We have a right to deprive our enemy of his possessions, of everything
which may augment his strength and enable him to make war. This everyone
endeavors to accomplish in the manner most suitable to him. Whenever we
have an opportunity we seize on the enemy's property and convert it to
our own use, and thus, besides diminishing the enemy's power, we augment
our own and obtain at least a partial indemnification or equivalent,
either for what constitutes the subject of the war or for the expenses
and losses incurred in its prosecution. In a word, we do ourselves
justice.
"Instead of the custom of pillaging the open country and defenseless
places," the levy of contributions has been "substituted."
Whoever carries on a just war has a right to make the enemy's country
contribute to the support of his army and toward defraying all the
charges of the war. Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him, and
the enemy's subjects, by consenting to pay the sum demanded, have their
property secured from pillage and the country is preserved.
These principles, it is believed, are uncontroverted by any civilized
nation in modern times. The public law of nations, by which they are
recognized, has been held by our highest judicial tribunal as a code
which is applicable to our "situation" in a state of war and binding on
the United States, while in admiralty and maritime cases it is often the
governing rule. It is in a just war that a nation has the "right to make
the enemy's country contribute to the support of his army." Not doubting
that our late war with Mexico was just on the part of the United States,
I did not hesitate when charged by the Constitution with its prosecution
to exercise a power common to all other nations, and Congress was duly
informed of the mode and extent to which that power had been and would
be exercised at the commencement of their first session thereafter.
Upon the declaration of war against Mexico by Congress the United States
were entitled to all the rights which any other nation at war would have
possessed. These rights could only be demanded and enforced by the
President, whose duty it was, as "Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States," to execute the law of Congress which
declared the war. In the act declaring war Congress provided for raising
men and money to enable the President "to prosecute it to a speedy and
successful termination." Congress prescribed no mode of conducting it,
but left the President to prosecute it according to the laws of nations
as his guide. Indeed, it would have been impracticable for Congress to
have provided for all the details of a campaign.
The mode of levying contributions must necessarily be left to the
discretion of the conqueror, subject to be exercised, however, in
conformity with the laws of nations. It may be exercised by requiring
a given sum or a given amount of provisions to be furnished by the
authorities of a captured city or province; it may be exercised by
imposing an internal tax or a tax on the enemy's commerce, whereby he
may be deprived of his revenues, and these may be appropriated to the
use of the conqueror. The latter mode was adopted by the collection of
duties in the ports of Mexico in our military occupation during the late
war with that Republic.
So well established is the military right to do this under the laws of
nations that our military and naval officers commanding our forces on
the theater of war adopted the same mode of levying contributions from
the enemy before the order of the President of the 31st of March, 1847,
was issued. The general in command of the Army at Vera Cruz, upon his
own view of his powers and duties, and without specific instructions to
that effect, immediately after the capture of that city adopted this
mode. By his order of the 28th of March, 1847, heretofore communicated
to the House of Representatives, he directed a "temporary and moderate
tariff of duties to be established." Such a tariff was established, and
contributions were collected under it and applied to the uses of our
Army. At a still earlier period the same power was exercised by the
naval officers in command of our squadron on the Pacific coast. ...
Not doubting the authority to resort to this mode, the order of the 31st
of March, 1847, was issued, and was in effect but a modification of the
previous orders of these officers, by making the rates of contribution
uniform and directing their collection in all the ports of the enemy in
our military occupation and under our temporary military government.
The right to levy contributions upon the enemy in the form of import and
export duties in his ports was sanctioned by the treaty of peace with
Mexico. By that treaty both Governments recognized ... and confirmed
the exercise of that right. By its provisions "the customhouses at all
the ports occupied by the forces of the United States" were, upon the
exchange of ratifications, to be delivered up to the Mexican
authorities, "together with all bonds and evidences of debt for duties
on importations and exportations _not yet fallen due_;" and "all duties
on imports and on exports collected at such custom-houses or elsewhere
in Mexico by authority of the United States" before the ratification of
the treaty by the Mexican Government were to be retained by the United
States, and only the net amount of the duties collected after this
period was to be "delivered to the Mexican Government." By its
provisions also all merchandise "imported previously to the restoration
of the custom-houses to the Mexican authorities" or "exported from any
Mexican port whilst in the occupation of the forces of the United
States" was protected from confiscation and from the payment of any
import or export duties to the Mexican Government, even although the
importation of such merchandise "be prohibited by the Mexican tariff."
