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THE FIGHT FOR THE REPUBLIC IN CHINA
by
B. L. PUTNAM WEALE
Author of _Indiscreet Letters from Peking_, etc.
With 28 Illustrations
London: Hurst & Blackett, Ltd.
Paternoster House, E.C.
1918
[Illustration: President Li Yuan-Hung.]
PREFACE
This volume tells everything that the student or the casual reader needs
to know about the Chinese Question. It is sufficiently exhaustive to
show very clearly the new forces at work, and to bring some realisation
of the great gulf which separates the thinking classes of to-day from
the men of a few years ago; whilst, at the same time, it is sufficiently
condensed not to overwhelm the reader with too great a multitude of
facts.
Particular attention may be devoted to an unique feature--namely, the
Chinese and Japanese documentation which affords a sharp contrast
between varying types of Eastern brains. Thus, in the Memorandum of the
Black Dragon Society (Chapter VII) we have a very clear and illuminating
revelation of the Japanese political mind which has been trained to
consider problems in the modern Western way, but which remains saturated
with theocratic ideals in the sharpest conflict with the Twentieth
Century. In the pamphlet of Yang Tu (Chapter VIII) which launched the
ill-fated Monarchy Scheme and contributed so largely to the dramatic
death of Yuan Shih-kai, we have an essentially Chinese mentality of the
reactionary or corrupt type which expresses itself both on home and
foreign issues in a naïvely dishonest way, helpful to future diplomacy.
In the Letter of Protest (Chapter X) against the revival of Imperialism
written by Liang Ch'i-chao--the most brilliant scholar living--we have a
Chinese of the New or Liberal China, who in spite of a complete
ignorance of foreign languages shows a marvellous grasp of political
absolutes, and is a harbinger of the great days which must come again to
Cathay. In other chapters dealing with the monarchist plot we see the
official mind at work, the telegraphic despatches exchanged between
Peking and the provinces being of the highest diplomatic interest. These
documents prove conclusively that although the Japanese is more
practical than the Chinese--and more concise--there can be no question
as to which brain is the more fruitful.
Coupled with this discussion there is much matter giving an insight into
the extraordinary and calamitous foreign ignorance about present-day
China, an ignorance which is just as marked among those resident in the
country as among those who have never visited it. The whole of the
material grouped in this novel fashion should not fail to bring
conviction that the Far East, with its 500 millions of people, is
destined to play an important rôle in _postbellum_ history because of
the new type of modern spirit which is being there evolved. The
influence of the Chinese Republic, in the opinion of the writer, cannot
fail to be ultimately world-wide in view of the practically unlimited
resources in man-power which it disposes of.
In the Appendices will be found every document of importance for the
period under examination,--1911 to 1917. The writer desires to record
his indebtedness to the columns of _The Peking Gazette_, a newspaper
which under the brilliant editorship of Eugene Ch'en--a pure Chinese
born and educated under the British flag--has fought consistently and
victoriously for Liberalism and Justice and has made the Republic a
reality to countless thousands who otherwise would have refused to
believe in it.
PUTNAM WEALE.
PEKING, June, 1917.
CONTENTS
I.--GENERAL INTRODUCTION
II.--THE ENIGMA OF YUAN SHIH-KAI
III.--THE DREAM REPUBLIC
(From the Manchu Abdication to the dissolution of Parliament)
IV.--THE DICTATOR AT WORK
(From the Coup d'état of the 4th Nov. 1913 to the outbreak of the
World-war, 1st August, 1914)
V.--THE FACTOR OF JAPAN
VI.--THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
VII.--THE ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
VIII.--THE MONARCHIST PLOT
1º The Pamphlet of Yang Tu
IX.--THE MONARCHY PLOT
2º Dr. Goodnow's Memorandum
X.--THE MONARCHY MOVEMENT IS OPPOSED
The Appeal of the Scholar Liang Chi-chao
XI.--THE DREAM EMPIRE
("The People's Voice" and the action of the Powers)
XII.--"THE THIRD REVOLUTION"
The Revolt of Yunnan
XIII.--"THE THIRD REVOLUTION" (_continued_)
Downfall and Death of Yuan Shih-kai
XIV.--THE NEW RÉGIME--FROM 1916 TO 1917
XV.--THE REPUBLIC IN COLLISION WITH REALITY: TWO TYPICAL INSTANCES OF
"FOREIGN AGGRESSION"
XVI.--CHINA AND THE WAR
XVII.--THE FINAL PROBLEM:--REMODELLING THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE WORLD
APPENDICES--DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA
ILLUSTRATIONS
President Li Yuan-Hung
The Funeral of Yuan-Shih-kai: The Procession passing down the great
Palace Approach with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the distance
The Provincial Troops of General Chang Hsun at his Headquarters of
Hsuchowfu
The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Catafalque over the Coffin on its
way to the Railway Station
The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Procession passing down the great
Palace Approach with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the distance
An Encampment of "The Punitive Expedition" of 1916 on the Upper
Yangtsze (_By courtesy of Major Isaac Newell, U.S. Military Attaché_.)
Revival of the Imperialistic Worship of Heaven by Yuan Shih-kai in
1914: Scene on the Altar of Heaven, with Sacrificial Officers clothed
in costumes dating from 2,000 years ago.
A Manchu Country Fair: The figures in the foreground are all Manchu
Women and Girls
A Manchu Woman grinding Grain
Silk-reeling done in the open under the Walls of Peking
Modern Peking: A Run on a Bank
The Re-opening of Parliament on August 1st, 1916, after three years of
dictatorial rule
The Original Constitutional Drafting Committee of 1913, photographed
on the Steps of the Temple of Heaven, where the Draft was completed
A Presidential Review of Troops in the Southern Hungtung Park outside
Peking: Arrival of the President
President Li Yuan-Hung and the General Staff watching the Review
March-past of an Infantry Division
Modern Peking: The Palace Entrance lined with Troops. Note the New
Type Chinese Policeman in the foreground
The Premier General Tuan Chi-Jui, Head of the Cabinet which decided to
declare war on Germany General Feng Kuo-chang, President of the
Republic The Scholar Liang Chi-chao, sometime Minister of Justice, and
the foremost "Brain" in China
General Tsao-ao, the Hero of the Yunnan Rebellion of 1915-16, who died
from the effects of the campaign
Liang Shih-yi, who was the Power behind Yuan Shih-kai, now proscribed
and living in exile at Hong-Kong
The Famous or Infamous General Chang Hsun, the leading Reactionary in
China to-day, who still commands a force of 30,000 men astride of the
Pukow Railway
The Bas-relief in a Peking Temple, well illustrating Indo-Chinese
Influences
The Late President Yuan Shih-kai
President Yuan Shih-kai photographed immediately after his
Inauguration as Provisional President, March 10th, 1912
The National Assembly sitting as a National Convention engaged on the
Draft of the Permanent Constitution. (Specially photographed by
permission of the Speakers for the Present Work)
View from rear of the Hall of the National Assembly sitting as a
National Convention engaged on the Draft of the Permanent
Constitution. (Specially photographed by permission of the Speakers
for the Present Work)
CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The revolution which broke out in China on the 10th October, 1911, and
which was completed with the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty on the
12th February, 1912, though acclaimed as highly successful, was in its
practical aspects something very different. With the proclamation of the
Republic, the fiction of autocratic rule had truly enough vanished; yet
the tradition survived and with it sufficient of the essential machinery
of Imperialism to defeat the nominal victors until the death of Yuan
Shih-kai.
The movement to expel the Manchus, who had seized the Dragon Throne in
1644 from the expiring Ming Dynasty, was an old one. Historians are
silent on the subject of the various secret plots which were always
being hatched to achieve that end, their silence being due to a lack of
proper records and to the difficulty of establishing the simple truth in
a country where rumour reigns supreme. But there is little doubt that
the famous Ko-lao-hui, a Secret Society with its headquarters in the
remote province of Szechuan, owed its origin to the last of the Ming
adherents, who after waging a desperate guerilla warfare from the date
of their expulsion from Peking, finally fell to the low level of
inciting assassinations and general unrest in the vain hope that they
might some day regain their heritage. At least, we know one thing
definitely: that the attempt on the life of the Emperor Chia Ching in
the Peking streets at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century was a
Secret Society plot and brought to an abrupt end the pleasant habit of
travelling among their subjects which the great Manchu Emperors
K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien Lung had inaugurated and always pursued and which
had so largely encouraged the growth of personal loyalty to a foreign
House.
From that day onwards for over a century no Emperor ventured out from
behind the frowning Walls of the Forbidden City, save for brief annual
ceremonies, such as the Worship of Heaven on the occasion of the Winter
Solstice, and during the two "flights"--first in 1860 when Peking was
occupied by an Anglo-French expedition and the Court incontinently
sought sanctuary in the mountain Palaces of Jehol; and, again, in 1900,
when with the pricking of the Boxer bubble and the arrival of the
International relief armies, the Imperial Household was forced along the
stony road to far-off Hsianfu.
The effect of this immurement was soon visible; the Manchu rule, which
was emphatically a rule of the sword, was rapidly so weakened that the
emperors became no more than _rois fainéants_ at the mercy of their
minister.[1] The history of the Nineteenth Century is thus logically
enough the history of successive collapses. Not only did overseas
foreigners openly thunder at the gateways of the empire and force an
ingress, but native rebellions were constant and common. Leaving minor
disturbances out of account, there were during this period two huge
Mahommedan rebellions, besides the cataclysmic Taiping rising which
lasted ten years and is supposed to have destroyed the unbelievable
total of one hundred million persons. The empire, torn by internecine
warfare, surrendered many of its essential prerogatives to foreigners,
and by accepting the principle of extraterritoriality prepared the road
to ultimate collapse.
How in such circumstances was it possible to keep alive absolutism? The
answer is so curious that we must be explicit and exhaustive.
The simple truth is that save during the period of vigour immediately
following each foreign conquest (such as the Mongol conquest in the
Thirteenth Century and the Manchu in the Seventeenth) not only has there
never been any absolutism properly so-called in China, but that apart
from the most meagre and inefficient tax-collecting and some
rough-and-ready policing in and around the cities there has never been
any true governing at all save what the people did for themselves or
what they demanded of the officials as a protection against one another.
Any one who doubts these statements has no inkling of those facts which
are the crown as well as the foundation of the Chinese group-system, and
which must be patiently studied in the village-life of the country to be
fitly appreciated. To be quite frank, absolutism is a myth coming down
from the days of Kublai Khan when he so proudly built his _Khanbaligh_
(the Cambaluc of Marco Polo and the forebear of modern Peking) and
filled it with his troops who so soon vanished like the snows of winter.
An elaborate pretence, a deliberate policy of make-believe, ever since
those days invested Imperial Edicts with a majesty which they have never
really possessed, the effacement of the sovereign during the Nineteenth
Century contributing to the legend that there existed in the capital a
Grand and Fearful Panjandrum for whom no miracle was too great and to
whom people and officials owed trembling obedience.
In reality, the office of Emperor was never more than a
politico-religious concept, translated for the benefit of the masses
into socio-economic ordinances. These pronouncements, cast in the form
of periodic homilies called Edicts, were the ritual of government; their
purpose was instructional rather than mandatory; they were designed to
teach and keep alive the State-theory that the Emperor was the High
Priest of the Nation and that obedience to the morality of the Golden
Age, which had been inculcated by all the philosophers since Confucius
and Mencius flourished twenty-five centuries ago, would not only secure
universal happiness but contribute to national greatness.
The office of Emperor was thus heavenly rather than terrestrial, and
suasion, not arms, was the most potent argument used in everyday life.
The amazing reply (_i.e._, amazing to foreigners) made by the great
Emperor K'ang-hsi in the tremendous Eighteenth Century controversy
between the Jesuit and the Dominican missionaries, which ruined the
prospects of China's ever becoming Roman Catholic and which the Pope
refused to accept--that the custom of ancestor-worship was political and
not religious--was absolutely correct, _politics in China under the
Empire being only a system of national control exercised by inculcating
obedience to forebears_. The great efforts which the Manchus made from
the end of the Sixteenth Century (when they were still a small
Manchurian Principality striving for the succession to the Dragon Throne
and launching desperate attacks on the Great Wall of China) to receive
from the Dalai Lama, as well as from the lesser Pontiffs of Tibet and
Mongolia, high-sounding religious titles, prove conclusively that
dignities other than mere possession of the Throne were held necessary
to give solidity to a reign which began in militarism and which would
collapse as the Mongol rule had collapsed by a mere Palace revolution
unless an effective _moral_ title were somehow won.
Nor was the Manchu military Conquest, even after they had entered
Peking, so complete as has been represented by historians. The Manchus
were too small a handful, even with their Mongol and Chinese
auxiliaries, to do more than defeat the Ming armies and obtain the
submission of the chief cities of China. It is well-known to students of
their administrative methods, that whilst they reigned over China they
_ruled_ only in company with the Chinese, the system in force being a
dual control which, beginning on the Grand Council and in the various
great Boards and Departments in the capital, proceeded as far as the
provincial chief cities, but stopped short there so completely and
absolutely that the huge chains of villages and burgs had their historic
autonomy virtually untouched and lived on as they had always lived. The
elaborate system of examinations, with the splendid official honours
reserved for successful students which was adopted by the Dynasty, not
only conciliated Chinese society but provided a vast body of men whose
interest lay in maintaining the new conquest; and thus Literature, which
had always been the door to preferment, became not only one of the
instruments of government, but actually the advocate of an alien rule.
With their persons and properties safe, and their women-folk protected
by an elaborate set of capitulations from being requisitioned for the
harems of the invaders, small wonder if the mass of Chinese welcomed a
firm administration after the frightful disorders which had torn the
country during the last days of the Mings.[2]
It was the foreigner, arriving in force in China after the capture of
Peking and the ratification of the Tientsin Treaties in 1860, who so
greatly contributed to making the false idea of Manchu absolutism
current throughout the world; and in this work it was the foreign
diplomat, coming to the capital saturated with the tradition of European
absolutism, who played a not unimportant part. Investing the Emperors
with an authority with which they were never really clothed, save for
ceremonial purposes (principally perhaps because the Court was entirely
withdrawn from view and very insolent in its foreign intercourse) a
conception of High Mightiness was spread abroad reminiscent of the awe
in which Eighteenth Century nabobs spoke of the Great Mogul of India.
Chinese officials, quickly discovering that their easiest means of
defence against an irresistible pressure was to take refuge behind the
august name of the sovereign, played their rôle so successfully that
until 1900 it was generally believed by Europeans that no other form of
government than a despotism _sans phrase_ could be dreamed of. Finding
that on the surface an Imperial Decree enjoyed the majesty of an Ukaze
of the Czar, Europeans were ready enough to interpret as best suited
their enterprises something which they entirely failed to construe in
terms expressive of the negative nature of Chinese civilization; and so
it happened that though the government of China had become no
government at all from the moment that extraterritoriality destroyed the
theory of Imperial inviolability and infallibility, the miracle of
turning state negativism into an active governing element continued to
work after a fashion because of the disguise which the immense distances
afforded.
Adequately to explain the philosophy of distance in China, and what it
has meant historically, would require a whole volume to itself; but it
is sufficient for our purpose to indicate here certain prime essentials.
The old Chinese were so entrenched in their vastnesses that without the
play of forces which were supernatural to them, _i.e._, the
steam-engine, the telegraph, the armoured war-vessel, etc., their daily
lives could not be affected. Left to themselves, and assisted by their
own methods, they knew that blows struck across the immense roadless
spaces were so diminished in strength, by the time they reached the spot
aimed at, that they became a mere mockery of force; and, just because
they were so valueless, paved the way to effective compromises. Being
adepts in the art which modern surgeons have adopted, of leaving wounds
as far as possible to heal themselves, they trusted to time and to
nature to solve political differences which western countries boldly
attacked on very different principles. Nor were they wrong in their
view. From the capital to the Yangtsze Valley (which is the heart of the
country), is 800 miles, that is far more than the mileage between Paris
and Berlin. From Peking to Canton is 1,400 miles along a hard and
difficult route; the journey to Yunnan by the Yangtsze river is
upwards of 2,000 miles, a distance greater than the greatest march
ever undertaken by Napoleon. And when one speaks of the Outer
Dominions--Mongolia, Tibet, Turkestan--for these hundreds of miles
it is necessary to substitute thousands, and add thereto difficulties
of terrain which would have disheartened even Roman Generals.
Now the old Chinese, accepting distance as the supreme thing, had made
it the starting-point as well as the end of their government. In the
perfected viceregal system which grew up under the Ming Dynasty, and
which was taken over by the Manchus as a sound and admirable governing
principle, though they superimposed their own military system of Tartar
Generals, we have the plan that nullified the great obstacle. Authority
of every kind was _delegated_ by the Throne to various distant governing
centuries in a most complete and sweeping manner, each group of
provinces, united under a viceroy, being in everything but name so many
independent linked commonwealths, called upon for matricular
contributions in money and grain but otherwise left severely alone[3].
The chain which bound provincial China to the metropolitan government
was therefore in the last analysis finance and nothing but finance; and
if the system broke down in 1911 it was because financial reform--to
discount the new forces of which the steam engine was the symbol--had
been attempted, like military reform, both too late and in the wrong
way, and instead of strengthening, had vastly weakened the authority of
the Throne.
In pursuance of the reform-plan which became popular after the Boxer
Settlement had allowed the court to return to Peking from Hsianfu, the
viceroys found their most essential prerogative, which was the control
of the provincial purse, largely taken from them and handed over to
Financial Commissioners who were directly responsible to the Peking
Ministry of Finance, a Department which was attempting to replace the
loose system of matricular contributions by the European system of a
directly controlled taxation every penny of which would be shown in an
annual Budget. No doubt had time been vouchsafed, and had European help
been enlisted on a large scale, this change could ultimately have been
made successful. But it was precisely time which was lacking; and the
Manchus consequently paid the penalty which is always paid by those who
delay until it is too late. The old theories having been openly
abandoned, it needed only the promise of a Parliament completely to
destroy the dignity of the Son of Heaven, and to leave the viceroys as
mere hostages in the hands of rebels. A few short weeks of rebellion was
sufficient in 1911 to cause the provinces to revert to their condition
of the earlier centuries when they had been vast unfettered agricultural
communities. And once they had tasted the joys of this new independence,
it was impossible to conceive of their becoming "obedient" again.
Here another word of explanation is necessary to show clearly the
precise meaning of regionalism in China.
What had originally created each province was the chief city in each
region, such cities necessarily being the walled repositories of all
increment. Greedy of territory to enhance their wealth, and jealous of
their power, these provincial capitals throughout the ages had left no
stone unturned to extend their influence in every possible direction and
bring under their economic control as much land as possible, a fact
which is abundantly proved by the highly diversified system of weights
and measures throughout the land deliberately drawn-up to serve as
economic barriers. River-courses, mountain-ranges, climate and soil, no
doubt assisted in governing this expansion, but commercial and financial
greed was the principal force. Of this we have an exceedingly
interesting and conclusive illustration in the struggle still proceeding
between the three Manchurian provinces, Fengtien, Kirin and
Heilungchiang, to seize the lion's share of the virgin land of Eastern
Inner Mongolia which has an "open frontier" of rolling prairies. Having
the strongest provincial capital--Moukden--it has been Fengtien province
which has encroached on the Mongolian grasslands to such an extent that
its jurisdiction to-day envelops the entire western flank of Kirin
province (as can be seen in the latest Chinese maps) in the form of a
salamander, effectively preventing the latter province from controlling
territory that geographically belongs to it. In the same way in the
land-settlement which is still going on the Mongolian plateau
immediately above Peking, much of what should be Shansi territory has
been added to the metropolitan province of Chihli. Though adjustments of
provincial boundaries have been summarily made in times past, in the
main the considerations we have indicated have been the dominant factors
in determining the area of each unit.
Now in many provinces where settlement is age-old, the regionalism which
results from great distances and bad communications has been greatly
increased by race-admixture. Canton province, which was largely settled
by Chinese adventurers sailing down the coast from the Yangtsze and
intermarrying with Annamese and the older autochthonous races, has a
population-mass possessing very distinct characteristics, which sharply
conflict with Northern traits. Fuhkien province is not only as
diversified but speaks a dialect which is virtually a foreign language.
And so on North and West of the Yangtsze it is the same story,
temperamental differences of the highest political importance being
everywhere in evidence and leading to perpetual bickerings and
jealousies. For although Chinese civilization resembles in one great
particular the Mahommedan religion, in that it accepts without question
all adherents irrespective of racial origin, _politically_ the effect of
this regionalism has been such that up to very recent times the Central
Government has been almost as much a foreign government in the eyes of
many provinces as the government of Japan. Money alone formed the bond
of union; so long as questions of taxation were not involved, Peking was
as far removed from daily life as the planet Mars.
As we are now able to see very clearly, fifty years ago--that is at the
time of the Taiping Rebellion--the old power and spell of the National
Capital as a military centre had really vanished. Though in ancient days
horsemen armed with bows and lances could sweep like a tornado over the
land, levelling everything save the walled cities, in the Nineteenth
Century such methods had become impossible. Mongolia and Manchuria had
also ceased to be inexhaustible reservoirs of warlike men; the more
adjacent portions had become commercialized; whilst the outer regions
had sunk to depopulated graziers' lands. The Government, after the
collapse of the Rebellion, being greatly impoverished, had openly fallen
to balancing province against province and personality against
personality, hoping that by some means it would be able to regain its
prestige and a portion of its former wealth. Taking down the ledgers
containing the lists of provincial contributions, the mandarins of
Peking completely revised every schedule, redistributed every weight,
and saw to it that the matricular levies should fall in such a way as to
be crushing. The new taxation, _likin_, which, like the income-tax in
England, is in origin purely a war-tax, by gripping inter-provincial
commerce by the throat and rudely controlling it by the barrier-system,
was suddenly disclosed as a new and excellent way of making felt the
menaced sovereignty of the Manchus; and though the system was plainly a
two-edged weapon, the first edge to cut was the Imperial edge; that is
largely why for several decades after the Taipings China was relatively
quiet.
Time was also giving birth to another important development--important
in the sense that it was to prove finally decisive. It would have been
impossible for Peking, unless men of outstanding genius had been living,
to have foreseen that not only had the real bases of government now
become entirely economic control, but that the very moment that control
faltered the central government of China would openly and absolutely
cease to be any government at all. Modern commercialism, already
invading China at many points through the medium of the treaty-ports,
was a force which in the long run could not be denied. Every year that
passed tended to emphasize the fact that modern conditions were cutting
Peking more and more adrift from the real centres of power--the economic
centres which, with the single exception of Tientsin, lie from 800 to
1,500 miles away. It was these centres that were developing
revolutionary ideas--_i.e._, ideas at variance with the Socio-economic
principles on which the old Chinese commonwealth had been slowly built
up, and which foreign dynasties such as the Mongol and the Manchu had
never touched. The Government of the post-Taiping period still imagined
that by making their hands lie more heavily than ever on the people and
by tightening the taxation control--not by true creative work--they
could rehabilitate themselves.
It would take too long, and would weary the indulgence of the reader to
establish in a conclusive manner this thesis which had long been a
subject of inquiry on the part of political students. Chinese society,
being essentially a society organized on a credit-co-operative system,
so nicely adjusted that money, either coined or fiduciary, was not
wanted save for the petty daily purchases of the people, any system
which boldly clutched the financial establishments undertaking the
movement of _sycee_ (silver) from province to province for the
settlement of trade-balances, was bound to be effective so long as those
financial establishments remained unshaken.
The best known establishments, united in the great group known as the
Shansi Bankers, being the government bankers, undertook not only all the
remittances of surpluses to Peking, but controlled by an intricate
pass-book system the perquisites of almost every office-holder in the
empire. No sooner did an official, under the system which had grown up,
receive a provincial appointment than there hastened to him a
confidential clerk of one of these accommodating houses, who in the name
of his employers advanced all the sums necessary for the payment of the
official's post, and then proceeded with him to his province so that
moiety by moiety, as taxation flowed in, advances could be paid off and
the equilibrium re-established. A very intimate and far-reaching
connection thus existed between provincial money-interests and the
official classes. The practical work of governing China was the
balancing of tax-books and native bankers' accounts. Even the
"melting-houses," where _sycee_ was "standardized" for provincial use,
were the joint enterprises of officials and merchants; bargaining
governing every transaction; and only when a violent break occurred in
the machinery, owing to famine or rebellion, did any other force than
money intervene.
There was nothing exceptional in these practices, in the use of which
the old Chinese empire was merely following the precedent of the Roman
Empire. The vast polity that was formed before the time of Christ by the
military and commercial expansion of Rome in the Mediterranean Basin,
and among the wild tribes of Northern Europe, depended very largely on
the genius of Italian financiers and tax-collectors to whom the revenues
were either directly "farmed," or who "assisted" precisely after the
Chinese method in financing officials and local administrations, and in
replenishing a central treasury which no wealth could satisfy. The
Chinese phenomenon was therefore in no sense new; the dearth of coined
money and the variety of local standards made the methods used economic
necessities. The system was not in itself a bad system: its fatal
quality lay in its woodenness, its lack of adaptability, and in its
growing weakness in the face of foreign competition which it could never
understand. Foreign competition--that was the enemy destined to achieve
an overwhelming triumph and dash to ruins a hoary survival.
War with Japan sounded the first trumpet-blast which should have been
heeded. In the year 1894, being faced with the necessity of finding
immediately a large sum of specie for purpose of war, the native bankers
proclaimed their total inability to do so, and the first great foreign
loan contract was signed.[4] Little attention was attracted to what is a
turning-point in Chinese history. There cannot be the slightest doubt
that in 1894 the Manchus wrote the first sentences of an abdication
which was only formally pronounced in 1912: they had inaugurated the
financial thraldom under which China still languishes. Within a period
of forty months, in order to settle the disastrous Japanese war, foreign
loans amounting to nearly fifty-five million pounds were completed. This
indebtedness, amounting to nearly three times the "visible" annual
revenues of the country--that is, the revenues actually accounted for to
Peking--was unparalleled in Chinese history. It was a gold indebtedness
subject to all sorts of manipulations which no Chinese properly
understood. It had special political meaning and special political
consequences because the loans were virtually guaranteed by the Powers.
It was a long-drawn _coup d'état_ of a nature that all foreigners
understood because it forged external chains.
The _internal_ significance was even greater than the external. The
loans were secured on the most important "direct" revenues reaching
Peking--the Customs receipts, which were concerned with the most vital
function in the new economic life springing up, the steam-borne coasting
and river-trade as well as the purely foreign trade. That most vital
function tended consequently to become more and more hall-marked as
foreign; it no longer depended in any direct sense on Peking for
protection. The hypothecation of these revenues to foreigners for
periods running into decades--coupled with their administration by
foreigners--was such a distinct restriction of the rights of eminent
domain as to amount to a partial abrogation of sovereignty.
That this was vaguely understood by the masses is now quite certain. The
Boxer movement of 1900, like the great proletarian risings which
occurred in Italy in the pre-Christian era as a result of the
impoverishment and moral disorder brought about by Roman misgovernment,
was simply a socio-economic catastrophe exhibiting itself in an
unexpected form. The dying Manchu dynasty, at last in open despair,
turned the revolt, insanely enough, against the foreigner--that is
against those who already held the really vital portion of their
sovereignty. So far from saving itself by this act, the dynasty wrote
another sentence in its death-warrant. Economically the Manchus had been
for years almost lost; the Boxer indemnities were the last straw. By
more than doubling the burden of foreign commitments, and by placing the
operation of the indemnities directly in the hands of foreign bankers by
the method of monthly quotas, payable in Shanghai, _the Peking
Government as far back as fifteen years ago was reduced to being a
government at thirty days' sight, at the mercy of any shock of events
which could be protracted over a few monthly settlements_. There is no
denying this signal fact, which is probably the most remarkable
illustration of the restrictive power of money which has ever been
afforded in the history of Asia.
The phenomenon, however, was complex and we must be careful to
understand its workings. A mercantile curiosity, to find the parallel
for which we must go back to the Middle Ages in Europe, when "free
cities" such as those of the Hanseatic League plentifully
dotted river and coast line, served to increase the general difficulties
of a situation which no one formula could adequately cover.
Extraterritoriality, by creating the "treaty port" in China, had been
the most powerful weapon in undermining native economics; yet at the
same time it had been the agent for creating powerful new
counter-balancing interests. Though the increasingly large groups of
foreigners, residing under their own laws, and building up, under their
own specially protected system of international exchange, a new and
imposing edifice, had made the hovel-like nature of Chinese economics
glaringly evident, the mercantile classes of the New China, being always
quick to avail themselves of money-making devices, had not only taken
shelter under this new and imposing edifice, but were rapidly extending
it of their own accord. In brief, the trading Chinese were identifying
themselves and their major interests with the treaty-ports; they were
transferring thither their specie and their credits; making huge
investments in land and properties, under the aegis of foreign flags in
which they absolutely trusted. The money-interests of the country knew
instinctively that the native system was doomed and that with this doom
there would come many changes; these interests, in the way common to
money all the world over, were insuring themselves against the
inevitable.
The force of this--politically--became finally evident in 1911; and what
we have said in our opening sentences should now be clear. The Chinese
Revolution was an emotional rising against the Peking System because it
was a bad and inefficient and retrograde system, just as much as against
the Manchus, who after all had adopted purely Chinese methods and who
were no more foreigners than Scotchmen or Irishmen are foreigners to-day
in England. The Revolution of 1911 derived its meaning and its value--as
well as its mandate--not from what it proclaimed, but for what it stood
for. Historically, 1911 was the lineal descendant of 1900, which again
was the offspring of the economic collapse advertised by the great
foreign loans of the Japanese war, loans made necessary because the
Taipings had disclosed the complete disappearance of the only _raison
d'être_ of Peking sovereignty, _i.e._ the old-time military power. The
story is, therefore, clear and well-connected and so logical in its
results that it has about it a finality suggesting the unrolling of the
inevitable.
