TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been
placed at the end of the book.
A superscript is denoted by ^, for example 15^x or 12^{th}.
A subscript is denoted by _{x}, for example a_{2} or CHCl_{3}.
Basic fractions are displayed as ½ ⅓ ¼ etc; other fractions are shown
in the form a/b, for example 1/25.
All changes noted in the ERRATA on page vii have been applied to the
etext.
Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.
MACHINE-GUN TACTICS
BY
CAPTAIN R. V. K. APPLIN, D.S.O.
14th (King’s) Hussars
LONDON
HUGH REES, LTD., 119 PALL MALL, S.W.
1910
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
PREFACE
This book, which was begun five years ago, is now published because
I feel that, with all its faults, it may bring into greater
prominence the latent possibilities of the machine gun, and the
vital necessity for the most complete organisation and tactical
training of the detachments.
I desire to express my great indebtedness to Captain C. O. Place,
D.S.O., Royal Engineers, who undertook the work of editing and
preparing the book for the press at a moment’s notice on my sailing
for India.
R. V. K. APPLIN.
R.I.M.S. “NORTHBROOK,”
_December 1st, 1909_.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. DESCRIPTION AND ORGANISATION 1
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 28
III. WITH INDEPENDENT CAVALRY 57
IV. WITH PROTECTIVE CAVALRY 86
V. EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY 105
VI. EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY (_cont._) 130
VII. IN FORTRESS WARFARE 144
VIII. IN MINOR OPERATIONS 161
IX. MACHINE GUNS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 187
LIST OF PLATES AND DIAGRAMS
FACING PAGE
MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
FRONT VIEW 224-5
MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
VIEW FROM REAR 224-5
MAP OF PORT ARTHUR 266
PAGE
DIAGRAM TO SHOW THE ZONE BEATEN BY 50 PER CENT.
OF BULLETS 5
DIAGRAM TO SHOW THE DISPERSION OF BULLETS 6
DIAGRAM TO SHOW FORMATION WHEN COMING INTO POSITION 39
DIAGRAM TO SHOW METHOD OF LAYING BY AIMING POSTS 51
DIAGRAM TO OBTAIN ANGLE OF SIGHT _m_ 53
DIAGRAM OF JAPANESE MACHINE-GUN TRIPOD MOUNT 251
ERRATA
-----------------+-----+-----+--------------------------------------
Error |Page |Line | Correction
-----------------+-----+-----+--------------------------------------
“firing” | 4 | 20 | finding
“to” | 6 | 4 | delete
“short” | 27 | 17 | shorter
“25” | 35 | 20 | 125
“G to O” | 53 | 9 | O to G;
“VIII” | 65 | 26 | I
“training” | 72 | 1 | turning
“distance” | 116 | 5 | distant
“work.” | 160 | 1 | works
“the” | 163 | 2 | delete (_i.e._ “attack in mass”)
“line” (omitted) | 177 | 27 | insert word “line” after “blockhouse”
“portable” | 174 | 28 | potable
(Sentence wrong) | 179 | 27 | “an event which has happened
| | | almost every decade.”
“1 ft.” | 196 | 22 | 1 ft. 6 in.
“natural” | 221 | 5 | mutual
“gear” | 226 | 15 | gun
“ground” | ” | 19 | gun
“screen” | 227 | 13 | screw
“it placed” | 231 | 12 | is
“attacked” | 238 | 8 | attached
·26 | 251 | 3 | ·256
“strap” | 252 | 5 | strip
----------------+----+----+-----------------------------------------
MACHINE-GUN TACTICS
CHAPTER I
DESCRIPTION AND ORGANISATION
The modern machine gun is essentially an automatic weapon of
small-arm calibre, capable of firing from 100 to 600 shots a minute
from a light mounting of extreme mobility, and should fulfil the
following qualifications:
1. It should be able to deliver about 400 shots a minute without
loss of accuracy, even with prolonged “continuous” firing.
2. It should be capable of accompanying cavalry and infantry
wherever these arms can go; it should occupy the smallest space,
and be able to come into action quickly at rifle range.
3. It should have a firm mounting, upon which the gun is steady,
and from which it can be aimed rapidly and fired while kneeling,
sitting, or lying.
