Fère Champenoise had been
repulsed and was already beginning the retreat which later at many
points turned into a rout, and he then continued his own retreat until
he reached the Aisne.
Von Kluck advanced or retreated short distances as the fortunes of the
battle varied, but on the whole successfully maintained his ground and
only retreated for good when the Germans' principal attack had thus
been defeated at another and distant point. After the 6th he was at
all times heavily engaged and his losses and those of his opponents
were excessively heavy.
Since the battle of the Marne there has been an almost universal
tendency to declare that von Kluck was defeated and that Paris was
thereby saved. This verdict, though erroneous, is easily explained.
Von Kluck was nearest Paris, "everyone" was in Paris, and in an action
extending over hundreds of miles "everyone" saw only what was nearest
to him and drew his conclusions from that alone. The losses in von
Kluck's army and in the armies opposed to it were so heavy that it is
small wonder people concluded that they waged the main battle. In
truth, these losses were probably heavier than those of any previous
battle since ancient times. I wish to emphasize again that von Kluck
did not attack Paris and had no intention of so doing, but that Paris
attacked him and that he held this attack in check until it was no
longer necessary to do so, since the German strategy had failed at
other points.
* * * * *
Let us now consider the main German offensive and its repulse. The
French center had taken a position on a plateau of rolling hills in
many places covered with pine forests, while several large swamps lay
in front of them. This country was for several weeks defended by
Napoleon in his despairing campaign of 1814. He had appreciated its
strategic value and somewhat developed its defensive possibilities. In
recent years the French had often held manoeuvres in this area and
had a permanent manoeuvre camp at Mailly, which was actually within
the battlefield of Fère Champenoise.
The German troops which were to make the great offensive movement
against the French center crossed the Marne in the section from
Epernay to Chalons without serious opposition. Their main attack was
launched against the Ninth Army of the French under General Foch along
a front of about fifteen miles, and probably close to a quarter of a
million Teutons were engaged. We saw dead Germans belonging to the
10th, 12th, 19th, 10th Reserve, and a Guard Corps.
The first contact took place at Fère Champenoise at three o'clock on
the morning of the 8th, when heavy forces advancing through the night
along the roads from Vertus and Chalons fell upon the French who were
encamped in the town and drove them out. The Germans continued
victorious throughout the day of the 8th, driving the stubbornly
resisting French back from the line through Sommesous, Fère
Champenoise, and Sézanne until, when the battle lulled late at night
after eighteen hours of combat, the French held a line through the
villages of Mailly, Gourgançon, Corroy, and Linthelles.
The fighting was very fierce, and terrible losses were sustained by
both sides as the possession of every foot of territory was hotly
contested. The French showed steadiness, determination, and efficiency
under the most trying conditions and under the most violent and
overwhelming attacks. We saw few signs or indications of any disorder
or weakness on their part. The Germans experienced particularly heavy
losses in driving the French from positions near the villages of Oeuvy
and Montépreux, while the French suffered most heavily in the
neighborhoods of Gourgançon and Corroy. Very little entrenching was
done by either side, as both armies were constantly shifting, and the
few trenches which were constructed had evidently been hurriedly built
at night.
On the 9th the Germans began the day with further successes and
apparently had forced a marked French retreat. At noon they considered
the battle as good as won. They had, however, apparently had no time
to entrench or to consolidate their forces, when, early in the
afternoon, General Foch suddenly ordered an attack by all his forces.
For six weeks the French had labored through a losing campaign and had
just fought through thirty-six hours of steady defeat, and yet they
turned about on the instant and attacked the astonished Germans with a
dash which could not have been surpassed by the troops of the First
Empire at the height of a victory. They would not be denied, but
attacked and attacked until the Germans were overwhelmed. We saw
fields where charging battalions had apparently been put out of action
up to the last man without deterring that last man from advancing.
By evening the French had retaken all the ground which they had lost
in the previous thirty-six hours, and on the morning of the 10th
their offensive was resumed with unabated fury and unfaltering
self-sacrifice. No number of casualties could stop them and in places
the retreat of the Germans became a rout. They left their wounded upon
the battlefields and abandoned their hospitals, caissons, and
supplies. Especially furious rearguard actions were fought in the
neighborhood of Pierre-Morains and Coizard and at Mondemont.