During the Revolution the one decisive factor was shown to be almost at
once--money, nothing but money. The pinch was felt at the end of the
first thirty days. Provincial remittances ceased; the Boxer quotas
remained unpaid; a foreign embargo was laid upon the Customs funds. The
Northern troops, raised and trained by Yuan Shih-kai, when he was
Viceroy of the Metropolitan province, were, it is true, proving
themselves the masters of the Yangtsze and South China troops; yet that
circumstance was meaningless. Those troops were fighting for what had
already proved itself a lost cause--the Peking System, as well as the
Manchu dynasty. The fight turned more and more into a money-fight. It
was foreign money which brought about the first truce and the transfer
of the so-called republican government from Nanking to Peking. In the
strictest sense of the words every phase of the settlement then arrived
at was a settlement in terms of cash.[5]
Had means existed for rapidly replenishing the Chinese Treasury without
having recourse to European stockmarkets (whose actions are
semi-officially controlled when distant regions are involved) the
Republic might have fared better. But placed almost at once through
foreign dictation under a species of police-control, which while
nominally derived from Western conceptions, was primarily designed to
rehabilitate the semblance of the authority which had been so
sensationally extinguished, the Republic remained only a dream; and the
world, taught to believe that there could be no real stability until the
scheme of government approximated to the conception long formed of
Peking absolutism, waited patiently for the rude awakening which came
with the Yuan Shih-kai _coup d'état_ of 4th November, 1913. Thus we had
this double paradox; on the one hand the Chinese people awkwardly trying
to be western in a Chinese way and failing: on the other, foreign
officials and foreign governments trying to be Chinese and making the
confusion worse confounded. It was inevitable in such circumstances
that the history of the past six years should have been the history of a
slow tragedy, and that almost every page should be written over with the
name of the man who was the selected bailiff of the Powers--Yuan
Shih-kai.
[Illustration: The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Procession passing
down the great Palace Approach, with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the
distance.]
[Illustration: The Provincial Troops of General Chang Hsun at his
Headquarters of Hsuchowfu.]
[Illustration: The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Catafalque over the
Coffin on its way to the Railway Station.]
[Illustration: The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai: The Procession passing down
the great Palace Approach, with the famous Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the
distance.]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] As there is a good deal of misunderstanding on the subject of the
Manchus an explanatory note is useful.
The Manchu people, who belong to the Mongol or Turanian Group, number at
the maximum five million souls. Their distribution at the time of the
revolution of 1911 was roughly as follows: In and around Peking say two
millions; in posts through China say one-half million,--or possibly
three-quarters of a million; in Manchuria Proper--the home of the
race--say two or two and a half millions. The fighting force was
composed in this fashion: When Peking fell into their hands in 1644 as a
result of a stratagem combined with dissensions among the Chinese
themselves, the entire armed strength was reorganized in Eight Banners
or Army Corps, each corps being composed of three racial divisions, (1)
pure Manchus, (2) Mongols who had assisted in the conquest and (3)
Northern Chinese who had gone over to the conquerors. These Eight
Banners, each commanded by an "iron-capped" Prince, represented the
authority of the Throne and had their headquarters in Peking with small
garrisons throughout the provinces at various strategic centres. These
garrisons had entirely ceased to have any value before the 18th Century
had closed and were therefore purely ceremonial and symbolic, all the
fighting being done by special Chinese corps which were raised as
necessity arose.
[2] This most interesting point--the immunity of Chinese women from
forced marriage with Manchus--has been far too little noticed by
historians though it throws a flood of light on the sociological aspects
of the Manchu conquest. Had that conquest been absolute it would have
been impossible for the Chinese people to have protected their
women-folk in such a significant way.
[3] A very interesting proof--and one that has never been properly
exposed--of the astoundingly rationalistic principles on which the
Chinese polity is founded is to be seen in the position of priesthoods
in China. Unlike every other civilization in the world, at no stage of
the development of the State has it been necessary for religion in China
to intervene between the rulers and the ruled, saving the people from
oppression. In Europe without the supernatural barrier of the Church,
the position of the common people in the Middle Ages would have been
intolerable, and life, and virtue totally unprotected. Buckle, in his
"History of Civilization," like other extreme radicals, has failed to
understand that established religions have paradoxically been most
valuable because of their vast secular powers, exercised under the mask
of spiritual authority. Without this ghostly restraint rulers would have
been so oppressive as to have destroyed their peoples. The two greatest
monuments to Chinese civilization, then consist of these twin facts;
first, that the Chinese have never had the need for such supernatural
restraints exercised by a privileged body, and secondly, that they are
absolutely without any feeling of class or caste--prince and pauper
meeting on terms of frank and humorous equality--the race thus being the
only pure and untinctured democracy the world has ever known.
[4] (a) This loan was the so-called 7 per cent. Silver loan of 1894 for
Shanghai Taels 10,000,000 negotiated by the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. It
was followed in 1895 by a £3,000,000 Gold 6 per cent. Loan, then by two
more 6 per cent. loans for a million each in the same year, making a
total of £6,635,000 sterling for the bare war-expenses. The Japanese war
indemnity raised in three successive issues--from 1895 to 1898--of
£16,000,000 each, added £48,000,000. Thus the Korean imbroglio cost
China nearly 55 millions sterling. As the purchasing power of the
sovereign is eight times larger in China than in Europe, this debt
economically would mean 440 millions in England--say nearly double what
the ruinous South African war cost. It is by such methods of comparison
that the vital nature of the economic factor in recent Chinese history
is made clear.
[5] There is no doubt that the so-called Belgian loan, £1,800,000 of
which was paid over in cash at the beginning of 1912, was the instrument
which brought every one to terms.
CHAPTER II
THE ENIGMA OF YUAN SHIH-KAI
THE HISTORY OF THE MAN FROM THE OPENING OF HIS CAREER IN KOREA IN 1882
TO THE END OF THE REVOLUTION, 12TH FEBRUARY, 1912
Yuan Shih-kai's career falls into two clear-cut parts, almost as if it
had been specially arranged for the biographer; there is the
probationary period in Korea, and the executive in North China. The
first is important only because of the moulding-power which early
influences exerted on the man's character; but it is interesting in
another way since it affords glimpses of the sort of things which
affected this leader's imagination throughout his life and finally
brought him to irretrievable ruin. The second-period is choke-full of
action; and over every chapter one can see the ominous point of
interrogation which was finally answered in his tragic political and
physical collapse.
Yuan Shih-kai's origin, without being precisely obscure, is unimportant.
He came of a Honanese family who were nothing more distinguished than
farmers possessing a certain amount of land, but not too much of the
world's possessions. The boy probably ran wild in the field at an age
when the sons of high officials and literati were already pale and
anaemic from over-much study. To some such cause the man undoubtedly
owed his powerful physique, his remarkable appetite, his general
roughness. Native biographers state that as a youth he failed to pass
his _hsiu-tsai_ examinations--the lowest civil service degree--because
he had spent too much time in riding and boxing and fencing. An uncle in
official life early took charge of him; and when this relative died the
young man displayed filial piety in accompanying the corpse back to the
family graves and in otherwise manifesting grief. Through official
connections a place was subsequently found for him in that public
department under the Manchus which may be called the military
intendancy, and it was through this branch of the civil service that he
rose to power. Properly speaking Yuan Shih-kai was never an
army-officer; he was a military official--his highest rank later on
being that of military judge, or better, Judicial Commissioner.
Yuan Shih-kai first emerges into public view in 1882 when, as a sequel
to the opening of Korea through the action of foreign Powers in forcing
the then Hermit kingdom to sign commercial treaties, China began
dispatching troops to Seoul. Yuan Shih-kai, with two other officers,
commanding in all some 3,000 men, arrived from Shantung, where he had
been in the train of a certain General Wu Chang-ching, and now encamped
in the Korean capital nominally to preserve order, but in reality, to
enforce the claims of the suzerain power. For the Peking Government had
never retreated from the position that Korea had been a vassal state
ever since the Ming Dynasty had saved the country from the clutches of
Hideyoshi and his Japanese invaders in the Sixteenth Century. Yuan
Shih-kai had been personally recommended by this General Wu Chang-ching
as a young man of ability and energy to the famous Li Hung Chang, who as
Tientsin Viceroy and High Commissioner for the Northern Seas was
responsible for the conduct of Korean affairs. The future dictator of
China was then only twenty-five years old.
His very first contact with practical politics gave him a peculiar
manner of viewing political problems. The arrival of Chinese troops in
Seoul marked the beginning of that acute rivalry with Japan which
finally culminated in the short and disastrous war of 1894-95. China, in
order to preserve her influence in Korea against the growing influence
of Japan, intrigued night and day in the Seoul Palaces, allying herself
with the Conservative Court party which was led by the notorious Korean
Queen who was afterwards assassinated. The Chinese agents aided and
abetted the reactionary group, constantly inciting them to attack the
Japanese and drive them out of the country.
Continual outrages were the consequence. The Japanese legation was
attacked and destroyed by the Korean mob not once but on several
occasions during a decade which furnishes one of the most amazing
chapters in the history of Asia. Yuan Shih-kai, being then merely a
junior general officer under the orders of the Chinese Imperial
Resident, is of no particular importance; but it is significant of the
man that he should suddenly come well under the limelight on the first
possible occasion. On 6th December, 1884, leading 2,000 Chinese troops,
and acting in concert with 3,000 Korean soldiers, he attacked the Tong
Kwan Palace in which the Japanese Minister and his staff, protected by
two companies of Japanese infantry, had taken refuge owing to the
threatening state of affairs in the capital. Apparently there was no
particular plan--it was the action of a mob of soldiery tumbling into a
political brawl and assisted by their officers for reasons which appear
to-day nonsensical. The sequel was, however, extraordinary. The Japanese
held the Palace gates as long as possible, and then being desperate
exploded a mine which killed numbers of Koreans and Chinese soldiery and
threw the attack into confusion. They then fought their way out of the
city escaping ultimately to the nearest sea-port, Chemulpo.
The explanation of this extraordinary episode has never been made
public. The practical result was that after a period of extreme tension
between China and Japan which was expected to lead to war, that
political genius, the late Prince Ito, managed to calm things down and
arrange workable _modus vivendi_. Yuan Shih-kai, who had gone to
Tientsin to report in person to Li Hung Chang, returned to Seoul
triumphantly in October, 1885, as Imperial Resident. He was then
twenty-eight years old; he had come to the front, no matter by what
means, in a quite remarkable manner.
The history of the next nine years furnishes plenty of minor incidents,
but nothing of historic importance. As the faithful lieutenant of Li
Hung Chang, Yuan Shih-kai's particular business was simply to combat
Japanese influence and hold the threatened advance in check. He failed,
of course, since he was playing a losing game; and yet he succeeded
where he undoubtedly wished to succeed. By rendering faithful service
he established the reputation he wished to win; and though he did
nothing great he retained his post right up to the act which led to the
declaration of war in 1894. Whether he actually precipitated that war is
still a matter of opinion. On the sinking by the Japanese fleet of the
British steamer _Kowshing_, which was carrying Chinese reinforcements
from Taku anchorage to Asan Bay to his assistance, seeing that the game
was up, he quietly left the Korean capital and made his way overland to
North China. That swift, silent journey home ends the period of his
novitiate.
It took him a certain period to weather the storm which the utter
collapse of China in her armed encounter with Japan brought about--and
particularly to obtain forgiveness for evacuating Seoul without orders.
Technically his offence was punishable by death--the old Chinese code
being most stringent in such matters. But by 1896 he was back in favour
again, and through the influence of his patron Li Hung Chang, he was at
length appointed in command of the Hsiaochan camp near Tientsin, where
he was promoted and given the task of reforming a division of old-style
troops and making them as efficient as Japanese soldiery. He had already
earned a wide reputation for severity, for willingness to accept
responsibility, for nepotism, and for a rare ability to turn even
disasters to his own advantage--all attributes which up to the last
moment stood him in good stead.
In the Hsiaochan camp the most important chapter of his life opens;
there is every indication that he fully realized it. Tientsin has always
been the gateway to Peking: from there the road to high preferment is
easily reached. Yuan Shih-kai marched steadily forward, taking the very
first turning-point in a manner which stamped him for many of his
compatriots in a way which can never be obliterated.
It is first necessary to say a word about the troops of his command,
since this has a bearing on present-day politics. The bulk of the
soldiery were so-called _Huai Chun_--_i.e._, nominally troops from the
Huai districts, just south of Li Hung Chang's native province Anhui.
These Kiangu men, mixed with Shantung recruits, had earned a historic
place in the favour of the Manchus owing to the part they had played in
the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, in which great event General
Gordon and Li Hung Chang had been so closely associated. They and the
troops of Hunan province, led by the celebrated Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan,
were "the loyal troops," resembling the Sikhs during the Indian Mutiny;
they were supposed to be true to their salt to the last man. Certainly
they gave proofs of uncustomary fidelity.
In those military days of twenty years ago Yuan Shih-kai and his
henchmen were, however, concerned with simpler problems. It was then a
question of drill and nothing but drill. In his camp near Tientsin the
future President of the Chinese Republic succeeded in reorganizing his
troops so well that in a very short time the Hsiaochan Division became
known as a _corps d'élite_. The discipline was so stern that there were
said to be only two ways of noticing subordinates, either by promoting
or beheading them. Devoting himself to his task Yuan Shih-kai gave
promise of being able to handle much bigger problems.
His zeal soon attracted the attention of the Manchu Court. The
circumstances in Peking at that time were peculiar. The famous old
Empress Dowager, Tzu-hsi, after the Japanese war, had greatly relaxed
her hold on the Emperor Kwanghsu, who though still in subjection to her,
nominally governed the empire. A well-intentioned but weak man, he had
surrounded himself with advanced scholars, led by the celebrated Kang Yu
Wei, who daily studied with him and filled him with new doctrines,
teaching him to believe that if he would only exert his power he might
rescue the nation from international ignominy and make for himself an
imperishable name.
The sequel was inevitable. In 1898 the oriental world was electrified by
the so-called Reform Edicts, in which the Emperor undertook to modernize
China, and in which he exhorted the nation to obey him. The greatest
alarm was created in Court circles by this action; the whole vast body
of Metropolitan officialdom, seeing its future threatened, flooded the
Palace of the Empress Dowager with Secret Memorials praying her to
resume power. Flattered, she gave her secret assent.
Things marched quickly after that. The Empress, nothing loth, began
making certain dispositions. Troops were moved, men were shifted here
and there in a way that presaged action; and the Emperor, now
thoroughly alarmed and yielding to the entreaties of his followers, sent
two members of the Reform Party to Yuan Shih-kai bearing an alleged
autograph order for him to advance instantly on Peking with all his
troops; to surround the Palace, to secure the person of the Emperor from
all danger, and then to depose the Empress Dowager for ever from power.
What happened is equally well-known. Yuan Shih-kai, after an exhaustive
examination of the message and messengers, as well as other attempts to
substantiate the genuineness of the appeal, communicated its nature to
the then Viceroy of Chihli, the Imperial Clansman Jung Lu, whose
intimacy with the Empress Dowager since the days of her youth has passed
into history. Jung Lu lost no time in acting. He beheaded the two
messengers and personally reported the whole plot to the Empress Dowager
who was already fully warned. The result was the so-called _coup d'état_
of September, 1898, when all the Reformers who had not fled were
summarily executed, and the Emperor Kwanghsu himself closely imprisoned
in the Island Palace within that portion of the Forbidden City known as
the Three Lakes, having (until the Boxer outbreak of 1900 carried him to
Hsianfu), as sole companions his two favourites, the celebrated
odalisques "Pearl" and "Lustre."
This is no place to enter into the controversial aspect of Yuan
Shih-kai's action in 1898 which has been hotly debated by partisans for
many years. For onlookers the verdict must always remain largely a
matter of opinion; certainly this is one of those matters which cannot
be passed upon by any one but a Chinese tribunal furnished with all the
evidence. Those days which witnessed the imprisonment of Kwanghsu were
great because they opened wide the portals of the Romance of History:
all who were in Peking can never forget the counter-stroke; the arrival
of the hordes composed of Tung Fu-hsiang's Mahommedan cavalry--men who
had ridden hard across a formidable piece of Asia at the behest of their
Empress and who entered the capital in great clouds of dust. It was in
that year of 1898 also that Legation Guards reappeared in Peking--a few
files for each Legation as in 1860--and it was then that clear-sighted
prophets saw the beginning of the end of the Manchu Dynasty.
Yuan Shih-kai's reward for his share in this counter-revolution was his
appointment to the governorship of Shantung province. He moved thither
with all his troops in December, 1899. Armed _cap-à-pie_ he was ready
for the next act--the Boxers, who burst on China in the Summer of 1900.
These men were already at work in Shantung villages with their
incantations and alleged witchcraft. There is evidence that their
propaganda had been going on for months, if not for years, before any
one had heard of it. Yuan Shih-kai had the priceless opportunity of
studying them at close range and soon made up his mind about certain
things. When the storm burst, pretending to see nothing but mad fanatics
in those who, realizing the plight of their country, had adopted the
war-cry "Blot out the Manchus and the foreigner," he struck at them
fiercely, driving the whole savage horde head-long into the metropolitan
province of Chihli. There, seduced by the Manchus, they suddenly changed
the inscription on their flags. Their sole enemy became the foreigner
and all his works, and forthwith they were officially protected. Far and
wide they killed every white face they could find. They tore up
railways, burnt churches and chapels and produced a general anarchy
which could only have one end--European intervention. The man, sitting
on the edge of Chinese history but not yet identifying himself with its
main currents because he was not strong enough for that had once again
not judged wrongly. With his Korean experience to assist him, he had
seen precisely what the end must inevitably be.
The crash in Peking, when the siege of the Legations had been raised by
an international army, found him alert and sympathetic--ready with
advice, ready to shoulder new responsibilities, ready to explain away
everything. The signature of the Peace Protocol of 1901 was signalized
by his obtaining the viceroyalty of Chihli, succeeding the great Li Hung
Chang himself, who had been reappointed to his old post, but had found
active duties too wearisome. This was a marvellous success for a man but
little over forty. And when the fugitive Court at length returned from
Hsianfu in 1902, honours were heaped upon him as a person particularly
worthy of honour because he had kept up appearances and maintained the
authority of the distressed Throne. As if in answer to this he flooded
the Court with memorials praying that in order to restore the power of
the Dynasty a complete army of modern troops be raised--as numerous as
possible but above all efficient.
His advice was listened to. From 1902 until 1907 as Minister of the Army
Reorganization Council--a special post he held simultaneously with that
of metropolitan Viceroy--Yuan Shih-kai's great effort was concentrated
on raising an efficient fighting force. In those five years, despite all
financial embarrassments, North China raised and equipped six excellent
Divisions of field-troops--75,000 men--all looking to Yuan Shih-kai as
their sole master. So much energy did he display in pushing military
reorganization throughout the provinces that the Court, warned by
jealous rivals of his growing power, suddenly promoted him to a post
where he would be powerless. One day he was brought to Peking as Grand
Councillor and President of the Board of Foreign Affairs, and ordered to
hand over all army matters to his noted rival, the Manchu Tieh Liang.
The time had arrived to muzzle him. His last phase as a pawn had come.
Few foreign diplomats calling at China's Foreign Office to discuss
matters during that short period which lasted barely a twelve-month,
imagined that the square resolute-looking man who as President of the
Board gave the same energy and attention to consular squabbles as to the
reorganization of a national-fighting force, was almost daily engaged in
a fierce clandestine struggle to maintain even his modest position.
Jealousy, which flourishes in Peking like the upas tree, was for ever
blighting his schemes and blocking his plans. He had been brought to
Peking to be tied up; he was constantly being denounced; and even his
all powerful patroness, the old Empress Dowager, who owed so much to
him, suffered from constant premonitions that the end was fast
approaching, and that with her the Dynasty would die.
In the Autumn of 1908 she took sick. The gravest fears quickly spread.
It was immediately reported that the Emperor Kwanghsu was also very
ill--an ominous coincidence. Very suddenly both personages collapsed and
died, the Empress Dowager slightly before the Emperor. There is little
doubt that the Emperor himself was poisoned. The legend runs that as he
expired not only did he give his Consort, who was to succeed him in the
exercise of the nominal power of the Throne, a last secret Edict to
behead Yuan Shih-kai, but that his faltering hand described circle
after circle in the air until his followers understood the meaning. In
the vernacular the name of the great viceroy and the word for circle
have the same sound; the gesture signified that the dying monarch's last
wish was revenge on the man who had failed him ten years before.
An ominous calm followed this great break with the past. It was
understood that the Court was torn by two violent factions regarding the
succession which the Empress Tzu-hsi had herself decided. The fact that
another long Regency had become inevitable through the accession of the
child Hsuan Tung aroused instant apprehensions among foreign observers,
whilst it was confidently predicted that Yuan Shih-kai's last days had
come.
The blow fell suddenly on the 2nd January, 1909. In the interval between
the death of the old Empress and his disgrace, Yuan Shih-kai was
actually promoted to the highest rank in the gift of the Throne, that
is, made "Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent" and placed in charge of
the Imperial funeral arrangements--a lucrative appointment. During that
interval it is understood that the new Regent, brother of the Emperor
Kwanghsu, consulted all the most trusted magnates of the empire
regarding the manner in which the secret decapitation Decree should be
treated. All advised him to be warned in time, and not to venture on a
course of action which would be condemned both by the nation and by the
Powers. Another Edict was therefore prepared simply dismissing Yuan
Shih-kai from office and ordering him to return to his native place.
Every one remembers that day in Peking when popular rumour declared that
the man's last hour had come. Warned on every side to beware, Yuan
Shih-kai left the Palace as soon as he had read the Edict of dismissal
in the Grand Council and drove straight to the railway-station, whence
he entrained for Tientsin, dressed as a simple citizen. Rooms had been
taken for him at a European hotel, the British Consulate approached for
protection, when another train brought down his eldest son bearing a
message direct from the Grand Council Chamber, absolutely guaranteeing
the safety of his life. Accordingly he duly returned to his native place
in Honan province, and for two years--until the outbreak of the
Revolution--devoted himself sedulously to the development of the large
estate he had acquired with the fruits of office. Living like a
patriarch of old, surrounded by his many wives and children, he
announced constantly that he had entirely dropped out of the political
life of China and only desired to be left in peace. There is reason to
believe, however, that his henchmen continually reported to him the true
state of affairs, and bade him bide his time. Certain it is that the
firing of the first shots on the Yangtsze found him alert and issuing
private orders to his followers. It was inevitable that he should have
been recalled to office--and actually within one hundred hours of the
first news of the outbreak the Court sent for him urgently and
ungraciously.
From the 14th October, 1911, when he was appointed by Imperial Edict
Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan and ordered to proceed at once to the front
to quell the insurrection, until the 1st November, when he was given
virtually Supreme Power as President of the Grand Council in place of
Prince Ching, a whole volume is required to discuss adequately the maze
of questions involved. For the purposes of this account, however, the
matter can be dismissed very briefly in this way. Welcoming the
opportunity which had at last come and determined once for all to settle
matters decisively, so far as he was personally concerned, Yuan Shih-kai
deliberately followed the policy of holding back and delaying everything
until the very incapacity marking both sides--the Revolutionists quite
as much as the Manchus--forced him, as man of action and man of
diplomacy, to be acclaimed the sole mediator and saviour of the nation.
The detailed course of the Revolution, and the peculiar manner in which
Yuan Shih-kai allowed events rather than men to assert their mastery has
often been related and need not long detain us. It is generally conceded
that in spite of the bravery of the raw revolutionary levies, their
capacity was entirely unequal to the trump card Yuan Shih-kai held all
the while in his hand--the six fully-equipped Divisions of Field Troops
he himself had organized as Tientsin Viceroy. It was a portion of this
field-force which captured and destroyed the chief revolutionary base in
the triple city of Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang in November, 1911, and
which he held back just as it was about to give the _coup de grâce_ by
crossing the river in force and sweeping the last remnants of the
revolutionary army to perdition. Thus it is correct to declare that had
he so wished Yuan Shih-kai could have crushed the revolution entirely
before the end of 1911; but he was sufficiently astute to see that the
problem he had to solve was not merely military but moral as well. The
Chinese as a nation were suffering from a grave complaint. Their
civilization had been made almost bankrupt owing to unresisted foreign
aggression and to the native inability to cope with the mass of
accumulated wrongs which a superimposed and exhausted feudalism--the
Manchu system--had brought about. Yuan Shih-kai knew that the Boxers had
been theoretically correct in selecting as they first did the watchword
which they had first placed on their banners--"blot out the Manchus and
all foreign things." Both had sapped the old civilization to its
foundations. But the programme they had proposed was idealistic, not
practical. One element could be cleared away--the other had to be
endured. Had the Boxers been sensible they would have modified their
programme to the extent of protecting the foreigners, whilst they
assailed the Dynasty which had brought them so low. The Court Party, as
we have said, seduced their leaders to acting in precisely the reverse
sense.
Yuan Shih-kai was neither a Boxer, nor yet a believer in idealistic
foolishness. He had realized that the essence of successful rule in the
China of the Twentieth Century was to support the foreign point of
view--nominally at least--because foreigners disposed of unlimited
monetary resources, and had science on their side. He knew that so long
as he did not openly flout foreign opinion by indulging in bare-faced
assassinations, he would be supported owing to the international
reputation he had established in 1900. Arguing from these premises, his
instinct also told him that an appearance of legality must always be
sedulously preserved and the aspirations of the nation nominally
satisfied. For this reason he arranged matters in such a manner as to
appear always as the instrument of fate. For this reason, although he
destroyed the revolutionists on the mid-Yangtsze, to equalize matters,
on the lower Yangtsze he secretly ordered the evacuation of Nanking by
the Imperialist forces so that he might have a tangible argument with
which to convince the Manchus regarding the root and branch reform which
he knew was necessary. That reform had been accepted in principle by the
Throne when it agreed to the so-called Nineteen Fundamental Articles, a
corpus of demands which all the Northern Generals had endorsed and had
indeed insisted should be the basis of government before they would
fight the rebellious South in 1911. There is reason to believe that
provided he had been made _de facto_ Regent, Yuan Shih-kai would have
supported to the end a Manchu Monarchy. But the surprising swiftness of
the Revolutionary Party's action in proclaiming the Republic at Nanking
on the 1st January, 1912, and the support which foreign opinion gave
that venture confused him. He had already consented to peace
negotiations with the revolutionary South in the middle of December,
1911, and once he was drawn into those negotiations his policy wavered,
the armistice in the field being constantly extended because he saw that
the Foreign Powers, and particularly England, were averse from further
civil war. Having dispatched a former lieutenant, Tong Shao-yi, to
Shanghai as his Plenipotentiary, he soon found himself committed to a
course of action different from what he had originally contemplated.
South China and Central China insisted so vehemently that the only
solution that was acceptable to them was the permanent and absolute
elimination of the Manchu Dynasty, that he himself was half-convinced,
the last argument necessary being the secret promise that he should
become the first President of the united Republic. In the circumstances,
had he been really loyal, it was his duty either to resume his warfare
or resign his appointment as Prime Minister and go into retirement. He
did neither. In a thoroughly characteristic manner he sought a middle
course, after having vaguely advocated a national convention to settle
the matter. By specious misrepresentation the widow of the Emperor
Kwanghsu--the Dowager Empress Lung Yu who had succeeded the Prince
Regent Ch'un in her care of the interests of the child Emperor Hsuan
Tung--was induced to believe that ceremonial retirement was the only
course open to the Dynasty if the country was to be saved from
disruption and partition. There is reason to believe that the Memorial
of all the Northern Generals which was telegraphed to Peking on the 28th
January, 1912, and which advised abdication, was inspired by him. In any
case it was certainly Yuan Shih-kai who drew up the so-called Articles
of Favourable Treatment for the Manchu House and caused them to be
telegraphed to the South, whence they were telegraphed back to him as
the maximum the Revolutionary Party was prepared to concede: and by a
curious chance the attempt made to assassinate him outside the Palace
Gates actually occurred on the very day he had submitted an outline of
these terms on his bended knees to the Empress Dowager and secured their
qualified acceptance. The pathetic attempt to confer on him as late as
the 25th January the title of Marquess, the highest rank of nobility
which could be given a Chinese, an attempt which was four times renewed,
was the last despairing gesture of a moribund power. Within very few
days the Throne reluctantly decreed its own abdication in three
extremely curious Edicts which are worthy of study in the appendix. They
prove conclusively that the Imperial Family believed that it was only
abdicating its political power, whilst retaining all ancient ceremonial
rights and titles. Plainly the conception of a Republic, or a People's
Government, as it was termed in the native ideographs, was
unintelligible to Peking.
Yuan Shih-kai had now won everything he wished for. By securing that the
Imperial Commission to organize the Republic and re-unite the warring
sections was placed solely in his hands, he prepared to give a type of
Government about which he knew nothing a trial. It is interesting to
note that he held to the very end of his life that he derived his powers
solely from the Last Edicts, and in nowise from his compact with the
Nanking Republic which had instituted the so-called Provisional
Constitution. He was careful, however, not to lay this down
categorically until many months later, when his dictatorship seemed
undisputed. But from the day of the Manchu Abdication almost, he was
constantly engaged in calculating whether he dared risk everything on
one throw of the dice and ascend the Throne himself; and it is precisely
this which imparts such dramatic interest to the astounding story which
follows.
CHAPTER III
THE DREAM REPUBLIC
(FROM THE 1st JANUARY, 1912, TO THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT)
To describe briefly and intelligibly the series of transactions from the
1st January, 1912, when the Republic was proclaimed at Nanking by a
handful of provincial delegates, and Dr. Sun Yat Sen elected Provisional
President, to the _coup d'état_ of 4th November, 1913, when Yuan
Shih-kai, elected full President a few weeks previously, after having
acted as Chief Executive for twenty months, boldly broke up Parliament
and made himself _de facto_ Dictator of China, is a matter of
extraordinary difficulty.
All through this important period of Chinese history one has the
impression that one is in dreamland and that fleeting emotions take the
place of more solid things. Plot and counter-plot follow one another so
rapidly that an accurate record of them all would be as wearisome as the
Book of Chronicles itself; whilst the amazing web of financial intrigue
which binds the whole together is so complex--and at the same time so
antithetical to the political struggle--that the two stories seem to run
counter to one another, although they are as closely united as two
assassins pledged to carry through in common a dread adventure. A huge
agglomeration of people estimated to number four hundred millions, being
left without qualified leaders and told that the system of government,
which had been laid down by the Nanking Provisional Constitution and
endorsed by the Abdication Edicts, was a system in which every man was
as good as neighbour, swayed meaninglessly to and fro, vainly seeking to
regain the equilibrium which had been so sensationally lost. A litigious
spirit became so universal that all authority was openly derided,
crimes of every description being so common as to force most respectable
men to withdraw from public affairs and leave a bare rump of desperadoes
in power.