4. The gun and its mounting must present a small target, and be
light enough for each, and if possible, both, to be carried by one
man for a considerable distance, and should admit of being dragged
by a man crawling or crouching for short distances.
5. It should be in constant readiness for action, and able when
limbered up to open fire in less than thirty seconds.
6. It should be simple, strong, and durable. Mobility and constant
readiness for action are indispensable with cavalry, while
lightness and smallness of target are essential factors.
There are eight main types of machine guns at present in use in the
armies of the world, viz.:
Gun. In use in
Maxim Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Italy, Portugal,
Turkey, Switzerland, and U.S.A.
Hotchkiss France, Japan, Belgium, Norway, Sweden,
Spain, and Portugal.
Perino Italy.
Puteaux France.
Schwarzlose Austria.
Skoda Japan and China.
Madsen Russia, Denmark (Rekyl pattern), and China
(for cavalry).
Colt By several countries in addition to adopted gun.
The principal differences between these guns are: (_a_) The
automatic mechanism. (_b_) Method of loading.
(_a_) may be divided into two classes: 1. _Recoil action_--the
Maxim, Perino, and the Madsen. 2. _Gas-pressure action_--the
Schwarzlose, Hotchkiss, Skoda, and Colt.
(_b_) consists of three classes: 1. _Belt loaders_--the Maxim,
Schwarzlose, and Colt. 2. _Metal clip loaders_--Hotchkiss, Madsen,
Perino, and Puteaux. 3. _Hopper loaders_--the Skoda.
Several of the above countries--notably Russia, Japan, France, and
Austria--have more than one pattern of gun in their service, and
it is difficult to say which they intend finally to adopt; but
Russia, since the war, has ordered several thousand Madsen guns,
and Japan is said to be trying this gun, one of which during the
war fired 25,000 shots in a single day.
The Rexar gun has been purposely omitted; it only weighs 17½ lb.,
but is fired from the shoulder, and is therefore more of the nature
of an automatic rifle than a machine gun. It would take too long
to deal with each of these weapons separately, therefore the Maxim
has been selected as the type with which to discuss the question of
tactics.
In order thoroughly to understand the methods that should govern
the tactical employment of machine guns, and their place in the
battlefield, it is first necessary clearly to realise their nature
and potentialities, and for this purpose we will examine their
principal characteristics. Guns of this class are capable of firing
service small-arm ammunition at the rate of 800 shots in one
minute, but this very high rate of fire is obviously undesirable
for several reasons--the principal, from a military point of view,
being that, however skilfully the gun is handled, a great waste of
ammunition must ensue, and hundreds of shots be wasted in space,
however accurate the fire. These guns are, therefore, regulated
to fire at a maximum rate of from 400 to 500 rounds a minute, or
seven to eight shots a second, but even this is greater than is
necessary to obtain the maximum fire effect; at ordinary targets
100 to 250 rounds a minute, according to the nature of the target,
has been found to give the best results in practice. The “rate of
fire” of a gun must not be confused with the number of rounds that
can be fired from it effectively in one minute; the necessity for
frequent pauses to observe the effect, to correct the elevation and
direction of the fire, prevent a greater number than from 150 to
250 shots being fired effectively in one minute from a gun whose
rate of fire is 450 shots a minute. Colonel Mayne, in his book _The
Infantry Weapon and its Use in War_, says: “The machine gun now in
use can fire about 600 rounds a minute, or ten a second. This is a
far greater rapidity of fire than is really necessary, for it means
that a man or horse is struck several times before falling. It is
a good thing to be able to fire 600 rounds a minute on occasions
(such as for range finding), but a far slower rate of fire (say 100
rounds or even less a minute) is ample for all ordinary tactical
purposes against living beings and animals, whilst causing an
enormous saving of ammunition.”