On the night of the 10th the German army pulled itself together, and
on the 11th, under the protection of magnificently executed rearguard
actions which held up the determined pursuit of the French, retreated
in good order to the Marne and across it. On the 12th they reached the
Aisne and have since been endeavoring to make a stand on the farther
side of Rheims.
The most conservative French officers with whom we talked estimated
that the total casualties of both sides in the fighting near Fère
Champenoise amounted to at least one hundred and fifty thousand. Some
thought it was as high as two hundred thousand, and I am inclined to
this latter figure. Perhaps we saw the field in its entirety more
thoroughly than did they. Certainly they were busy with many other
affairs, whereas we had nothing other to do than study and estimate.
Had the German attack succeeded in breaking the French center, the
French army would have been cut in two and both remnants would have
been compelled to retreat in order to save themselves from ruinous
flank attacks. In retreating they would have been obliged to leave
Verdun and Paris each to take care of itself, and the German armies
could have swung about to surround and lay siege to either or both of
them.
As far as we could observe, the German attack at Fère Champenoise had
been unsupported by any heavy artillery. This was probably a
contributing cause of their defeat, as was also their arrogant
over-confidence in themselves and their under-estimation of their
enemy. The French won the battle because their field artillery was
superior and because, man for man, they outfought the Germans. Having
staked the fate of their families and of their beloved _patrie_ upon a
single throw, the French gained one of the most desperate battles in
the world's history by the coolness and dogged determination of their
chiefs and by the sublime tenacity and self-sacrifice of their
soldiers. These outdid the best traditions of their race. At command
they threw their lives away as a man throws away a trifle, and to meet
new conditions they developed new qualities with which they have not
previously been credited, qualities of stubborn scientific stolidity.
They out-Germaned the Germans in the way their organization withstood
the shock and wrack of battle. It was the German machine which broke
down first. On that field a new France was born. Let no German ever
again say that she is effete. It was purely a French victory. This is
no aspersion upon the Belgians and the British; the slight part which
they played in this battle is explained by their small numbers. At
Liège and Namur, at Mons and St. Quentin they helped win for France a
fighting chance behind the Marne. All hail to them for that!
During our trip we found no evidence of German acts deserving to be
called "atrocities." The word "atrocity" has been so carelessly used
that it will be useful to re-define what that word means in relation
to war. It should be limited to instances where unnecessary violence
is used toward the enemy's soldiers and civilians. It has a meaning
distinct from the inevitable destruction and vandalism which seem to
be necessary integral parts of all wars. The burning and destroying of
buildings by shell-fire or for reasons of military expediency and the
confiscation of food supplies for military purposes are allowed by all
rules of war. The use of the word "atrocity" should be limited to such
acts as the killing of prisoners, the mutilation of civilians, and
the violation of women. Of such deeds we personally found no instance,
although we carefully cross-questioned the inhabitants of many towns
which had been occupied by Germans.
Food and wine had been pretty generally confiscated, a thing to be
expected; also we found several instances of pillaging in which
especially desirable articles had been carried off. Wanton breakage
was rare and not extensive, and in most cases appeared to have been
more mischievous than malicious. It was probably due to a somewhat too
liberal use of pillaged wine. In general, the worst charges against
the Germans in France were that they had been exceedingly rude and
boorish. There were, however, some instances which came to my notice
where German officers had shown consideration for the civilians, had
politely apologized for their unwelcome but "necessary" intrusion into
French families, and had carefully paid for their board and lodging.
We talked with several French surgeons who were captured early in the
war and had since, according to The Hague rules, been returned to
France. These all acknowledged the consideration and good care which
their captured wounded had received from the Germans.
* * * * *
When the Germans were retreating northward towards Rheims after their
defeat in the Battle of the Marne, notices (about twenty by thirty
inches) printed on green paper were posted in the streets of the city,
of which the following is a literal translation:
"PROCLAMATION.
"In case a combat should take place today or in the
immediate future in the environs of Rheims or within the
city itself, the inhabitants are forewarned that they must
remain absolutely inactive and must not attempt in any way
to take part in the battle. They must not attempt to attack
either isolated German soldiers or detachments of the German
army. It is hereby officially forbidden to construct
barricades, or to tear up the streets in such a manner as to
hamper the movements of our troops. In a word, it is
forbidden to undertake any act whatsoever which might be in
any manner a hindrance to the German army.
