Calvinism has never had another advocate equally qualified w

Produced by Keith G. Richardson

ON CALVINISM.

BY THE

REV. WILLIAM HULL,

PERPETUAL CURATE OF ST. GREGORY'S, NORWICH.

Touton gar hapase psyche physikon nomon boethon aute kai symmachon

epi ton prakteon ho ton holon demiourgos hupestato. Dia men tou

nomou ten eutheian aute paradeixas hodon: dia de tes aute

dedoremenes autexousiou eleutherias ten ton kreittonon airesin

epainou kai apodoches axian apophenas geron te kai meizonon

epathlon.--Eusebius.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. G. F. & J. RIVINGTON,

ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD,

AND WATERLOO PLACE, PALL MALL.

1841.

LONDON:

GILBERT & RIVINGTON, PRINTERS,

ST. JOHN'S SQUARE.

TO

THE HONOURABLE AND VERY REVEREND

DR. PELLEW,

DEAN OF NORWICH.

Sir,

When I venture to inscribe to you the following pages, I am fearless

of having applied to me Johnson's definition of a dedicator, "one

who inscribes his work to a patron with compliment and servility."

Adulation, Sir, from any quarter, _you_ would resent as an

indignity, and the tenor of my own life and writings will secure me

from the imputation of _servile_ deference to others, with whatever

reverence I may contemplate their rank, their talents, or their

virtues.

When, Sir, under unusual circumstances, I engaged in the ministry of

the Church, the presentation which I received from the Chapter was,

on my part, unsolicited and unexpected, and, on yours, a favour done

on public principle to one who was personally unknown to you.

In respectfully presenting to your attention this short treatise, I

do not prejudge your opinion of its contents, whether favourable or

adverse. The responsibility rests exclusively with the writer.

But I cherish the persuasion that it contains no sentiments, and

expresses no feelings, which can be justly displeasing to a

dignified clergyman, who has firmly professed his attachment to the

great principles of the Church in times more dangerous to her

interests, and more difficult for her ministers, than any which have

heretofore occurred since the great Rebellion.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

your obliged and faithful servant,

WILLIAM HULL.

Eaton next Norwich,

Sept. 1841.

PREFACE.

That strenuous attempts are now in progress to propagate Calvinism

in its most objectionable forms, by impressing into its service that

spirit of earnest, but often misinformed piety which has been

awakened within the bosom of the Church, is too notorious to require

proof or to admit of refutation.

The following sheets have been written, and are now published, under

the solemn conviction, that the danger to be apprehended from the

extensive diffusion of this creed, both to religion and the Church,

renders it impossible that it should be allowed to pursue its

unmolested course, without correspondent efforts, on the part of

sound Churchmen, to counteract its baleful influence.

Superstition, which lays undue stress on outward forms, and

fanaticism, which gives credit to preternatural impulses, and

professes a particular kind of inspiration differing not at all from

infallibility, are the Scylla and Charybdis, through which, over

stormy waters or serene, we have to make our steady way. Both are

equally intolerant, and both are condemned by the genius of

Protestantism, the constitution of the Church, and the spirit of the

Bible.

It is devoutly to be desired, that none who are more regardful of

truth than of party, that none who are alive to the real state of

the times, and to the character of the respective interests which

may hereafter be brought into unhappy collision, may hesitate,

through fear or favour, to act in this crisis with moral courage

tempered with holy charity. Let them discountenance all extreme

innovations, from whatsoever quarter they may proceed, or by

whatsoever distinguished names they may be sanctioned. Let them rise

with manly integrity above the mean suggestions of temporizing

policy, and look only to the substantial and permanent interests of

the Church, which are those of truth and charity, of freedom in

alliance with order, of Christianity in its most ennobling form, and

of the public welfare of the British Empire.

If the spirit of rigid Calvinism, under any plausible disguise,

should be widely diffused through the Anglican Church, we need no

prophetic mind to announce, that it will lead to consequences fatal

to her peace and liberty, introducing a spiritual despotism whose

power will be felt throughout the length and breadth of the land,

overawing, as in the days of John Knox, the majesty of princes, and

spreading its morbid gloom to the sequestered cottage of the

peasant, in the remotest regions and most unfrequented provinces.

History proves, that the men who are deeply imbued with this spirit,

merge all other interests in their devoted zeal to its propagation.

Those of that party who, like Mr. Noel, think "our venerable Church"

means no more than "our venerable _selves_," will be ready to betray

her into the hands of her adversaries, whensoever they may be deemed

strong enough to carry her outworks, and to supplant the orthodox

clergyman by the Calvinistic minister;--while those who reverence

the Apostolical succession, or the general order of the Church, will

form within our pale an intolerant party, intriguing for dominion,

restless and oppressive, never to be satisfied until they have

crushed or excluded all who have dared to profess their rejection of

the Calvinistic theology.