The extreme range of this type of gun is for all practical purposes
the same as the infantry rifle--about 3,500 yards--though it is
more effective at the longer ranges than an equal volume of rifle
fire, owing to the ease with which the firer can elevate and aim
the gun on its mountings and the stability of this mounting, which
causes it to have a beaten zone of only half the depth and nearly
half the width of that of infantry firing the same number of
rounds. This has been proved again by actual experiment at the
schools of musketry in England, India, and South Africa, while
very elaborate experiments and trials carried out in Germany with
the Maxim gun on the carriage adopted for that service proved that
the beaten zone was only one-sixth of that obtained by infantry,
probably because of the greater stability of their mounting.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM I
TO SHOW THE ZONE BEATEN BY 50 PER CENT. OF BULLETS]
In order that “fire” may be “effective,” it is necessary to bring
the enemy within the zone beaten by 75 per cent. of shots, and
it has been found by experiment that 25 per cent. of shots fall
immediately in front and behind the target, then 12½ per cent., 7½
per cent., and, finally, 5 per cent. scattered far in front and
behind.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM II
TO SHOW THE DISPERSION OF BULLETS]
Infantry usually fire at the rate of three rounds a minute “slow,”
and fifteen rounds a minute “rapid”; “slow” fire is the ordinary
rate, and “rapid” fire can only be effectually maintained for about
four minutes; but this is when the firer is fresh, and has not
been subjected to several hours’ marching and fighting as would be
the case in battle, and it is doubtful if “rapid” fire can be kept
up on service for more than one-and-a-half to two minutes without
becoming wild and consequently ineffective. On the other hand,
“rapid” fire is less tiring to the machine gunner than “deliberate”
fire; the gun is held for him by the mounting, it loads and fires
itself, while elevation and direction are maintained without the
least exertion on his part by the elevating and traversing gears.
In comparing the volume of fire of the machine gun with that of a
body of infantry, it is obvious that “rapid” cannot be taken as
the normal rate of infantry fire, as it can only be used for the
shortest periods, and even then it reduces the users to a state of
inefficiency as regards accuracy in two or three minutes. On the
other hand, “rapid” fire can only be used by the machine gunner on
special occasions, for tactical reasons which will be explained
later, so that it will be necessary to compare “slow” infantry fire
with “deliberate” fire from the machine gun, in order to arrive at
the mean fire volume of each. Seventy shots a minute can easily
be fired “deliberately” from a machine gun, and this could be
increased to 120 by highly trained gunners, but, taking the lower
figure, deliberate fire equals in volume the fire of twenty-four
men using rifles. But it must be always remembered that the object
of the fire fight is to bring a concentrated and overwhelming
fire to bear _at the right moment_ on certain positions of the
enemy, and when the moment arrives machine guns can and will use
the most rapid rate of fire possible, which will be from 250 to
300 rounds a minute or equal to that of 50 or 100 riflemen. Mere
volume of fire, however, is useless without control, accuracy, and
concentration, and it is here that the machine gun is so vastly
superior to the rifle; for amongst 50 men using their rifles there
can only be a small percentage of good shots, while even among the
good shots unforeseen factors, such as fatigue, bad fire positions,
excitement, wrong sighting, failure to see the target, etc., cause
a large percentage of the shots to go astray, and make it very
difficult to concentrate the fire on any particular position of the
enemy.
An object-lesson to illustrate this superiority of the machine gun
has been carried out during each course at the South African school
of musketry under circumstances most favourable to the rifles.
The record of one such test, carried out on September 21st, 1904,
between a Maxim gun mounted on Mark III. tripod and 42 rifles
(Lee Enfield), was published. The machine gun was worked by two
sergeant-instructors, while the 42 rifles were fired by students
who were all, at least, 1st Class shots before joining the school,
and who for five weeks had been receiving daily instruction in
musketry, and had just completed a course of firing both on the
ranges (Table B) and in field-firing, and had gone through a course
of judging distance. The range was unknown--the number of rounds
unlimited, and the rate of fire “rapid.” The time was limited to
one minute, and the firers were allowed to charge their magazines
before starting. The targets were figures representing infantry in
line extended to two paces. The following was the result:
Rounds Figures Percentage
fired. Hits. Percentage. hit. of loss.
