WASHINGTON, _December 7, 1847_.
_Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives_:
The annual meeting of Congress is always an interesting event. The
representatives of the States and of the people come fresh from their
constituents to take counsel together for the common good.
After an existence of near three-fourths of a century as a free and
independent Republic, the problem no longer remains to be solved whether
man is capable of self-government. The success of our admirable system
is a conclusive refutation of the theories of those in other countries
who maintain that a "favored few" are born to rule and that the mass of
mankind must be governed by force. Subject to no arbitrary or hereditary
authority, the people are the only sovereigns recognized by our
Constitution.
Numerous emigrants, of every lineage and language, attracted by the
civil and religious freedom we enjoy and by our happy condition,
annually crowd to our shores, and transfer their heart, not less than
their allegiance, to the country whose dominion belongs alone to the
people.
No country has been so much favored, or should acknowledge with deeper
reverence the manifestations of the divine protection. An all-wise
Creator directed and guarded us in our infant struggle for freedom and
has constantly watched over our surprising progress until we have become
one of the great nations of the earth.
It is in a country thus favored, and under a Government in which the
executive and legislative branches hold their authority for limited
periods alike from the people, and where all are responsible to their
respective constituencies, that it is again my duty to communicate with
Congress upon the state of the Union and the present condition of public
affairs.
During the past year the most gratifying proofs are presented that our
country has been blessed with a widespread and universal prosperity.
There has been no period since the Government was founded when all the
industrial pursuits of our people have been more successful or when
labor in all branches of business has received a fairer or better
reward. From our abundance we have been enabled to perform the pleasing
duty of furnishing food for the starving millions of less favored
countries.
In the enjoyment of the bounties of Providence at home such as have
rarely fallen to the lot of any people, it is cause of congratulation
that our intercourse with all the powers of the earth except Mexico
continues to be of an amicable character.
It has ever been our cherished policy to cultivate peace and good will
with all nations, and this policy has been steadily pursued by me.
No change has taken place in our relations with Mexico since the
adjournment of the last Congress. The war in which the United States
were forced to engage with the Government of that country still
continues.
I deem it unnecessary, after the full exposition of them contained in my
message of the 11th of May, 1846, and in my annual message at the
commencement of the session of Congress in December last, to reiterate
the serious causes of complaint which we had against Mexico before she
commenced hostilities.
It is sufficient on the present occasion to say that the wanton
violation of the rights of person and property of our citizens committed
by Mexico, her repeated acts of bad faith through a long series of
years, and her disregard of solemn treaties stipulating for indemnity to
our injured citizens not only constituted ample cause of war on our
part, but were of such an aggravated character as would have justified
us before the whole world in resorting to this extreme remedy. With an
anxious desire to avoid a rupture between the two countries, we forbore
for years to assert our clear rights by force, and continued to seek
redress for the wrongs we had suffered by amicable negotiation in the
hope that Mexico might yield to pacific counsels and the demands of
justice. In this hope we were disappointed. Our minister of peace sent
to Mexico was insultingly rejected. The Mexican Government refused even
to hear the terms of adjustment which he was authorized to propose, and
finally, under wholly unjustifiable pretexts, involved the two countries
in war by invading the territory of the State of Texas, striking the
first blow, and shedding the blood of our citizens on our own soil.
Though the United States were the aggrieved nation, Mexico commenced the
war, and we were compelled in self-defense to repel the invader and to
vindicate the national honor and interests by prosecuting it with vigor
until we could obtain a just and honorable peace.
On learning that hostilities had been commenced by Mexico I promptly
communicated that fact, accompanied with a succinct statement of our
other causes of complaint against Mexico, to Congress, and that body, by
the act of the 13th of May, 1846, declared that "by the act of the
Republic of Mexico a state of war exists between that Government and the
United States." This act declaring "the war to exist by the act of the
Republic of Mexico," and making provision for its prosecution "to a
speedy and successful termination," was passed with great unanimity by
Congress, there being but two negative votes in the Senate and but
fourteen in the House of Representatives.
The existence of the war having thus been declared by Congress, it
became my duty under the Constitution and the laws to conduct and
prosecute it. This duty has been performed, and though at every stage of
its progress I have manifested a willingness to terminate it by a just
peace, Mexico has refused to accede to any terms which could be accepted
by the United States consistently with the national honor and interest.
