WASHINGTON, _February 10, 1847_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit to the Senate, for their advice with regard to its
ratification, "a general treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and
commerce between the United States of America and the Republic of New
Granada," concluded at Bogota on the 12th December last by Benjamin A.
Bidlack, chargé d'affaires of the United States, on their part, and by
Manuel Maria Mallarino, secretary of state and foreign relations, on the
part of that Republic.
It will be perceived by the thirty-fifth article of this treaty that New
Granada proposes to guarantee to the Government and citizens of the
United States the right of passage across the Isthmus of Panama over the
natural roads and over any canal or railroad which may be constructed to
unite the two seas, on condition that the United States shall make a
similar guaranty to New Granada of the neutrality of this portion of her
territory and her sovereignty over the same.
The reasons which caused the insertion of this important stipulation in
the treaty will be fully made known to the Senate by the accompanying
documents. From these it will appear that our chargé d'affaires acted in
this particular upon his own responsibility and without instructions.
Under such circumstances it became my duty to decide whether I would
submit the treaty to the Senate, and after mature consideration I have
determined to adopt this course.
The importance of this concession to the commercial and political
interests of the United States can not easily be overrated. The route by
the Isthmus of Panama is the shortest between the two oceans, and from
the information herewith communicated it would seem to be the most
practicable for a railroad or canal.
The vast advantages to our commerce which would result from such a
communication, not only with the west coast of America, but with Asia
and the islands of the Pacific, are too obvious to require any detail.
Such a passage would relieve us from a long and dangerous navigation of
more than 9,000 miles around Cape Horn and render our communication with
our possessions on the northwest coast of America comparatively easy and
speedy.
The communication across the Isthmus has attracted the attention of the
Government of the United States ever since the independence of the South
American Republics. On the 3d of March, 1835, a resolution passed the
Senate in the following words:
_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be respectfully
requested to consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the
governments of other nations, and particularly with the Governments
of Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of effectually
protecting, by suitable treaty stipulations with them, such individuals
or companies as may undertake to open a communication between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the construction of a ship canal across
the isthmus which connects North and South America, and of securing
forever by such stipulations the free and equal right of navigating such
canal to all nations on the payment of such reasonable tolls as may be
established to compensate the capitalists who may engage in such
undertaking and complete the work.
No person can be more deeply sensible than myself of the danger of
entangling alliances with any foreign nation. That we should avoid such
alliances has become a maxim of our policy consecrated by the most
venerated names which adorn our history and sanctioned by the unanimous
voice of the American people. Our own experience has taught us the
wisdom of this maxim in the only instance, that of the guaranty to
France of her American possessions, in which we have ever entered into
such an alliance. If, therefore, the very peculiar circumstances of the
present case do not greatly impair, if not altogether destroy, the force
of this objection, then we ought not to enter into the stipulation,
whatever may be its advantages. The general considerations which have
induced me to transmit the treaty to the Senate for their advice may be
summed up in the following particulars:
1. The treaty does not propose to guarantee a territory to a foreign
nation in which the United States will have no common interest with that
nation. On the contrary, we are more deeply and directly interested in
the subject of this guaranty than New Granada herself or any other
country.
2. The guaranty does not extend to the territories of New Granada
generally, but is confined to the single Province of the Isthmus of
Panama, where we shall acquire by the treaty a common and coextensive
right of passage with herself.
3. It will constitute no alliance for any political object, but for a
purely commercial purpose, in which all the navigating nations of the
world have a common interest.
4. In entering into the mutual guaranties proposed by the thirty-fifth
article of the treaty neither the Government of New Granada nor that of
the United States has any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate
object, as presented by the Senate of the United States in their
resolution to which I have already referred, is to secure to all nations
the free and equal right of passage over the Isthmus. If the United
States, as the chief of the American nations, should first become a
party to this guaranty, it can not be doubted--indeed, it is confidently
expected by the Government of New Granada--that similar guaranties will
be given to that Republic by Great Britain and France. Should the
proposition thus tendered be rejected we may deprive the United States
of the just influence which its acceptance might secure to them and
confer the glory and benefits of being the first among the nations in
concluding such an arrangement upon the Government either of Great
Britain or France. That either of these Governments would embrace the
offer can not be doubted, because there does not appear to be any other
effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages of this
important passage but the guaranty of great commercial powers that the
Isthmus shall be neutral territory. The interests of the world at stake
are so important that the security of this passage between the two
oceans can not be suffered to depend upon the wars and revolutions which
may arise among different nations.
Besides, such a guaranty is almost indispensable to the construction of
a railroad or canal across the territory. Neither sovereign states nor
individuals would expend their capital in the construction of these
expensive works without some such security for their investments.
The guaranty of the sovereignty of New Granada over the Isthmus is a
natural consequence of the guaranty of its neutrality, and there does
not seem to be any other practicable mode of securing the neutrality of
this territory. New Granada would not consent to yield up this Province
in order that it might become a neutral state, and if she should it is
not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish and maintain an
independent sovereignty. But a civil government must exist there in
order to protect the works which shall be constructed. New Granada is
a power which will not excite the jealousy of any nation. If Great
Britain, France, or the United States held the sovereignty over the
Isthmus, other nations might apprehend that in case of war the
Government would close up the passage against the enemy, but no such
fears can ever be entertained in regard to New Granada.
This treaty removes the heavy discriminating duties against us in the
ports of New Granada, which have nearly destroyed our commerce and
navigation with that Republic, and which we have been in vain
endeavoring to abolish for the last twenty years.
It may be proper also to call the attention of the Senate to the
twenty-fifth article of the treaty, which prohibits privateering in case
of war between the two Republics, and also to the additional article,
which nationalizes all vessels of the parties which "shall be provided
by the respective Governments with a patent issued according to its
laws," and in this particular goes further than any of our former
treaties.