"In order thoroughly to insure the security of the German
troops and to act as sureties for the inactivity of the
population of Rheims, the personages named below have been
seized as hostages by the General commanding the German
army. At the least sign of disorder these hostages will be
hanged. Also the city will be entirely or partly burned and
its inhabitants hanged if any infractions whatsoever of the
above orders are committed.
"On the other hand, if the city remains absolutely quiet,
the hostages and inhabitants will be protected by the German
army.
"By order of the German Authorities,
"The Mayor, DR. LAUGHT.
"Rheims, September 12, 1914."
Below was appended a list of names and addresses of ninety-one leading
citizens, officials, and ecclesiastics, and, as if that were not
enough, this list was finished by the words "and others."
* * * * *
_Paris, Thursday, September 17th._ During my absence at the Battle of
the Marne last week, the powers-that-be at the Embassy decided that I
was too much needed in Paris for the German-Austrian affairs to be
allowed to go to the front again.
[Illustration: THE CHÂTEAU OF MONDEMONT]
Therefore, when another expedition departed today, I was not permitted
to be one of the party.
On our trip I took rough field notes during the daytime and sat up at
night into the early morning hours in order to expand these jottings
into an accurate and comprehensive diary. I am now arranging this
material into a report to be forwarded to Washington.
* * * * *
The whole "deuxième étage" of the _Chancellerie_ is now given over to
the Austrian, German, and Hungarian affairs. The arrangement of rooms
is the same as in the American _Chancellerie_ on the floor below. Mr.
Percival Dodge, ex-first-assistant Secretary of State, is now head of
the department and occupies the room over Ambassador Herrick. I have
the room over the First Secretary, and Mr. Hazeltine the room over the
Second Secretary. Lieutenant Donait is to be chief of the office
staff, which consists of three stenographers and two messengers. We
have, in addition, three personal stenographers. This arrangement will
be a great improvement, as our rooms on the ground floor were much too
cramped for the volume of business.
* * * * *
_Monday, September 21st._ The immense amount of effective work
accomplished under Mr. Herrick would have been impossible had he not
been so ably supported by the two Secretaries of the Embassy, Mr.
Bliss and Mr. Frazier, past-masters of the intricate technique of
their profession. In the emergency of the war crisis the usefulness of
the numerous subordinate members of the Embassy staff absolutely
depended upon the skill and patience with which these two Secretaries
trained them for the work of the various departments to which they
were assigned, and prevented any divergence from correct diplomatic
methods. It is most fortunate that our foolish American habit of
replacing Ambassadors whenever some one else has a stronger political
"pull" does not extend to our first and second secretaries.
Five of the younger men of the Embassy have formed a little luncheon
club for the purpose of exchanging news and discussing and studying
the military situation. They are Lieut. Boyd of the Cavalry, Lieut.
Hunnicutt of the Artillery, Harry Dodge, the Ambassador's private
Secretary, Lieut. Donait of the Infantry and Ordnance Departments, and
myself. We meet each noon at a little pension near the Embassy and
there we argue and debate for an hour or more. These daily conferences
give us a much better comprehension of the war as a whole and a more
exact knowledge of its important details. We have all been more or
less at the front and usually some one of us has just returned with
first-hand data as to what is going on at the moment. Whenever any
outsider is discovered who has recent war news of value, we invite him
to luncheon and proceed to cross-question him in general and in
particular.
* * * * *
_Wednesday, September 23d._ A little sadly I took supper this evening
at the Café du Commerce where the members of the atelier used to meet
in the days of student life. As I was eating, who should walk in and
sit down beside me but my friend Daumal, _sous-massier_ of the atelier
when war broke out, whom I had not seen since he departed for the
front as a private.
He is now Sergeant Daumal of the First Line Regiment, wounded at
Longwy and just out of the hospital, homeward bound on a two weeks'
convalescent leave. As he described it, "une de ces marmites à
28-centimètres" had exploded a little distance from him. Although he
had not been struck by any fragments, the shock had rendered him so
thoroughly unconscious that for a day he had been passed over by the
ambulance orderlies as dead and had finally been discovered by a
burying squad to be not in need of a grave but of a hospital.