The rapid and brilliant successes of our arms and the vast extent of the
enemy's territory which had been overrun and conquered before the close
of the last session of Congress were fully known to that body. Since
that time the war has been prosecuted with increased energy, and, I am
gratified to state, with a success which commands universal admiration.
History presents no parallel of so many glorious victories achieved by
any nation within so short a period. Our Army, regulars and volunteers,
have covered themselves with imperishable honors. Whenever and wherever
our forces have encountered the enemy, though he was in vastly superior
numbers and often intrenched in fortified positions of his own selection
and of great strength, he has been defeated. Too much praise can not be
bestowed upon our officers and men, regulars and volunteers, for their
gallantry, discipline, indomitable courage, and perseverance, all
seeking the post of danger and vying with each other in deeds of noble
daring.
While every patriot's heart must exult and a just national pride animate
every bosom in beholding the high proofs of courage, consummate military
skill, steady discipline, and humanity to the vanquished enemy exhibited
by our gallant Army, the nation is called to mourn over the loss of many
brave officers and soldiers, who have fallen in defense of their
country's honor and interests. The brave dead met their melancholy fate
in a foreign land, nobly discharging their duty, and with their
country's flag waving triumphantly in the face of the foe. Their
patriotic deeds are justly appreciated, and will long be remembered by
their grateful countrymen. The parental care of the Government they
loved and served should be extended to their surviving families.
Shortly after the adjournment of the last session of Congress the
gratifying intelligence was received of the signal victory of Buena
Vista, and of the fall of the city of Vera Cruz, and with it the strong
castle of San Juan de Ulloa, by which it was defended. Believing that
after these and other successes so honorable to our arms and so
disastrous to Mexico the period was propitious to afford her another
opportunity, if she thought proper to embrace it, to enter into
negotiations for peace, a commissioner was appointed to proceed to the
headquarters of our Army with full powers to enter upon negotiations and
to conclude a just and honorable treaty of peace. He was not directed to
make any new overtures of peace, but was the bearer of a dispatch from
the Secretary of State of the United States to the minister of foreign
affairs of Mexico, in reply to one received from the latter of the 22d
of February, 1847, in which the Mexican Government was informed of his
appointment and of his presence at the headquarters of our Army, and
that he was invested with full powers to conclude a definitive treaty of
peace whenever the Mexican Government might signify a desire to do so.
While I was unwilling to subject the United States to another indignant
refusal, I was yet resolved that the evils of the war should not be
protracted a day longer than might be rendered absolutely necessary by
the Mexican Government.
Care was taken to give no instructions to the commissioner which could
in any way interfere with our military operations or relax our energies
in the prosecution of the war. He possessed no authority in any manner
to control these operations. He was authorized to exhibit his
instructions to the general in command of the Army, and in the event of
a treaty being concluded and ratified on the part of Mexico he was
directed to give him notice of that fact. On the happening of such
contingency, and on receiving notice thereof, the general in command was
instructed by the Secretary of War to suspend further active military
operations until further orders. These instructions were given with a
view to intermit hostilities until the treaty thus ratified by Mexico
could be transmitted to Washington and receive the action of the
Government of the United States. The commissioner was also directed on
reaching the Army to deliver to the general in command the dispatch
which he bore from the Secretary of State to the minister of foreign
affairs of Mexico, and on receiving it the general was instructed by the
Secretary of War to cause it to be transmitted to the commander of the
Mexican forces, with a request that it might be communicated to his
Government.
The commissioner did not reach the headquarters of the Army until after
another brilliant victory had crowned our arms at Cerro Gordo.
The dispatch which he bore from the Secretary of War to the general in
command of the Army was received by that officer, then at Jalapa, on the
7th of May, 1847, together with the dispatch from the Secretary of State
to the minister of foreign affairs of Mexico, having been transmitted to
him from Vera Cruz. The commissioner arrived at the headquarters of the
Army a few days afterwards. His presence with the Army and his
diplomatic character were made known to the Mexican Government from
Puebla on the 12th of June, 1847, by the transmission of the dispatch
from the Secretary of State to the minister of foreign affairs of
Mexico.
Many weeks elapsed after its receipt, and no overtures were made nor was
any desire expressed by the Mexican Government to enter into
negotiations for peace.
Our Army pursued its march upon the capital, and as it approached it was
met by formidable resistance. Our forces first encountered the enemy,
and achieved signal victories in the severely contested battles of
Contreras and Churubusco. It was not until after these actions had
resulted in decisive victories and the capital of the enemy was within
our power that the Mexican Government manifested any disposition to
enter into negotiations for peace, and even then, as events have proved,
there is too much reason to believe they were insincere, and that in
agreeing to go through the forms of negotiation the object was to gain
time to strengthen the defenses of their capital and to prepare for
fresh resistance.