Long embarrassed by the struggle to pay her foreign loans and
indemnities, China was also virtually penniless. The impossibility of
arranging large borrowings on foreign markets without the open support
of foreign governments--a support which was hedged round with
conditions--made necessary a system of petty expedients under which
practically every provincial administration hypothecated every liquid
asset it could lay hands upon in order to pay the inordinate number of
undisciplined soldiery who littered the countryside. The issue of
unguaranteed paper-money soon reached such an immense figure that the
market was flooded with a worthless currency which it was unable to
absorb. The Provincial leaders, being powerless to introduce
improvement, exclaimed that it was the business of the Central
Government as representative of the sovereign people to find solutions;
and so long as they maintained themselves in office they went their
respective ways with a sublime contempt for the chaos around them.
What was this Central Government? In order successfully to understand an
unparalleled situation we must indicate its nature.
The manoeuvres to which Yuan Shih-kai had so astutely lent himself from
the outbreak of the Revolution had left him at its official close
supreme in name. Not only had he secured an Imperial Commission from the
abdicating Dynasty to organize a popular Government in obedience to the
national wish, but having brought to Peking the Delegates of the Nanking
Revolutionary Body he had received from them the formal offer of the
Presidency.
These arrangements had, of course, been secretly agreed to _en bloc_
before the fighting had been stopped and the abdication proclaimed, and
were part and parcel of the elaborate scenery which officialdom always
employs in Asia even when it is dealing with matters within the purview
of the masses. They had been made possible by the so-called "Article of
Favourable Treatment" drawn-up by Yuan Shih-kai himself, after
consultation with the rebellious South. In these Capitulations it had
been clearly stipulated that the Manchu Imperial Family should receive
in perpetuity a Civil List of $4,000,000 Mexican a year, retaining all
their titles as a return for the surrender of their political power, the
bitter pill being gilded in such fashion as to hide its real meaning,
which alone was a grave political error.
In spite of this agreement, however, great mutual suspicion existed
between North and South China. Yuan Shih-kai himself was unable to
forget that the bold attempt to assassinate him in the Peking streets on
the 17th January, when he was actually engaged in negotiating these very
terms of the Abdication, had been apparently inspired from Nanking;
whilst the Southern leaders were daily reminded by the vernacular press
that the man who held the balance of power had always played the part of
traitor in the past and would certainly do the same again in the near
future.
When the Delegates came to Peking in February, by far the most important
matter which was still in dispute was the question of the oath of office
which Yuan Shih-kai was called upon to take to insure that he would be
faithful to the Republic. The Delegates had been charged specifically to
demand on behalf of the seceding provinces that Yuan Shih-kai should
proceed with them to Nanking to take that oath, a course of action which
would have been held tantamount by the nation to surrender on his part
to those who had been unable to vanquish him in the field. It must also
not be forgotten that from the very beginning a sharp and dangerous
cleavage of opinion existed as to the manner in which the powers of the
new government had been derived. South and Central China claimed, and
claimed rightly, that the Nanking Provincial Constitution was the
Instrument on which the Republic was based: Yuan Shih-kai declared that
the Abdication Edicts, and not the Nanking Instrument had established
the Republic, and that therefore it lay within his competence to
organize the new government in the way which he considered most fit.
The discussion which raged was suddenly terminated on the night of the
29th February (1912) when without any warning there occurred the
extraordinary revolt of the 3rd Division, a picked Northern corps who
for forty-eight hours plundered and burnt portions of the capital
without any attempts at interference, there being little doubt to-day
that this manoeuvre was deliberately arranged as a means of intimidation
by Yuan Shih-kai himself. Although the disorders assumed such dimensions
that foreign intervention was narrowly escaped, the upshot was that the
Nanking Delegates were completely cowed and willing to forget all about
forcing the despot of Peking to proceed to the Southern capital. Yuan
Shih-kai as the man of the hour was enabled on the 10th March, 1912, to
take his oath in Peking as he had wished thus securing full freedom of
action during the succeeding years.[6]
[Illustration: An Encampment of "The Punitive Expedition" of 1910 on the
Upper Yangtsze.
_By courtesy of Major Isaac Newell, U.S. Military Attaché_.]
[Illustration: Revival of the Imperialistic Worship of Heaven by Yuan
Shih-kai in 1914: Scene on the Altar of Heaven, with Sacrificial
Officers clothed in costumes dating from 2,000 years ago.]
[Illustration: A Manchu Country Fair: The figures in the foreground are
all Manchu women and girls.]
[Illustration: A Manchu Woman grinding Grain.]
It was on this astounding basis--by means of an organized revolt--that
the Central Government was reorganized; and every act that followed
bears the mark of its tainted parentage. Accepting readily as his
Ministers in the more unimportant government Departments the nominees of
the Southern Confederacy (which was now formally dissolved), Yuan
Shih-kai was careful to reserve for his own men everything that
concerned the control of the army and the police, as well as the
all-important ministry of finance. The framework having been thus
erected, attention was almost immediately concentrated on the problem of
finding money, an amazing matter which would weary the stoutest reader
if given in all its detail but which being part and parcel of the
general problem must be referred to.
Certain essential features can be very rapidly exposed. We have already
made clear the purely economic nature of the forces which had sapped the
foundations of Chinese society. Primarily it had been the disastrous
nature of Chinese gold-indebtedness which had given the new ideas the
force they required to work their will on the nation. And just because
the question of this gold-indebtedness had become so serious and such a
drain on the nation, some months before the outbreak of the Revolution
an arrangement had been entered into with the bankers of four nations
for a Currency Loan of £10,000,000 with which to make an organized
effort to re-establish internal credit. But this loan had never actually
been floated, as a six months' safety clause had permitted a delay
during which the Revolution had come. It was therefore necessary to
begin the negotiations anew; and as the rich prizes to be won in the
Chinese lottery had attracted general attention in the European
financial world through the advertisement which the Revolution had given
the country, a host of alternative loan proposals now lay at the
disposal of Peking.
Consequently an extraordinary chapter of bargaining commenced. Warned
that an International Debt Commission was the goal aimed at by official
finance, Yuan Shih-kai and the various parties who made up the
Government of the day, though disagreeing on almost every other
question, were agreed that this danger must be fought as a common enemy.
Though the Four-Power group alleged that they held the first option on
all Chinese loans, money had already been advanced by a Franco-Belgian
Syndicate to the amount of nearly two million pounds during the critical
days of the Abdication. Furious at the prospect of losing their
percentages, the Four Power group made the confusion worse confounded by
blocking all competing proposals and closing every possible door. Russia
and Japan, who had hitherto not been parties to the official consortium,
perceiving that participation had become a political necessity, now
demanded a place which was grudgingly accorded them; and it was in this
way that the celebrated six-power Group arose.
It was round this group and the proposed issue of a £60,000,000 loan to
reorganize Chinese finance that the central battle raged. The Belgian
Syndicate, having been driven out of business by the financial boycott
which the official group was strong enough to organize on the European
bourses, it remained for China to see whether she could not find some
combination or some man who would be bold enough to ignore all
governments.
Her search was not in vain. In September (1912) a London stockbroker,
Mr. Birch Crisp, determined to risk a brilliant coup by negotiating by
himself a Loan of £10,000,000; and the world woke up one morning to
learn that one man was successfully opposing six governments. The
recollection of the storm raised in financial circles by this bold
attempt will be fresh in many minds. Every possible weapon was brought
into play by international finance to secure that the impudence of
financial independence should be properly checked; and so it happened
that although £5,000,000 was secured after an intense struggle it was
soon plain that the large requirements of a derelict government could
not be satisfied in this Quixotic manner. Two important points had,
however, been attained; first, China was kept financially afloat during
the year 1912 by the independence of a single member of the London Stock
Exchange; secondly, using this coup as a lever the Peking Government
secured better terms than otherwise would have been possible from the
official consortium.
Meanwhile the general internal situation remained deplorable. Nothing
was done for the provinces whose paper currency was depreciating from
month to month in an alarming manner; whilst the rivalries between the
various leaders instead of diminishing seemed to be increasing. The
Tutuhs, or Military Governors, acting precisely as they saw fit, derided
the authority of Peking and sought to strengthen their old position by
adding to their armed forces. In the capital the old Manchu court,
safely entrenched in the vast Winter Palace from which it has not even
to-day been ejected (1917) published daily the Imperial Gazette,
bestowing honours and decorations on courtiers and clansmen and
preserving all the old etiquette. In the North-western provinces, and in
Manchuria and Mongolia, the so-called Tsung She Tang, or Imperial Clan
Society, intrigued perpetually to create risings which would hasten the
restoration of the fallen House; and although these intrigues never rose
to the rank of a real menace to the country, the fact that they were
surreptitiously supported by the Japanese secret service was a continual
source of anxiety. The question of Outer Mongolia was also harassing the
Central Government. The Hutuktu or Living Buddha of Urga--the chief city
of Outer Mongolia--had utilized the revolution to throw off his
allegiance to Peking; and the whole of this vast region had been thrown
into complete disorder--which was still further accentuated when Russia
on the 21st October (1912) recognized its independence. It was known
that as a pendent to this Great Britain was about to insist on the
autonomy of Tibet,--a development which greatly hurt Chinese pride.
On the 15th August, 1912, the deplorable situation was well-epitomised
by an extraordinary act in Peking, when General Chang Cheng-wu, one of
the "heroes" of the original Wuchang rising, who had been enticed to the
capital, was suddenly seized after a banquet in his honour and shot
without trial at midnight.
This event, trivial in itself during times when judicial murders were
common, would have excited nothing more than passing interest had not
the national sentiment been so aroused by the chaotic conditions. As it
was it served to focus attention on the general mal-administration over
which Yuan Shih-kai ruled as provisional President. "What is my crime?"
had shrieked the unhappy revolutionist as he had been shot and then
bayonetted to death. That query was most easily answered. His crime was
that he was not strong enough or big enough to compete against more
sanguinary men, his disappearance being consequently in obedience to an
universal law of nature. Yuan Shih-kai was determined to assert his
mastery by any and every means; and as this man had flouted him he must
die.
The uproar which this crime aroused was, however, not easily appeased;
and the Advisory Council, which was sitting in Peking pending the
assembling of the first Parliament, denounced the Provisional President
so bitterly that to show that these reproaches were ill-deserved he
invited Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the capital treating him with unparalleled
honours and requesting him to act as intermediary between the rival
factions. All such manoeuvres, however, were inspired with one
object,--namely to prove how nobody but the master of Peking could
regulate the affairs of the country.
Still no Parliament was assembled. Although the Nanking Provisional
Constitution had stipulated that one was to meet within ten months
_i.e._ before 1st November, 1912, the elections were purposely delayed,
the attention of the Central Government being concentrated on the
problem of destroying all rivals, and everything being subordinate to
this war on persons. Rascals, getting daily more and more out of hand,
worked their will on rich and poor alike, discrediting by their actions
the name of republicanism and destroying public confidence--which was
precisely what suited Yuan Shih-kai. Dramatic and extraordinary
incidents continually inflamed the public mind, nothing being too
singular for those remarkable days.
Very slowly the problem developed, with everyone exclaiming that foreign
intervention was becoming inevitable. With the beginning of 1913, being
unable to delay the matter any longer, Yuan Shih-kai allowed elections
to be held in the provinces. He was so badly beaten at the polls that it
seemed in spite of his military power that he would be outvoted and
outmanoeuvred in the new National Assembly and his authority undermined.
To prevent this a fresh assassination was decided upon. The ablest
Southern leader, Sung Chiao-jen, just as he was entraining for Peking
with a number of Parliamentarians at Shanghai, was coolly shot in a
crowded railway station by a desperado who admitted under trial that he
had been paid £200 for the job by the highest authority in the land, the
evidence produced in court including telegrams from Peking which left no
doubt as to who had instigated the murder.
The storm raised by this evil measure made it appear as if no parliament
could ever assemble in Peking. But the feeling had become general that
the situation was so desperate that action had to be taken. Not only was
their reputation at stake, but the Kuomingtang or Revolutionary Party
now knew that the future of their country was involved just as much as
the safety of their own lives; and so after a rapid consultation they
determined that they would beard the lion in his den. Rather
unexpectedly on the 7th April (1913) Parliament was opened in Peking
with a huge Southern majority and the benediction of all Radicals.[7]
Hopes rose with mercurial rapidity as a solution at last seemed in
sight. But hardly had the first formalities been completed and Speakers
been elected to both Houses, than by a single dramatic stroke Yuan
Shih-kai reduced to nought these labours by stabbing in the back the
whole theory and practice of popular government.
The method he employed was simplicity itself, and it is peculiarly
characteristic of the man that he should have been so bluntly cynical.
Though the Provisional Nanking Constitution, which was the "law" of
China so far as there was any law at all, had laid down specifically in
article XIX that all measures affecting the National Treasury must
receive the assent of Parliament, Yuan Shih-kai, pretending that the
small Advisory Council which had assisted him during the previous year
and which had only just been dissolved, had sanctioned a foreign loan,
peremptorily ordered the signature of the great Reorganization Loan of
£25,000,000 which had been secretly under negotiation all winter with
the financial agents of six Powers[8], although the rupture which had
come in the previous June as a forerunner to the Crisp loan had caused
the general public to lose sight of the supreme importance of the
financial factor. Parliament, seeing that apart from the possibility of
a Foreign Debt Commission being created something after the Turkish and
Egyptian models, a direct challenge to its existence had been offered,
raged and stormed and did its utmost to delay the question; but the
Chief Executive having made up his mind shut himself up in his Palace
and absolutely refused to see any Parliamentary representatives.
Although the Minister of Finance himself hesitated to complete the
transaction in the face of the rising storm and actually fled the
capital, he was brought back by special train and forced to complete the
agreement. At four o'clock in the morning on the 25th April the last
documents were signed in the building of a foreign bank and the Finance
Minister, galloping his carriage suddenly out of the compound to avoid
possible bombs, reported to his master that at last--in spite of the
nominal foreign control which was to govern the disbursement--a vast sum
was at his disposal to further his own ends.
Safe in the knowledge that possession is nine points of the law, Yuan
Shih-kai now treated with derision the resolutions which Parliament
passed that the transaction was illegal and the loan agreement null and
void. Being openly backed by the agents of the Foreign Powers, he
immediately received large cash advances which enabled him to extend his
power in so many directions that further argument with him seemed
useless. It is necessary to record that the Parliamentary leaders had
almost gone down on their knees to certain of the foreign Ministers in
Peking in a vain attempt to persuade them to delay--as they could very
well have done--the signature of this vital Agreement for forty-eight
hours so that it could be formally passed by the National Assembly, and
thus save the vital portion of the sovereignty of the country from
passing under the heel of one man. But Peking diplomacy is a perverse
and disagreeable thing; and the Foreign Ministers of those days,
although accredited to a government which while it had not then been
formally recognized as a Republic by any Power save the United States,
was bound to be so very shortly, were determined to be reactionary and
were at heart delighted to find things running back normally to
absolutism[9]. High finance had at last got hold of everything it
required from China and was in no mood to relax the monopoly of the salt
administration which the Loan Agreement conferred. Nor must the fact be
lost sight of that of the nominal amount of £25,000,000 which had been
borrowed, fully half consisted of repayments to foreign Banks and never
left Europe. According to the schedules attached to the Agreement, Annex
A, comprising the Boxer arrears and bank advances, absorbed £4,317,778:
Annex B, being so-called provincial loans, absorbed a further
£2,870,000: Annex C, being liabilities shortly maturing, amounted to
£3,592,263: Annex D, for disbandment of troops, amounted to £3,000,000:
Annex C, to cover current administrative expenses totalled £5,500,000:
whilst Annex E which covered the reorganization of the Salt
Administration, absorbed the last £2,000,000; The bank profits on this
loan alone amounted to 1¼ million pounds; whilst Yuan Shih-kai
himself was placed in possession by a system of weekly disbursements of
a sum roughly amounting to ten million sterling, which was amply
sufficient to allow him to wreak his will on his fellow-countrymen.
Exasperated to the pitch of despair by this new development, the Central
and Southern provinces, after a couple of months' vain argument, began
openly to arm. On the 10th July in Kiangse province on the river
Yangtsze the Northern garrisons were fired upon from the Hukow forts by
the provincial troops under General Li Lieh-chun and the so-called
Second Revolution commenced.
The campaign was short and inglorious. The South, ill-furnished with
munitions and practically penniless, and always confronted by the same
well-trained Northern Divisions who had proved themselves invincible
only eighteen months before fought hard for a while, but never became a
serious menace to the Central Government owing to the lack of
co-operation between the various Rebel forces in the field. The Kiangse
troops under General Li Lieh-chun, who numbered at most 20,000 men,
fought stiffly, it is true, for a while but were unable to strike with
any success and were gradually driven far back from the river into the
mountains of Kiangse where their numbers rapidly melted away. The
redoubtable revolutionary Huang Hsin, who had proved useful as a
propagandist and a bomb-thrower in earlier days, but who was useless in
serious warfare, although he assumed command of the Nanking garrison
which had revolted to a man, and attempted a march up the Pukow railway
in the direction of Tientsin, found his effort break down almost
immediately from lack of organization and fled to Japan. The Nanking
troops, although deserted by their leader, offered a strenuous
resistance to the capture of the southern capital which was finally
effected by the old reactionary General Chang Hsun operating in
conjunction with General Feng Kuo-chang who had been dispatched from
Peking with a picked force. The attack on the Shanghai arsenal which had
been quietly occupied by a small Northern Garrison during the months
succeeding the great loan transaction, although pushed with vigour by
the South, likewise ultimately collapsed through lack of artillery and
proper leadership. The navy, which was wholly Southern in its sympathies
and which had been counted upon as a valuable weapon in cutting off the
whole Yangtsze Valley, was at the last moment purchased to neutrality by
a liberal use of money obtained from the foreign banks, under, it is
said, the heading of administrative expenses! The turbulent city of
Canton, although it also rose against the authority of Peking, had been
well provided for by Yuan Shih-kai. A border General, named Lung
Chi-kwang, with 20,000 semi-savage Kwangsi troops had been moved near
the city and at once attacked and overawed the garrison. Appointed
Military Governor of the province in return for his services, this Lung
Chi-kwang, who was an infamous brute, for three years ruled the South
with heartless barbarity, until he was finally ejected by the great
rising of 1916. Thoroughly disappointed in this and many other
directions the Southern Party was now emasculated; for the moneyed
classes had withheld their support to the end, and without money nothing
is possible in China. The 1913 outbreak, after lasting a bare two
months, ignominiously collapsed with the flight of every one of the
leaders on whose heads prices were put. The road was now left open for
the last step Yuan Shih-kai had in mind, the coup against Parliament
itself, which although unassociated in any direct way with the rising,
had undoubtedly maintained secret relations with the rebellious generals
in the field.
Parliament had further sinned by appointing a Special Constitutional
Drafting Committee which had held its sittings behind closed doors at
the Temple of Heaven. During this drafting of the Permanent
Constitution, admittance had been absolutely refused to Yuan Shih-kai's
delegates who had been sent to urge a modification of the
decentralization which had been such a characteristic of the Nanking
Instrument. Such details as transpired showed that the principle of
absolute money-control was not only to be the dominant note in the
Permanent Constitution, but that a new and startling innovation was
being included to secure that a _de facto_ Dictatorship should be
rendered impossible. Briefly, it was proposed that when Parliament was
not actually in session there should be left in Peking a special
Parliamentary Committee, charged with supervising and controlling the
Executive, and checking any usurpation of power.
This was enough for Yuan Shih-kai: he felt that he was not only an
object of general suspicion but that he was being treated with contempt.
He determined to finish with it all. He was as yet, however, only
provisional President and it was necessary to show cunning. Once more he
set to work in a characteristic way. By a liberal use of money
Parliament was induced to pass in advance of the main body of articles
the Chapter of the Constitution dealing with the election and term of
office of the President. When that had been done the two Chambers
sitting as an Electoral College, after the model of the French
Parliament, being partly bribed and partly terrorised by a military
display, were induced to elect him full President.
On the 10th October he took his final oath of office as President for a
term of five years before a great gathering of officials and the whole
diplomatic body in the magnificent Throne Room of the Winter Palace.
Safe now in his Constitutional position nothing remained for him but to
strike. On the 4th November he issued an arbitrary Mandate, which
received the counter-signature of the whole Cabinet, ordering the
unseating of all the so-called Kuomingtang or Radical Senators and
Representatives on the counts of conspiracy and secret complicity with
the July rising and vaguely referring to the filling of the vacancies
thus created by new elections.[10] The Metropolitan Police rigorously
carried out the order and although no brutality was shown, it was made
clear that if any of the indicted men remained in Peking their lives
would be at stake. Having made it impossible for Parliament to sit owing
to the lack of quorums, Yuan Shih-kai was able to proceed with his work
of reorganization in the way that best suited him; and the novel
spectacle was offered of a truly Mexican situation created in the Far
East by and with the assent of the Powers. It is significant that the
day succeeding this _coup d'état_ of the 4th November the agreement
conceding autonomy to Outer Mongolia was signed with Russia, China
simply retaining the right to station a diplomatic representative at
Urga.[11]
In spite of his undisputed power, matters however did not improve. The
police-control, judiciously mingled with assassinations, which was now
put in full vigour was hardly the administration to make room for which
the Manchus had been expelled; and the country secretly chafed and
cursed. But the disillusionment of the people was complete. Revolt had
been tried in vain; and as the support which the Powers were affording
to this régime was well understood there was nothing to do but to wait,
safe in the knowledge that such a situation possessed no elements of
permanency.
FOOTNOTES:
[6] The defective nature of this oath of office will be patent at a
glance:
"At the beginning of the Republic there are many things to be taken care
of. I, Yuan Shih-kai, sincerely wish to exert my utmost to promote the
democratic spirit, to remove the dark blots of despotism, to obey
strictly the Constitution, and to abide by the wish of the people, so as
to place the country in a safe, united, strong, and firm position, and
to effect the happiness and welfare of the divisions of the Chinese
race. All these wishes I will fulfil without fail. As soon as a new
President is elected by the National Assembly I shall at once vacate my
present position. With all sincerity I take this oath before the people
of China.
"Dated the tenth day of March in the First Year of the Republic of China
(1912)."
(Signed) Yuan Shih-kai.
[7] The Parliament of China is composed of a House of Representatives
numbering 596 members and a Senate of 274. The Representatives are
elected by means of a property and educational franchise which is
estimated to give about four million voters (1 per cent of the
population) although in practice relatively few vote. The Senate is
elected by the Provincial Assemblies by direct ballot. In the opinion of
the writer, the Chinese Parliament in spite of obvious shortcoming, is
representative of the country in its present transitional stage.
[8] The American Group at the last moment dropped out of the Sextuple
combination (prior to the signature of the contract) after President
Wilson had made his well-known pronouncement deprecating the association
of Americans in any financial undertakings which impinged upon the
rights of sovereignty of a friendly Power,--which was his considered
view of the manner in which foreign governments were assisting their
nationals to gain control of the Salt Administration The exact language
the President used was that the conditions of the loan seemed "to touch
very nearly the administrative independence of China itself," and that a
loan thus obtained was "obnoxious" to the principles upon which the
American government rests. It is to be hoped that President Wilson's
dictum will be universally accepted after the war and that meddling in
Chinese affairs will cease.
[9] The United States accorded formal recognition to the Republic on the
election of the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament: the other
Treaty Powers delayed recognition until Yuan Shih-kai had been elected
full President in October. It has been very generally held that the long
delay in foreign recognition of the Republic contributed greatly to its
internal troubles by making every one doubt the reality of the Nanking
transaction. Most important, however, is the historical fact that a
group of Powers numbering the two great leaders of democracy in
Europe--England and France--did everything they could in Peking to
enthrone Yuan Shih-kai as dictator.
[10] According to the official lists published subsequent to the coup
d'état, 98 Senators and 252 Members of the House of Representatives had
their Parliamentary Certificates impounded by the police as a result of
the Mandates of the 4th November, and were ordered to leave the Capital.
In addition 34 Senators and 54 Members of the Lower House fled from
Peking before their Certificates could be seized. Therefore the total
number affected by the proscription was 132 Senators and 306
Representatives. As the quorums in the case of both Houses are half the
total membership, any further sittings were thus made impossible.
[11] A full copy of this agreement will be found in the appendix.
CHAPTER IV
THE DICTATOR AT WORK
(FROM THE COUP D'ETAT OF THE 4TH NOVEMBER, 1913, TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE
WORLD-WAR 1ST AUGUST, 1914)
With the Parliament of China effectively destroyed, and the turbulent
Yangtsze Valley dragooned into sullen submission, Yuan Shih-kai's task
had become so vastly simplified that he held the moment to have arrived
when he could openly turn his hand to the problem of making himself
absolutely supreme, _de jure_ as well as _de facto_. But there was one
remaining thing to be done. To drive the last nail into the coffin of
the Republic it was necessary to discredit and virtually imprison the
man who was Vice-President.
It is highly characteristic that although he had received from the hero
of the Wuchang Rising the most loyal co-operation--a co-operation of a
very arduous character since the Commander of the Middle Yangtsze had
had to resist the most desperate attempt? to force him over to the side
of the rebellion in July, 1913, nevertheless, Yuan Shih-kai was
determined to bring this man to Peking as a prisoner of state.
It was just the fact that General Li Yuan-hung was a national hero which
impelled the Dictator to action. In the election which had been carried
out in October, 1913, by the National Assembly sitting as a National
Convention, in spite of every effort to destroy his influence, the
personal popularity of the Vice-President had been such that he had
received a large number of votes for the office of full President--which
had necessitated not one but three ballots being taken, making most
people declare that had there been no bribery or intimidation he would
have probably been elected to the supreme office in the land, and
ousted the ambitious usurper. In such circumstances his complete
elimination was deemed an elementary necessity. To secure that end Yuan
Shih-kai suddenly dispatched to Wuchang--where the Vice-President had
resided without break since 1911--the Minister of War, General Tuan
Chi-jui, with implicit instructions to deal with the problem in any way
he deemed satisfactory, stopping short of nothing should his victim
prove recalcitrant.
Fortunately General Tuan Chi-jui did not belong to the ugly breed of men
Yuan Shih-kai loved to surround himself with; and although he was a
loyal and efficient officer the politics of the assassin were unknown to
him. He was therefore able to convince the Vice-President after a brief
discussion that the easiest way out of the ring of intriguers and
plotters in which Yuan Shih-kai was rapidly surrounding him in Wuchang
was to go voluntarily to the capital. There at least he would be in
daily touch with developments and able to fight his own battles without
fear of being stabbed in the back; since under the eye of the foreign
Legations even Yuan Shih-kai was exhibiting a certain timidity. Indeed
after the outcry which General Chang Cheng-wu's judicial murder had
aroused he had reserved his ugliest deeds for the provinces, only small
men being done to death in Peking. Accordingly, General Li Yuan-hung
packed a bag and accompanied only by an aide-de-camp left abruptly for
the capital where he arrived on the 11th December, 1913.
A great sensation was caused throughout China by this sudden departure,
consternation prevailing among the officers and men of the Hupeh
(Wuchang) army when the newspapers began to hint that their beloved
chief had been virtually abducted. Although cordially received by Yuan
Shih-kai and given as his personal residence the. Island Palace where
the unfortunate Emperor Kwanghsu had been so long imprisoned by the
Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi after her _coup d'état_ of 1898, it did not take
long for General Li Yuan-hung to understand that his presence was a
source of embarrassment to the man who would be king. Being, however,
gifted with an astounding fund of patience, he prepared to sit down and
allow the great game which he knew would now unroll to be played to its
normal ending. What General Li Yuan-hung desired above all was to be
forgotten completely and absolutely--springing to life when the hour of
deliverance finally arrived. His policy was shown to be not only
psychologically accurate, but masterly in a political sense. The
greatest ally of honesty in China has always been time, the inherent
decency of the race finally discrediting scoundrelism in every period of
Chinese history.
The year 1914 dawned with so many obstacles removed that Yuan Shih-kai
became more and more peremptory in his methods. In February the young
Empress Lun Yi, widow of the Emperor Kwanghsu, who two years previously
in her character of guardian of the boy-Emperor Hsuan Tung, had been
cajoled into sanctioning the Abdication Edicts, unexpectedly expired,
her death creating profound emotion because it snapped the last link
with the past. Yuan Shih-kai's position was considerably strengthened by
this auspicious event which secretly greatly delighted him; and by his
order for three days the defunct Empress lay in State in the Grand Hall
of the Winter Palace and received the obeisance of countless multitudes
who appeared strangely moved by this hitherto unknown procedure. There
was now only a nine-year old boy between the Dictator and his highest
ambitions. Two final problems still remained to be dealt with: to give a
legal form to a purely autocratic rule, and to find money to govern the
country. The second matter was vastly more important than the first to a
man who did not hesitate to base his whole polity on the teachings of
Machiavelli, legality being looked upon as only so much political
window-dressing to placate foreign opinion and prevent intervention,
whilst without money even the semblance of the rights of eminent domain
could not be preserved. Everything indeed hinged on the question of
finding money.
There was none in China, at least none for the government. Financial
chaos still reigned supreme in spite of the great Reorganization Loan of
£25,000,000, which had been carefully arranged more for the purpose of
wiping-out international indebtedness and balancing the books of foreign
bankers than to institute a modern government. All the available specie
in the country had been very quietly remitted in these troubled times by
the native merchant-guilds from every part of China to the vast emporium
of Shanghai for safe custody, where a sum not far short of a hundred
million ounces now choked the vaults of the foreign banks,--being safe
from governmental expropriation. The collection of provincial revenues
having been long disorganized, Yuan Shih-kai, in spite of his military
dictatorship, found it impossible to secure the proper resumption of the
provincial remittances. Fresh loans became more and more sought after;
by means of forced domestic issues a certain amount of cash was
obtained, but the country lived from hand to mouth and everybody was
unhappy. Added to this by March the formidable insurrection of the
"White Wolf" bandits in Central China--under the legendary leadership of
a man who was said to be invulnerable--necessitated the mobilization of
a fresh army which ran into scores of battalions and which was vainly
engaged for nearly half a year in rounding-up this replica of the
Mexican Villa. So demoralized had the army become from long licence that
this guerrilla warfare was waged with all possible slackness until a
chance shot mortally wounded the chief brigand and his immense following
automatically dispersed. During six months these pests had ravaged three
provinces and menaced one of the most strongly fortified cities in
Asia--the old capital of China, Hsianfu, whither the Manchu Court had
fled in 1900.
