Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of
the United States. If he approve he _shall_ sign it, but if not he
_shall_ return it with his objections to that House in which it shall
have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their
Journal and proceed to reconsider it.
The preservation of the Constitution from infraction is the President's
highest duty. He is bound to discharge that duty at whatever hazard of
incurring the displeasure of those who may differ with him in opinion.
He is bound to discharge it as well by his obligations to the people who
have clothed him with his exalted trust as by his oath of office, which
he may not disregard. Nor are the obligations of the President in any
degree lessened by the prevalence of views different from his own in one
or both Houses of Congress. It is not alone hasty and inconsiderate
legislation that he is required to check; but if at any time Congress
shall, after apparently full deliberation, resolve on measures which he
deems subversive of the Constitution or of the vital interests of the
country, it is his solemn duty to stand in the breach and resist them.
The President is bound to approve or disapprove every bill which passes
Congress and is presented to him for his signature. The Constitution
makes this his duty, and he can not escape it if he would. He has no
election. In deciding upon any bill presented to him he must exercise
his own best judgment. If he can not approve, the Constitution commands
him to return the bill to the House in which it originated with his
objections, and if he fail to do this within ten days (Sundays excepted)
it shall become a law without his signature. Right or wrong, he may be
overruled by a vote of two-thirds of each House, and in that event the
bill becomes a law without his sanction. If his objections be not thus
overruled, the subject is only postponed, and is referred to the States
and the people for their consideration and decision. The President's
power is negative merely, and not affirmative. He can enact no law. The
only effect, therefore, of his withholding his approval of a bill passed
by Congress is to suffer the existing laws to remain unchanged, and the
delay occasioned is only that required to enable the States and the
people to consider and act upon the subject in the election of public
agents who will carry out their wishes and instructions. Any attempt to
coerce the President to yield his sanction to measures which he can not
approve would be a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, palpable
and flagrant, and if successful would break down the independence of the
executive department and make the President, elected by the people and
clothed by the Constitution with power to defend their rights, the mere
instrument of a majority of Congress. A surrender on his part of the
powers with which the Constitution has invested his office would effect
a practical alteration of that instrument without resorting to the
prescribed process of amendment.
With the motives or considerations which may induce Congress to pass any
bill the President can have nothing to do. He must presume them to be as
pure as his own, and look only to the practical effect of their measures
when compared with the Constitution or the public good.
But it has been urged by those who object to the exercise of this
undoubted constitutional power that it assails the representative
principle and the capacity of the people to govern themselves; that
there is greater safety in a numerous representative body than in the
single Executive created by the Constitution, and that the Executive
veto is a "one-man power," despotic in its character. To expose the
fallacy of this objection it is only necessary to consider the frame and
true character of our system. Ours is not a consolidated empire, but a
confederated union. The States before the adoption of the Constitution
were coordinate, coequal, and separate independent sovereignties, and by
its adoption they did not lose that character. They clothed the Federal
Government with certain powers and reserved all others, including their
own sovereignty, to themselves. They guarded their own rights as States
and the rights of the people by the very limitations which they
incorporated into the Federal Constitution, whereby the different
departments of the General Government were checks upon each other. That
the majority should govern is a general principle controverted by none,
but they must govern according to the Constitution, and not according to
an undefined and unrestrained discretion, whereby they may oppress the
minority.
The people of the United States are not blind to the fact that they may
be temporarily misled, and that their representatives, legislative and
executive, may be mistaken or influenced in their action by improper
motives. They have therefore interposed between themselves and the laws
which may be passed by their public agents various representations, such
as assemblies, senates, and governors in their several States, a House
of Representatives, a Senate, and a President of the United States. The
people can by their own direct agency make no law, nor can the House of
Representatives, immediately elected by them, nor can the Senate, nor
can both together without the concurrence of the President or a vote of
two-thirds of both Houses.
Happily for themselves, the people in framing our admirable system of
government were conscious of the infirmities of their representatives,
and in delegating to them the power of legislation they have fenced them
around with checks to guard against the effects of hasty action, of
error, of combination, and of possible corruption. Error, selfishness,
and faction have often sought to rend asunder this web of checks and
subject the Government to the control of fanatic and sinister
influences, but these efforts have only satisfied the people of the
wisdom of the checks which they have imposed and of the necessity of
preserving them unimpaired.