The general in command of the Army deemed it expedient to suspend
hostilities temporarily by entering into an armistice with a view to the
opening of negotiations. Commissioners were appointed on the part of
Mexico to meet the commissioner on the part of the United States. The
result of the conferences which took place between these functionaries
of the two Governments was a failure to conclude a treaty of peace.
The commissioner of the United States took with him the project of a
treaty already prepared, by the terms of which the indemnity required by
the United States was a cession of territory.
It is well known that the only indemnity which it is in the power of
Mexico to make in satisfaction of the just and long-deferred claims of
our citizens against her and the only means by which she can reimburse
the United States for the expenses of the war is a cession to the United
States of a portion of her territory. Mexico has no money to pay, and no
other means of making the required indemnity. If we refuse this, we can
obtain nothing else. To reject indemnity by refusing to accept a cession
of territory would be to abandon all our just demands, and to wage the
war, bearing all its expenses, without a purpose or definite object.
A state of war abrogates treaties previously existing between the
belligerents and a treaty of peace puts an end to all claims for
indemnity for tortious acts committed under the authority of one
government against the citizens or subjects of another unless they are
provided for in its stipulations. A treaty of peace which would
terminate the existing war without providing for indemnity would enable
Mexico, the acknowledged debtor and herself the aggressor in the war, to
relieve herself from her just liabilities. By such a treaty our citizens
who hold just demands against her would have no remedy either against
Mexico or their own Government. Our duty to these citizens must forever
prevent such a peace, and no treaty which does not provide ample means
of discharging these demands can receive my sanction.
A treaty of peace should settle all existing differences between the two
countries. If an adequate cession of territory should be made by such a
treaty, the United States should release Mexico from all her liabilities
and assume their payment to our own citizens. If instead of this the
United States were to consent to a treaty by which Mexico should again
engage to pay the heavy amount of indebtedness which a just indemnity to
our Government and our citizens would impose on her, it is notorious
that she does not possess the means to meet such an undertaking. From
such a treaty no result could be anticipated but the same irritating
disappointments which have heretofore attended the violations of similar
treaty stipulations on the part of Mexico. Such a treaty would be but a
temporary cessation of hostilities, without the restoration of the
friendship and good understanding which should characterize the future
intercourse between the two countries.
That Congress contemplated the acquisition of territorial indemnity when
that body made provision for the prosecution of the war is obvious.
Congress could not have meant when, in May, 1846, they appropriated
$10,000,000 and authorized the President to employ the militia and naval
and military forces of the United States and to accept the services of
50,000 volunteers to enable him to prosecute the war, and when, at their
last session, and after our Army had invaded Mexico, they made
additional appropriations and authorized the raising of additional
troops for the same purpose, that no indemnity was to be obtained from
Mexico at the conclusion of the war; and yet it was certain that if no
Mexican territory was acquired no indemnity could be obtained. It is
further manifest that Congress contemplated territorial indemnity from
the fact that at their last session an act was passed, upon the
Executive recommendation, appropriating $3,000,000 with that express
object. This appropriation was made "to enable the President to conclude
a treaty of peace, limits, and boundaries with the Republic of Mexico,
to be used by him in the event that said treaty, when signed by the
authorized agents of the two Governments and duly ratified by Mexico,
shall call for the expenditure of the same or any part thereof." The
object of asking this appropriation was distinctly stated in the several
messages on the subject which I communicated to Congress. Similar
appropriations made in 1803 and 1806, which were referred to, were
intended to be applied in part consideration for the cession of
Louisiana and the Floridas. In like manner it was anticipated that in
settling the terms of a treaty of "limits and boundaries" with Mexico a
cession of territory estimated to be of greater value than the amount of
our demands against her might be obtained, and that the prompt payment
of this sum in part consideration for the territory ceded, on the
conclusion of a treaty and its ratification on her part, might be an
inducement with her to make such a cession of territory as would be
satisfactory to the United States; and although the failure to conclude
such a treaty has rendered it unnecessary to use any part of the
$3,000,000 appropriated by that act, and the entire sum remains in the
Treasury, it is still applicable to that object should the contingency
occur making such application proper.