Meanwhile wholesale executions were carried out in the provinces with
monotonous regularity and all attempts at rising ruthlessly suppressed.
In Peking the infamous Chih Fa Chu or Military Court--a sort of Chinese
Star-Chamber--was continually engaged in summarily dispatching men
suspected of conspiring against the Dictator, Even the printed word was
looked upon as seditious, an unfortunate native editor being actually
flogged to death in Hankow for telling the truth about conditions in the
riverine districts. These cruelties made men more and more determined to
pay off the score the very first moment that was possible. Although he
was increasingly pressed for ready money, Yuan Shih-kai, by the end of
April, 1914, had the situation sufficiently in hand to bring out his
supreme surprise,--a brand-new Constitution promulgated under the
euphonious title of "The Constitutional Compact."
This precious document, which had no more legality behind it as a
governing instrument than a private letter, can be studied by the
curious in the appendix where it is given in full: here it is sufficient
to say that no such hocuspocus had ever been previously indulged in
China. Drafted by an American legal adviser, Dr. Goodnow, who was later
to earn unenviable international notoriety as the endorser of the
monarchy scheme, it erected what it was pleased to call the Presidential
System; that is, it placed all power directly in the hands of the
President, giving him a single Secretary of State after the American
model and reducing Cabinet Ministers to mere Department Chiefs who
received their instructions from the State Department but had no real
voice in the actual government. A new provincial system was likewise
invented for the provinces, the Tutuhs or Governors of the Revolutionary
period being turned into Chiang Chun or Military Officials on the Manchu
model and provincial control absolutely centralized in their hands,
whilst the Provincial Assemblies established under the former dynasty
were summarily abolished. The worship at the Temple of Heaven was also
re-established and so was the official worship of Confucius--both
Imperialistic measures--whilst a brand-new ceremony, the worship of the
two titulary Military Gods, was ordered so as to inculcate military
virtue! It was laid down that in the worship of Heaven the President
would wear the robes of the Dukes of the Chow dynasty, B.C. 1112, a
novel and interesting republican experiment. Excerpts from two Mandates
which belong to these days throw a flood of light on the kind of
reasoning which was held to justify these developments. The first
declares:
... "In a Republic the Sovereign Power is vested in the people, and
the main principle is that all things should be determined in
accordance with the desires of the majority. These desires may be
embraced by two words, namely, existence and happiness. I, the
President, came from my farm because I was unable to bear the
eternal sufferings of the innocent people. I assumed office and
tried vainly to soothe the violent feelings. The greatest evil
nowadays is the misunderstanding of true principles. The Republicans
on the pretext of public interest try to attain selfish ends, some
going so far as to consider the forsaking of parents as a sign of
liberty and regarding the violation of the laws as a demonstration
of equality. I will certainly do my best to change all this."
In the second Mandate Yuan Shih-kai justifies the re-establishment of
the Confucian worship in a singular way, incidentally showing how
utterly incomprehensible to him is the idea of representative
government, since he would appear to have imagined that by dispatching
circular telegrams to the provincial capitals and receiving affirmative
replies from his creatures all that is necessary in the way of a
national endorsement of high constitutional measures had been obtained.
... "China's devotion to Confucius began with the reign of the
Emperor Hsiaowu, of the Han dynasty, who rejected the works of the
hundred authors, making the six Confucian classics the leading
books. Confucius, born in the time of the tyranny of the nobility,
in his works declared that after war disturbances comes peace, and
with peace real tranquillity and happiness. This, therefore, is the
fountain of Republicanism. After studying the history of China and
consulting the opinions of scholars, I find that Confucius must
remain the teacher for thousands of generations. But in a Republic
the people possess sovereign power. Therefore circular telegrams
were dispatched to all the provinces to collect opinions, and many
affirmative answers have already been received. Therefore, all
colleges, schools, and public bodies are ordered to revive the
sacrificial ceremony of Confucius, which shall be carefully and
minutely ordained." ...
With the formal promulgation of the Constitutional Compact the situation
had become bizarre in the extreme. Although even the child-mind might
have known that powers for Constitution-making were vested solely in the
National Assembly, and that the re-division of authority which was now
made was wholly illegal, because Yuan Shih-kai as the bailiff of the
Powers was able to do much as he pleased; and at a moment when Liberal
Europe was on the eve of plunging into the most terrible war in history
in defence of right against might, reaction and Prussianism of the most
repulsive type were passed by unnoticed in China. In a few loosely
drafted chapters not only was the governance of the country rearranged
to suit a purely dictational rule, but the actual Parliament was
permanently extinguished and replaced by a single Legislative Chamber
(_Li Fa Yuan_) which from its very composition could be nothing but a
harmless debating Society with no greater significance than a dietine of
one of the minor German States. Meanwhile, as there was no intention of
allowing even this chamber to assemble until the last possible moment, a
Senate was got together as the organ of public opinion, ten Senators
being chosen to draft yet another Constitution which would be the final
one. Remarkable steps were taken a little later in the year (1914) to
secure that the succession to the dictatorship should be left in Yuan
Shih-kai's own hands. An elaborate ritual was contrived and officially
promulgated under the title of the Presidential Succession Law on the
29th December whereby the Chief Executive selected three names which
were placed in a gold box in a Stone House in the grounds of the
Palace,--the gold box only to be opened when death or incapacity
deprived the nation of its self-appointed leader. For the term of the
presidency was openly converted into one of ten years and made subject
to indefinite renewal by this precious instrument which was the work of
the puppet senate. In case of the necessity of an election suddenly
arising, an Electoral College was to be formed by fifty members drawn
from the Legislative Chamber and fifty from the Senate, the Presidential
candidates consisting of the President (if he so desired) and the three
whose names were in the gold box in the Stone House in the Palace
grounds. It is not definitely known to whom these provisions were due,
but it is known that at least they were not the work of the American
adviser.
His responsibility, however, was very great; for the keynote of all this
scheme, according to Dr. Goodnow[12], was "centralization of power," a
parrot-like phrase which has deluded better men than ever came to China
and which--save as a method necessary during a state of war--should
have no place in modern politics. But it was precisely this which
appealed to Yuan Shih-kai. Although as President he was _ex officio_
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, he now turned this office into
a direct and special organization installed within the precincts of the
Imperial City. The flags of this new dictatorship constantly floated
over his palace, whilst scores of officers were appointed to scores of
departments which were directly concerned with centralizing the control
of every armed man in the country in the master's hands. Meanwhile in
order to placate provincial commanders, a "Palace of Generals," was
created in Peking to which were brought all men it was held desirable to
emasculate. Here, drawing ample salaries, they could sit in idleness the
livelong day, discussing the battles they had never fought and
intriguing against one another, two occupations in which the product of
the older school of men in China excels. Provincial levies which had any
military virtue, were gradually disbanded, though many of the rascals
and rapscallions, who were open menaces to good government were left
with arms in their hands so as to be an argument in favour of drastic
police-rule. Thus it is significant of the underlying falseness and
weakness of the dictator's character that he never dared to touch the
troops of the reprobate General Chang Hsun, who had made trouble for
years, and who had nearly embroiled China in war with Japan during the
so-called Second Revolution (July-August, 1913) by massacring some
Japanese civilians in the streets of Nanking when the city was
recaptured. So far from disbanding his men, Chang Hsun managed
constantly to increase his army of 30,000 men on the plea that the post
of Inspector-General of the Yangtsze Valley, which had been given to him
as a reward for refusing to throw in his lot with the Southern rebels,
demanded larger forces. Yuan Shih-kai, although half afraid of him,
found him at various periods useful as a counterweight to other generals
in the provinces; in any case he was not the man to risk anything by
attempting to crush him. As he was planted with his men astride of the
strategically important Pukow railway, it was always possible to order
him at a moment's notice into the Yangtsze Valley which was thus
constantly under the menace of fire and sword.
Far and wide Yuan Shih-kai now stretched his nets. He even employed
Americans throughout the United States in the capacity of press-agents
in order to keep American public opinion favourable to him, hoping to
invoke their assistance against his life-enemy--Japan--should that be
necessary. The precise details of this propaganda and the sums spent in
its prosecution are known to the writer; if he refrains from publishing
them it is solely for reasons of policy. England it was not necessary to
deal with in this way. Chance had willed that the British Representative
in Peking should be an old friend who had known the Dictator intimately
since his Korean days; and who faithful to the extraordinary English
love of hero-worship believed that such a surprising character could do
little wrong. British policy which has always been a somewhat variable
quantity in China, owing to the spasmodic attention devoted to such a
distant problem, may be said to have been non-existent during all this
period--a state of affairs not conducive to international happiness.
Slowly the problem developed in a shiftless, irresolute way. Unable to
see that China had vastly changed, and that government by rascality had
become a physical and moral impossibility, the Legations in Peking
adopted an attitude of indifference leaving Yuan Shih-kai to wreak his
will on the people. The horde of foreign advisers who had been appointed
merely as a piece of political window-dressing, although they were
allowed to do no work, were useful in running backwards and forwards
between the Legations and the Presidential headquarters and in making
each Power suppose that its influence was of increasing importance. It
was made abundantly clear that in Yuan Shih-kai's estimation the
Legations played in international politics much the same rôle that
provincial capitals did in domestic politics: so long as you bound both
to benevolent neutrality the main problem--the consolidation of
dictatorial power--could be pushed on with as you wished. Money,
however, remained utterly lacking and a new twenty-five million sterling
loan was spoken of as inevitable--the accumulated deficit in 1914 being
alone estimated at thirty-eight million pounds. But although this
financial dearth was annoying, Chinese resources were sufficient to
allow the account to be carried on from day to day. Some progress was
made in railways, building concessions being liberally granted to
foreign corporations, this policy having received a great impetus from
the manner in which Dr. Sun Yat Sen had boomed the necessity for better
communications during the short time he had ruled at a National Railway
Bureau in Shanghai, an office from which he had been relieved in 1913 on
it being discovered that he was secretly indenting for quick-firing
guns. Certain questions proved annoying and insoluble, for instance the
Tibetan question concerning which England was very resolute, as well as
the perpetual risings in Inner Mongolia, a region so close to Peking
that concentrations of troops were necessary. But on the whole as time
went on there was increasing indifference both among the Foreign Powers
and Chinese for the extraordinary state of affairs which had been
allowed to grow up.
There was one notable exception, however, Japan. Never relaxing her grip
on a complicated problem, watchful and active, where others were
indifferent and slothful, Japan bided her time. Knowing that the hour
had almost arrived when it would be possible to strike, Japan was vastly
active behind the scenes in China long before the outbreak of the
European war gave her the longed for opportunity; and largely because of
her the pear, which seemed already almost ripe, finally withered on the
tree.
FOOTNOTES:
[12] It is significant that Dr. Goodnow carried out all his
Constitutional studies in Germany, specializing in that department known
as Administrative Law which has no place, fortunately, in Anglo-Saxon
conceptions of the State.
CHAPTER V
THE FACTOR OF JAPAN
(FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD-WAR, 1ST AUGUST, 1914, TO THE FILING OF
THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 18TH JANUARY, 1915)
The thunderclap of the European war shattered the uneasy calm in China,
not because the Chinese knew anything of the mighty issues which were to
be fought out with such desperation and valour, but because the presence
of the German colony of Kiaochow on Chinese soil and the activity of
German cruisers in the Yellow Sea brought the war to China's very doors.
Vaguely conscious that this might spell disaster to his own ambitious
plans, Yuan Shih-kai was actually in the midst of tentative negotiations
with the German Legation regarding the retrocession of the Kiaochow
territory when the news reached him that Japan, after some rapid
negotiations with her British Ally, had filed an ultimatum on Germany,
peremptorily demanding the handing-over of all those interests that had
been forcibly acquired in Shantung province in the great leasing-year of
1898.
At once Yuan Shih-kai realized that the Nemesis which had dogged his
footsteps all his life was again close behind him. In the Japanese
attack on Kiaochow he foresaw a web of complications which even his
unrivalled diplomacy might be unable to unravel; for he knew well from
bitter experience that wherever the Japanese sets his foot there he
remains. It is consequently round this single factor of Japan that the
history of the two succeeding years revolves. From being indisputably
the central figure on the Chinese canvas, Yuan Shih-kai suddenly becomes
subordinate to the terror of Japanese intervention which hangs over him
constantly like a black cloud, and governs every move he made from the
15th August, 1914, to the day of his dramatic death on the 6th June,
1916. We shall attempt to write down the true explanation of why this
should have been so.
It is extremely hard to discuss the question of Japan for the benefit of
an exclusively Western audience in a convincing way because Japanese
policy has two distinct facets which seem utterly contradictory, and yet
which are in a great measure understandable if the objects of that
diplomacy are set down. Being endowed with an extraordinary capacity for
taking detached views, the Statesmen of Tokio long ago discerned the
necessity of having two independent policies--an Eastern policy for
Eastern Asia and a Western policy for Western nations--because East and
West are essentially antithetical, and cannot be treated (at least not
yet) in precisely the same manner. Whilst the Western policy is frank
and manly, and is exclusively in the hands of brilliant and attractive
men who have been largely educated in the schools of Europe and America
and who are fully able to deal with all matters in accordance with the
customary traditions of diplomacy, the Eastern policy is the work of
obscurantists whose imaginations are held by the vast projects which the
Military Party believes are capable of realization in China. There is
thus a constant contradiction in the attitude of Japan which men have
sought in vain to reconcile. It is for this reason that the outer world
is divided into two schools of thought, one believing implicitly in
Japan's _bonâ fides_, the other vulgarly covering her with abuse and
declaring that she is the last of all nations in her conceptions of fair
play and honourable treatment. Both views are far-fetched. It is as true
of Japan as it is of every other Government in the world that her
actions are dictated neither by altruism nor by perfidy, but are merely
the result of the faulty working of a number of fallible brains and as
regards the work of administration in Japan itself the position is
equally extraordinary. Here, at the extreme end of the world, so far
from being in any way threatened, the principle of Divine Right, which
is being denounced and dismembered in Europe as a crude survival from
almost heathen days, stands untouched and still exhibits itself in all
its pristine glory. A highly aristocratic Court, possessing one of the
most complicated and jealously protected hierarchies in the world, and
presided over by a monarch claiming direct descent from the sacred Jimmu
Tenno of twenty-five hundred years ago, decrees to-day precisely as
before, the elaborate ritual governing every move, every decision and
every agreement. There is something so engaging in this political
curiosity, something so far removed from the vast world-movement now
rolling fiercely to its conclusion, that we may be pardoned for
interpolating certain capital considerations which closely affect the
future of China and therefore cannot fail to be of public interest.
The Japanese, who owe their whole theocratic conception to the Chinese,
just as they owe all their letters and their learning to them, still
nominally look upon their ruler as the link between Heaven and Earth,
and the central fact dominating their cosmogony. Although the vast
number of well-educated men who to-day crowd the cities of Japan are
fully conscious of the bizarre nature of this belief in an age which has
turned its back on superstition, nothing has yet been done to modify it
because--and this is the important point--the structure of Japanese
society is such that without a violent upheaval which shall hurl the
military clan system irremediably to the ground, it is absolutely
impossible for human equality to be admitted and the man-god theory to
be destroyed. So long as these two features-exist; that is so long as a
privileged military caste supports and attempts to make all-powerful the
man-god theory, so long will Japan be an international danger-spot
because there will lack those democratic restraints which this war has
shown are absolutely essential to secure a peaceful understanding among
the nations. It is for this reason that Japan will fail to attain the
position the art-genius and industry of her people entitle her to and
must limp behind the progress of the world unless a very radical
revision of the constitution is achieved. The disabilities which arise
from an archaic survival are so great that they will affect China as
adversely as Japan, and therefore should be universally understood.
Japanese history, if stripped of its superficial aspects, has a certain
remarkable quality; it seems steeped in heroic blood. The doctrine of
force, which expresses itself in its crudest forms in Europe, has always
been in Japan a system of heroic-action so fascinating to humanity at
large that until recent times its international significance has not
been realized. The feudal organization of Japanese society which arose
as a result of the armed conquest of the islands fifteen hundred years
ago, precluded centralizating measures being taken because the Throne,
relying on the virtues of Divine Ancestors rather than on any
well-articulated political theory, was weak in all except certain
quasisacerdotal qualities, and forced to rely on great chieftains for
the execution of its mandates as well as for its defence. The military
title of "barbarian-conquering general," which was first conferred on a
great clan leader eight centuries ago, was a natural enough development
when we remember that the autochthonous races were even then not yet
pushed out of the main island, and were still battling with the
advancing tide of Japanese civilization which was itself composed of
several rival streams coming from the Asiatic mainland and from the
Malayan archipelagoes. This armed settlement saturates Japanese history
and is responsible for the unending local wars and the glorification of
the warrior. The conception of triumphant generalship which Hideyoshi
attempted unsuccessfully to carry into Korea in the Sixteenth Century,
led directly at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century to the formal
establishment of the Shogunate, that military dictatorship being the
result of the backwash of the Korean adventure, and the greatest proof
of the disturbance which it had brought in Japanese society. The
persistence of this hereditary military dictatorship for more than two
and a half centuries is a remarkable illustration of the fact that as in
China so in Japan the theocratic conception was unworkable save in
primitive times--civilization demanding organization rather than
precepts and refusing to bow its head to speechless kings. Although the
Restoration of 1868 nominally gave back to the Throne all it had been
forced to leave in other hands since 1603, that transfer of power was
imaginary rather than real, the new military organization which
succeeded the Shogun's government being the vital portion of the
Restoration. In other words, it was the leaders of Japan's conscript
armies who inherited the real power, a fact made amply evident by the
crushing of the Satsuma Rebellion by these new corps whose organization
allowed them to overthrow the proudest and most valorous of the Samurai
and incidentally to proclaim the triumph of modern firearms.
Now it is important to note that as early as 1874--that is six years
after the Restoration of the Emperor Meiji--these facts were attracting
the widest notice in Japanese society, the agitation for a Constitution
and a popular assembly being very vigorously pushed. Led by the
well-known and aristocratic Itagaki, Japanese Liberalism had joined
battle with out-and-out Imperialism more than a quarter of a century
ago; and although the question of recovering Tariff and Judicial
autonomy and revising the Foreign Treaties was more urgent in those
days, the foreign question was often pushed aside by the fierceness of
the constitutional agitation.
It was not, however, until 1889 that a Constitution was finally granted
to the Japanese--that instrument being a gift from the Crown, and
nothing more than a conditional warrant to a limited number of men to
become witnesses of the processes of government but in no sense its
controllers. The very first Diet summoned in 1890 was sufficient proof
of that. A collision at once occurred over questions of finance which
resulted in the resignation of the Ministry. And ever since those days,
that is for twenty-seven consecutive years, successive Diets in Japan
have been fighting a forlorn fight for the power which can never be
theirs save by revolution, it being only natural that Socialism should
come to be looked upon by the governing class as Nihilism, whilst the
mob-threat has been very acute ever since the Tokio peace riots of 1905.
Now it is characteristic of the ceremonial respect which all Japanese
have for the Throne that all through this long contest the main issue
should have been purposely obscured. The traditional feelings of
veneration which a loyal and obedient people feel for a line of
monarchs, whose origin is lost in the mists of antiquity, are such that
they have turned what is in effect an ever-growing struggle against the
archaic principle of divine right into a contest with clan-leaders whom
they assert are acting "unconstitutionally" whenever they choose to
assert the undeniable principles of the Constitution. Thus to-day we
have this paradoxical situation; that although Japanese Liberalism must
from its very essence be revolutionary, _i.e._, destructive before it
can hope to be constructive, it feigns blindness, hoping that by suasion
rather than by force the principle of parliamentary government will
somehow be grafted on to the body politic and the emperors, being left
outside the controversy, become content to accept a greatly modified
rule.
This hope seems a vain one in the light of all history. Militarism and
the clans are by no means in the last ditch in Japan, and they will no
more surrender their power than would the Russian bureaucracy. The only
argument which is convincing in such a case is the last one which is
ever used; and the mere mention of it by so-called socialists is
sufficient to cause summary arrest in Japan. Sheltering themselves
behind the Throne, and nominally deriving their latter-day dictatorship
from the Imperial mandate, the military chiefs remain adamant, nothing
having yet occurred to incline them to surrender any of their
privileges. By a process of adaptation to present-day conditions, a
formula has now been discovered which it is hoped will serve many a long
year. By securing by extra-legal means the return of a "majority" in the
House of Representatives the fiction of national support of the
autocracy has been re-invigorated, and the doctrine laid down that what
is good for every other advanced people in the world is bad for the
Japanese, who must be content with what is granted them and never
question the superior intelligence of a privileged caste. In the opinion
of the writer, it is every whit as important for the peace of the world
that the people of Japan should govern themselves as it is for the
people of Germany to do so. The persistence of the type of military
government which we see to-day in Japan is harmful for all alike because
it is as antiquated as Tsarism and a perpetual menace to a disarmed
nation such as China. So long as that government remains, so long must
Japan remain an international suspect and be denied equal rights in the
council-chambers of the Liberal Powers.
If the situation which arose on the 15th August, 1914, is to be
thoroughly understood, it is necessary to pick up threads of
Chino-Japanese relations from a good many years back. First-hand
familiarity with the actors and the scenes of at least three decades is
essential to give the picture the completeness, the brilliancy of
colouring, and withal the suggestiveness inseparable from all true
works of art. For the Chino-Japanese question is primarily a work of art
and not merely a piece of jejune diplomacy stretched across the years.
As the shuttle of Fate has been cast swiftly backwards and forwards, the
threads of these entwining relations have been woven into patterns
involving the whole Far East, until to-day we have as it were a complete
Gobelin tapestry, magnificent with meaning, replete with action, and
full of scholastic interest.
Let us follow some of the tracery. It has long been the habit to affirm
that the conflict between China and Japan had its origin in Korea, when
Korea was a vassal state acknowledging the suzerainty of Peking; and
that the conflict merited ending there, since of the two protagonists
contending for empire Japan was left in undisputed mastery. This
statement, being incomplete, is dangerously false. Dating from that
vital period of thirty years ago, when Yuan Shih-kai first went to Seoul
as a general officer in the train of the Chinese Imperial Resident (on
China being forced to take action in protection of her interests, owing
to the "opening" of Korea by the American Treaty of 1882) three
contestants, equally interested in the balance of land-power in Eastern
Asia were constantly pitted against one another with Korea as their
common battling-ground--Russia, China and Japan. The struggle, which
ended in the eclipse of the first two, merely shifted the venue from the
Korean zone to the Manchurian zone; and from thence gradually extended
it further and further afield until at last not only was Inner Mongolia
and the vast belt of country fronting the Great Wall embraced within its
scope, but the entire aspect of China itself was changed. For these
important facts have to be noted. Until the Russian war of 1904-05 had
demonstrated the utter valuelessness of Tsarism as an international
military factor, Japan had been almost willing to resign herself to a
subordinate rôle in the Far East. Having eaten bitter bread as the
result of her premature attempt in 1895 (after the Korean war) to become
a continental power--an attempt which had resulted in the forced
retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula--she had been placed on her good
behaviour, an attitude which was admirably reflected in 1900 when her
Peking Expeditionary Force proved itself so well-behaved and so gallant
as to arouse the world's admiration. But the war with Russia and the
collapse of the Tsar's Manchurian adventure not only drew her back into
territory that she never hoped to see again, but placed her in
possession of a ready-made railway system which carried her almost up to
the Sungari river and surrendered to her military control vast
grasslands stretching to the Khingan mountains. This Westernly march so
greatly enlarged the Japanese political horizon, and so entirely changed
the Japanese viewpoint, that the statesmen of Tokio in their excitement
threw off their ancient spectacles and found to their astonishment that
their eyes were every whit as good as European eyes. Now seeing the
world as others had long seen it, they understood that just as with the
individuals so with nations the struggle for existence can most easily
be conducted by adopting that war-principle of Clausewitz--the restless
offensive, and not by writing meaningless dispatches. Prior to the
Russian war they had written to Russia a magnificent series of documents
in which they had pleaded with sincerity for an equitable
settlement,--only to find that all was in vain. Forced to battle, they
had found in combat not only success but a new principle.
The discovery necessitated a new policy. During the eighties, and in a
lesser degree in the nineties, Japan had apart from everything else been
content to act in a modest and retiring way, because she wished at all
costs to avoid testing too severely her immature strength. But owing to
the successive collapses of her rivals, she now found herself not only
forced to attack as the safest course of action, but driven to the view
that the Power that exerts the maximum pressure constantly and
unremittedly is inevitably the most successful. This conclusion had
great importance. For just as the first article of faith for England in
Asia has been the doctrine that no Power can be permitted to seize
strategic harbours which menace her sea-communications, so did it now
become equally true of Japan that her dominant policy became not an
Eastern Monroe doctrine, as shallow men have supposed, but simply the
Doctrine of Maximum Pressure. To press with all her strength on China
was henceforth considered vital by every Japanese; and it is in this
spirit that every diplomatic pattern has been woven since the die was
cast in 1905. Until this signal fact has been grasped no useful analysis
can be made of the evolution of present conditions. Standing behind
this policy, and constantly reinforcing it, are the serried ranks of
the new democracy which education and the great increase in material
prosperity have been so rapidly creating. The soaring ambition which
springs from the sea lends to the attacks developed by such a people the
aspect of piracies; and it is but natural. In such circumstances that
for Chinese Japan should not only have the aspect of a sea-monster but
that their country should appear as hapless Andromeda bound to a rock,
always awaiting a Perseus who never comes....
The Revolution of 1911 had been entirely unexpected in Japan. Whilst
large outbreaks had been certainly counted on since the Chinese
Revolutionary party had for years used Japan as an asylum and a base of
operations, never had it been anticipated that the fall of an ancient
Dynasty could be so easily encompassed. Consequently, the abdication of
the Manchus as the result of intrigues rather than of warfare was looked
upon as little short of a catastrophe because it hopelessly complicated
the outlook, broke the pattern which had been so carefully woven for so
many years, and interjected harsh elements which could not be assigned
an orderly place. Not only was a well-articulated State-system suddenly
consigned to the flames, but the ruin threatened to be so general that
the balance of power throughout the Far East would be twisted out of
shape. Japanese statesmen had desired a weak China, a China which would
ultimately turn to them for assistance because they were a kindred race,
but not a China that looked to the French Revolution for its
inspiration. To a people as slow to adjust themselves to violent
surprises as are the Japanese, there was an air of desperation about the
whole business which greatly alarmed them, and made them determined at
the earliest possible moment to throw every ounce of their weight in the
direction which would best serve them by bringing matters back to their
original starting-point. For this reason they were not only prepared in
theory in 1911 to lend armed assistance to the Manchus but would have
speedily done so had not England strongly dissented from such a course
of action when she was privately sounded about the matter. Even to-day,
when a temporary adjustment of Japanese policy has been successfully
arranged, it is of the highest importance for political students to
remember that the dynastic influences in Tokio have never departed from
the view that the legitimate sovereignty of China remains vested in the
Manchu House and that everything that has taken place since 1911 is
irregular and unconstitutional.
For the time being, however, two dissimilar circumstances demanded
caution: first, the enthusiasm which the Japanese democracy, fed by a
highly excited press, exhibited towards the Young China which had been
so largely grounded in the Tokio schools and which had carried out the
Revolution: secondly--and far more important--the deep, abiding and
ineradicable animosity which Japanese of all classes felt for the man
who had come out of the contest head and shoulders above everybody
else--Yuan Shih-kai. These two remarkable features ended by completely
thrusting into the background during the period 1911-1914 every other
element in Japanese statesmanship; and of the two the second must be
counted the decisive one. Dating back to Korea, when Yuan Shih-kai's
extraordinary diplomatic talents constantly allowed him to worst his
Japanese rivals and to make Chinese counsels supreme at the Korean Court
up to the very moment when the first shots of the war of 1894 were
fired, this ancient dislike, which amounted to a consuming hatred, had
become a fixed idea. Restrained by the world's opinion during the period
prior to the outbreak of the world-war as well as by the necessity of
acting financially in concert with the other Powers, it was not until
August, 1914, that the longed-for opportunity came and that Japan
prepared to act in a most remarkable way.
The campaign against Kiaochow was unpopular from the outset among the
Japanese public because it was felt that they were not legitimately
called upon to interest themselves in such a remote question as the
balance of power among European nations, which was what British warfare
against Germany seemed to them to be. Though some ill-will was felt
against Germany for the part played by her in the intervention of 1895,
it must not be forgotten that just as the Japanese navy is the child of
the British navy, so is the Japanese army the child of the German
army--and that Japanese army chiefs largely control Japan. These men
were averse from "spoiling their army" in a contest which did not
interest them. There was also the feeling abroad that England by
calling upon her Ally to carry out the essential provisions of her
Alliance had shown that she had the better part of a bargain, and that
she was exploiting an old advantage in a way which could not fail to
react adversely on Japan's future world's relationships. Furthermore, it
is necessary to underline the fact that official Japan was displeased by
the tacit support an uninterested British Foreign Office had
consistently given to the Yuan Shih-kai régime. That the Chinese
experiment was looked upon in England more with amusement than with
concern irritated the Japanese--more particularly as the British Foreign
Office was issuing in the form of White Papers documents covering Yuan
Shih-kai's public declarations as if they were contributions to
contemporary history. Thus in the preceding year (1913) under the
nomenclature of "affairs in China" the text of a _démenti_ regarding the
President of China's Imperial aspirations had been published,--a
document which Japanese had classified as a studied lie, and as an act
of presumption because its working showed that its author intended to
keep his back turned on Japan. The Dictator had declared:--
... From my student days, I, Yuan Shih-kai, have admired the
example of the Emperors Yao and Shun, who treated the empire as a
public trust, and considered that the record of a dynasty in history
for good or ill is inseparably bound up with the public spirit or
self-seeking by which it has been animated. On attaining middle age
I grew more familiar with foreign affairs, was struck by the
admirable republican system in France and America, and felt that
they were a true embodiment of the democratic precepts of the
ancients. When last year the patriotic crusade started in Wuchang
its echoes went forth into all the provinces, with the result that
this ancient nation with its 2,000 years of despotism adopted with
one bound the republican system of government.