Rifles 408 62 15·1 27 54
Maxim 228 69 30·2 32 64
The small number of rounds fired by the Maxim was due to the
necessity of picking up the range by firing small groups of five
or ten shots and observing the strike of the bullets. What is
most interesting is that although the rifles fired nearly twice
as many shots as the machine gun, the latter made actually more
hits, while the percentage of loss inflicted was 10 per cent.
greater. The actual range was 1,000 yards. A similar experiment
was carried out during the annual training for 1908 in the U.S.A.
between 42 “sharpshooters” and a Maxim at the regulation “L”
target. The ranges were 600, 800, 1,000 yards; the sharpshooters
fired an average of 750 rounds at the three distances and made an
average of 429 hits, which gave a collective figure of merit of
59·09. The machine gun also fired 750 rounds, made 601 hits, giving
a collective figure of merit of 79·54, being 22·45 in favour of
the machine gun. The troops were armed with new rifles, and fired
the new “S” bullet, while the machine gun used the old pattern
ammunition and a barrel that had fired at least 7,000 shots. The
gun squad had no previous practice at this target, and the gun was
fired by different men at the several ranges. The collective fire
of the troop was “slow aimed,” while the fire of the machine gun
was “rapid continuous” for the number of rounds at each range. The
machine gun took 30 seconds to fire 250 shots at each range, or a
quarter that of the troop.[1]
The two experiments are particularly interesting, as showing how
closely the results agree, although the conditions are dissimilar
in one respect: viz. that in the first case the number of rounds
was unlimited and the result had to be obtained within one minute;
while in the second case time was unlimited, but the number
of rounds fired by each was the same. The result of the two
experiments show that both in accuracy and rapidity a machine gun
is much superior to 42 picked shots, whether firing the same number
of rounds at known ranges or firing an unlimited number of shots in
a given time at an unknown range. We shall not be wrong, then, if
we say that a machine gun is at least equal to 50 rifles in fire
value,[2] but there are other factors to be considered as well as
fire effect in determining its tactical value, and it is in these
other factors that machine guns are so far superior to riflemen
as to make a reliable estimate of their relative value almost
impossible; these factors are: (1) Mobility; (2) Visibility; (3)
Vulnerability.
_Mobility._--The mobility of the infantry soldier is limited to
the rate at which he can march, which on the battlefield is
about 100 yards a minute or less than three-and-a-half miles an
hour. Doubling may be left out of the question, as it quickly
reduces fire efficiency to a minimum. An experiment made in the
Austrian Army showed that the percentage of hits which was 76·5 per
cent. after an advance in quick time, fell to 51 per cent. after
doubling.[3] The mobility of the machine gun will depend almost
entirely on the way it is carried, and must not be judged by any
particular carriage which may happen to be in use for the time
being in our own service. A short description of these mountings
and their method of transport will be found in Chapter IX., but
none of them are entirely satisfactory.
The infantry carriages are heavy, clumsy, and conspicuous, and
are the least mobile of all; they can hardly be moved out of a
walk without risk, and Marks III. and IV. cannot come into action
without first unharnessing the mule or horse, and they then have to
be dragged into position by the whole detachment--thus presenting
a most conspicuous and vulnerable target at the moment when least
desired and when concealment and invisibility are essential to
tactical success.[4] In the German Official Account of the late
Boer War, issued by the General Staff, is the following criticism
of this carriage:
“Both sides have machine guns, but the rather clumsy mountings
of those used by the British offered too high a target, and so
prevented their being advanced from position to position during the
attack.”
The tripod mounting, which is light and inconspicuous, is carried
with the gun on a limbered wagon; but the advantages of its
lightness and portability are almost neutralised by being carried
on a wagon, thus reducing its mobility by confining it to ground
suitable for wheeled vehicles.
If used on a pack-saddle the difficulty of managing a led animal on
foot in the stress of battle may become insuperable, and moving the
gun in and out of action is entirely dependent on the docility of
the pack-animal. The gun weighs anything from 40 to 60 lb., while
the mountings need not weigh more than 34 lb. The combined weight
of a gun and mounting should never exceed 120 lb. and can be as
little as 74 lb.
In whatever way it is decided to carry the gun, it is a _sine quâ
non_ that it must be at least as mobile as horse artillery. There
is no reason why it should not be as mobile as cavalry, and the
choice remains between a pack-horse with a mounted detachment or
a galloping carriage; and the former is in every way preferable,
principally because it can carry the gun and ammunition across any
country, and can come into action in less than 30 seconds on an
adjustable tripod, which can be carried by hand into any position
and presents a very small, inconspicuous target.