The doctrine of no territory is the doctrine of no indemnity, and if
sanctioned would be a public acknowledgment that our country was wrong
and that the war declared by Congress with extraordinary unanimity was
unjust and should be abandoned--an admission unfounded in fact and
degrading to the national character.
The terms of the treaty proposed by the United States were not only just
to Mexico, but, considering the character and amount of our claims, the
unjustifiable and unprovoked commencement of hostilities by her, the
expenses of the war to which we have been subjected, and the success
which had attended our arms, were deemed to be of a most liberal
character.
The commissioner of the United States was authorized to agree to the
establishment of the Rio Grande as the boundary from its entrance into
the Gulf to its intersection with the southern boundary of New Mexico,
in north latitude about 32°, and to obtain a cession to the United
States of the Provinces of New Mexico and the Californias and the
privilege of the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The
boundary of the Rio Grande and the cession to the United States of New
Mexico and Upper California constituted an ultimatum which our
commissioner was under no circumstances to yield.
That it might be manifest, not only to Mexico, but to all other nations,
that the United States were not disposed to take advantage of a feeble
power by insisting upon wresting from her all the other Provinces,
including many of her principal towns and cities, which we had conquered
and held in our military occupation, but were willing to conclude a
treaty in a spirit of liberality, our commissioner was authorized to
stipulate for the restoration to Mexico of all our other conquests.
As the territory to be acquired by the boundary proposed might be
estimated to be of greater value than a fair equivalent for our just
demands, our commissioner was authorized to stipulate for the payment of
such additional pecuniary consideration as was deemed reasonable.
The terms of a treaty proposed by the Mexican commissioners were wholly
inadmissible. They negotiated as if Mexico were the victorious, and not
the vanquished, party. They must have known that their ultimatum could
never be accepted. It required the United States to dismember Texas by
surrendering to Mexico that part of the territory of that State lying
between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, included within her limits by her
laws when she was an independent republic, and when she was annexed to
the United States and admitted by Congress as one of the States of our
Union. It contained no provision for the payment by Mexico of the just
claims of our citizens. It required indemnity to Mexican citizens for
injuries they may have sustained by our troops in the prosecution of the
war. It demanded the right for Mexico to levy and collect the Mexican
tariff of duties on goods imported into her ports while in our military
occupation during the war, and the owners of which had paid to officers
of the United States the military contributions which had been levied
upon them; and it offered to cede to the United States, for a pecuniary
consideration, that part of Upper California lying north of latitude
37°. Such were the unreasonable terms proposed by the Mexican
commissioners.
The cession to the United States by Mexico of the Provinces of New
Mexico and the Californias, as proposed by the commissioner of the
United States, it was believed would be more in accordance with the
convenience and interests of both nations than any other cession of
territory which it was probable Mexico could be induced to make.
It is manifest to all who have observed the actual condition of the
Mexican Government for some years past and at present that if these
Provinces should be retained by her she could not long continue to hold
and govern them. Mexico is too feeble a power to govern these Provinces,
lying as they do at a distance of more than 1,000 miles from her
capital, and if attempted to be retained by her they would constitute
but for a short time even nominally a part of her dominions. This would
be especially the case with Upper California.
The sagacity of powerful European nations has long since directed their
attention to the commercial importance of that Province, and there can
be little doubt that the moment the United States shall relinquish their
present occupation of it and their claim to it as indemnity an effort
would be made by some foreign power to possess it, either by conquest or
by purchase. If no foreign government should acquire it in either of
these modes, an independent revolutionary government would probably be
established by the inhabitants and such foreigners as may remain in or
remove to the country as soon as it shall be known that the United
States have abandoned it. Such a government would be too feeble long to
maintain its separate independent existence, and would finally become
annexed to or be a dependent colony of some more powerful state.
Should any foreign government attempt to possess it as a colony, or
otherwise to incorporate it with itself, the principle avowed by
President Monroe in 1824, and reaffirmed in my first annual message,
that no foreign power shall with our consent be permitted to plant or
establish any new colony or dominion on any part of the North American
continent must be maintained. In maintaining this principle and in
resisting its invasion by any foreign power we might be involved in
other wars more expensive and more difficult than that in which we are
now engaged.
The Provinces of New Mexico and the Californias are contiguous to the
territories of the United States, and if brought under the government of
our laws their resources--mineral, agricultural, manufacturing, and
commercial--would soon be developed.