It was my good fortune to see this glorious day at my life's late
eve; I cherished the hope that I might dwell in the seclusion of my
own home and participate in the blessings of an age of peace.
But once again my fellow-countrymen honoured me with the pressing
request that I should again assume a heavy burden, and on the day on
which the Republic was proclaimed I announced to the whole nation
that never again should a monarchy be permitted in China. At my
inauguration I again took this solemn oath in the sight of heaven
above and earth beneath. Yet of late ignorant persons in the
provinces have fabricated wild rumours to delude men's minds, and
have adduced the career of the First Napoleon on which to base their
erroneous speculations. It is best not to inquire as to their
motives; in some cases misconception may be the cause, in others
deliberate malice.
The Republic has now been proclaimed for six months; so far there
is no prospect of recognition from the Powers, while order is far
from being restored in the provinces. Our fate hangs upon a hair;
the slightest negligence may forfeit all. I, who bear this arduous
responsibility, feel it my bounden duty to stand at the helm in the
hope of successfully breasting the wild waves.
But while those in office are striving with all their might to
effect a satisfactory solution, spectators seem to find a difficulty
in maintaining a generous forbearance. They forget that I, who have
received this charge from my countrymen, cannot possibly look
dispassionately on when the fate of the nation is in the balance. If
I were aware that the task was impossible and played a part of easy
acquiescence, so that the future of the Republic might become
irreparable, others might not reproach me, but my own conscience
would never leave me alone.
My thoughts are manifest in the sight of high heaven. But at this
season of construction and dire crisis how shall these mutual
suspicions find a place? Once more I issue this announcement; if
you, my fellow countrymen, do indeed place the safety of China
before all other considerations, it behooves you to be large-minded.
Beware of lightly heeding the plausible voice of calumny, and of
thus furnishing a medium for fostering anarchy. If evilly disposed
persons, who are bent on destruction, seize the excuse for sowing
dissension to the jeopardy of the situation, I, Yuan Shih-kai, shall
follow the behest of my fellow-countrymen in placing such men beyond
the pale of humanity.
A vital issue is involved. It is my duty to lay before you my
inmost thought, so that suspicion may be dissipated. Those who know
have the right to impose their censure. It is for public opinion to
take due notice.
[Illustration: Silk-reeling done in the open under the Walls of Peking.]
[Illustration: Modern Peking: A Run on a Bank.]
[Illustration: The Re-opening of Parliament on August 1st, 1916, after
three years of dictatorial rule.]
Moreover Yuan Shih-kai had also shown in his selection and use of
foreign Advisers, that he was determined to proceed in such a manner as
to advertise his suspicion and enmity of Japan. After the Coup d'état of
the 4th November, 1913, and the scattering of Parliament, it was an
American Adviser who was set to work on the new "Constitution"; and
although a Japanese, Dr. Ariga, who was in receipt of a princely salary,
aided and abetted this work, his endorsement of the dictatorial rule was
looked upon as traitorous by the bulk of his countrymen. Similarly, it
was perfectly well-known that Yuan Shih-kai was spending large sums of
money in Tokio in bribing certain organs of the Japanese Press and in
attempting to win adherents among Japanese members of Parliament.
Remarkable stories are current which compromise very highly-placed
Japanese but which the writer hesitates to set down in black and white
as documentary proof is not available. In any case, be this as it may,
it was felt in Tokio that the time had arrived to give a proper
definition to the relations between the two states,--the more so as Yuan
Shih-kai, by publicly proclaiming a small war-zone in Shantung within
the limits of which the Japanese were alone permitted to wage war
against the Germans, had shown himself indifferent to the majesty of
Japan. The Japanese having captured Kiaochow by assault before the end
of 1914 decided to accept the view that a _de facto_ Dictatorship
existed in China. Therefore on the 18th of January, 1915, the Japanese
Minister, Dr. Hioki, personally served on Yuan Shih-kai the now famous
Twenty-one Demands, a list designed to satisfy every present and future
need of Japanese policy and to reduce China to a state of vassalage.
CHAPTER VI
THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
Although the press of the world gave a certain prominence at the time to
the astounding _démarche_ with which we now have to deal, there was such
persistent mystery about the matter and so many official _démentis_
accompanied every publication of the facts that even to this day the
nature of the assault which Japan delivered on China is not adequately
realized, nor is the narrow escape assigned its proper place in
estimates of the future. Briefly, had there not been publication of the
facts and had not British diplomacy been aroused to action there is
little doubt that Japan would have forced matters so far that Chinese
independence would now be virtually a thing of the past. Fortunately,
however, China in her hour of need found many who were willing to
succour her; with the result that although she lost something in these
negotiations, Japan nevertheless failed in a very signal fashion to
attain her main objective. The Pyrrhic victory which she won with her
eleventh hour ultimatum will indeed in the end cost her more than would
have a complete failure, for Chinese suspicion and hostility are now so
deep-seated that nothing will ever completely eradicate them. It is
therefore only proper that an accurate record should be here
incorporated of a chapter of history which has much international
importance; and if we invite close attention to the mass of documents
that follow it is because we hold that an adequate comprehension of them
is essential to securing the future peace of the Far East. Let us first
give the official text of the original Demands:
JAPAN'S ORIGINAL TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
Translations of Documents Handed to the President, Yuan Shih-kai, by
Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, on January 18th, 1915.
GROUP I
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being desirous of
maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further
strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
between the two nations agree to the following articles:--
Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all
matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with
the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights,
interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or
otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.
Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province
of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded
or leased to a third Power under any pretext.
Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building a
railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochou-Tsinanfu
railway.
Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as
possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of
Shantung as Commercial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be
jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.
GROUP II
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the
Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position
enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,
agree to the following articles:--
Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term
of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South
Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended
to the period of 99 years.
Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either
for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for
farming.
Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business
and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.
Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese
subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they
shall be decided upon jointly.
Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the
(two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's consent
shall be first obtained before action is taken:--
(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power
to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the
purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia.
(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the
local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as
security.
Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese
Government employs political, financial or military advisers or
instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the
Japanese Government shall first be consulted.
Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and
management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to
the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the
signing of this Agreement.
GROUP III
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that
Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Co. have close relations with
each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the
two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:--
Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the
opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a
joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without
the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act
dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said
Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.
Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the
neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be
permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by
other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that
if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is
apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the
said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be
obtained.
GROUP IV
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the object
of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree
to the following special articles:--
The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power
any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.
GROUP V
Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential
Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.
Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior
of China shall be granted the right of owning land.
Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese
Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and
Chinese police to settle cases which caused no little
misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police
departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly
administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments
of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at
the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police
Service.
Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of
munitions of war (say 50% or more) of what is needed by the Chinese
Government or that there shall be established in China a
Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are
to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.
Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing
a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another
line between Nanchang and Hanchow, and another between Nanchang and
Chaochou.
Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build
railways and construct harbour-works (including dock-yards) in the
Provinces of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.
Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right
of missionary propaganda in China.[13]
The five groups into which the Japanese divided their demands possess a
remarkable interest not because of their sequence, or the style of their
phraseology, but because every word reveals a peculiar and very
illuminating chemistry of the soul. To study the original Chinese text
is to pass as it were into the secret recesses of the Japanese brain,
and to find in that darkened chamber a whole world of things which
advertise ambitions mixed with limitations, hesitations overwhelmed by
audacities, greatnesses succumbing to littlenesses, and vanities having
the appearance of velleities. Given an intimate knowledge of Far Eastern
politics and Far Eastern languages, only a few minutes are required to
re-write the demands in the sequence in which they were originally
conceived as well as to trace the natural history of their genesis.
Unfortunately a great deal is lost in their official translation, and
the menace revealed in the Chinese original partly cloaked: for by
transferring Eastern thoughts into Western moulds, things that are like
nails in the hands of soft sensitive Oriental beings are made to appear
to the steel-clad West as cold-blooded, evolutionary necessities which
may be repellent but which are never cruel. The more the matter is
studied the more convinced must the political student be that in this
affair of the 18th January we have an international _coup_ destined to
become classic in the new text-books of political science. All the way
through the twenty-one articles it is easy to see the desire for action,
the love of accomplished facts, struggling with the necessity to observe
the conventions of a stereotyped diplomacy and often overwhelming those
conventions. As the thoughts thicken and the plot develops, the effort
to mask the real intention lying behind every word plainly breaks down,
and a growing exultation rings louder and louder as if the coveted
Chinese prize were already firmly grasped. One sees as it were the
Japanese nation, released from bondage imposed by the Treaties which
have been binding on all nations since 1860, swarming madly through the
breached walls of ancient Cathay and disputing hotly the spoils of
age-old domains.
Group I, which deals with the fruits of victory in Shantung, has little
to detain us since events which have just unrolled there have already
told the story of those demands. In Shantung we have a simple and
easily-understood repeated performance of the history of 1905 and the
settlement of the Russo-Japanese War. Placed at the very head of the
list of demands, though its legitimate position should be after
Manchuria, obviously the purpose of Group I is conspicuously to call
attention to the fact that Japan had been at war with Germany, and is
still at war with her. This flourish of trumpets, after the battle is
over, however, scarcely serves to disguise that the fate of Shantung,
following so hard on the heels of the Russian débâcle in Manchuria, is
the great moral which Western peoples are called upon to note. Japan,
determined as she has repeatedly announced to preserve the peace of the
Orient by any means she deems necessary, has found the one and only
formula that is satisfactory--that of methodically annexing everything
worth fighting about.
So far so good. The insertion of a special preamble to Group II, which
covers not only South Manchuria but Eastern Inner Mongolia as well, is
an ingenious piece of work since it shows that the hot mood of conquest
suitable for Shantung must be exchanged for a certain judicial
detachment. The preamble undoubtedly betrays the guiding hand of
Viscount Kato, the then astute Minister of Foreign Affairs, who
saturated in the great series of international undertakings made by
Japan since the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, clearly believes
that the stately Elizabethan manner which still characterizes British
official phrasing is an admirable method to be here employed. The
preamble is quite English; it is so English that one is almost lulled
into believing that one's previous reasoning has been at fault and that
Japan is only demanding what she is entitled to. Yet study Group II
closely and subtleties gradually emerge. By boldly and categorically
placing Eastern Inner Mongolia on precisely the same footing as Southern
Manchuria--though they have nothing in common--the assumption is made
that the collapse in 1908 of the great Anglo-American scheme to run a
neutral railway up the flank of Southern Manchuria to Northern Manchuria
(the once celebrated Chinchow-Aigun scheme), coupled with general
agreement with Russia which was then arrived at, now impose upon China
the necessity of publicly resigning herself to a Japanese overlordship
of that region. In other words, the preamble of Group II lays down that
Eastern Inner Mongolia has become part and parcel of the Manchurian
Question because Japan has found a parallel for what she is doing in the
acts of European Powers.
These things, however, need not detain us. Not that Manchuria or the
adjoining Mongolian plain is not important; not that the threads of
destiny are not woven thickly there. For it is certain that the vast
region immediately beyond the Great Wall of China is the Flanders of the
Far East--and that the next inevitable war which will destroy China or
make her something of a nation must be fought on that soil just as two
other wars have been fought there during the past twenty years. But this
does not belong to contemporary politics; it is possibly an affair of
the Chinese army of 1925 or 1935. Some day China will fight for
Manchuria if it is impossible to recover it in any other way,--nobody
need doubt that. For Manchuria is absolutely Chinese--people must
remember. No matter how far the town-dwelling Japanese may invade the
country during the next two or three decades, no matter what large
alien garrisons may be planted there, the Chinese must and will remain
the dominant racial element, since their population which already
numbers twenty-five millions is growing at the rate of half a million a
year, and in a few decades will equal the population of a first-class
European Power.
When we reach Group III we touch matters that are not only immediately
vital but quite new in their type of audacity and which every one can
to-day understand since they are politico-industrial. Group III, as it
stands in the original text, is _simply the plan for the conquest of the
mineral wealth of the Yangtsze Valley_ which mainly centres round Hankow
because the vast alluvial plains of the lower reaches of this greatest
of rivers were once the floor of the Yellow Sea, the upper provinces of
Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi being the region of prehistoric forests clothing
the coasts, which once looked down upon the slowly-receding waste of
waters, and which to-day contain all the coal and iron. Hitherto every
one has always believed that the Yangtsze Valley was _par excellence_
the British sphere in China; and every one has always thought that that
belief was enough. It is true that political students, going carefully
over all published documents, have ended their search by declaring that
the matter certainly required further elucidation. To be precise, this
so-called British sphere is not an _enclave_ at all in the proper sense;
indeed it can only seem one to those who still believe that it is still
possible to pre-empt provinces by ministerial declarations. The Japanese
have been the first to dare to say that the preconceived general belief
was stupid. They know, of course, that it was a British force which
invaded the Yangtsze Valley seventy-five years ago, and forced the
signature of the Treaty of Nanking which first opened China to the
world's trade; but they are by no means impressed with the rights which
that action has been held to confer, since the mineral resources of this
region are priceless in their eyes and must somehow be won.
The study of twenty years of history proves this assumption to be
correct. Ever since 1895, Japan has been driving wedges into the
Yangtsze Valley of a peculiar kind to form the foundations for her
sweeping claims of 1915. Thus after the war with China in 1894-95, she
opened by her Treaty of Peace four ports in the Yangtsze Valley region,
Soochow, Hangchow, Chungking and Shasi; that is, at the two extreme ends
of the valley she established politico-commercial _points d'appui_ from
which to direct her campaign. Whilst the proximity of Soochow and
Hangchow to the British stronghold of Shanghai made it difficult to
carry out any "penetration" work at the lower end of the river save in
the form of subsidized steam-shipping, the case was different in Hunan
and Hupeh provinces. There she was unendingly busy, and in 1903 by a
fresh treaty she formally opened to trade Changsha, the capital of the
turbulent Hunan province. Changsha for years remained a secret centre
possessing the greatest political importance for her, and serving as a
focus for most varied activities involving Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, as
well as a vast hinterland. The great Tayeh iron-mines, although entirely
Chinese-owned, were already being tapped to supply iron-ore for the
Japanese Government Foundry at Wakamatsu on the island of Kiushiu. The
rich coal mines of Pinghsiang, being conveniently near, supplied the
great Chinese Government arsenal of Hanyang with fuel; and since Japan
had very little coal or iron of her own, she decided that it would be
best to embrace as soon as possible the whole area of interests in one
categorical demand--that is, to claim a dominant share in the Hanyang
arsenal, the Tayeh iron-mines and the Pinghsiang collieries.[14] By
lending money to these enterprises, which were grouped together under
the name of Hanyehping, she had early established a claim on them which
she turned at the psychological moment into an international question.
We can pass quickly by Group IV which is of little importance, except to
say that in taking upon herself, without consultation with the senior
ally, the duty of asking from China a declaration concerning the future
non-leasing of harbours and islands, Japan has attempted to assume a
protectorship of Chinese territory which does not belong to her
historically. It is well also to note that although Japan wished it to
appear to the world that this action was dictated by her desire to
prevent Germany from acquiring a fresh foothold in China after the war,
in reality Group IV was drafted as a general warning to the nations, one
point being that she believed that the United States was contemplating
the reorganization of the Foochow Arsenal in Fuhkien province, and that
as a corollary to that reorganization would be given the lease of an
adjoining harbour such as Santuao.
It is not, however, until we reach Group V that the real purpose of the
Japanese demands becomes unalterably clear, for in this Group we have
seven sketches of things designed to serve as the _coup de grâce_. Not
only is a new sphere--Fuhkien province--indicated; not only is the
mid-Yangtsze, from the vicinity of Kiukiang, to serve as the terminus
for a system of Japanese railways, radiating from the great river to the
coasts of South China; but the gleaming knife of the Japanese surgeon is
to aid the Japanese teacher in the great work of propaganda; the
Japanese monk and the Japanese policeman are to be dispersed like
skirmishers throughout the land; Japanese arsenals are to supply all the
necessary arms, or failing that a special Japanese arsenal is to be
established; Japanese advisers are to give the necessary advice in
finance, in politics, in every department--foreshadowing a complete and
all embracing political control. Never was a more sweeping programme of
supervision presented, and small wonder if Chinese when they learnt of
this climax exclaimed that the fate of Korea was to be their own.
For a number of weeks after the presentation of these demands everything
remained clothed in impenetrable mystery, and despite every effort on
the part of diplomatists reliable details of what was occurring could
not be obtained. Gradually, however, the admission was forced that the
secrecy being preserved was due to the Japanese threat that publicity
would be met with the harshest reprisals; and presently the veil was
entirely lifted by newspaper publication and foreign Ambassadors began
making inquiries in Tokio. The nature and scope of the Twenty-one
Demands could now be no longer hidden; and in response to the growing
indignation which began to be voiced by the press and the pressure which
British diplomacy brought to bear, Japan found it necessary to modify
some of the most important items. She had held twenty-four meetings at
the Chinese Foreign Office, and although the Chinese negotiators had
been forced to give way in such matters as extending the "leasing"
periods of railways and territories in Manchuria and in admitting the
Japanese right to succeed to all German interests and rights in Shantung
(Group I and II), in the essential matters of the Hanyehping concessions
(Group III) and the noxious demands of Group V China had stood
absolutely firm, declining even to discuss some of the items.
Accordingly Japanese diplomacy was forced to restate and re-group the
whole corpus of the demands. On the 26th April, acting under direct
instructions from Tokio, the Japanese Minister to Peking presented a
revised list for renewed consideration, the demands being expanded to
twenty-four articles (in place of the original twenty-one largely
because discussion had shown the necessity of breaking up into smaller
units some of the original articles). Most significant, however, is the
fact that Group V (which in its original form was a more vicious assault
on Chinese sovereignty than the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia of June,
1914), was so remodelled as to convey a very different meaning, the
group heading disappearing entirely and an innocent-looking exchange of
notes being asked for. It is necessary to recall that, when taxed with
making Demands which were entirely in conflict with the spirit of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Japanese Government through its ambassadors
abroad had categorically denied that they had ever laid any such Demands
on the Chinese Government. It was claimed that there had never been
twenty-one Demands, as the Chinese alleged, but only fourteen, _the
seven items of Group V being desiderata which it was in the interests of
China to endorse but which Japan had no intention of forcing upon her_.
The writer, being acquainted from first to last with everything that
took place in Peking from the 18th January to the filing of the Japanese
ultimatum of the 7th May, has no hesitation in stigmatizing this
statement as false. The whole aim and object of these negotiations was
to force through Group V. Japan would have gladly postponed _sine die_
the discussion of all the other Groups had China assented to provisions
which would have made her independence a thing of the past. Every
Chinese knew that, in the main, Group V was simply a repetition of the
measures undertaken in Korea after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 as a
forerunner to annexation; and although obviously in the case of China no
such rapid surgery could be practised, the endorsement of these measures
would have meant a virtual Japanese Protectorate. Even a cursory study
of the text that follows will confirm in every particular these capital
contentions:
JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS
Japan's Revised Demands on China, twenty-four in all, presented
April 26, 1915.
_Note on original text_:
[The revised list of articles is a Chinese translation of the
Japanese text. It is hereby declared that when a final decision is
reached, there shall be a revision of the wording of the text.]
GROUP I
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous
of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further
strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
between the two nations, agree to the following articles:--
Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all
matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with
the German Government, relating to the disposition of all rights,
interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or
otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.
Article 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung
and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased
to any Power under any pretext.
Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards the
railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to
connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to
abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China
will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.
Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as
soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung
as Commercial Ports.
(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)
The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen and the
regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the
Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.
GROUP II
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with a view to
developing their economic relations in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:--
Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that the term
of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South
Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to
99 years.
(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)
The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th
year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South
Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the
Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian
Railway Agreement stating that it may be redeemed by China after 36
years after the traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of
the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the
Republic or 2007.
Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease or
purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for
trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.
Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in
South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any
kind whatsoever.
Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two
articles, besides being required to register with the local
authorities passports which they must procure under the existing
regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and tax
regulations, which are approved by the Japanese consul. Civil and
criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried
and adjudicated by the Japanese consul; those in which the
defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese
Authorities. In either case an officer can be deputed to the court
to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and
Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by
delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law
and local usage. When the judicial system in the said region is
completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning
Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts.
Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall be
permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for
and open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, apart
from those mining areas in which mines are being prospected for or
worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely settled methods at
present in force shall be followed.
PROVINCE OF FENG-TIEN
|Locality |District |Mineral
| | |
|Niu Hsin T'ai |Pen-hsi |Coal
|Tien Shih Fu Kou |Pen-hsi |Coal
|Sha Sung Kang |Hai-lung |Coal
|T'ieh Ch'ang |Tung-hua |Coal
|Nuan Ti Tang |Chin |Coal
|An Shan Chan region |From Liaoyang to Pen-hsi |Iron
PROVINCE OF KIRIN
(Southern portion)
|Sha Sung Kang |Ho-lung |Coal and Iron
|Kang Yao |Chi-lin (Kirin) |Coal
|Chia P'i Kou |Hua-tien |Gold
Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter provide
funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if foreign capital
is required, the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for the loan
with Japanese capitalists first.
Article 5a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign loan is
to be made on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria (not
including customs and salt revenue on the security of which loans
have already been made by the Central Government), it will negotiate
for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.
Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign advisers
or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters,
are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will be employed
first.
Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a
fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement,
taking as a standard the provisions in railroad loan agreements made
heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in future, more
advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements
are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with railway loans,
the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with
Japan's wishes.
All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria
shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Convention,
remain in force.
1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign loan
is to be made on the security of the taxes of Eastern Inner
Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.
2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself provide
funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Mongolia; if
foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with the Japanese
Government first.
3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for
the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as
possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as
Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be
chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese
Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before
making a decision.
4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to
undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental
thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission.
GROUP III
The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very
intimate, if those interested in the said Company come to an
agreement with the Japanese capitalists for co-operation, the
Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The
Chinese Government further agrees that, without the consent of the
Japanese capitalists, China will not convert the Company into a
state enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use
foreign capital other than Japanese.
GROUP IV
China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with the
following principle:--
No bay, harbour, or island along the coast of China may be ceded or
leased to any Power.
Notes to be Exchanged
A
As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect
with the Kiu-kiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang-Hangchow railway, and
the Nanchang-Chaochow railway, if it is clearly ascertained that
other Powers have no objection, China shall grant the said right to
Japan.
B
As regards the rights of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect
with the Kiu-kiang-Nanchang railway, a railway from Nanchang to
Hangchow and another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese
Government shall not grant the said right to any foreign Power
before Japan comes to an understanding with the other Power which is
heretofore interested therein.
[Illustration: The Original Constitutional Drafting Committee of 1913,
photographed on the steps of the Temple of Heaven, where the Draft was
completed.]
[Illustration: A Presidential Review of Troops in the Southern Hungtung
Park outside Peking: Arrival of the President.]
NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED
The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is to be
permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, a dockyard,
a coaling station for military use, or a naval base; nor to be
authorized to set up any other military establishment. The Chinese
Government further agrees not to use foreign capital for setting up
the above mentioned construction or establishment.
Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows:--
1. The Chinese Government, shall, whenever, in future, it considers
this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese advisers.
2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire to lease or
purchase land in the interior of China for establishing schools or
hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent
thereto.
3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the Chinese
Government will send military officers to Japan to negotiate with
Japanese military authorities the matter of purchasing arms or that
of establishing a joint arsenal.
Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows:--
As relates to the question of the right of missionary propaganda the
same shall be taken up again for negotiation in future.
An ominous silence followed the delivery of this document. The Chinese
Foreign Office had already exhausted itself in a discussion which had
lasted three months, and pursuant to instructions from the Presidential
Palace prepared an exhaustive Memorandum on the subject. It was
understood by now that all the Foreign Offices in the world were
interesting themselves very particularly in the matter; and that all
were agreed that the situation which had so strangely developed was very
serious. On the 1st May, proceeding by appointment to the Waichiaopu
(Foreign Office) the Japanese Minister had read to him the following
Memorandum which it is very necessary to grasp as it shows how
solicitous China had become of terminating the business before there was
an open international break. It will also be seen that this Memorandum
was obviously composed for purpose of public record, the fifth group
being dealt with in such a way as to fix upon Japan the guilt of having
concealed from her British Ally matters which conflicted vitally with
the aims and objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty.
MEMORANDUM
Read by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Hioki, the Japanese
Minister, at a Conference held at Wai Chiao Pu, May 1, 1915.
The list of demands which the Japanese Government first presented to
the Chinese Government consists of five groups, the first relating
to Shantung, the second relating to South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia, the third relating to Hanyehping Company, the fourth
asking for non-alienation of the coast of the country, and the fifth
relating to the questions of national advisers, national police,
national arms, missionary propaganda, Yangtsze Valley railways, and
Fukien Province. Out of profound regard for the intentions
entertained by Japan, the Chinese Government took these momentous
demands into grave and careful consideration and decided to
negotiate with the Japanese Government frankly and sincerely what
were possible to negotiate. This is a manifestation to Japan of the
most profound regard which the Chinese Government entertains for the
relations between the two nations.
Ever since the opening of the negotiations China has been doing her
best to hasten their progress holding as many as three conferences a
week. As regards the articles in the second group, the Chinese
Government being disposed to allow the Japanese Government to
develop the economic relations of the two countries in South
Manchuria, realizing that the Japanese Government attaches
importance to its interests in that region, and wishing to meet the
hope of Japan, made a painful effort, without hesitation, to agree
to the extension of the 25-year lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, the
36-year period of the South Manchurian Railway and the 15-year
period of the Antung-Mukden Railway, all to 99 years; and to abandon
its own cherished hopes to regain control of these places and
properties at the expiration of their respective original terms of
lease. It cannot but be admitted that this is a most genuine proof
of China's friendship for Japan.
As to the right of opening mines in South Manchuria, the Chinese
Government has already agreed to permit Japanese to work mines
within the mining areas designated by Japan. China has further
agreed to give Japan a right of preference in the event of borrowing
foreign capital for building railways or of making a loan on the
security of the local taxes in South Manchuria. The question of
revising the arrangement for the Kirin-Changchun Railway has been
settled in accordance with the proposal made by Japan. The Chinese
Government has further agreed to employ Japanese first in the event
of employing foreign advisers on political, military, financial and
police matters.
Furthermore, the provision about the repurchase period in the South
Manchurian Railway was not mentioned in Japan's original proposal.
Subsequently, the Japanese Government alleging that its meaning was
not clear, asked China to cancel the provision altogether. Again,
Japan at first demanded the right of Japanese to carry on farming in
South Manchuria, but subsequently she considered the word "farming"
was not broad enough and asked to replace it with the phrase
"agricultural enterprises." To these requests the Chinese
Government, though well aware that the proposed changes could only
benefit Japan, still acceded without delay. This, too, is a proof of
China's frankness and sincerity towards Japan.
As regards matters relating to Shantung the Chinese Government has
agreed to a majority of the demands.
The question of inland residence in South Manchuria is, in the
opinion of the Chinese Government, incompatible with the treaties
China had entered into with Japan and other Powers, still the
Chinese Government did its best to consider how it was possible to
avoid that incompatibility. At first, China suggested that the
Chinese Authorities should have full rights of jurisdiction over
Japanese settlers. Japan declined to agree to it. Thereupon China
reconsidered the question and revised her counter-proposal five or
six times, each time making some definite concession, and went so
far to agree that all civil and criminal cases between Chinese and
Japanese should be arranged according to existing treaties. Only
cases relating to land or lease contracts were reserved to be
adjudicated by Chinese Courts, as a mark of China's sovereignty over
the region. This is another proof of China's readiness to concede as
much as possible.
Eastern Inner Mongolia is not an enlightened region as yet, and the
conditions existing there are entirely different from those
prevailing in South Manchuria. The two places, therefore, cannot be
considered in the same light. Accordingly, China agreed to open
commercial marts first, in the interests of foreign trade.
The Hanyehping Company mentioned in the third group is entirely a
private company, and the Chinese Government is precluded from
interfering with it and negotiating with another government to make
any disposal of the same as the Government likes, but having regard
for the interests of the Japanese capitalists, the Chinese
Government agreed that whenever, in future, the said company and the
Japanese capitalists should arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for
co-operation, China will give her assent thereto. Thus the interests
of the Japanese capitalists are amply safeguarded.
Although the demand in the fourth group asking for a declaration not
to alienate China's coast is an infringement of her sovereign
rights, yet the Chinese Government offered to make a voluntary
pronouncement so far as it comports with China's sovereign rights.
Thus, it is seen that the Chinese Government, in deference to the
wishes of Japan, gave a most serious consideration even to those
demands, which gravely affect the sovereignty and territorial rights
of China as well as the principle of equal opportunity and the
treaties with foreign Powers. All this was a painful effort on the
part of the Chinese Government to meet the situation--a fact of
which the Japanese Government must be aware.
As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all infringe China's
sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers or the principle of
equal opportunity. Although Japan did not indicate any difference
between this group and the preceding four in the list which she
presented to China in respect to their character, the Chinese
Government, in view of their palpably objectionable features,
persuaded itself that these could not have been intended by Japan as
anything other than Japan's mere advice to China. Accordingly China
has declared from the very beginning that while she entertains the
most profound regard for Japan's wishes, she was unable to admit
that any of these matters could be made the subject of an
understanding with Japan. Much as she desired to pay regard to
Japan's wishes, China cannot but respect her own sovereign rights
and the existing treaties with other Powers. In order to be rid of
the seed for future misunderstanding and to strengthen the basis of
friendship, China was constrained to iterate the reasons for
refusing to negotiate on any of the articles in the fifth group, yet
in view of Japan's wishes China has expressed her readiness to state
that no foreign money was borrowed to construct harbour work in
Fukien Province. Thus it is clear that China went so far as to see a
solution for Japan of a question that really did not admit of
negotiation. Was there, then, evasion, on the part of China?
Now, since the Japanese Government has presented a revised list of
demands and declared at the same time, that it will restore the
leased territory of Kiaochow, the Chinese Government reconsiders the
whole question and herewith submits a new reply to the friendly
Japanese Government.
In this reply the unsettled articles in the first group are stated
again for discussion.