The true theory of our system is not to govern by the acts or decrees
of any one set of representatives. The Constitution interposes checks
upon all branches of the Government, in order to give time for error to
be corrected and delusion to pass away; but if the people settle down
into a firm conviction different from that of their representatives they
give effect to their opinions by changing their public servants. The
checks which the people imposed on their public servants in the adoption
of the Constitution are the best evidence of their capacity for
self-government. They know that the men whom they elect to public
stations are of like infirmities and passions with themselves, and not
to be trusted without being restricted by coordinate authorities and
constitutional limitations. Who that has witnessed the legislation of
Congress for the last thirty years will say that he knows of no instance
in which measures not demanded by the public good have been carried? Who
will deny that in the State governments, by combinations of individuals
and sections, in derogation of the general interest, banks have been
chartered, systems of internal improvements adopted, and debts entailed
upon the people repressing their growth and impairing their energies for
years to come?
After so much experience it can not be said that absolute unchecked
power is safe in the hands of any one set of representatives, or that
the capacity of the people for self-government, which is admitted in its
broadest extent, is a conclusive argument to prove the prudence, wisdom,
and integrity of their representatives.
The people, by the Constitution, have commanded the President, as
much as they have commanded the legislative branch of the Government,
to execute their will. They have said to him in the Constitution, which
they require he shall take a solemn oath to support, that if Congress
pass any bill which he can not approve "he shall return it to the House
in which it originated with his objections." In withholding from it
his approval and signature he is executing the will of the people,
constitutionally expressed, as much as the Congress that passed it.
No bill is presumed to be in accordance with the popular will until it
shall have passed through all the branches of the Government required
by the Constitution to make it a law. A bill which passes the House of
Representatives may be rejected by the Senate, and so a bill passed by
the Senate may be rejected by the House. In each case the respective
Houses exercise the veto power on the other.
Congress, and each House of Congress, hold under the Constitution a
check upon the President, and he, by the power of the qualified veto, a
check upon Congress. When the President recommends measures to Congress,
he avows in the most solemn form his opinions, gives his voice in their
favor, and pledges himself in advance to approve them if passed by
Congress. If he acts without due consideration, or has been influenced
by improper or corrupt motives, or if from any other cause Congress,
or either House of Congress, shall differ with him in opinion, they
exercise their _veto_ upon his recommendations and reject them; and
there is no appeal from their decision but to the people at the ballot
box. These are proper checks upon the Executive, wisely interposed by
the Constitution. None will be found to object to them or to wish them
removed. It is equally important that the constitutional checks of the
Executive upon the legislative branch should be preserved.
If it be said that the Representatives in the popular branch of Congress
are chosen directly by the people, it is answered, the people elect the
President. If both Houses represent the States and the people, so does
the President. The President represents in the executive department the
whole people of the United States, as each member of the legislative
department represents portions of them.
The doctrine of restriction upon legislative and executive power, while
a well-settled public opinion is enabled within a reasonable time to
accomplish its ends, has made our country what it is, and has opened to
us a career of glory and happiness to which all other nations have been
strangers.
In the exercise of the power of the veto the President is responsible
not only to an enlightened public opinion, but to the people of the
whole Union, who elected him, as the representatives in the legislative
branches who differ with him in opinion are responsible to the people
of particular States or districts, who compose their respective
constituencies. To deny to the President the exercise of this power
would be to repeal that provision of the Constitution which confers it
upon him. To charge that its exercise unduly controls the legislative
will is to complain of the Constitution itself.
If the Presidential veto be objected to upon the ground that it checks
and thwarts the popular will, upon the same principle the equality of
representation of the States in the Senate should be stricken out of
the Constitution. The vote of a Senator from Delaware has equal weight
in deciding upon the most important measures with the vote of a Senator
from New York, and yet the one represents a State containing, according
to the existing apportionment of Representatives in the House of
Representatives, but one thirty-fourth part of the population of the
other. By the constitutional composition of the Senate a majority of
that body from the smaller States represent less than one-fourth of the
people of the Union. There are thirty States, and under the existing
apportionment of Representatives there are 230 Members in the House
of Representatives. Sixteen of the smaller States are represented in
that House by but 50 Members, and yet the Senators from these States
constitute a majority of the Senate. So that the President may recommend
a measure to Congress, and it may receive the sanction and approval of
more than three-fourths of the House of Representatives and of all the
Senators from the large States, containing more than three-fourths of
the whole population of the United States, and yet the measure may be
defeated by the votes of the Senators from the smaller States. None, it
is presumed, can be found ready to change the organization of the Senate
on this account, or to strike that body practically out of existence by
requiring that its action shall be conformed to the will of the more
numerous branch.