Upper California is bounded on the north by our Oregon possessions, and
if held by the United States would soon be settled by a hardy,
enterprising, and intelligent portion of our population. The Bay of San
Francisco and other harbors along the Californian coast would afford
shelter for our Navy, for our numerous whale ships, and other merchant
vessels employed in the Pacific Ocean, and would in a short period
become the marts of an extensive and profitable commerce with China and
other countries of the East.
These advantages, in which the whole commercial world would participate,
would at once be secured to the United States by the cession of this
territory; while it is certain that as long as it remains a part of the
Mexican dominions they can be enjoyed neither by Mexico herself nor by
any other nation.
New Mexico is a frontier Province, and has never been of any
considerable value to Mexico. From its locality it is naturally
connected with our Western settlements. The territorial limits of the
State of Texas, too, as defined by her laws before her admission into
our Union, embrace all that portion of New Mexico lying east of the Rio
Grande, while Mexico still claims to hold this territory as a part of
her dominions. The adjustment of this question of boundary is important.
There is another consideration which induced the belief that the Mexican
Government might even desire to place this Province under the protection
of the Government of the United States. Numerous bands of fierce and
warlike savages wander over it and upon its borders. Mexico has been and
must continue to be too feeble to restrain them from committing
depredations, robberies, and murders, not only upon the inhabitants of
New Mexico itself, but upon those of the other northern States of
Mexico. It would be a blessing to all these northern States to have
their citizens protected against them by the power of the United States.
At this moment many Mexicans, principally females and children, are in
captivity among them. If New Mexico were held and governed by the United
States, we could effectually prevent these tribes from committing such
outrages, and compel them to release these captives and restore them to
their families and friends.
In proposing to acquire New Mexico and the Californias, it was known
that but an inconsiderable portion of the Mexican people would be
transferred with them, the country embraced within these Provinces being
chiefly an uninhabited region.
These were the leading considerations which induced me to authorize the
terms of peace which were proposed to Mexico. They were rejected, and,
negotiations being at an end, hostilities were renewed. An assault was
made by our gallant Army upon the strongly fortified places near the
gates of the City of Mexico and upon the city itself, and after several
days of severe conflict the Mexican forces, vastly superior in number to
our own, were driven from the city, and it was occupied by our troops.
Immediately after information was received of the unfavorable result of
the negotiations, believing that his continued presence with the Army
could be productive of no good, I determined to recall our commissioner.
A dispatch to this effect was transmitted to him on the 6th of October
last. The Mexican Government will be informed of his recall, and that in
the existing state of things I shall not deem it proper to make any
further overtures of peace, but shall be at all times ready to receive
and consider any proposals which may be made by Mexico.
Since the liberal proposition of the United States was authorized to be
made, in April last, large expenditures have been incurred and the
precious blood of many of our patriotic fellow-citizens has been shed in
the prosecution of the war. This consideration and the obstinate
perseverance of Mexico in protracting the war must influence the terms
of peace which it may be deemed proper hereafter to accept.
Our arms having been everywhere victorious, having subjected to our
military occupation a large portion of the enemy's country, including
his capital, and negotiations for peace having failed, the important
questions arise, in what manner the war ought to be prosecuted and what
should be our future policy. I can not doubt that we should secure and
render available the conquests which we have already made, and that with
this view we should hold and occupy by our naval and military forces all
the ports, towns, cities, and Provinces now in our occupation or which
may hereafter fall into our possession; that we should press forward our
military operations and levy such military contributions on the enemy as
may, as far as practicable, defray the future expenses of the war.
Had the Government of Mexico acceded to the equitable and liberal terms
proposed, that mode of adjustment would have been preferred. Mexico
having declined to do this and failed to offer any other terms which
could be accepted by the United States, the national honor, no less than
the public interests, requires that the war should be prosecuted with
increased energy and power until a just and satisfactory peace can be
obtained. In the meantime, as Mexico refuses all indemnity, we should
adopt measures to indemnify ourselves by appropriating permanently a
portion of her territory. Early after the commencement of the war New
Mexico and the Californias were taken possession of by our forces. Our
military and naval commanders were ordered to conquer and hold them,
subject to be disposed of by a treaty of peace.