As regards the second group, those articles which have already been
initialled are omitted. In connection with the question of inland
residence the police regulation clause has been revised in a more
restrictive sense. As for the trial of cases relating to land and
lease contracts the Chinese Government now permits the Japanese
Consul to send an officer to attend the proceedings.
Of the four demands in connection with that part of Eastern Inner
Mongolia which is within the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the
Jehol intendency, China agrees to three.
China, also, agrees to the article relating to the Hanyehping
Company as revised by Japan.
It is hoped that the Japanese Government will appreciate the
conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Government in making this final
concession and forthwith give her assent thereto.
There is one more point. At the beginning of the present
negotiations it was mutually agreed to observe secrecy but
unfortunately a few days after the presentation of the demands by
Japan an Osaka newspaper published an "Extra" giving the text of the
demands. The foreign and the Chinese press has since been paying
considerable attention to this question and frequently publishing
pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese comments in order to call forth the
World's conjecture--a matter which the Chinese Government deeply
regrets.
The Chinese Government has never carried on any newspaper campaign
and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly declared
this to the Japanese Minster.
In conclusion, the Chinese Government wishes to express its hope
that the negotiations now pending between the two countries will
soon come to an end and whatever misgivings foreign countries
entertain toward the present situation may be quickly dispelled.
The Peking Government, although fully aware of the perils now
confronting it, had dared to draft a complete reply to the revised
Demands and had reduced Japanese redundancy to effective limits. Not
only were various articles made more compact, but the phraseology
employed conveyed unmistakably, if in a somewhat subtle way, that China
was not a subordinate State treating with a suzerain. Moreover, after
dealing succinctly and seriously with Groups I, II and III, the Chinese
reply terminates abruptly, the other points in the Japanese List being
left entirely unanswered. It is important to seize these points in the
text that follows.
CHINA'S REPLY TO REVISED DEMANDS
China's Reply of May 1, 1915, to the Japanese Revised Demands of
April 26, 1915.
GROUP I
The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, being desirous
of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further
strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
between the two nations, agree to the following articles:--
Article I. The Chinese Government declares that they will give full
assent to all matters upon which the Japanese and German Governments
may hereafter mutually agree, relating to the disposition of all
interests, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or recorded cases,
possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.
The Japanese Government declares that when the Chinese Government
give their assent to the disposition of interests above referred to,
Japan will restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China; and
further recognize the right of the Chinese Government to participate
in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany.
Article 2. The Japanese Government consents to be responsible for
the indemnification of all losses occasioned by Japan's military
operation around the leased territory of Kiaochow. The customs,
telegraphs and post offices within the leased territory of Kiaochow
shall, prior to the restoration of the said leased territory to
China, be administered as heretofore for the time being. The
railways and telegraph lines erected by Japan for military purposes
are to be removed forthwith. The Japanese troops now stationed
outside the original leased territory of Kiaochow are now to be
withdrawn first, those within the original leased territory are to
be withdrawn on the restoration of the said leased territory to
China.
Article 3. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung
and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased
to any Power under any pretext.
Article 4. The Chinese Government consent that as regards the
railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to
connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany is willing to
abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China
will approach Japanese capitalists for a loan.
Article 5. The Chinese Government engage, in the interest of trade
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as
possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as
Commercial Ports.
(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)
The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the
regulations are to be drafted by the Chinese Government, but the
Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.
Article 6. If the Japanese and German Governments are not able to
come to a definite agreement in future in their negotiations
respecting transfer, etc., this provisional agreement contained in
the foregoing articles shall be void.
GROUP II[15]
The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, with a view to
developing their economic relations in South Manchuria, agree to the
following articles:--
Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by arrangement
with the owners, lease land required for erecting suitable buildings
for trade and manufacture or agricultural enterprises.
Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in
South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any
kind whatsoever.
Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two
articles, besides being required to register with the local
authorities passports which they must procure under the existing
regulations, shall also observe police rules and regulations and pay
taxes in the same manner as Chinese. Civil and criminal cases shall
be tried and adjudicated by the authorities of the defendant
nationality and an officer can be deputed to attend the proceedings.
But all cases purely between Japanese subjects and mixed cases
between Japanese or Chinese, relating to land or disputes arising
from lease contracts, shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese
Authorities and the Japanese Consul may also depute an officer to
attend the proceedings. When the judicial system in the said
Province is completely reformed, all the civil and criminal cases
concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law
courts.
RELATING TO EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA
(To be Exchanged by Notes)
1. The Chinese Government declare that China will not in future
pledge the taxes, other than customs and salt revenue of that part
of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria
and Jehol Intendency, as security for raising a foreign loan.
2. The Chinese Government declare that China will herself provide
funds for building the railways in the part of Eastern Inner
Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol
Intendency; if foreign capital is required, China will negotiate
with Japanese capitalists first, provided this does not conflict
with agreements already concluded with other Powers.
The Chinese Government agree, in the interest of trade and for the
residence of foreigners, to open by China herself certain suitable
places in that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction
of South Manchurian and the Jehol Intendency, as Commercial Marts.
The regulations for the said Commercial Marts will be made in
accordance with those of other Commercial Marts opened by China
herself.
GROUP III
The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very
intimate, if the said Company comes to an agreement with the
Japanese capitalists for co-operation, the Chinese Government shall
forthwith give their consent thereto. The Chinese Government further
declare that China will not convert the company into a state
enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use
foreign capital other than Japanese.
Letter to be addressed by the Japanese Minister to the Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Excellency: I have the honour to state that a report has reached me
that the Chinese Government have given permission to foreign nations
to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling
stations for military use, naval bases and other establishments for
military purposes; and further, that the Chinese Government are
borrowing foreign capital for putting up the above-mentioned
constructions or establishments. I shall be much obliged if the
Chinese Government will inform me whether or not these reports are
well founded in fact.
Reply to be addressed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to
the Japanese Minister.
Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
Excellency's Note of.... In reply I beg to state that the Chinese
Government have not given permission to foreign Powers to construct,
on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for
military use, naval bases or other establishments for military
purposes; nor do they contemplate to borrow foreign capital for
putting up such constructions or establishments.
Within forty-eight hours of this passage-at-arms of the 1st May it was
understood in Peking that Japan was meditating a serious step. That
vague feeling of unrest which so speedily comes in capitals when
national affairs reach a crisis was very evident, and the word
"ultimatum" began to be whispered. It was felt that whilst China had
held to her rights to the utmost and had received valuable indirect
support from both England and the United States, the world-situation was
such that it would be difficult to prevent Japan from proceeding to
extremities. Accordingly there was little real surprise when on the 7th
May Japan filed an ultimatum demanding a satisfactory reply within 48
hours to her Revised Demands--failing which those steps deemed necessary
would be taken. A perusal of the text of the Ultimatum will show an
interesting change in the language employed. Coaxing having failed, and
Japan being _now convinced that so long as she did not seek to annex the
rights of other Foreign Powers in China open opposition could not be
offered to her_, states her case very defiantly. One significant point,
however, must be carefully noted--that she agrees "to detach Group V
from the present negotiations and to discuss it separately in the
future." It is this fact which remains the sword of Damocles hanging
over China's head; and until this sword has been flung back into the
waters of the Yellow Sea the Far Eastern situation will remain perilous.
JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO CHINA
Japan's Ultimatum delivered by the Japanese Minister to the Chinese
Government, on May 7th, 1915.
The reason why the Imperial Government opened the present
negotiations with the Chinese Government is first to endeavour to
dispose of the complications arising out of the war between Japan
and China, and secondly to attempt to solve those various questions
which are detrimental to the intimate relations of China and Japan
with a view to solidifying the foundation of cordial friendship
subsisting between the two countries to the end that the peace of
the Far East may be effectually and permanently preserved. With this
object in view, definite proposals were presented to the Chinese
Government in January of this year, and up to to-day as many as
twenty-five conferences have been held with the Chinese Government
in perfect sincerity and frankness.
In the course of the negotiation the Imperial Government have
consistently explained the aims and objects of the proposals in a
conciliatory spirit, while on the other hand the proposals of the
Chinese Government, whether important or unimportant, have been
attended to without any reserve.
It may be stated with confidence that no effort has been spared to
arrive at a satisfactory and amicable settlement of those questions.
The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals was practically
at an end at the twenty-fourth conference; that is on the 17th of
the last month. The Imperial Government, taking a broad view of the
negotiation and in consideration of the points raised by the Chinese
Government, modified the original proposals with considerable
concessions and presented to the Chinese Government on the 26th of
the same month the revised proposals for agreement, and at the same
time it was offered that, on the acceptance of the revised
proposals, the Imperial Government would, at a suitable opportunity,
restore, with fair and proper conditions, to the Chinese Government
the Kiaochow territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial
Government had made a great sacrifice.
On the 1st of May, the Chinese Government delivered the reply to the
revised proposals of the Japanese Government, which is contrary to
the expectations of the Imperial Government. The Chinese Government
not only did not give a careful consideration to the revised
proposals but even with regard to the offer of the Japanese
Government to restore Kiaochow to the Chinese Government the latter
did not manifest the least appreciation for Japan's good will and
difficulties.
From the commercial and military point of view Kiaochow is an
important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire
sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisition the
Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China. But with the
object of increasing the future friendly relations of the two
countries, they went to the extent of proposing its restoration, yet
to their great regret, the Chinese Government did not take into
consideration the good intention of Japan and manifest appreciation
of her difficulties. Furthermore, the Chinese Government not only
ignored the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government in offering
the restoration of Kiaochow Bay, but also in replying to the revised
proposals they even demanded its unconditional restoration; and
again China demanded that Japan should bear the responsibility of
paying indemnity for all the unavoidable losses and damages
resulting from Japan's military operations at Kiaochow; and still
further in connection with the territory of Kiaochow China advanced
other demands and declared that she has the right of participation
at the future peace conference to be held between Japan and Germany.
Although China is fully aware that the unconditional restoration of
Kiaochow and Japan's responsibility of indemnification for the
unavoidable losses and damages can never be tolerated by Japan yet
she purposely advanced these demands and declared that this reply
was final and decisive.
Since Japan could not tolerate such demands the settlement of the
other questions, however compromising it may be, would not be to her
interest. The consequence is that the present reply of the Chinese
Government is, on the whole, vague and meaningless.
Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Government to the other
proposals in the revised list of the Imperial Government, such as
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where Japan particularly
has geographical, commercial, industrial and strategic relations, as
recognized by all the nations, and made more remarkable in
consequence of the two wars in which Japan was engaged the Chinese
Government overlooks these facts and does not respect Japan's
position in that place. The Chinese Government even freely altered
those articles which the Imperial Government, in a compromising
spirit, have formulated in accordance with the statement of the
Chinese Representatives thereby making the statements of the
Representatives an empty talk; and on seeing them conceding with the
one hand and withholding with the other it is very difficult to
attribute faithfulness and sincerity to the Chinese authorities.
As regards the articles relating to the employment of advisers, the
establishment of schools, and hospitals, the supply of arms and
ammunition and the establishment of arsenals and railway concessions
in South China in the revised proposals they were either proposed
with the proviso that the consent of the Power concerned must be
obtained, or they are merely to be recorded in the minutes in
accordance with the statements of the Chinese delegates, and thus
they are not in the least in conflict either with Chinese
sovereignty or her treaties with the Foreign Powers, yet the Chinese
Government in their reply to the proposals, alleging that these
proposals are incompatible with their sovereign rights and treaties
with Foreign Powers, defeat the expectations of the Imperial
Government. However, in spite of such attitude of the Chinese
Government, the Imperial Government, though regretting to see that
there is no room for further negotiations, yet warmly attached to
the preservation of the peace of the Far East, is still hoping for a
satisfactory settlement in order to avoid the disturbance of the
relations.
So in spite of the circumstances which admitted no patience, they
have reconsidered the feelings of the Government of their
neighbouring country and, with the exception of the article relating
to Fukien which is to be the subject of an exchange of notes as has
already been agreed upon by the Representatives of both nations,
will undertake to detach the Group V from the present negotiation
and discuss it separately in the future. Therefore the Chinese
Government should appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial
Government by immediately accepting without any alteration all the
articles of Group I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in
connection with Fukien province in Group V as contained in the
revised proposals presented on the 26th of April.
The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope
that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a
satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock P.M. on the 9th day of May. It is
hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or
at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps they
may deem necessary.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
Accompanying Ultimatum delivered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
by the Japanese Minister, May 7th, 1915.
1. With the exception of the question of Fukien to be arranged by an
exchange of notes, the five articles postponed for later negotiation
refer to (a) the employment of advisers, (b) the establishment of
schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in South China,
(d) the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishment of
arsenals and (e) right of missionary propaganda.
2. The acceptance by the Chinese Government of the article relating
to Fukien may be either in the form as proposed by the Japanese
Minister on the 26th of April or in that contained in the Reply of
the Chinese Government of May 1st. Although the Ultimatum calls for
the immediate acceptance by China of the modified proposals
presented on April 26th, without alteration but it should be noted
that it merely states the principle and does not apply to this
article and articles 4 and 5 of this note.
3. If the Chinese Government accept all the articles as demanded in
the Ultimatum the offer of the Japanese Government to restore
Kiaochow to China, made on the 26th of April, will still hold good.
4. Article 2 of Group II relating to the lease or purchase of land,
the terms "lease" and "purchase" may be replaced by the terms
"temporary lease" and "perpetual lease" or "lease on consultation,"
which means a long-term lease with its unconditional renewal.
Article 4 of Group II relating to the approval of police laws and
Ordinances and local taxes by the Japanese Council may form the
subject of a secret agreement.
5. The phrase "to consult with the Japanese Government" in
connection with questions of pledging the local taxes for raising
loans and the loans for the construction of railways, in Eastern
Inner Mongolia, which is similar to the agreement in Manchuria
relating to the matters of the same kind, may be replaced by the
phrase "to consult with the Japanese capitalists."
The article relating to the opening of trade marts in Eastern Inner
Mongolia in respect to location and regulations, may, following
their precedent set in Shantung, be the subject of an exchange of
notes.
6. From the phrase "those interested in the Company" in Group III of
the revised list of demands, the words "those interested in" may be
deleted.
7. The Japanese version of the Formal Agreement and its annexes
shall be the official text or both the Chinese and Japanese shall be
the official texts.
Whilst it would be an exaggeration to say that open panic followed the
filing of this document, there was certainly very acute alarm,--so much
so that it is to-day known in Peking that the Japanese Legation cabled
urgently to Tokio that even better terms could be obtained if the matter
was left to the discretion of the men on the spot. But the Japanese
Government had by now passed through a sufficiently anxious time itself,
being in possession of certain unmistakable warnings regarding what was
likely to happen after a world-peace had come,--if matters were pressed
too far. Consequently nothing more was done, and on the following day
China signified her acceptance of the Ultimatum in the following terms.
_Reply of the Chinese Government to the Ultimatum of the Japanese
Government, delivered to the Japanese Minister by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs on the 8th of May, 1915._
On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock P.M. the Chinese
Government received an Ultimatum from the Japanese Government
together with an Explanatory Note of seven articles. The Ultimatum
concluded with the hope that the Chinese Government by six o'clock
P.M. on the 9th of May will give a satisfactory reply, and it is
hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or
at the specified time, the Japanese Government will take steps she
may deem necessary.
The Chinese Government with a view to preserving the peace of the
Far East hereby accepts, with the exception of those five articles
of Group V postponed for later negotiation, all the articles of
Group I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in connection
with Fukien Province in Group V as contained in the revised
proposals presented on the 26th of April, and in accordance with the
Explanatory Note of seven articles accompanying the Ultimatum of the
Japanese Government with the hope that thereby all the outstanding
questions are settled, so that the cordial relationship between the
two countries may be further consolidated. The Japanese Minister is
hereby requested to appoint a day to call at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to make the literary improvement of the text and sign the
Agreement as soon as possible.
Thus ended one of the most extraordinary diplomatic negotiations ever
undertaken in Peking.
FOOTNOTES:
[13] Refers to preaching Buddhism.
[14] The reader will observe, that the expression "Hanyehping
enterprises" is compounded by linking together characters denoting the
triple industry.
[15] Six articles found in Japan's Revised Demands are omitted here as
they had already been initialled by the Chinese Foreign Minister and the
Japanese Minister.
CHAPTER VII
THE ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
The key to this remarkable business was supplied by a cover sent
anonymously to the writer during the course of these negotiations with
no indication as to its origin. The documents which this envelope
contained are so interesting that they merit attention at the hands of
all students of history, explaining as they do the psychology of the
Demands as well as throwing much light on the manner in which the
world-war has been viewed in Japan.
The first document is purely introductory, but is none the less
interesting. It is a fragment, or rather a _précis_ of the momentous
conversation which took place between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese
Minister when the latter personally served the Demands on the Chief
Executive and took the opportunity to use language unprecedented even in
the diplomatic history of Peking.
The _précis_ begins in a curious way. After saying that "the Japanese
Minister tried to influence President Yuan Shih-kai with the following
words," several long lines of asterisks suggest that after reflection
the unknown chronicler had decided, for political reasons of the highest
importance, to allow others to guess how the "conversation" opened. From
the context it seems absolutely clear that the excised words have to
deal with the possibility of the re-establishment of the Empire in
China--a very important conclusion in view of what followed later in the
year. Indeed there is no reason to doubt that the Japanese Envoy
actually told Yuan Shih-kai that as he was already virtually Emperor it
lay within his power to settle the whole business and to secure his
position at one blow. In any case the _précis_ begins with these
illuminating sentences:
... Furthermore, the Chinese revolutionists are in close touch and
have intimate relations with numerous irresponsible Japanese, some
of whom have great influence and whose policy is for strong
measures. Our Government has not been influenced by this policy, but
if your Government does not quickly agree to these stipulations, it
will be impossible to prevent some of our irresponsible people from
inciting the Chinese revolutionists to create trouble in China.
The majority of the Japanese people are also opposed to President
Yuan and Yuan's Government. They all declare that the President
entertains anti-Japanese feeling and adopts the policy of
"befriending the Far" (Europe and America) and "antagonizing the
Near" (Japan). Japanese public opinion is therefore exceedingly
hostile.
Our Government has all along from first to last exerted its best
efforts to help the Chinese Government, and if the Chinese
Government will speedily agree to these stipulations it will have
thus manifested its friendship for Japan.
The Japanese people will then be able to say that the President
never entertained anti-Japanese feelings, or adopted the policy of
"befriending the Far and antagonizing the Near." Will not this then
be indeed a bonâ fide proof of our friendly relations?
The Japanese Government also will then be inclined to render
assistance to President Yuan's Government whenever it is
necessary....
We are admittedly living in a remarkable age which is making waste paper
of our dearest principles. But in all the welter which the world war has
made it would be difficult to find anything more extraordinary than
these few paragraphs. Japan, through her official representative, boldly
tears down the veil hiding her ambitions, and using the undoubted menace
which Chinese revolutionary activities then held for the Peking
Government, declares in so many words that unless President Yuan
Shih-kai bows his head to the dictation of Tokio, the duel which began
in Seoul twenty-five years ago would be openly resumed.
Immediately following the "conversation" is the principal document in
the dossier. This is nothing less than an exhaustive Memorandum, divided
into two sections, containing the policy advocated by the Japanese
secret society, called the Black Dragon Society, which is said to have
assumed that name on account of the members (military officers) having
studied the situation in the Heilungchiang (or "Black Dragon") province
of Manchuria. The memorandum is the most remarkable document dealing
with the Far East which has come to light since the famous Cassini
Convention was published in 1896. Written presumably late in the autumn
of 1914 and immediately presented to the Japanese Government, it may
undoubtedly be called the fulminate which exploded the Japanese mine of
the 18th January, 1915. It shows such sound knowledge of
world-conditions, and is so scientific in its detachment that little
doubt can exist that distinguished Japanese took part in its drafting.
It can therefore be looked upon as a genuine expression of the highly
educated Japanese mind, and as such cannot fail to arouse serious
misgivings. The first part is a general review of the European War and
the Chinese Question: the second is concerned with the Defensive
Alliance between China and Japan, which is looked upon as the one goal
of all Japanese Diplomacy.
PART I. THE EUROPEAN WAR AND THE CHINESE QUESTION
The present gigantic struggle in Europe has no parallel in history.
Not only will the equilibrium of Europe be affected and its effect
felt all over the globe, but its results will create a New Era in
the political and social world. Therefore, whether or not the
Imperial Japanese Government can settle the Far Eastern Question and
bring to realization our great Imperial policy depends on our being
able to skilfully avail ourselves of the world's general trend of
affairs so as to extend our influence and to decide upon a course of
action towards China which shall be practical in execution. If our
authorities and people view the present European War with
indifference and without deep concern, merely devoting their
attention to the attack on Kiaochow, neglecting the larger issues of
the war, they will have brought to nought our great Imperial policy,
and committed a blunder greater than which it can not be conceived.
We are constrained to submit this statement of policy for the
consideration of our authorities, not because we are fond of
argument but because we are deeply anxious for our national welfare.
No one at present can foretell the outcome of the European War. If
the Allies meet with reverses and victory shall crown the arms of
the Germans and Austrians, German militarism will undoubtedly
dominate the European Continent and extend southward and eastward to
other parts of the world. Should such a state of affairs happen to
take place the consequences resulting therefrom will be indeed great
and extensive. On this account we must devote our most serious
attention to the subject. If, on the other hand, the Germans and
Austrians should be crushed by the Allies, Germany will be deprived
of her present status as a Federated State under a Kaiser. The
Federation will be disintegrated into separate states, and Prussia
will have to be content with the status of a second-rate Power.
Austria and Hungary, on account of this defeat, will consequently be
divided. What their final fate shall be, no one would now venture
to predict. In the meantime Russia will annex Galicia and the
Austrian Poland: France will repossess Alsace and Lorraine: Great
Britain will occupy the German Colonies in Africa and the South
Pacific; Servia and Montenegro will take Bosnia, Herzegovina and a
certain portion of Austrian Territory; thus making such great
changes in the map of Europe that even the Napoleonic War in 1815
could not find a parallel.
When these events take place, not only will Europe experience great
changes, but we should not ignore the fact that they will occur also
in China and in the South Pacific. After Russia has replaced Germany
in the territories lost by Germany and Austria, she will hold a
controlling influence in Europe, and, for a long time to come, will
have nothing to fear from her western frontier. Immediately after
the war she will make an effort to carry out her policy of expansion
in the East and will not relax that effort until she has acquired a
controlling influence in China. At the same time Great Britain will
strengthen her position in the Yangtsze Valley and prohibit any
other country from getting a footing there. France will do likewise
in Yunnan province using it as her base of operations for further
encroachments upon China and never hesitate to extend her
advantages. We must therefore seriously study the situation
remembering always that the combined action of Great Britain,
Russia, and France will not only affect Europe but that we can even
foresee that it will also affect China.
Whether this combined action on the part of England, France and
Russia is to terminate at the end of the war or to continue to
operate, we can not now predict. But after peace in Europe is
restored, these Powers will certainly turn their attention to the
expansion of their several spheres of interest in China, and, in the
adjustment, their interests will most likely conflict with one
another. If their interests do not conflict, they will work jointly
to solve the Chinese Question. On this point we have not the least
doubt. If England, France and Russia are actually to combine for the
coercion of China, what course is to be adopted by the Imperial
Japanese Government to meet the situation? What proper means shall
we employ to maintain our influence and extend our interests within
this ring of rivalry and competition? It is necessary that we bear
in mind the final results of the European War and forestall the
trend of events succeeding it so as to be able to decide upon a
policy towards China and determine the action to be ultimately
taken. If we remain passive, the Imperial Japanese Government's
policy towards China will lose that subjective influence and our
diplomacy will be checked for ever by the combined force of the
other Powers. The peace of the Far East will be thus endangered and
even the existence of the Japanese Empire as a nation will no doubt
be imperilled. It is therefore our first important duty at this
moment to enquire of our Government what course is to be adopted to
face that general situation after the war? What preparations are
being made to meet the combined pressure of the Allies upon China?
What policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Question? When
the European War is terminated and peace restored we are not
concerned so much with the question whether it be the Dual
Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerge victorious but
whether, in anticipation of the future expansion of European
influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial
Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ force to
check the movement before this occurrence. Now is the most opportune
moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese Question. Such an
opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come. Not only
is it Japan's divine duty to act now, but present conditions in
China favour the execution of such a plan. We should by all means
decide and act at once. If our authorities do not avail themselves
of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be
encountered in future in the settlement of this Chinese Question.
Japan will be isolated from the European Powers after the war, and
will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is
now regarded. Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at
this very moment the Chinese Question?
No one--not even those who care nothing for politics--can deny that
there is in this document an astounding disclosure of the mental
attitude of the Japanese not only towards their enemies but towards
their friends as well. They trust nobody, befriend nobody, envy nobody;
they content themselves with believing that the whole world may in the
not distant future turn against them. The burden of their argument
swings just as much against their British ally as against Germany and
Austria; and the one and only matter which preoccupies Japanese who make
it their business to think about such things is to secure that Japan
shall forestall Europe in seizing control of China. It is admitted in so
many words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in the
gigantic European struggle; it is also admitted that Germany will
forever be the enemy. At the same time it is expected, should the issue
of the struggle be clear-cut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that
a new three-Power combination formed by England, France and Russia may
be made to operate against Japan. Although the alliance with England,
twice renewed since 1902, should occupy as important a place in the Far
East as the _Entente_ between England and France occupies in Europe, not
one Japanese in a hundred knows or cares anything about such an
arrangement; and even if he has knowledge of it, he coolly assigns to
his country's major international commitment a minimum and constantly
diminishing importance. In his view the British Alliance is nothing but
a piece of paper which may be consumed in the great bonfire now shedding
such a lurid light over the world. What is germane to the matter is his
own plan, his own method of taking up arms in a sea of troubles. The
second part of the Black Dragon Society's Memorandum, pursuing the
argument logically and inexorably and disclosing traces of real
political genius, makes this unalterably clear.
Having established clearly the attitude of Japan towards the world--and
more particularly towards the rival political combinations now locked
together in a terrible death-struggle, this second part of the
Memorandum is concerned solely with China and can be broken into two
convenient sections. The first section is constructive--the plan for the
reconstruction of China is outlined in terms suited to the Japanese
genius. This part begins with an illuminating piece of rhetoric.
PART II. THE CHINESE QUESTION AND THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE
It is a very important matter of policy whether the Japanese
Government, in obedience to its divine mission, shall solve the
Chinese Question in a heroic manner by making China voluntarily rely
upon Japan. To force China to such a position there is nothing else
for the Imperial Japanese Government to do but to take advantage of
the present opportunity to seize the reins of political and
financial power and to enter by all means into a defensive alliance
with her under secret terms as enumerated below:
_The Secret Terms of the Defensive Alliance_
The Imperial Japanese Government, with due respect for the
Sovereignty and Integrity of China and with the object and hope of
maintaining the peace of the Far East, undertakes to share the
responsibility of co-operating with China to guard her against
internal trouble and foreign invasion and China shall accord to
Japan special facilities in the matter of China's National Defence,
or the protection of Japan's special rights and privileges and for
these objects the following treaty of Alliance is to be entered into
between the two contracting parties:
1. When there is internal trouble in China or when she is at war
with another nation or nations, Japan shall send her army to render
assistance, to assume the responsibility of guarding Chinese
territory and to maintain peace and order in China.
2. China agrees to recognize Japan's privileged position in South
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and to cede the sovereign rights of
these regions to Japan to enable her to carry out a scheme of local
defence on a permanent basis.
3. After the Japanese occupation of Kiaochow, Japan shall acquire
all the rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Germans in
regard to railways, mines and all other interests, and after peace
and order is restored in Tsingtao, the place shall be handed back to
China to be opened as an International Treaty port.
4. For the maritime defence of China and Japan, China shall lease
strategic harbours along the coast of the Fukien province to Japan
to be converted into naval bases and grant to Japan in the said
province all railway and mining rights.
5. For the reorganization of the Chinese army China shall entrust
the training and drilling of the army to Japan.
6. For the unification of China's firearms and munitions of war,
China shall adopt firearms of Japanese pattern, and at the same time
establish arsenals (with the help of Japan) in different strategic
points.
7. With the object of creating and maintaining a Chinese Navy, China
shall entrust the training of her navy to Japan.
8. With the object of reorganizing her finances and improving the
methods of taxation, China shall entrust the work to Japan, and the
latter shall elect competent financial experts who shall act as
first-class advisers to the Chinese Government.
9. China shall engage Japanese educational experts as educational
advisers and extensively establish schools in different parts of the
country to teach Japanese so as to raise the educational standard of
the country.
10. China shall first consult with and obtain the consent of Japan
before she can enter into an agreement with another Power for making
loans, the leasing of territory, or the cession of the same.
From the date of the signing of this Defensive Alliance, Japan and
China shall work together hand-in-hand. Japan will assume the
responsibility of safeguarding Chinese territory and maintaining the
peace and order in China. This will relieve China of all future
anxieties and enable her to proceed energetically with her reforms,
and, with a sense of territorial security, she may wait for her
national development and regeneration. Even after the present
European War is over and peace is restored China will absolutely
have nothing to fear in the future of having pressure brought
against her by the foreign powers. It is only thus that permanent
peace can be secured in the Far East.
But before concluding this Defensive Alliance, two points must first
be ascertained and settled, (1) Its bearing on the Chinese
Government. (2) Its bearing on those Powers having intimate
relations with and great interests in China.
In considering its effect on the Chinese Government, Japan must try
to foresee whether the position of China's present ruler Yuan
Shih-kai shall be permanent or not; whether the present Government's
policy will enjoy the confidence of a large section of the Chinese
people; whether Yuan Shih-kai will readily agree to the Japanese
Government's proposal to enter into a treaty of alliance with us.
These are points to which we are bound to give a thorough
consideration. Judging by the attitude hitherto adopted by Yuan
Shih-kai we know he has always resorted to the policy of expediency
in his diplomatic dealings, and although he may now outwardly show
friendliness towards us, he will in fact rely upon the influence of
the different Powers as the easiest check against us and refuse to
accede to our demands. Take for a single instance, his conduct
towards us since the Imperial Government declared war against
Germany and his action will then be clear to all. Whether we can
rely upon the ordinary friendly methods of diplomacy to gain our
object or not it does not require much wisdom to decide. After the
gigantic struggle in Europe is over, leaving aside America which
will not press for advantage, China will not be able to obtain any
loans from the other Powers. With a depleted treasury, without means
to pay the officials and the army, with local bandits inciting the
poverty-stricken populace to trouble, with the revolutionists
waiting for opportunities to rise, should an insurrection actually
occur while no outside assistance can be rendered to quell it we are
certain it will be impossible for Yuan Shih-kai, single-handed, to
restore order and consolidate the country. The result will be that
the nation will be cut up into many parts beyond all hope of remedy.