Upon the same principle that the _veto_ of the President should be
practically abolished the power of the Vice-President to give the
casting vote upon an equal division of the Senate should be abolished
also. The Vice-President exercises the _veto_ power as effectually by
rejecting a bill by his casting vote as the President does by refusing
to approve and sign it. This power has been exercised by the
Vice-President in a few instances, the most important of which was the
rejection of the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States in
1811. It may happen that a bill may be passed by a large majority of the
House of Representatives, and may be supported by the Senators from the
larger States, and the Vice-President may reject it by giving his vote
with the Senators from the smaller States; and yet none, it is presumed,
are prepared to deny to him the exercise of this power under the
Constitution.
But it is, in point of fact, untrue that an act passed by Congress
is conclusive evidence that it is an emanation of the popular will.
A majority of the whole number elected to each House of Congress
constitutes a quorum, and a majority of that quorum is competent to pass
laws. It might happen that a quorum of the House of Representatives,
consisting of a single member more than half of the whole number elected
to that House, might pass a bill by a majority of a single vote, and in
that case a fraction more than one-fourth of the people of the United
States would be represented by those who voted for it. It might happen
that the same bill might be passed by a majority of one of a quorum of
the Senate, composed of Senators from the fifteen smaller States and a
single Senator from a sixteenth State; and if the Senators voting for it
happened to be from the eight of the smallest of these States, it would
be passed by the votes of Senators from States having but fourteen
Representatives in the House of Representatives, and containing less
than one-sixteenth of the whole population of the United States. This
extreme case is stated to illustrate the fact that the mere passage of
a bill by Congress is no conclusive evidence that those who passed it
represent the majority of the people of the United States or truly
reflect their will. If such an extreme case is not likely to happen,
cases that approximate it are of constant occurrence. It is believed
that not a single law has been passed since the adoption of the
Constitution upon which all the members elected to both Houses have been
present and voted. Many of the most important acts which have passed
Congress have been carried by a close vote in thin Houses. Many
instances of this might be given. Indeed, our experience proves that
many of the most important acts of Congress are postponed to the last
days, and often the last hours, of a session, when they are disposed of
in haste, and by Houses but little exceeding the number necessary to
form a quorum.
Besides, in most of the States the members of the House of
Representatives are chosen by pluralities, and not by majorities of all
the voters in their respective districts, and it may happen that a
majority of that House may be returned by a less aggregate vote of the
people than that received by the minority.
If the principle insisted on be sound, then the Constitution should be
so changed that no bill shall become a law unless it is voted for by
members representing in each House a majority of the whole people of the
United States. We must remodel our whole system, strike down and abolish
not only the salutary checks lodged in the executive branch, But must
strike out and abolish those lodged in the Senate also, and thus
practically invest the whole power of the Government in a majority of
a single assembly--a majority uncontrolled and absolute, and which may
become despotic. To conform to this doctrine of the right of majorities
to rule, independent of the checks and limitations of the Constitution,
we must revolutionize our whole system; we must destroy the
constitutional compact by which the several States agreed to form a
Federal Union and rush into consolidation, which must end in monarchy or
despotism. No one advocates such a proposition, and yet the doctrine
maintained, if carried out, must lead to this result.
One great object of the Constitution in conferring upon the President
a qualified negative upon the legislation of Congress was to protect
minorities from injustice and oppression by majorities. The equality of
their representation in the Senate and the veto power of the President
are the constitutional guaranties which the smaller States have that
their rights will be respected. Without these guaranties all their
interests would be at the mercy of majorities in Congress representing
the larger States. To the smaller and weaker States, therefore, the
preservation of this power and its exercise upon proper occasions
demanding it is of vital importance. They ratified the Constitution and
entered into the Union, securing to themselves an equal representation
with the larger States in the Senate; and they agreed to be bound by all
laws passed by Congress upon the express condition, and none other, that
they should be approved by the President or passed, his objections to
the contrary notwithstanding, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses.
Upon this condition they have a right to insist as a part of the compact
to which they gave their assent.
A bill might be passed by Congress against the will of the whole people
of a particular State and against the votes of its Senators and all its
Representatives. However prejudicial it might be to the interests of
such State, it would be bound by it if the President shall approve it or
it shall be passed by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses; but it has
a right to demand that the President shall exercise his constitutional
power and arrest it if his judgment is against it. If he surrender this
power, or fail to exercise it in a case where he can not approve, it
would make his formal approval a mere mockery, and would be itself a
violation of the Constitution, and the dissenting State would become
bound by a law which had not been passed according to the sanctions of
the Constitution.