The majority of foreign countries have adopted pack transport for
their machine guns. It is desirable with infantry and absolutely
essential with cavalry. A suitable saddle is, of course,
indispensable, and strong spiral springs to the hooks which hold
the gun and tripod on either side will entirely prevent horses from
straining their backs when galloping across country or jumping
obstacles with the guns. These hooks must be leather-covered and
made to fit the gun exactly, and, in order to do away with the
present cumbersome straps and buckles, they should have a hinged
attachment to close over the gun and lock automatically in such a
way as to admit of its being opened by a single movement when it
is required to dismount the gun. The Swiss and the Americans have
permanently adopted pack transport for the machine guns with their
cavalry, which are able to accompany them over any country without
detriment to either horses or guns; and in the American army the
average time for a well-trained cavalry machine-gun detachment to
go into action front, from mounted formation, unpack, and set up
the guns, load, aim, and open fire, is 25 seconds; while at the
departmental meeting for 1908 the machine guns of the 10th Cavalry,
from the halt in line, _moved forward in section column at a gallop
for 200 yards and went into action and fired a blank shot in 31
seconds_.[5]
This brings us to the second factor--_Visibility_. It is
absolutely necessary for the successful tactical employment of
machine guns that they should be as inconspicuous as possible
when in action; the gun itself is a very small object when close
to the ground, and its visibility will depend almost entirely on
the nature of mounting and its adaptability for use behind cover
of varying heights. All our infantry carriages are so conspicuous
as to be quite unconcealable except in defence, the wheels being
4 ft. 8 in. in diameter and the gun axis 3 ft. 6 in. above the
ground. The Mark IV. tripod is the handiest and least conspicuous
of the mountings at present in use in our service, and although it
weighs 48 lb. it can be carried into almost any position and easily
concealed. It can be adjusted to fire at any desired height between
14½ and 30 in. above the ground level, and consequently can be used
from behind any suitable cover.
_Vulnerability._--The question of vulnerability would appear at
first to depend entirely on visibility; or, in other words, on
the target presented to the enemy’s fire, but this is only true
to a certain extent. To obtain the minimum vulnerability it is
of course necessary to have the gun as low and inconspicuous as
possible, because the less it can be seen and the better cover it
can obtain, the more difficult it will be to locate and hit. But
the true vulnerability of the gun in comparison with infantry lies
in the amount of front they occupy respectively; or in other words,
the breadth of the target exposed to the enemy and the percentage
of loss they can each sustain _without their fire effect being
reduced_. Infantry will never again fight in two ranks in civilised
warfare, and the closest formation possible for a firing line is
one pace per man; 50 men will therefore occupy a front of, roughly,
50 yards; in other words, the target presented to the enemy is 50
yards in breadth, and, provided the elevation is correct, shots
striking anywhere within this 50 yards will be effective. The
machine gun, however, only occupies a front of from 4 ft. to 5
ft. 2 in., or 1/25th _the front offered by infantry having equal
fire effect_. It is on this point that the wonderful tactical
possibilities of the machine gun rests: _the maximum of rifle
fire from the minimum of front_. It is obvious that 10 per cent.
of casualties in the infantry firing line reduce the fire effect
by just that amount, while from 30 to 40 per cent. will probably
silence its fire altogether or render it ineffective. The machine
gun, on the other hand, is unaffected by even 50 per cent. of loss,
while it can suffer 80 per cent. of loss without diminishing its
fire effect, though such a loss would of course cause it to lose
its mobility and seriously affect the morale of the gunners. A
machine-gun detachment consists of from 16 to 24 men, but only two
of them actually work the gun, and one man alone can fire the gun
once it is in action, the second man merely assisting him with the
ammunition, etc., but he is not absolutely necessary to the firing
of the gun. Thus we see that the killing of the gunner only causes
a momentary cessation of fire until another man takes his place,
when the fire is resumed without loss of intensity, accuracy, or
concentration.
We are now in a position to form an accurate estimate of the
potentialities of the machine gun and its true tactical value as
compared with infantry, and we find:
1. Its fire effect 50 rifles at least.
2. Its mobility Cavalry.
3. Its visibility A file (2 men).
4. Its vulnerability Unaffected by 50% of loss.
Before discussing their place in battle and tactical use it will
be necessary to say a few words on the best methods of grouping
the guns and organising their detachments and the training of the
personnel in peace for the duties they will have to perform in war.
In our service two machine guns are issued to each regiment of
cavalry and battalion of infantry, and the detachment consists of:
Cavalry. Infantry.