The treaty also provides that should the custom-houses be surrendered to
the Mexican authorities in less than sixty days from the date of its
signature, the rates of duty on merchandise imposed by the United States
were in that event to survive the war until the end of this period; and
in the meantime Mexican custom-house officers were bound to levy no
other duties thereon "than the duties established by the tariff found in
force at such custom-houses at the time of the restoration of the same."
The "tariff found in force at such custom-houses," which is recognized
and sustained by this stipulation, was that established by the military
order of the 31st of March, 1847, as a mode of levying and collecting
military contributions from the enemy.
The right to blockade the ports and coasts of the enemy in war is no
more provided for or prescribed by the Constitution than the right
to levy and collect contributions from him in the form of duties or
otherwise, and yet it has not been questioned that the President had the
power after war had been declared by Congress to order our Navy to
blockade the ports and coasts of Mexico. The right in both cases exists
under the laws of nations. If the President can not order military
contributions to be collected without an act of Congress, for the same
reason he can not order a blockade; nor can he direct the enemy's
vessels to be captured on the high seas; nor can he order our military
and naval officers to invade the enemy's country, conquer, hold, and
subject to our military government his cities and provinces; nor can he
give to our military and naval commanders orders to perform many other
acts essential to success in war.
If when the City of Mexico was captured the commander of our forces had
found in the Mexican treasury public money which the enemy had provided
to support his army, can it be doubted that he possessed the right to
seize and appropriate it for the use of our own Army? If the money
captured from the enemy could have been thus lawfully seized and
appropriated, it would have been by virtue of the laws of war,
recognized by all civilized nations; and by the same authority the
sources of revenue and of supply of the enemy may be cut off from him,
whereby he may be weakened and crippled in his means of continuing or
waging the war. If the commanders of our forces, while acting under the
orders of the President, in the heart of the enemy's country and
surrounded by a hostile population, possess none of these essential and
indispensable powers of war, but must halt the Army at every step of its
progress and wait for an act of Congress to be passed to authorize them
to do that which every other nation has the right to do by virtue of the
laws of nations, then, indeed, is the Government of the United States in
a condition of imbecility and weakness, which must in all future time
render it impossible to prosecute a foreign war in an enemy's country
successfully or to vindicate the national rights and the national honor
by war.
The contributions levied were collected in the enemy's country, and were
ordered to be "applied" in the enemy's country "toward defraying the
expenses of the war," and the appropriations made by Congress for that
purpose were thus relieved, and considerable balances remained undrawn
from the Treasury. The amount of contributions remaining unexpended at
the close of the war, as far as the accounts of collecting and
disbursing officers have been settled, have been paid into the Treasury
in pursuance of an order for that purpose, except the sum "applied
toward the payment of the first installment due under the treaty with
Mexico," as stated in my last annual message, for which an appropriation
had been made by Congress. The accounts of some of these officers, as
stated in the report of the Secretary of War accompanying that message,
will require legislation before they can be finally settled.
In the late war with Mexico it is confidently believed that the levy of
contributions and the seizure of the sources of public revenue upon
which the enemy relied to enable him to continue the war essentially
contributed to hasten peace. By those means the Government and people of
Mexico were made to feel the pressure of the war and to realize that if
it were protracted its burdens and inconveniences must be borne by
themselves. Notwithstanding the great success of our arms, it may well
be doubted whether an honorable peace would yet have been obtained but
for the very contributions which were exacted.