That this state of affairs will come is not difficult to foresee.
When this occurs, shall we uphold Yuan's Government and assist him
to suppress the internal insurrection with the certain assurance
that we could influence him to agree to our demands, or shall we
help the revolutionists to achieve a success and realize our object
through them? This question must be definitely decided upon this
very moment so that we may put it into practical execution. If we do
not look into the future fate of China but go blindly to uphold
Yuan's Government, to enter into a Defensive Alliance with China,
hoping thus to secure a complete realization of our object by
assisting him to suppress the revolutionists, it is obviously a
wrong policy. Why? Because the majority of the Chinese people have
lost all faith in the tottering Yuan Shih-kai who is discredited and
attacked by the whole nation for having sold his country. If Japan
gives Yuan the support, his Government, though in a very precarious
state, may possibly avoid destruction. Yuan Shih-kai belongs to that
school of politicians who are fond of employing craftiness and
cunning. He may be friendly to us for a time, but he will certainly
abandon us and again befriend the other Powers when the European war
is at an end. Judging by his past we have no doubt as to what he
will do in the future. For Japan to ignore the general sentiment of
the Chinese people and support Yuan Shih-kai with the hope that we
can settle with him the Chinese Question is a blunder indeed.
Therefore in order to secure the permanent peace of the Far East,
instead of supporting a Chinese Government which can neither be long
continued in power nor assist in the attainment of our object, we
should rather support the 400,000,000 Chinese people to renovate
their corrupt Government, to change its present form, to maintain
peace and order in the land and to usher into China a new era of
prosperity so that China and Japan may in fact as well as in name be
brought into the most intimate and vital relations with each other.
China's era of prosperity is based on the China-Japanese Alliance
and this Alliance is the foundational power for the repelling of the
foreign aggression that is to be directed against the Far East at
the conclusion of the European war. This alliance is also the
foundation-stone of the peace of the world. Japan therefore should
take this as the last warning and immediately solve this question.
Since the Imperial Japanese Government has considered it imperative
to support the Chinese people, we should induce the Chinese
revolutionists, the Imperialists and other Chinese malcontents to
create trouble all over China. The whole country will be thrown into
disorder and Yuan's Government will consequently be overthrown. We
shall then select a man from amongst the most influential and most
noted of the 400,000,000 of Chinese and help him to organize a new
form of Government and to consolidate the whole country. In the
meantime our army must assist in the restoration of peace and order
in the country, and in the protection of the lives and properties of
the people, so that they may gladly tender their allegiance to the
new Government which will then naturally confide in and rely upon
Japan. It is after the accomplishment of only these things that we
shall without difficulty gain our object by the conclusion of a
Defensive Alliance with China.
For us to incite the Chinese revolutionists and malcontents to rise
in China we consider the present to be the most opportune moment.
The reason why these men cannot now carry on an active campaign is
because they are insufficiently provided with funds. If the Imperial
Government can take advantage of this fact to make them a loan and
instruct them to rise simultaneously, great commotion and disorder
will surely prevail all over China. We can intervene and easily
adjust matters.
The progress of the European War warns Japan with greater urgency of
the imperative necessity of solving this most vital of questions.
The Imperial Government cannot be considered as embarking on a rash
project. This opportunity will not repeat itself for our benefit. We
must avail ourselves of this chance and under no circumstances
hesitate. Why should we wait for the spontaneous uprising of the
revolutionists and malcontents? Why should we not think out and lay
down a plan beforehand? When we examine into the form of Government
in China, we must ask whether the existing Republic is well suited
to the national temperament and well adapted to the thoughts and
aspirations of the Chinese people. From the time the Republic of
China was established up to the present moment, if what it has
passed through is to be compared to what it ought to be in the
matter of administration and unification, we find disappointment
everywhere. Even the revolutionists themselves, the very ones who
first advocated the Republican form of government, acknowledge that
they have made a mistake. The retention of the Republican form of
Government in China will be a great future obstacle in the way of a
Chino-Japanese Alliance. And why must it be so? Because, in a
Republic the fundamental principles of government as well as the
social and moral aims of the people are distinctly different from
that of a Constitutional Monarchy. Their laws and administration
also conflict. If Japan act as a guide to China and China models
herself after Japan, it will only then be possible for the two
nations to solve by mutual effort the Far East Question without
differences and disagreements. Therefore to start from the
foundation for the purpose of reconstructing the Chinese
Government, of establishing a Chino-Japanese Alliance, of
maintaining the permanent peace of the Far East and of realizing the
consummation of Japan's Imperial policy, we must take advantage of
the present opportunity to alter China's Republican form of
Government into a Constitutional Monarchy which shall necessarily be
identical, in all its details, to the Constitutional Monarchy of
Japan, and to no other. This is really the key and first principle
to be firmly held for the actual reconstruction of the form of
Government in China. If China changes her Republican form of
Government to that of a Constitutional Monarchy, shall we, in the
selection of a new ruler, restore the Emperor Hsuan T'ung to his
throne or choose the most capable man from the Monarchists or select
the most worthy member from among the revolutionists? We think,
however, that it is advisable at present to leave this question to
the exigency of the future when the matter is brought up for
decision. But we must not lose sight of the fact that to actually
put into execution this policy of a Chino-Japanese Alliance and the
transformation of the Republic of China into a Constitutional
Monarchy, is, in reality, the fundamental principle to be adopted
for the reconstruction of China.
We shall now consider the bearing of this Defensive Alliance on the
other Powers. Needless to say, Japan and China will in no way impair
the rights and interests already acquired by the Powers. At this
moment it is of paramount importance for Japan to come to a special
understanding with Russia to define our respective spheres in
Manchuria and Mongolia so that the two countries may co-operate with
each other in the future. This means that Japan after the
acquisition of sovereign rights in South Manchuria and Inner
Mongolia will work together with Russia after her acquisition of
sovereign rights in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia to maintain
the status quo, and endeavour by every effort to protect the peace
of the Far East. Russia, since the outbreak of the European War, has
not only laid aside all ill-feelings against Japan, but has adopted
the same attitude as her Allies and shown warm friendship for us. No
matter how we regard the Manchurian and Mongolian Questions in the
future she is anxious that we find some way of settlement. Therefore
we need not doubt but that Russia, in her attitude towards this
Chinese Question, will be able to come to an understanding with us
for mutual co-operation.
The British sphere of influence and interest in China is centred in
Tibet and the Yangtsze Valley. Therefore if Japan can come to some
satisfactory arrangement with China in regard to Tibet and also give
certain privileges to Great Britain in the Yangtsze Valley, with an
assurance to protect those privileges, no matter how powerful Great
Britain might be, she will surely not oppose Japan's policy in
regard to this Chinese Question. While this present European War is
going on Great Britain has never asked Japan to render her
assistance. That her strength will certainly not enable her to
oppose us in the future need not be doubted in the least.
Since Great Britain and Russia will not oppose Japan's policy
towards China, it can readily be seen what attitude France will
adopt in regard to the subject. What Japan must now somewhat reckon
with is America. But America in her attitude towards us regarding
our policy towards China has already declared the principle of
maintaining China's territorial integrity and equal opportunity and
will be satisfied, if we, do not impair America's already acquired
rights and privileges. We think America will also have no cause for
complaint. Nevertheless America has in the East a naval force which
can be fairly relied upon, though not sufficiently strong to be
feared. Therefore in Japan's attitude towards America there is
nothing really for us to be afraid of.
Since China's condition is such on the one hand and the Powers'
relation towards China is such on the other hand, Japan should avail
herself in the meantime of the European War to definitely decide
upon a policy towards China, the most important move being the
transformation of the Chinese Government to be followed up by
preparing for the conclusion of the Defensive Alliance. The
precipitate action on the part of our present Cabinet in acceding to
the request of Great Britain to declare war against Germany without
having definitely settled our policy towards China has no real
connection with our future negotiations with China or affect the
political condition in the Far East. Consequently all intelligent
Japanese, of every walk of life throughout the land, are very deeply
concerned about the matter.
Our Imperial Government should now definitely change our dependent
foreign policy which is being directed by others into an independent
foreign policy which shall direct others, proclaiming the same with
solemn sincerity to the world and carrying it out with
determination. If we do so, even the gods and spirits will give way.
These are important points in our policy towards China and the
result depends on how we carry them out. Can our authorities firmly
make up their mind to solve this Chinese Question by the actual
carrying out of this fundamental principle? If they show
irresolution while we have this heaven-conferred chance and merely
depend on the good will of the other Powers, we shall eventually
have greater pressure to be brought against the Far East after the
European War is over, when the present equilibrium will be
destroyed. That day will then be too late for us to repent of our
folly. We are therefore impelled by force of circumstances to urge
our authorities to a quicker sense of the situation and to come to a
determination.
The first point which leaps out of this extraordinarily frank
disquisition is that the origin of the Twenty-one Demands is at last
disclosed. A perusal of the ten articles forming the basis of the
Defensive alliance proposed by the Black Dragon Society, allows us to
understand everything that occurred in Peking in the spring of 1915. As
far back as November, 1914, it was generally rumoured in Peking that
Japan had a surprise of an extraordinary nature in her diplomatic
archives, and that it would be merely a matter of weeks before it was
sprung. Comparing this elaborate memorandum of the Black Dragon Society
with the original text of the Twenty-one Demands it is plain that the
proposed plan, having been handed to Viscount Kato, had to be passed
through the diplomatic filters again and again until all gritty matter
had been removed, and an appearance of innocuousness given to it. It is
for this reason that the defensive alliance finally emerges as five
compact little "groups" of demands, with the vital things directly
affecting Chinese sovereignty labelled _desiderata_, so that Japanese
ambassadors abroad could leave very warm assurances at every Foreign
Office that there was nothing in what Japan desired which in any way
conflicted with the Treaty rights of the Powers in China. The air of
mystery which surrounded the whole business from the 18th January to the
7th May--the day of the ultimatum--was due to the fact that Japan
attempted to translate the conspiracy into terms of ordinary
intercourse, only to find that in spite of the "filtering" the
atmosphere of plotting could not be shaken off or the political threat
adequately hidden. There is an arresting piece of psychology in this.
The conviction expressed in the first portion of the Memorandum that
bankruptcy was the rock on which the Peking administration must sooner
or later split, and that the moment which Japan must seize is the
outbreak of insurrections, is also highly instructive in view of what
happened later. Still more subtle is the manner in which the ultimate
solution is left open: it is consistently admitted throughout the mass
of reasoning that there is no means of knowing whether suasion or force
will ultimately be necessary. Force, however, always beckons to Japan
because that is the simplest formula. And since Japan is the
self-appointed defender of the dumb four hundred millions, her influence
will be thrown on the side of the populace in order "to usher into China
a new era of prosperity" so that China and Japan may in fact as well as
in name be brought into the most intimate and vital relations with each
other.
The object of the subsidized insurrections is also clearly stated; it is
to alter China's republican form of government into a Constitutional
Monarchy which shall necessarily be identical in all its details to the
Constitutional Monarchy of Japan and to no other. Who the new Emperor is
to be is a point left in suspense, although we may here again recall
that in 1912 in the midst of the revolution Japan privately sounded
England regarding the advisability of lending the Manchus armed
assistance, a proposal which was immediately vetoed. But there are other
things: nothing is forgotten in the Memorandum. Russia is to be
specially placated, England to be specially negotiated with, thus
incidentally explaining Japan's recent attitude regarding the Yangtsze
Railways. Japan, released from her dependent foreign policy, that is
from a policy which is bound by conventions and treaties which others
respect, can then carry out her own plans without fear of molestation.
And this brings us to the two last documents of the dossier--the method
of subsidizing and arranging insurrections in China when and wherever
necessary.
The first document is a detailed agreement between the Revolutionary
Party and various Japanese merchants. Trained leaders are to be used in
the provinces South of the Yellow River, and the matter of result is so
systematized that the agreement specifies the amount of compensation to
be paid for every Japanese killed on active service; it declares that
the Japanese will deliver arms and ammunition in the districts of
Jihchow in Shantung and Haichow in Kiangsu; and it ends by stating that
the first instalment of cash, Yen 400,000, had been paid over in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The second document is an
additional loan agreement between the interested parties creating a
special "trading" corporation, perhaps satirically named "The Europe and
Asia Trading Company," which in a consideration of a loan of half a
million yen gives Japanese prior rights over all the mines of China.
ALLEGED SECRET AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN SUN WEN (SUN YAT SEN) AND THE
JAPANESE
In order to preserve the peace in the Far East, it is necessary for
China and Japan to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance
whereby in case of war with any other nation or nations Japan shall
supply the military force while China shall be responsible for the
finances. It is impossible for the present Chinese Government to
work hand in hand with the Japanese Government nor does the Japanese
Government desire to co-operate with the former. Consequently
Japanese politicians and merchants who have the peace of the Far
East at heart are anxious to assist China in her reconstruction. For
this object the following Agreement is entered into by the two
parties:
1. Before an uprising is started, Terao, Okura, Tseji Karoku and
their associates shall provide the necessary funds, weapons and
military force, but the funds so provided must not exceed 1,500,000
yen and rifles not to exceed 100,000 pieces.
2. Before the uprising takes place the loan shall be temporarily
secured by 10,000,000 yen worth of bonds to be issued by Sun Wen
(Sun Yat Sen). It shall however, be secured afterwards by all the
movable properties of the occupied territory. (See Article 14 of
this Agreement.)
3. The funds from the present loan and military force to be provided
are for operations in the provinces South of the Yellow River, viz.:
Yunnan, Kweichow, Hunan, Hupeh, Szechuan, Kiangsi, Anhuei, Kiangsu
Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. If it is intended to invade
the Northern provinces North of the Yellow River, Tseji Karoku and
his associates shall participate with the revolutionists in all
deliberations connected with such operations.
4. The Japanese volunteer force shall be allowed from the date of
their enrolment active service pay in accordance with the
regulations of the Japanese army. After the occupation of a place,
the two parties will settle the mode of rewarding the meritorious
and compensating the family of the killed, adopting the most
generous practice in vogue in China and Japan. In the case of the
killed, compensation for each soldier shall, at the least, be more
than 1,000 yen.
5. Wherever the revolutionary army might be located the Japanese
military officers accompanying these expeditions shall have the
right to advise a continuation or cessation of operations.
6. After the revolutionary army has occupied a region and
strengthened its defences, all industrial undertakings and railway
construction and the like, not mentioned in the Treaties with other
foreign Powers, shall be worked with joint capital together with the
Japanese.
7. On the establishment of a new Government in China, all Japan's
demands on China shall be recognized by the new Government as
settled and binding.
8. All Japanese Military Officers holding the rank of Captain or
higher ranks engaged by the Chinese revolutionary army shall have
the privilege of being continued in their employment with a limit as
to date and shall have the right to ask to be thus employed.
9. The loan shall be paid over in three instalments. The first
instalment will be 400,000 yen, the second instalment ... yen and
the third instalment ... yen. After the first instalment is paid
over, Okura who advances the loan shall have the right to appoint
men to supervise the expenditure of the money.
10. The Japanese shall undertake to deliver all arms and ammunition
in the Districts of Jih Chao and Haichow (in Shantung and Kiangsu,
South of Kiaochow).
11. The payment of the first instalment of the loan shall be made
not later than three days after the signing of this Agreement.
12. All the employed Japanese Military officers and Japanese
volunteers are in duty bound to obey the orders of the Commander of
the revolutionary army.
13. The Commander of the revolutionary army shall have the right to
send back to Japan those Japanese military officers and Japanese
volunteers who disobey his orders and their passage money shall not
be paid if such decision meets with the approval of three or more of
the Japanese who accompany the revolutionary force.
14. All the commissariat departments in the occupied territory must
employ Japanese experts to co-operate in their management.
15. This Agreement takes effect immediately it is signed by the two
parties.
The foregoing fifteen articles have been discussed several times
between the two parties and signed by them in February. The first
instalment of 400,000 yen has been paid according to the terms of
this Agreement.
LOAN AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY REPRESENTED BY
CHANG YAO-CHING AND HIS ASSOCIATES OF THE FIRST PART AND KAWASAKI
KULANOSKE OF THE SECOND PART
1. The Europe and Asia Trading Company undertakes to raise a loan of
500,000 yen. After the Agreement is signed and sealed by the
contracting parties the Japanese Central Bank shall hand over 3/10
of the loan as the first instalment. When Chang Yao-Ching and his
associates arrive at their proper destination the sum of 150,000 yen
shall be paid over as the second instalment. When final arrangements
are made the third and last instalment of 200,000 yen shall be paid.
2. When money is to be paid out, the Europe and Asia Trading Company
shall appoint supervisors. Responsible individuals of the
contracting parties shall jointly affix their seals (to the cheques)
before money is drawn for expenditure.
3. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall secure a volunteer
force of 150 men, only retired officers of the Japanese army to be
eligible.
4. On leaving Japan the travelling expenses and personal effects of
the volunteers shall be borne by themselves. After reaching China,
Chang Yao-Ching and his associates shall give the volunteers the pay
of officers of the subordinate grade according to the established
regulations of the Japanese army.
5. If a volunteer is wounded while on duty Chang Yao-Ching and his
associates shall pay him a provisional compensation of not exceeding
1,000 yen. When wounded seriously a provisional compensation of
5,000 yen shall be paid as well as a life pension in accordance with
the rules of the Japanese army. If a volunteer meets with an
accident, thus losing his life, an indemnity of 50,000 yen shall be
paid to his family.
6. If a volunteer is not qualified for duty Chang Yao-Ching and his
associates shall have the power to dismiss him. All volunteers are
subject to the orders of Chang Yao-Ching and his associates and to
their command in the battlefields.
7. When volunteers are required to attack a certain selected place
it shall be their duty to do so. But the necessary expenses for the
undertaking shall be determined beforehand by both parties after
investigating into existing conditions.
8. The volunteer force shall be organized after the model of the
Japanese army. Two Japanese officers recommended by the Europe and
Asia Trading Company shall be employed.
9. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the power to
dispose of the public properties in the places occupied by the
volunteer force.
10. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the first
preference for working the mines in places occupied and protected by
the volunteer force.
And here ends this extraordinary collection of papers. Is fiction mixed
with fact--are these only "trial" drafts, or are they real documents
signed, sealed, and delivered? The point seems unimportant. The thing of
importance is the undoubted fact that assembled and treated in the way
we have treated them they present a complete and arresting picture of
the aims and ambitions of the ordinary Japanese; of their desire to push
home the attack to the last gasp and so to secure the infeodation of
China.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MONARCHIST PLOT
THE PAMPHLET OF YANG TU
A shiver of impotent rage passed over the country when the nature and
acceptance of the Japanese Ultimatum became generally known. The
Chinese, always an emotional people, responding with quasi-feminine
volubility to oppressive acts, cried aloud at the ignominy of the
diplomacy which had so cruelly crucified them. One and all declared that
the day of shame which had been so harshly imposed upon them would never
be forgotten and that Japan would indeed pay bitterly for her policy of
extortion.
Two movements were started at once: one to raise a National Salvation
Fund to be applied towards strengthening the nation in any way the
government might decide; the other, to boycott all Japanese articles of
commerce. Both soon attained formidable proportions. The nation became
deeply and fervently interested in the double-idea; and had Yuan
Shih-kai possessed true political vision there is little doubt that by
responding to this national call he might have ultimately been borne to
the highest pinnacles of his ambitions without effort on his part. His
oldest enemies now openly declared that henceforth he had only to work
honourably and whole-heartedly in the nation's interest to find them
supporting him, and to have every black mark set against his name wiped
out.
In these circumstances what did he do? His actions form one of the most
incredible and, let it be said, contemptible chapters of contemporary
history.
In dealing with the origins of the Twenty-one Demands we have already
discussed the hints the Japan Representative had officially made when
presenting his now famous Memorandum. Briefly Yuan Shih-kai had been
told in so many words that since he was already autocrat of all the
Chinese, he had only to endorse the principle of Japanese guidance in
his administration to find that his Throne would be as good as publicly
and solidly established. Being saturated with the doleful diplomacy of
Korea, and seeing in these proposals a mere trap, Yuan Shih-kai, as we
have shown, had drawn back in apparent alarm. Nevertheless the words
spoken had sunk in deep, for the simple and excellent reason that ever
since the _coup d'état_ of the 4th November, 1913, the necessity of
"consolidating" his position by something more permanent than a display
of armed force had been a daily subject of conversation in the bosom of
his family. The problem, as this misguided man saw it, was simply by
means of an unrivalled display of cunning to profit by the Japanese
suggestion, and at the same time to leave the Japanese in the lurch.
His eldest son, an individual of whom it has been said that he had
absorbed every theory his foreign teachers had taught him without being
capable of applying a single one, was the leader in this family
intrigue. The unhappy victim of a brutal attempt to kill him during the
Revolution, this eldest son had been for years semi-paralyzed: but
brooding over his disaster had only fortified in him the resolve to
succeed his father as legitimate Heir. Having saturated himself in
Napoleonic literature, and being fully aware of how far a bold leader
can go in times of emergency, he daily preached to his father the
necessity of plucking the pear as soon as it was ripe. The older man,
being more skilled and more cautious in statecraft than this youthful
visionary, purposely rejected the idea so long as its execution seemed
to him premature. But at last the point was reached when he was
persuaded to give the monarchy advocates the free hand they solicited,
being largely helped to this decision by the argument that almost
anything in China could be accomplished under cover of the war,--_so
long as vested foreign interests were not jeopardized_.
In accordance with this decision, very shortly after the 18th January,
the dictator's lieutenants had begun to sound the leaders of public
opinion regarding the feasibility of substituting for the nominal
Republic a Constitutional Monarchy. Thus, in a highly characteristic
way, all through the tortuous course of the Japanese negotiations, to
which he was supposed to be devoting his sole attention in order to save
his menaced fatherland, Yuan Shih-kai was assisting his henchmen to
indoctrinate Peking officialdom with the idea that the salvation of the
State depended more on restoring on a modified basis the old empire than
in beating off the Japanese assault. It was his belief that if some
scholar of national repute could be found, who would openly champion
these ideas and urge them with such persuasiveness and authority that
they became accepted as a Categorical Imperative, the game would be as
good as won, the Foreign Powers being too deeply committed abroad to pay
much attention to the Far East. The one man who could have produced that
result in the way Yuan Shih-kai desired to see it, the brilliant
reformer Liang Chi-chao, famous ever since 1898, however, obstinately
refused to lend himself to such work; and, sooner than be involved in
any way in the plot, threw up his post of Minister of Justice and
retired to the neighbouring city of Tientsin from which centre he was
destined to play a notable part.
This hitch occasioned a delay in the public propaganda, though not for
long. Forced to turn to a man of secondary ability, Yuan Shih-kai now
invoked the services of a scholar who had been known to be his secret
agent in the Old Imperial Senate under the Manchus--a certain Yang
Tu--whose constant appeals in that chamber had indeed been the means of
forcing the Manchus to summon Yuan Shih-kai back to office to their
rescue on the outbreak of the Wuchang rebellion in 1911. After very
little discussion everything was arranged. In the person of this
ex-Senator, whose whole appearance was curiously Machiavellian and
decadent, the neo-imperialists at last found their champion.
Events now moved quickly enough. In the Eastern way, very few weeks
after the Japanese Ultimatum, a society was founded called the Society
for the Preservation of Peace (_Chou An Hui_) and hundreds of
affiliations opened in the provinces. Money was spent like water to
secure adherents, and when the time was deemed ripe the now famous
pamphlet of Yang Tu was published broadcast, being in everybody's hands
during the idle summer month of August. This document is so remarkable
as an illustration of the working of that type of Chinese mind which
has assimilated some portion of the facts of the modern world and yet
remains thoroughly reactionary and illogical, that special attention
must be directed to it. Couched in the form of an argument between two
individuals--one the inquirer, the other the expounder--it has something
of the Old Testament about it both in its blind faith and in its
insistence on a few simple essentials. It embodies everything essential
to an understanding of the old mentality of China which has not yet been
completely destroyed. From a literary standpoint it has also much that
is valuable because it is so naïve; and although it is concerned with
such a distant region of the world as China its treatment of modern
political ideas is so bizarre and yet so acute that it will repay study.
It was not, however, for some time, that the significance of this
pamphlet was generally understood. It was such an amazing departure from
old precedents for the Peking Government to lend itself to public
propaganda as a revolutionary weapon that the mind of the people refused
to credit the fatal turn things were taking. But presently when it
became known that the "Society for the Preservation of Peace" was
actually housed in the Imperial City and in daily relations with the
President's Palace; and that furthermore the Procurator-General of
Peking, in response to innumerable memorials of denunciation, having
attempted to proceed against the author and publishers of the pamphlet,
as well as against the Society, had been forced to leave the capital
under threats against his life, the document was accepted at its
face-value. Almost with a gasp of incredulity China at last realized
that Yuan Shih-kai had been seduced to the point of openly attempting to
make himself Emperor. From those August days of 1915 until the 6th June
of the succeeding year, when Fate had her own grim revenge, Peking was
given up to one of the most amazing episodes that has ever been
chronicled in the dramatic history of the capital. It was as if the old
city walls, which had looked down on so much real drama, had determined
to lend themselves to the staging of an unreal comedy. For from first to
last the monarchy movement had something unreal about it, and might have
been the scenario of some vast picture-play. It was acting pure and
simple--acting done in the hope that the people might find it so
admirable that they would acclaim it as real, and call the Dictator
their King. But it is time to turn to the arguments of Yang Tu and allow
a Chinese to picture the state of his country:
A DEFENCE OF THE MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT
PART I
Mr. Ko (or "the stranger"): Since the establishment of the Republic
four years have passed, and upon the President depends the
preservation of order at home and the maintenance of prestige
abroad. I suppose that after improving her internal administration
for ten or twenty years, China will become a rich and prosperous
country, and will be able to stand in the front rank with western
nations.
Mr. Hu: No! No! If China does not make any change in the form of
government there is no hope for her becoming strong and rich; there
is even no hope for her having a constitutional government. I say
that China is doomed to perish.
Mr. Ko: Why so?
Mr. Hu: The republican form of government is responsible. The
Chinese people are fond of good names, but they do not care much
about the real welfare of the nation. No plan to save the country is
possible. The formation of the Republic as a result of the first
revolution has prevented that.
Mr. Ko: Why is it that there is no hope of China's becoming strong?
Mr. Hu: The people of a republic are accustomed to listen to the
talk of equality and freedom which must affect the political and
more especially the military administration. In normal circumstances
both the military and student classes are required to lay great
emphasis upon unquestioned obedience and respect for those who hold
high titles. The German and Japanese troops observe strict
discipline and obey the orders of their chiefs. That is why they are
regarded as the best soldiers in the world. France and America are
in a different position. They are rich but not strong. The sole
difference is that Germany and Japan are ruled by monarchs while
France and America are republics. Our conclusion therefore is that
no republic can be strong.
But since the French and American peoples possess general education
they are in a position to assume responsibility for the good
government of their nations which they keep in good order. On that
account, although these republics are not strong in dealing with the
Powers, they can maintain peace at home. China, however, is unlike
these countries, for her standard of popular education is very low.
Most of the Chinese soldiers declare as a commonplace: "We eat the
imperial food and we must therefore serve the imperial master." But
now the Imperial family is gone, and for it has been substituted an
impersonal republic, of which they know nothing whatsoever. These
soldiers are now law-abiding because they have awe-inspiring and
respectful feelings for the man at the head of the state. But as the
talk of equality and freedom has gradually influenced them, it has
become a more difficult task to control them. As an example of this
corrupt spirit, the commanders of the Southern troops formerly had
to obey their subordinate officers and the subordinate officers had
to obey their soldiers. Whenever there was an important question to
be discussed, the soldiers demanded a voice and a share in the
solution. These soldiers were called the republican army. Although
the Northern troops have not yet become so degenerate, still they
never hesitate to disobey the order of their superiors whenever they
are ordered to proceed to distant localities. Now we have come to
the point when we are deeply satisfied if the army of the Republic
does not openly mutiny! We cannot expect any more from them save to
hope that they will not mutiny and that they will be able to
suppress internal disturbances. In the circumstances there is no use
talking about resistance of a foreign invasion by these soldiers. As
China, a republic, is situated between two countries, Japan and
Russia, both of which have monarchical governments, how can we
resist their aggression once diplomatic conversations begin? From
this it is quite evident that there is nothing which can save China
from destruction. Therefore I say there is no hope of China becoming
strong.
Mr. Ko: But why is it that there is no hope of China ever becoming
rich?
Mr. Hu: People may not believe that while France and America are
rich China must remain poor. Nevertheless, the reason why France and
America are rich is that they were allowed to work out their own
salvation without foreign intervention for many years, and that at
the same time they were free from internal disturbances. If any
nation wishes to become rich, it must depend upon industries for its
wealth. Now, what industries most fear is disorder and civil war.
During the last two years order has been restored and many things
have returned to their former state, but our industrial condition is
the same as under the Manchu Dynasty. Merchants who lost their
capital during the troublous times and who are now poor have no way
of retrieving their losses, while those who are rich are unwilling
to invest their money in industrial undertakings, fearing that
another civil war may break out at any moment, since they take the
recent abortive second revolution as their warning. In future, we
shall have disquietude every few years; that is whenever the
president is changed. Then our industrial and commercial condition
will be in a still worse condition. If our industries are not
developed, how can we expect to be strong? Take Mexico as a warning.
There is very little difference between that country and China,
which certainly cannot be compared with France and America.
Therefore I say there is no hope for China ever becoming rich.
Mr. Ko: Why is it that you say there is no hope for China having a
Constitutional Government?