Subaltern 1 1
Sergeant 1 1
Corporal 1 1
Privates 12 12
Drivers 8 2
Bâtmen 2 -
-- --
25 (1 officer) 17 (1 officer)
This section of two guns is therefore the smallest tactical
unit, and the officer in command is solely responsible for the
training and efficiency of his section. It is therefore absolutely
essential that the machine-gun section commander should be a
subaltern of not less than three years’ service, specially selected
for his keenness, efficiency, and self-reliance, who has passed
the examination “C” for promotion, and who holds the special
machine-gun certificate from a School of Musketry. A “destroyer”
in the Royal Navy is commanded by a very junior officer, but he is
most carefully selected for similar qualities to those mentioned,
and is in addition required to possess the necessary professional
qualifications--consequently it is a command much sought after,
and competition enables the authorities to appoint the pick of the
service and thus obtain the maximum efficiency where efficiency is
the essence of successful employment in war. The best and nothing
but the best is necessary to the successful employment of machine
guns, and the importance of obtaining the very best officers as
section commanders is so great that there is reason to doubt the
utility of having machine guns at all if they are not commanded and
handled by those who are in every way expert in their use.
In order to enable machine-gun sections to be trained in tactics
and to co-operate with larger units in war, it is essential that
they should be trained under a senior officer during peace. The
late Colonel Henderson said of the Volunteers in Mexico: “The
ideal of the battle is a combined effort directed by a well-trained
leader: as individuals they fought well; as organised bodies
capable of manœuvring under fire and of combined effort, they
proved to be comparatively worthless.” This is precisely the case
of regimental machine guns. It is easy enough to use a section or
even a single gun apart from its battery should occasion require,
but it is impossible to improvise a battery from a number of
separate sections. It is therefore essential before attempting the
tactical training of machine guns, much less their tactical use,
to organise them in batteries during peace. For this purpose it is
suggested that when a battalion is brigaded with others, either
for administration or training, the six or eight guns should be
formed into one or two batteries, under a selected field officer,
who would be solely responsible for their peace training and
tactical efficiency, and who would command them on manœuvres and
on service. There would be little or no innovation in this, as
our regimental signallers are at present trained and commanded on
similar lines under the divisional signalling officer. A cavalry
brigade under the present organisation (1909) would have one
battery of six guns, and an infantry brigade two batteries of four
guns each. The batteries of a Division would be commanded by the
divisional machine-gun commander. While such organisation would in
no way prevent the regimental machine-gun section being used with
its own unit as at present, it would ensure a very high standard
of tactical training, and enable the Divisional General to have a
splendid reserve in his own hands for use at the critical moment of
the fight as mobile as cavalry, in fire action more powerful than
infantry, occupying the smallest possible front, yet capable of
delivering a storm of some 10,000 bullets a minute with the maximum
of accuracy and concentration.
The tactics in this book are based on the understanding that the
machine guns are trained on this system, and that they are mounted
on light, adjustable tripods and carried on trained pack-horses
with the entire detachment mounted.
The failure of machine guns is due to two principal causes: (1)
Insufficient training in working the guns. (2) Improper tactical
employment.
It will be obvious that unless the gun can be depended upon to open
fire with certainty and accuracy, and maintain it continuously
without jamming or mechanical failure, it is useless to consider
its tactical employment. The mechanism of the Maxim is somewhat
complicated and delicate, and depends for its proper working
upon the exact adjustment of each part; but no more so than any
other piece of modern machinery--it is far less complicated and
certainly far less delicate than the modern motor-car. Indeed,
the comparison is analogous in several respects, as both require
highly trained operators to ensure their smooth and continuous
working, and each individual machine, whether gun or motor, has
its own peculiarities and requires special study to obtain the best
results. Both are capable of hard and constant employment for long
periods, without breakdown or failure, in the hands of an expert.
No one would think for one moment of engaging a chauffeur for a
high-class motor-car who had less than six months’ training and
experience, and who was not capable of stripping and adjusting
the motors and effecting minor repairs. It would be difficult to
find a machine-gun detachment with a single man who possessed even
these minimum qualifications. Apart from the mechanical knowledge
it must be remembered that the man who fires the gun, known as No.