The objection to the exercise of the _veto_ power is founded upon an
idea respecting the popular will, which, if carried out, would
annihilate State sovereignty and substitute for the present Federal
Government a consolidation directed by a supposed numerical majority.
A revolution of the Government would be silently effected and the
States would be subjected to laws to which they had never given their
constitutional consent.
The Supreme Court of the United States is invested with the power to
declare, and has declared, acts of Congress passed with the concurrence
of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the approval of the
President to be unconstitutional and void, and yet none, it is presumed,
can be found who will be disposed to strip this highest judicial
tribunal under the Constitution of this acknowledged power--a power
necessary alike to its independence and the rights of individuals.
For the same reason that the Executive veto should, according to the
doctrine maintained, be rendered nugatory, and be practically expunged
from the Constitution, this power of the court should also be rendered
nugatory and be expunged, because it restrains the legislative and
Executive will, and because the exercise of such a power by the court
may be regarded as being in conflict with the capacity of the people to
govern themselves. Indeed, there is more reason for striking this power
of the court from the Constitution than there is that of the qualified
veto of the President, because the decision of the court is final, and
can never be reversed even though both Houses of Congress and the
President should be unanimous in opposition to it, whereas the veto of
the President may be overruled by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses
of Congress or by the people at the polls.
It is obvious that to preserve the system established by the
Constitution each of the coordinate branches of the Government--the
executive, legislative, and judicial--must be left in the exercise of
its appropriate powers. If the executive or the judicial branch be
deprived of powers conferred upon either as checks on the legislative,
the preponderance of the latter will become disproportionate and
absorbing and the others impotent for the accomplishment of the great
objects for which they were established. Organized, as they are, by the
Constitution, they work together harmoniously for the public good. If
the Executive and the judiciary shall be deprived of the constitutional
powers invested in them, and of their due proportions, the equilibrium
of the system must be destroyed, and consolidation, with the most
pernicious results, must ensue--a consolidation of unchecked, despotic
power, exercised by majorities of the legislative branch.
The executive, legislative, and judicial each constitutes a separate
coordinate department of the Government, and each is independent of
the others. In the performance of their respective duties under the
Constitution neither can in its legitimate action control the others.
They each act upon their several responsibilities in their respective
spheres. But if the doctrines now maintained be correct, the executive
must become practically subordinate to the legislative, and the
judiciary must become subordinate to both the legislative and the
executive; and thus the whole power of the Government would be merged in
a single department. Whenever, if ever, this shall occur, our glorious
system of well-regulated self-government will crumble into ruins, to be
succeeded, first by anarchy, and finally by monarchy or despotism. I am
far from believing that this doctrine is the sentiment of the American
people; and during the short period which remains in which it will
be my duty to administer the executive department it will be my aim to
maintain its independence and discharge its duties without infringing
upon the powers or duties of either of the other departments of the
Government.
The power of the Executive veto was exercised by the first and most
illustrious of my predecessors and by four of his successors who
preceded me in the administration of the Government, and it is believed
in no instance prejudicially to the public interests. It has never been
and there is but little danger that it ever can be abused. No President
will ever desire unnecessarily to place his opinion in opposition to
that of Congress. He must always exercise the power reluctantly, and
only in cases where his convictions make it a matter of stern duty,
which he can not escape. Indeed, there is more danger that the
President, from the repugnance he must always feel to come in collision
with Congress, may fail to exercise it in cases where the preservation
of the Constitution from infraction, or the public good, may demand it
than that he will ever exercise it unnecessarily or wantonly.
During the period I have administered the executive department of
the Government great and important questions of public policy, foreign
and domestic, have arisen, upon which it was my duty to act. It may,
indeed, be truly said that my Administration has fallen upon eventful
times. I have felt most sensibly the weight of the high responsibilities
devolved upon me. With no other object than the public good, the
enduring fame, and permanent prosperity of my country, I have pursued
the convictions of my own best judgment. The impartial arbitrament of
enlightened public opinion, present and future, will determine how far
the public policy I have maintained and the measures I have from time
to time recommended may have tended to advance or retard the public
prosperity at home and to elevate or depress the estimate of our
national character abroad.
Invoking the blessings of the Almighty upon your deliberations at your
present important session, my ardent hope is that in a spirit of harmony
and concord you may be guided to wise results, and such as may redound
to the happiness, the honor, and the glory of our beloved country.