Mr. Hu: A true republic must be conducted by many people possessing
general education, political experience and a certain political
morality. Its president is invested with power by the people to
manage the general affairs of the state. Should the people desire to
elect Mr. A their president to-day and Mr. B to-morrow, it does not
make much difference; for the policy of the country may be changed
together with the change of the president without there being any
danger of disorder or chaos following such change. We have a very
different problem to solve in China. The majority of our people do
not know what the republic is, nor do they know anything about a
Constitution nor have they any true sense of equality and freedom.
Having overthrown the Empire and established in its place a republic
they believe that from now on they are subservient to no one, and
they think they can do as they please. Ambitious men hold that any
person may be president, and if they cannot get the presidency by
fair means of election they are prepared to fight for it with the
assistance of troops and robbers. The second revolution is an
illustration of this point. From the moment that the Emperor was
deposed, the centralization of power in the government was
destroyed; and no matter who may be at the head of the country, he
cannot restore peace except by the re-establishment of the monarchy.
So at the time when the republic was formed, those who had
previously advocated Constitutional Government turned into
monarchists. Although we have a Provisional Constitution now and we
have all kinds of legislative organs, which give to the country an
appearance of a constitutional government, China has a
constitutional government in name only and is a monarchy in spirit.
Had the government refrained from exercising monarchical power
during the last four years, the people could not have enjoyed one
day of peace. In short, China's republic must be governed by a
monarchy through a constitutional government. If the constitutional
government cannot govern the republic, the latter cannot remain. The
question of constitutional government is therefore very important,
but it will take ten or twenty years before it can be solved.
Look at the people of China to-day! They know that something
terrible is going to come sooner or later. They dare not think of
the future. The corrupt official lines his pocket with unrighteous
money, preparing to flee to foreign countries or at least to the
Foreign Settlements for safety. The cautious work quietly and do not
desire to earn merit but merely try to avoid giving offence. The
scholars and politicians are grandiloquent and discourse upon their
subjects in a sublime vein, but they are no better than the corrupt
officials. As for our President, he can remain at the head of the
State for a few years. At most he may hold office for several
terms,--or perhaps for his whole life. Then questions must arise as
to who shall succeed him; how to elect his successor; how many
rivals will there be; whether their policies will be different from
his, etc., etc. He personally has no idea regarding the solution of
these questions. Even if the president is a sagacious and capable
man he will not be able to make a policy for the country or fix a
Constitution which will last for a hundred years. Because of this he
is driven merely to adopt a policy so as to maintain peace in his
own country and to keep the nation intact so long as he may live. In
the circumstances such a president can be considered the best
executive head we can have. Those who are worshippers of the
constitutional government cannot do more than he does. Here we find
the reason for the silence of the former advocates of a
constitutional administration. They have realized that by the
formation of the republic the fundamental problem of the country has
been left unsolved. In this wise it happens that the situation is
something like this. Whilst the country is governed by an able
president, the people enjoy peace and prosperity. But once an
incapable man assumes the presidency, chaos will become the order of
the day, a state of affairs which will finally lead to the overthrow
of the president himself and the destruction of the country. In such
circumstances, how can you devise a general policy for the country
which will last for a hundred years? I say that there is no hope for
China establishing a truly constitutional government.
Mr. Ko: In your opinion there is no hope for China becoming strong
and rich or for her acquiring a constitutional government. She has
no choice save ultimately to disappear. And yet is there no plan
possible whereby she may be saved?
Mr. Hu: If China wishes to save herself from ultimate disappearance
from the face of the earth, first of all she must get rid of the
republic. Should she desire wealth and strength, she must adopt a
constitutional government. Should she want constitutional government
she must first establish a monarchy.
Mr. Ko: How is it that should China desire wealth and strength she
must first adopt the constitutional form of government?
Mr. Hu: Wealth and strength is the object of the country, and a
constitutional government is the means to realizing this object. In
the past able rulers could accomplish their purpose without a
constitutional government. We refer to Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty
and Emperor Tai Chung of the Tang Dynasty. However, when these able
rulers died their system of administration died with them. This
contention can be supported by numerous historical instances; but
suffice to say that in China as well as in Europe, the lack of a
constitutional government has been the cause of the weakness of most
of the nations in ancient times. Japan was never known as a strong
nation until she adopted a constitutional government. The reason is
this: when there is no constitutional government, the country cannot
continue to carry out a definite policy.
Within comparatively recent times there was born in Europe the
constitutional form of government. European nations adopted it, and
they became strong. The most dangerous fate that can confront a
nation is that after the death of an able ruler the system of
administration he has established disappears with him; but this the
constitutional form of government is able to avert. Take for
instance William I. of Germany who is dead but whose country
continues to this day strong and prosperous. It is because of
constitutional government. The same is true of Japan, which has
adopted constitutional government and which is becoming stronger and
stronger every day. The change of her executive cannot affect her
progress in respect of her strength. From this it is quite clear
that constitutional government is a useful instrument for building
up a country. It is a government with a set of fixed laws which
guard the actions of both the people and the president none of whom
can overstep the boundary as specified in the laws. No ruler,
whether be he a good man or a bad man, can change one iota of the
laws. The people reap the benefit of this in consequence. It is easy
to make a country strong and rich but it is difficult to establish a
constitutional government. When a constitutional government has been
established, everything will take care of itself, prosperity
following naturally enough. The adoption of a constitutional
government at the present moment can be compared to the problem of a
derailed train. It is hard to put the train back on the track, but
once on the track it is very easy to move the train. What we should
worry about is not how to make the country rich and prosperous, but
how to form a genuine constitutional government. Therefore I say
that if China desires to be strong and prosperous, she should first
of all adopt the constitutional form of government.
Mr. Ko: I do not understand why it is that a monarchy should be
established before the constitutional form of government can be
formed?
Mr. Hu: Because if the present system continues there will be
intermittent trouble. At every change of the president there will be
riot and civil war. In order to avert the possibility of such awful
times place the president in a position which is permanent. It
follows that the best thing is to make him Emperor. When that bone
of contention is removed, the people will settle down to business
and feel peace in their hearts, and devote their whole energy and
time to the pursuit of their vocations. It is logical to assume that
after the adoption of the monarchy they will concentrate their
attention on securing a constitutional government which they know is
the only salvation for their country. As for the Emperor, knowing
that he derives his position from the change from a republic, and
filled with the desire of pacifying the people, he cannot help
sanctioning the formation of the constitutional form of government
which in addition, will insure to his offspring the continuation of
the Throne. Should he adopt any other course, he will be exposed to
great personal danger. If he is broadminded, he will further
recognize the fact that if no constitutional form of government is
introduced, his policy will perish after his death. Therefore I say
that before the adoption of the constitutional form of government, a
monarchy should be established. William I. of Germany and the
Emperor Meiji of Japan both tried the constitutional form of
government and found it a success.
Mr. Ko: Please summarize your discussion.
Mr. Hu: In short, the country cannot be saved except through the
establishment of a constitutional form of government. No
constitutional government can be formed except through the
establishment of a monarchy. The constitutional form of government
has a set of fixed laws, and the monarchy has a definite head who
cannot be changed, in which matters lies the source of national
strength and wealth.
Mr. Ko: What you have said in regard to the adoption of the
constitutional monarchy as a means of saving the country from
dismemberment is quite true, but I would like to have your opinion
on the relative advantages and disadvantages of a republic and a
monarchy, assuming that China adopts the scheme of a monarchy.
Mr. Hu: I am only too glad to give you my humble opinion on this
momentous question.
Mr. Ko: You have said that China would be devastated by contending
armies of rival leaders trying to capture the presidency. At what
precise moment will that occur?
Mr. Hu: The four hundred million people of China now rely upon the
President alone for the protection of their lives and property. Upon
him likewise falls the burden of preserving both peace and the
balance of power in the Far East. There is no time in the history of
China that the Head of the State has had to assume such a heavy
responsibility for the protection of life and property and for the
preservation of peace in Asia; and at no time in our history has the
country been in greater danger than at the present moment. China can
enjoy peace so long as His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai remains the
President, and no longer. Should anything befall the President,
every business activity will at once be suspended, shops will be
closed, disquietude will prevail, people will become panic-stricken,
the troops uncontrollable, and foreign warships will enter our
harbours. European and American newspapers will be full of special
dispatches about the complicated events in China, and martial law
will be declared in every part of the country. All this will be due
to the uncertainty regarding the succession to the presidency.
It will be seen from the first section of this long and extraordinary
pamphlet how the author develops his argument. One of his major premises
is the inherent unruliness of Republican soldiery,--the armies of
republics not to be compared with the armed forces of monarchies,--and
consequently constituting a perpetual menace to good government. Passing
on from this, he lays down the proposition that China cannot hope to
become rich so long as the fear of civil war is ever-present; and that
without a proper universal education a republic is an impossibility. The
exercise of monarchical power in such circumstances can only be called
an inevitable development,--the one goal to be aimed at being the
substitution of Constitutional Government for the dictatorial rule. The
author deals at great length with the background to this idea, playing
on popular fears to reinforce his casuistry. For although constitutional
government is insisted upon as the sole solution, he speedily shows that
this constitutionalism will depend more on the benevolence of the
dictator than on the action of the people. And should his advice be not
heeded, when Fortune wills that Yuan Shih-kai's rule shall end, chaos
will ensue owing to the "uncertainty" regarding the succession.
Here the discussion reaches its climax--for the demand that salvation be
sought by enthroning Yuan Shih-kai now becomes clear and unmistakable.
Let the author speak for himself.
Mr. Ko: But it is provided in the Constitutional Compact that a
president must be selected from among the three candidates whose
names are now kept in a golden box locked in a stone room. Do you
think this provision is not sufficient to avert the terrible times
which you have just described?
Mr. Hu: The provision you have mentioned is useless. Can you find
any person who is able to be at the head of the state besides His
Excellency Yuan Shih-kai? The man who can succeed President Yuan
must enjoy the implicit confidence of the people and must have
extended his influence all over the country and be known both at
home and abroad. He must be able to maintain order, and then no
matter what the constitution provides, he will be unanimously
elected President. He must also be able to assure himself that the
two other candidates for the presidency have no hope for success in
the presidential campaign. The provision in the constitution, as
well as the golden casket in which the names of the three candidates
are kept which you have mentioned, are nothing but nominal measures.
Moreover there is no man in China who answers the description of a
suitable, successor which I have just given. Here arises a difficult
problem; and what has been specified in the Constitutional Compact
is a vain attempt to solve it. It is pertinent to ask why the
law-makers should not have made the law in such a way that the
people could exercise their free choice in the matter of the
presidential successor? The answer is that there is reason to fear
that a bad man may be elected president by manipulations carried out
with a masterly hand, thereby jeopardizing the national welfare.
This fear has influenced the constitution-makers to settle upon
three candidates from among whom the president must be elected. Then
it may be asked why not fix upon one man instead of upon three since
you have already deprived the people of part of their freedom? The
answer is that: there is not a single man whose qualifications are
high enough to be the successor. As it is, three candidates of equal
qualifications are put forward for the people to their selection. No
matter how one may argue this important question from the legal
point of view, there is the fact that the law makers fixed upon
three candidates for the presidency, believing that we do not
possess a suitable presidential successor. The vital question of the
day setting aside all paper talk, is whether or not China has a
suitable man to succeed President Yuan Shih-kai. Whether or not the
constitutional compact can be actually carried out in future I do
not know; but I do know that that instrument will eventually become
ineffective.
Mr. Ko: I desire a true picture of the chaos which you have hinted
will ensue in this country. Can you tell me anything along that
line?
Mr. Hu: In a time of confusion, the soldiers play the most
important part, virtuous and experienced and learned statesmen being
unable to cope with the situation. The only qualification which a
leader at such a time needs to possess is the control of the
military, and the ability to suppress Parliament. Should such a
person be made the president, he cannot long hold his enviable post
in view of the fact that he cannot possess sufficient influence to
control the troops of the whole country. The generals of equal rank
and standing will not obey each other, while the soldiers and
politicians, seeing a chance in these differences for their
advancement, will stir up their feelings and incite one another to
fight. They will fight hard among themselves. The rebels, who are
now exiles in foreign lands, taking advantage of the chaos in China,
will return in very little time to perpetrate the worst crimes known
in human history. The royalists who are in retirement will likewise
come out to fish in muddy waters. Persons who have the
qualifications of leaders will be used as tools to fight for the
self-aggrandizement of those who use them. I do not wish to mention
names, but I can safely predict that more than ten different parties
will arise at the psychological moment. Men who will never be
satisfied until they become president, and those who know they
cannot get the presidency but who are unwilling to serve others,
will come out one after another. Confusion and disturbance will
follow with great rapidity. Then foreign countries which have
entertained wild ambitions, availing themselves of the distressful
situation in China will stir up ill-feelings among these parties and
so increase the disturbances. When the proper time comes, various
countries, unwilling to let a single country enjoy the privilege of
controlling China, will resort to armed intervention. In consequence
the eastern problem will end in a rupture of the international
peace. Whether China will be turned at that time into a battleground
for the Chinese people or for the foreign Powers I cannot tell you.
It is too dreadful to think of the future which is enshrouded in a
veil of mystery. However, I can tell you that the result of this
awful turmoil will be either the slicing of China like a melon or
the suppression of internal trouble with foreign assistance which
will lead to dismemberment. As to the second result some explanation
is necessary. After foreign countries have helped us to suppress
internal disturbances, they will select a man of the type of Li Wang
of Korea, who betrayed his country to Japan, and make him Emperor of
China. Whether this man will be the deposed emperor or a member of
the Imperial family or the leader of the rebel party, remains to be
seen. In any event he will be a figurehead in whose hand will not be
vested political, financial and military power, which will be
controlled by foreigners. All the valuable mines, various kinds of
industries and our abundant natural resources will likewise be
developed by others. China will thus disappear as a nation. In
selecting a man of the Li Wang type, the aforesaid foreign countries
will desire merely to facilitate the acquisition of China's
territory. But there can be easily found such a man who bears
remarkable resemblance to Li Wang, and who will be willing to make a
treaty with the foreigners whereby he unpatriotically sells his
country in exchange for a throne which he can never obtain or keep
without outside assistance. His procedure will be something like
this: He will make an alliance with a foreign nation by which the
latter will be given the power to carry on foreign relations on
behalf of his country. In the eyes of foreigners, China will have
been destroyed, but the people will continue deceived and made to
believe that their country is still in existence. This is the first
step. The second step will be to imitate the example of Korea and
make a treaty with a certain power, whereby China is annexed and the
throne abolished. The imperial figurehead then flees to the foreign
country where he enjoys an empty title. Should you then try to make
him devise means for regaining the lost territory it will be too
late. For China will have been entirely destroyed by that time. This
is the second procedure in the annexation of Chinese territory. The
reason why that foreign country desires to change the republic into
the monarchy is to set one man on the throne and make him witness
the whole process of annexation of his country, thereby simplifying
the matter. When that time has come, the people will not be
permitted to make any comment upon the form of government suitable
for China, or upon the destruction of their country. The rebels who
raised the standard of the republic have no principles and if they
now find that some other tactics will help to increase their power
they will adopt these tactics. China's republic is doomed, no matter
what happens. If we do not change it ourselves, others will do it
for us. Should we undertake the change ourselves we can save the
nation: otherwise there is no hope for China to remain a nation. It
is to be regretted that our people now assume an attitude of
indifference, being reluctant to look forward to the future, and
caring not what may happen to them and their country. They are
doomed to become slaves after the loss of their national
independence.
Mr. Ko: I am very much frightened by what you have said. You have
stated that the adoption of a constitutional monarchy can avert such
terrible consequences; but is there not likely to be disturbance
during the change of the republic to monarchy, since such
disturbance must always accompany the presidential election?
Mr. Hu: No comparison can be formed between these two things. There
may be tumult during the change of the form of government, but it
will be better in comparison with the chaos that will some day ensue
in the republic. There is no executive head in the country when a
republic endeavours to select a presidential successor. At such a
time, the ambitious try to improve their future, while the patriotic
are at a loss now to do anything which will assist in the
maintenance of order. Those who are rebellious rise in revolt while
those who are peace-loving are compelled by circumstances to join
their rank and file. Should the form of government be transformed
into a monarchical one, and should the time for change of the head
of the state come, the successor having already been provided for,
that will be well-known to the people. Those who are patriotic will
exert their utmost to preserve peace, and as result the
heir-apparent can peacefully step on the throne. There are persons
who will contend for the office of the President, but not for the
throne. Those who contend for the office of President do not commit
any crime, but those who try to seize the throne are rebels. Who
dares to contend for the Throne?
At the time of the change of the president in a republic, ambitious
persons arise with the intention of capturing this most honourable
office, but not so when the emperor is changed. Should there be a
body of persons hostile to the heir-apparent, that body must be very
small. Therefore I say that the enemies of a succeeding Emperor are
a few, whilst there are many in the case of a presidential
successor. This is the first difference.
Those who oppose the monarchy are republican enthusiasts or persons
who desire to make use of the name of the republic for their own
benefit. These persons will raise trouble even without the change of
the government. They do not mind disturbing the peace of the country
at the present time when the republic exists. It is almost certain
that at the first unfurling of the imperial flags they will at once
grasp such an opportune moment and try to satisfy their ambition.
Should they rise in revolt at the time when the Emperor is changed
the Government, supported by the loyal statesmen and officials,
whose interests are bound up with the welfare of the imperial family
and whose influence has spread far and wide, will be able to deal
easily with any situation which may develop. Therefore I declare
that the successor to the throne has more supporters while the
presidential successor has few. This is the second difference
between the republic and the constitutional monarchy.
Why certain persons will contend for the office of the President can
be explained by the fact that there is not a single man in the
country whose qualifications are above all the others. Succession to
the throne is a question of blood-relation with the reigning
Emperor, and not a question of qualifications. The high officials
whose qualifications are unusually good are not subservient to
others but they are obedient to the succeeding Emperor, because of
their gratitude for what the imperial family has done for them, and
because their well-being is closely associated with that of the
imperial household. I can cite an historical incident to support my
contention. Under the Manchu Dynasty, at one time General Chu
Chung-tang was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Mohammedan
rebellion. He appointed General Liu Sung San generalissimo. Upon the
death of General Liu, Chu Chung-tang appointed his subordinate
officers to lead the army but the subordinate officers competed for
power. Chu Chung-tang finally made the step-son of General Liu the
Commander-in-Chief and the officers and soldiers all obeyed his
order as they did his father's. But it may be mentioned that this
young man was not more able than any of his father's subordinate
commanders. Nevertheless prestige counted. He owed his success to
his natural qualification, being a step-son to General Liu. So is
the case with the emperor whose successor nobody dares openly to
defy--to say nothing of actually disputing his right to the throne.
This is the third difference between the republic and the monarchy.
I will not discuss the question: as to whether there being no
righteous and able heir-apparent to succeed his Emperor-father,
great danger may not confront the nation. However, in order to
provide against any such case, I advocate that the formation of a
constitutional government should go hand in hand with the
establishment of the monarchy. At first it is difficult to establish
and carry out a constitutional government, but once it is formed it
will be comparatively easy. When the constitutional government has
been established, the Emperor will have to seek his fame in such
useful things as the defence of his country and the conquest of his
enemy. Everything has to progress, and men possessing European
education will be made use of by the reigning family. The first
Emperor will certainly do all he can to capture the hearts of the
people by means of adopting and carrying out in letter as well as in
spirit constitutional government. The heir-apparent will pay
attention to all new reforms and new things. Should he do so, the
people will be able to console themselves by saying that they will
aways be the people of a constitutional monarchy even after the
succession to the throne of the heir-apparent. When the time comes
for the heir-apparent to mount the throne the people will extend to
him their cordial welcome, and there will be no need to worry about
internal disturbances.
Therefore, I conclude that the successor to the presidential chair
has to prevent chaos by wielding the monarchical power, while the
new emperor can avert internal disquietude forever by means of his
constitutional government. This is the fourth difference between the
republic and the monarchy. These four differences are accountable
for the fact that there will not be as much disturbance at the time
of the change of emperors as at the time when the president is
changed.
Mr. Ko: I can understand what you have said with regard to the
advantages and disadvantages of the republic and the monarchy, but
there are many problems connected with the formation of a
constitutional monarchy which we have to solve. Why is it that the
attempt to introduce constitutional government during the last years
of the Manchu Dynasty proved a failure?
Mr. Hu: The constitutional government of the Manchu Dynasty was one
in name only, and as such the forerunner of the revolution of 1911.
Towards the end of the Manchu Dynasty, the talk of starting a
revolution to overthrow the imperial régime was in everybody's
mouth, although the constitutional party endeavoured to accomplish
something really useful. At that time His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai
was the grand chancellor, and realizing the fact that nothing except
the adoption of a constitutional government could save the throne of
the Manchus, he assumed the leadership of the constitutional party,
which surpassed in strength the revolutionary party as a result of
his active support. The people's hearts completely turned to the
constitutional party for salvation, while the revolutionary party
lost that popular support which it had formerly enjoyed. Then it
seemed that the imperial household would soon adopt the
constitutional monarchy and the threatening revolution could be
averted. Unfortunately, the elaborate plans of His Excellency Yuan
Shih-kai regarding the adoption of the constitutional government
were not carried out by the imperial household. A great change took
place: His Excellency retired to his native province; and after
losing this powerful leader the constitutional party was pitilessly
shattered. A monarchist party suddenly made its appearance on the
political arena to assist the imperial family, which pretended to do
its very best for the development of a constitutional government,
but secretly exerted itself to the utmost for the possession and
retention of the real power. This double-dealing resulted in
bringing about the revolution of 1911. For instance, when the people
cried for the convening of a parliament, the imperial family said
"No." The people also failed to secure the abolition of certain
official organs for the imperialists. They lost confidence in the
Reigning House, and simultaneously the revolutionary party raised
its banner and gathered its supporters from every part of the
country. As soon as the revolt started at Wuchang the troops all
over the country joined in the movement to overthrow the Manchu
Dynasty. The members of the Imperial Senate, most of whom were
members of the constitutional party, could not help showing their
sympathy with the revolutionists. At last the imperial household
issued a proclamation containing Nineteen Articles--a veritable
_magna charta_--but it was too late. The constitutional government
which was about to be formed was thus laid aside. What the imperial
family did was the mere organization of an advisory council. A
famous foreign scholar aptly remarked: "A false constitutional
government will eventually result in a true revolution." In trying
to deceive the people by means of a false constitutional government
the imperial house encompassed its own destruction. Once His
Excellency Yuan Shih-kai stated in a memorial to the throne that
there were only two alternatives: to give the people a
constitutional government or to have them revolt. What happened
afterwards is a matter of common knowledge. Therefore I say that the
government which the imperial family attempted to form was not a
constitutional government.
Mr. Ko: Thank you for your discussion of the attempt of the imperial
household to establish a constitutional government; but how about
the Provisional Constitution, the parliament and the cabinet in the
first and second years of the Republic? The parliament was then so
powerful that the government was absolutely at its mercy, thereby
disturbing the peaceful condition of the country. The people have
tasted much of the bitterness of constitutional government. Should
you mention the name of constitutional government again they would
be thoroughly frightened. Is that true?
Mr. Hu: During the first and second years of the Republic, in my
many conversations with the members of the Kuo Ming Tang, I said
that the republic could not form an efficient method of control, and
that there would be an over centration of power through the adoption
of monarchical methods of ruling, knowing as well as I did the
standards of our people. When the members of the Kuo Ming Tang came
to draw up the Provisional Constitution they purposely took
precisely the opposite course of action and ignored my suggestion.
It may, however, be mentioned that the Provisional Constitution made
in Nanking was not so bad, but after the government was removed to
Peking, the Kuo Ming Tang people tied the hand and foot of the
government by means of the Cabinet System and other restrictions
with the intention of weakening the power of the central
administration in order that they might be able to start another
revolution. From the dissolution of the Nanking government to the
time of the second revolution they had this one object in view,
namely to weaken the power of the central administration so that
they could contend for the office of the president by raising
further internal troubles in China. Those members of the Kuo Ming
Tang who made the constitution know as well as I that China's
republic must be governed through a monarchical administration; and
therefore the unreasonable restrictions in the Provisional
Constitution were purposely inserted.
Mr. Ko: What is the difference between the constitutional government
which you have proposed and the constitutional government which the
Manchu Dynasty intended to adopt?
Mr. Hu: The difference lies in the proper method of procedure and in
honesty of purpose, which are imperative if constitutional
government expects to be successful.
Mr. Ko: What do you mean by the proper method of procedure?
Mr. Hu: The Provisional Constitution made in Nanking, which was
considered good, is not suitable for insertion in the future
constitution, should a constitutional monarchy be established. In
making a constitution for the future constitutional monarchy we have
to consult the constitutions of the monarchies of the world. They
can be divided into three classes which are represented by England,
Prussia and Japan. England is advanced in its constitutional
government, which has been in existence for thousands of years,
(_sic_) and is the best of all in the world. The English king enjoys
his empty title and the real power of the country is exercised by
the parliament, which makes all the laws for the nation. As to
Prussia, the constitutional monarchy was established when the people
started a revolution. The ruler of Prussia was compelled to convene
a parliament and submitted to that legal body a constitution.
Prussia's constitution was made by its ruler together with the
parliament. Its constitutional government is not so good as the
English. As to the Japanese constitutional monarchy, the Emperor
made a constitution and then convened a parliament. The
constitutional power of the Japanese people is still less than that
of the Prussian people. According to the standard of our people we
cannot adopt the English constitution as our model, for it is too
advanced. The best thing for us to do is to adopt part of the
Prussian and part of the Japanese in our constitution-making. As our
people are better educated now than ever before, it is decidedly
unwise entirely to adopt the Japanese method, that is, for the
Emperor to make a constitution without the approval of the
parliament and then to convoke a legislative body. In the
circumstances China should adopt the Prussian method as described
above with some modifications, which will be very suitable to our
conditions. As to the contents of the constitution we can copy such
articles as those providing the right for the issue of urgent orders
and appropriation of special funds, etc., from the Japanese
Constitution, so that the power of the ruler can be increased
without showing the slightest contempt for the legislative organ. I
consider that this is the proper method of procedure for the
formation of a constitutional monarchy for China.
Mr. Ko: Can I know something about the contents of our future
constitution in advance?
Mr. Hu: If you want to know them in detail I recommend you to read
the Constitutions of Prussia and Japan. But I can tell you this
much. Needless to say that such stipulations as articles
guaranteeing the rights of the people and the power of the
parliament will surely be worked into the future constitution. These
are found in almost every constitution in the world. But as the
former Provisional Constitution has so provided that the power of
the parliament is unlimited, while that of the president is very
small, the Chief Executive, besides conferring decorations and
giving Orders of Merit, having almost nothing to do without the
approval of the Senate, it is certain that nothing will be taken
from that instrument for the future constitution. Nor will the
makers of the future constitution take anything from the nineteen
capitulations offered by the Manchu Government, which gave too much
power to the legislative organ. According to the Nineteen Articles
the Advisory Council was to draw up the constitution, which was to
be ratified by the parliament; the Premier being elected by the
parliament; whilst the use of the army and navy required the
parliament's sanction; the making of treaties with foreign countries
have likewise to be approved by the parliament, etc., etc. Such
strict stipulations which are not even known in such an advanced
country in matters constitutional as England were extorted from the
imperial family by the advisory council. Therefore it is most
unlikely that the makers of the future constitution will take any
article from the nineteen capitulations of "confidence." They will
use the Constitutions of Japan and Prussia as joint model and will
always have in their mind the actual conditions of this country and
the standard of the people. In short, they will copy some of the
articles in the Japanese constitution, and adopt the Prussian method
of procedure for the making of the constitution.
Mr. Ko: What do you mean by honesty?
Mr. Hu: It is a bad policy to deceive the people. Individually the
people are simple, but they cannot be deceived collectively. The
Manchu Government committed an irretrievable mistake by promising
the people a constitutional government but never carrying out their
promise. This attitude on the part of the then reigning house
brought about the first revolution. As the standard of our people at
the present time is not very high, they will be satisfied with less
power if it is properly given to them. Should any one attempt to
deceive them his cause will finally be lost. I do not know how much
power the people and the parliament will get in the constitutional
monarchy, but I would like to point out here that it is better to
give them less power than to deceive them. If they are given less
power, and if they want more, they will contend for it. Should the
government deem it advisable to give them a little more, well and
good. Should they be unfit for the possession of greater power, the
government can issue a proclamation giving the reasons for not
complying with their request, and they will not raise trouble
knowing the true intention of the government. However, honesty is
the most important element in the creation of a constitutional
monarchy. It is easy and simple to practise it. The parliament must
have the power to decide the laws and fix the budgets. Should its
decision be too idealistic or contrary to the real welfare of the
country, the Government can explain its faults and request it to
reconsider its decision. Should the parliament return the same
decision, the Government can dissolve it and convoke another
parliament. In so doing the Government respects the parliament
instead of despising it. But what the parliament has decided should
be carried out strictly by the Government, and thus we will have a
real constitutional Government. It is easy to talk but difficult to
act, but China like all other countries has to go through the
experimental stage and face all kinds of difficulties before a
genuine constitutional government can be evolved. The beginning is
difficult but once the difficulty is over everything will go on
smoothly. I emphasize that it is better to give the people less
power at the beginning than to deceive them. Be honest with them is
my policy.
Mr. Ko: I thank you very much for what you have said. Your
discussion is interesting and I can understand it well. The proper
method of procedure and honesty of purpose which you have mentioned
will tend to wipe out all former corruption.
Mr. Ko, or the stranger, then departed.
On this note the pamphleteer abruptly ends. Having discussed _ad
nauseam_ the inadequacy of all existing arrangements, even those made by
Yuan Shih-kai himself, to secure a peaceful succession to the
presidency; and having again insisted upon the evil part soldiery cannot
fail to play, he introduces a new peril, the certainty that the foreign
Powers will set up a puppet Emperor unless China solves this problem
herself, the case of Korea being invoked as an example of the fate of
divided nations. Fear of Japan and the precedent of Korea, being
familiar phenomena, are given a capital position in all this debate,
being secondary only to the crucial business of ensuring the peaceful
succession to the supreme office. The transparent manner in which the
history of the first three years of the Republic is handled in order to
drive home these arguments will be very apparent. A fit crown is put on
the whole business by the final suggestion that the Constitutional
Government of China under the new empire must be a mixture of the
Prussian and Japanese systems, Yang Tu's last words being that it is
best to be honest with the people!
No more damning indictment of Yuan Shih-kai's régime could possibly have
been penned.