These Provinces are now in our undisputed occupation, and have been so
for many months, all resistance on the part of Mexico having ceased
within their limits. I am satisfied that they should never be
surrendered to Mexico. Should Congress concur with me in this opinion,
and that they should be retained by the United States as indemnity, I
can perceive no good reason why the civil jurisdiction and laws of the
United States should not at once be extended over them. To wait for a
treaty of peace such as we are willing to make, by which our relations
toward them would not be changed, can not be good policy; whilst our own
interest and that of the people inhabiting them require that a stable,
responsible, and free government under our authority should as soon as
possible be established over them. Should Congress, therefore, determine
to hold these Provinces permanently, and that they shall hereafter be
considered as constituent parts of our country, the early establishment
of Territorial governments over them will be important for the more
perfect protection of persons and property; and I recommend that such
Territorial governments be established. It will promote peace and
tranquillity among the inhabitants, by allaying all apprehension that
they may still entertain of being again subjected to the jurisdiction of
Mexico. I invite the early and favorable consideration of Congress to
this important subject.
Besides New Mexico and the Californias, there are other Mexican
Provinces which have been reduced to our possession by conquest. These
other Mexican Provinces are now governed by our military and naval
commanders under the general authority which is conferred upon a
conqueror by the laws of war. They should continue to be held, as a
means of coercing Mexico to accede to just terms of peace. Civil as well
as military officers are required to conduct such a government. Adequate
compensation, to be drawn from contributions levied on the enemy, should
be fixed by law for such officers as may be thus employed. What further
provision may become necessary and what final disposition it may be
proper to make of them must depend on the future progress of the war and
the course which Mexico may think proper hereafter to pursue.
With the views I entertain I can not favor the policy which has been
suggested, either to withdraw our Army altogether or to retire to a
designated line and simply hold and defend it. To withdraw our Army
altogether from the conquests they have made by deeds of unparalleled
bravery, and at the expense of so much blood and treasure, in a just war
on our part, and one which, by the act of the enemy, we could not
honorably have avoided, would be to degrade the nation in its own
estimation and in that of the world. To retire to a line and simply hold
and defend it would not terminate the war. On the contrary, it would
encourage Mexico to persevere and tend to protract it indefinitely. It
is not to be expected that Mexico, after refusing to establish such a
line as a permanent boundary when our victorious Army are in possession
of her capital and in the heart of her country, would permit us to hold
it without resistance. That she would continue the war, and in the most
harassing and annoying forms, there can be no doubt. A border warfare of
the most savage character, extending over a long line, would be
unceasingly waged. It would require a large army to be kept constantly
in the field, stationed at posts and garrisons along such a line, to
protect and defend it. The enemy, relieved from the pressure of our arms
on his coasts and in the populous parts of the interior, would direct
his attention to this line, and, selecting an isolated post for attack,
would concentrate his forces upon it. This would be a condition of
affairs which the Mexicans, pursuing their favorite system of guerrilla
warfare, would probably prefer to any other. Were we to assume a
defensive attitude on such a line, all the advantages of such a state of
war would be on the side of the enemy. We could levy no contributions
upon him, or in any other way make him feel the pressure of the war, but
must remain inactive and await his approach, being in constant
uncertainty at what point on the line or at what time he might make an
assault. He may assemble and organize an overwhelming force in the
interior on his own side of the line, and, concealing his purpose, make
a sudden assault upon some one of our posts so distant from any other as
to prevent the possibility of timely succor or reenforcements, and in
this way our gallant Army would be exposed to the danger of being cut
off in detail; or if by their unequaled bravery and prowess everywhere
exhibited during this war they should repulse the enemy, their numbers
stationed at any one post may be too small to pursue him. If the enemy
be repulsed in one attack, he would have nothing to do but to retreat to
his own side of the line, and, being in no fear of a pursuing army, may
reenforce himself at leisure for another attack on the same or some
other post. He may, too, cross the line between our posts, make rapid
incursions into the country which we hold, murder the inhabitants,
commit depredations on them, and then retreat to the interior before a
sufficient force can be concentrated to pursue him. Such would probably
be the harassing character of a mere defensive war on our part. If our
forces when attacked, or threatened with attack, be permitted to cross
the line, drive back the enemy, and conquer him, this would be again to
invade the enemy's country after having lost all the advantages of the
conquests we have already made by having voluntarily abandoned them.
To hold such a line successfully and in security it is far from being
certain that it would not require as large an army as would be necessary
to hold all the conquests we have already made and to continue the
prosecution of the war in the heart of the enemy's country. It is also
far from being certain that the expenses of the war would be diminished
by such a policy.
I am persuaded that the best means of vindicating the national honor and
interest and of bringing the war to an honorable close will be to
prosecute it with increased energy and power in the vital parts of the
enemy's country.