* * * * *
The bombardment of Rheims Cathedral has stirred France to indignation,
but apparently not nearly as much as it has stirred the outside world.
The capacity of the French for being "stirred to indignation" has lost
some of its elasticity by this time. It is an action so vivid, so
neat, so concise, that it turns the sympathies of neutrals more than a
thousand "routine" accounts of burnings and killings. _They bombarded
Rheims Cathedral!_ These four words need no elaboration. I myself find
it difficult to keep that neutral equilibrium which is necessary in an
Attaché who wishes to observe as much and as correctly as possible.
Whitney Warren, the architect, and several Attachés are to be sent to
Rheims in a day or two to make an investigation.
* * * * *
_Sunday, September 27th._ I examine indigent Germans, Austrians, and
Hungarians every morning, and during the afternoon take special cases
to the police, and write up accounts.
Today Paris had another visit from a German aëroplane which threw the
usual three bombs. One of them fell in the Avenue du Trocadéro near
the Embassy. It just missed demolishing the Ambassador and Mr. Frazier
who were in an automobile on their way to inspect the buildings and
grounds of the German Embassy. They had driven over the spot only two
minutes before the bomb struck. I was at the same time on my way to
the Embassy, having met them near the Pont d'Alma. I passed along the
avenue a minute later and had just turned the corner when the bomb
fell, killing an old man and tearing a leg off a little girl. The day
was very cloudy and the aviator was above the clouds; for this reason
no one seems to have discovered him and he must have thrown his bomb
at random.
* * * * *
_Monday, September 28th._ At lunch today in the Café Royal I overheard
a Frenchman remark that although he and all his compatriots greatly
esteemed Mr. Herrick, it would nevertheless have been an excellent
service against the enemy had he tactfully allowed himself to be
annihilated by the German bomb which missed him yesterday. Later in
the afternoon I took tea with Mr. Herrick at the _Chancellerie_, and
he was much amused when I recounted to him this example of a somewhat
equivocal good-will.
* * * * *
_Tuesday, September 29th._ The damage to Rheims Cathedral was largely
the result of fire. The Germans had, during the time they held the
city, converted it into a hospital; they had stacked the chairs
against the walls and covered the floor deep with straw upon which to
lay their wounded. During the spring and summer the front façade had
been undergoing repairs and was covered with heavy wooden scaffolding
similar to that which has for several years disfigured St. Sulpice in
Paris. The Cathedral was very famous for its choir-stalls and other
wood-carving, of which there was a great quantity, and the roof which
covered the vaulting was held up by a forest of great timbers many
centuries old.
After the Germans had been driven out of the city they bombarded it
from the hills outside, and their shells lit the straw on the
Cathedral floor. Over it the fire ran swiftly, ignited the chairs
piled against the walls, and then spread to the great masses of carved
woodwork; finally the scaffolding and roof caught fire and the famous
old Cathedral burned in one great conflagration. It has been
particularly famous for three things: its woodwork, its front façade,
and its stained-glass windows. The woodwork went up in smoke, the
front façade was all scorched and disintegrated by the intense heat so
that the surface of the stone detail is blowing off in fine dust,
while the glass to the last particle was shattered by the concussions
of bursting shells. The Cathedral stands like a great skeleton of its
former self. Its flesh, as it were, is gone although few of its bones
are broken.
* * * * *
_Saturday, October 3d._ This is the first war in modern times in which
whole nations have gone to battle; in this conflict every man in a
nation is a soldier. In Napoleon's day France had about the same
population--forty millions--that she now has, but Napoleon's
professional armies numbered, at most, only two hundred thousand men,
while today France has put fifteen or twenty times as many in the
field. In the present war, when an army sustains a 10 per cent. loss
it is not merely 10 per cent. of the army, but actually of the
able-bodied men of the nation.
* * * * *
_Wednesday, October 7th._ A German aëroplane again threw bombs on
Paris today.
* * * * *
_Thursday, October 8th._ Another Taube came today and threw bombs in
the neighborhood of the Gare du Nord. These machines in flight look
very much like sparrow-hawks and have a singularly sinister
appearance.
* * * * *
_Sunday, October 11th._ We had a record-breaking flock of Taubes today
when a number came together and dropped about twenty bombs. Their
combined score was twenty-two people killed and wounded; as usual, all
women, children, and old men.