I. in our service, has in his own hands the fire from 50 rifles,
and on his own judgment and skill as a shot will entirely depend
the effectiveness or otherwise of this fire; it stands to reason
therefore that he should be chosen primarily for his good shooting,
but, in addition to his skill in aiming, he must be a good judge
of distance and possess considerable intelligence, initiative, and
self-reliance; for although he will usually receive orders as to
target, range, rate of fire, and the moment for opening or ceasing
fire, it will often happen that he has to use his own judgment in
these very important matters.
As the gun is generally required to move and come into action
independently of other troops, it must find its own scouts, who not
only have to safeguard it from surprise when moving, but must be
trained to select good positions whence it can come into action.
For this reason the men of the detachment must be trained scouts.
To summarise:
(1) Only marksmen should be chosen.
(2) Trained scouts should be given the preference.
(3) The whole detachment must be trained as range-finders and
scouts.
(4) The whole detachment must be proficient in judging distance.
(5) Only strong men should be selected.
The strength of a machine-gun detachment is given in Chapter IX.
With the tripod mountings and pack transport the best _working_
strength for a machine-gun section will be found to be the
following:--
1 officer, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 20 privates--that is, 1
N.C.O. and 10 men to each gun. It is almost superfluous to say that
the whole detachment must be trained to work and fire the gun, and
should have a very thorough knowledge of its parts and mechanism,
and be experts at remedying failures and effecting minor repairs.
Until the whole detachment are so trained and can detect the cause
of any failure instantly and remedy the same in the minimum time
required, it is useless to attempt tactical training in the field.
The preliminary training will take from three to six months,
according to the ability of the instructor and the time available
daily for work.
It will be found that certain men of the detachment are far more
skilful in laying and firing the gun than others, and it is
undoubtedly sound to specially train these men as gun-layers and to
permanently allot to the two best layers the duties of Nos. 1 and
2 (_i.e._ the firer and his assistant). This should be the post of
honour and coveted accordingly, and the two best gun-layers should
be awarded a distinguishing badge. As no badge is authorised by our
regulations, a lance stripe might be given to the best No. 1 of
each gun.
In training the men of the section in the preliminary details
of working the guns, the following points may be found of use.
First frame a course of instruction for each day which will give
systematic and progressive individual instruction in the following
points: mechanism, name and use of every part, the working of the
mechanism, care of gun, stripping and fitting, loading and firing;
spare-part box, the name of each of its contents and recognition of
every part _when out of the box_; failures, their recognition and
remedy; gun-laying and firing, co-operation between layer, loader,
and observer. This course should last at least three months,
provided not less than two hours a day are available. Drills may
be combined with preliminary instruction at the end of the first
month, and must aim at extreme quickness in dismounting the gun
and opening _aimed_ fire and remounting the gun again. The chief
points in the preliminary training are that _all_ the detachment
are _equally_ instructed. Training on the 20-yard range in barracks
should take place during the third month, and special targets
should be used to teach laying the gun, slow use of elevating
gear and combined sights, traversing fire, fire control, rapid
change of target, indirect fire. During this short-range practice
the failures should be practically demonstrated, and firing on
the range should never take place without making a few artificial
failures to test the efficiency of the detachment. These failures
should be introduced by the officer himself without the knowledge
of the detachment, and should be so arranged as to occur naturally
while firing. They should be timed by him in each case, and the
record time for the remedy of each failure posted up in the
barrack-room with the man’s name. Artificial failures can easily
be made by filing round the base of a cartridge so that it is torn
off when fired; by loosening a bullet in a cartridge, by slightly
flattening a cartridge so as to cause it to jam in the chamber, by
wedging a cartridge in the belt, by introducing a blank cartridge,
and by repacking the asbestos with dry packing. It will be found
that by making two or three such jams every time the gun is taken
out to fire the detachment will soon become expert in recognising
and remedying failures.
The men should be taught that failures may be divided into two
classes, viz. _avoidable_ and _unavoidable_. The occurrence of
an avoidable failure should be looked upon as a disgrace to the
firer. The _unavoidable_ failures so seldom occur that they are
negligible.
The _avoidable_ failures are those due to (1) Fuzee spring
adjustment. (2) Want of oil. (3) Dirt. (4) Want of water. (5) Bad
packing. (6) Damaged ammunition. (7) Faults in feed due to badly
filled, new, or damaged belts. Each machine gun will be found to
work best with a certain weight of fuzee spring which can only
be found by trial, and this weight will change from time to time
as the gun wears. The machine gunner cannot be considered fit
for further training until he has become so familiar with his
gun that he can instantly tell by the sound if it is working at
its best; just as a chauffeur knows at once if his engines are
running perfectly, and can instantly detect the slightest defect
and make the necessary adjustment of the spark, petrol, or oil
to ensure smooth running. The unavoidable failures are so few
and rare that they will seldom be met with, and can be quickly
remedied, except the breaking of an important part. Failures due
to defective ammunition are extremely rare provided ordinary
precautions are taken to avoid placing damaged cartridges in the
belt. A breakage in any part of the lock can be remedied in a
few seconds by substituting the spare lock which should always
be _on the gun_ in action. The breaking of any other part of the
gun will be an accident of rare occurrence and, provided the gun
is properly inspected before use, may be more properly classified
under accidents than failures. A modern machine gun in the hands
of experts should never jam, while failure of automatic fire will
be rare and momentary. Until this standard has been reached a
machine-gun detachment cannot be considered fit to begin tactical
training. The Japanese in the late war were obliged to improvise
the detachments for their hastily acquired machine guns; and
Captain Matsuda, who commanded the machine guns with Prince Kanin’s
Cavalry Brigade, says: “Whereas at the battle of Peu-si-lau on
October 12th we had some trouble after firing 1,800 rounds, on
March 3rd the guns of one section after firing 11,000 rounds
continued to work perfectly. _The gunners were absolutely familiar
with their weapons._” Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B.,
remarked: “Like a good chauffeur, the Japanese machine gunner knows
all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires and can tell almost by
instinct when anything is going wrong.” It is almost superfluous
to say that the men of the machine-gun detachment must never be
changed or taken for any other work. Nothing has been said of the
necessity for training the detachment in the all-important duties
of scouting, range-taking, and horsemastership during this period,
but of course they are vital to ultimate success and must not be
neglected.
Range practices will follow, and the peculiarities of the gun
and its fire effect must be carefully taught during this period.
The use of traversing and sweeping fire, combined sights, and
observation of fire and the use of deliberate fire in imitation
of rifle fire should be perfected during range practice, so that
they may be carried out under service conditions during the field
practices which follow.
The tactical training should commence as soon as the field
practices have been completed. The course for this should be
carefully mapped out beforehand and should be based upon the
principles given in Chapter II. and in the chapter dealing with
the arm to which the section belongs, and should culminate in
divisional manœuvres. This course might follow the following
headings:
(1) Drill over rough country.
(2) Selecting a position.
(3) Selecting alternate positions.
(4) Taking up a position.
(5) Screening guns.
(6) Making artificial cover.
(7) Mutual support (movement and fire).
(8) Indirect fire.
(9) A battery working on a wide front in mutual support.
No drill for a battery has been authorised yet (1909), but the
simple formations of a troop as laid down in _Cavalry Training_
will be found admirably suited for a battery of machine guns on
pack-horses with mounted detachment.
The writer is fully aware of the condition under which machine guns
are officered and manned at present, and that a great error has
been made in estimating the time required to train the detachments.
The Germans, who have studied the question of machine guns with a
thoroughness far greater than that of any other nation, have made
them a separate arm of their service, under trained and permanent
gunners, and they evidently consider that only specialists can
attain the necessary efficiency.
However this may be, it is certain that the officer, whether
commanding a section or the batteries of a Division, must be a
specialist and a highly trained one.
An officer commanding a company of Russian machine guns in the
Russo-Japanese War, writing his experiences to the _Nouskin
Invalid_, says:
“I have spent three years in studying machine guns, and consider
myself proficient in their use, but I have always been convinced
that the requisite skill and knowledge cannot be acquired in a
shorter time.”
The commanding officer who at present looks upon his machine
guns in much the same light as he regards any other portion of
his first-line transport--a necessary encumbrance taking away an
officer and several men from their proper duties, and a source of
anxiety when the regiment goes into action--would regard them with
very different feelings if assured of their efficiency and relieved
of the responsibility for their tactics and safety. That this is
possible without altering the present organisation has been shown;
that it is absolutely essential for their efficient use in war it
is hoped to demonstrate in the chapters that follow.