In the spirit already exemplified by the Pastoral Aid Society, for

the detection of whose sectarian principles we are indebted to the

Christian courage of Dr. Molesworth, they will throw obstacles in

the way of candidates for ordination or parochial cures, if they

come not up to the doctrinal standard of their _triers_: the

episcopal functions will be usurped or controlled by the ruthless

zeal of an ecclesiastical faction; the Church societies for the

extension of Christian knowledge and piety will lose their catholic

character, dwindling into ignoble channels for spreading abroad the

bigotry of an exclusive school; and gone for ever will be those

beautiful charities, and that liberal regard to the just exercise of

Christian and clerical freedom, which have been recently elicited,

and expressed with deliberate solemnity, in the correspondence of

the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London, with the

reverend Canon Wodehouse, on the subject of subscription.

The author of this tract has aimed at conciseness, so far as the

nature of the argument would allow, not employing "those arts by

which a big book is made." But if the smallness of the work does not

seem to accord with the magnitude of the subject, it is not to be

inferred that the sentiments have been hastily formed or rashly

vindicated. For many years they have been taking deep root in the

mind of the writer; nor would he have engaged in the ministry of the

Church, but on the conviction, after serious inquiry, that her faith

was primitive and not Calvinistic.

He has spared no "plainness of speech," in his exposure of dangerous

error, but from principle and feeling he has abstained from the

malice of personal vituperation. His warfare is with pernicious

opinions, not with those who hold them, many of whom are impressed

with the religious persuasion, that what they have believed they

have received from divine teaching, and that in upholding their

creed they glorify God.

Such divine teaching as the Calvinist claims, and which, if it means

any thing, amounts to plenary inspiration, the writer does not

suppose to have superintended his own thoughts while engaged in the

composition of these pages. He would deem it unwarrantable

presumption to look for such miraculous effusion of the Spirit in

the ordinary condition of the Church. But he confidently believes,

that, to those who seek it in humble faith, such grace is given as

may purify the dispositions of the heart, and thus guard it from all

predilection for error and all prejudice against _the truth_.

Entertaining these views of the office of the Holy Spirit under the

evangelical dispensation, the writer humbly commits this work, not

executed without dependence on his preventing grace, to Him who is

the eternal source and the faithful patron of truth; uniting in the

prayer of this beautiful collect, with all those, who, whatsoever

their doctrinal views of religion, seek for truth as the richest of

treasures.

"O Lord, from whom all good things do come; grant to us thy humble

servants, that by thy holy inspiration, we may think those things

that be good, and by thy merciful guiding may perform the same,

through our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen."

CONTENTS.

General remarks

Particular objections

I. Calvinism impugns the moral character of the Deity

II. Calvinism is not to be reconciled with the moral responsibility

of man

III. Calvinism is opposed to the constitution and the purposes of a

visible Church

IV. Calvinism is productive of positively injurious effects, on

individual character and on social happiness

V. Calvinism is not the doctrine of Scripture, nor of the Anglican

Church

VI. Calvinism has led to the corruption of Christian doctrine, that

the Scriptures may be accommodated to extreme views of the divine

decrees

Appendix

ON CALVINISM.

PART I.

GENERAL REMARKS.

To St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in Africa, belongs the equivocal

distinction of having originated in the Christian Church a

controversy respecting the Divine decrees, a controversy which dates

its origin from the fifth century, and which, after the lapse of

thirteen hundred years, exhibits no symptoms of approaching to its

end. In the Roman Communion, it was the source of those bitter

animosities, which reciprocally exasperated the Jesuits and

Jansenists. The Protestant Churches, in the early days of the

Reformation, were disturbed by the agitation of this perplexed and

perilous subject. And when Calvin appeared as the vindicator of the

Divine sovereignty in predetermining the fates of men, he only

introduced to the Churches of the Reformation a doctrine which had

been transmitted from earlier times, but which, perhaps, he defined

with more precision, expounded with more fearless consistency, and

invested with the authority of his own great and illustrious name.

In the present discussion the word _Calvinism_ is used, not to

signify those doctrines of the Church which Calvin held in common

with the fathers of the Reformation, but those only which relate to

his extreme views of the Divine decrees, to his predestinarian

theology, and to his modification of other scripture truths to

render them harmonious with his principal tenets.

Whatever therefore may be the merits or the final result of this

grave and earnest controversy, it leaves untouched the corruption of

human nature, the deity and atonement of Christ, justification by

faith, the necessity of Divine influence to renew and purify the

heart, and the scriptural doctrine of predestination, according to

the fore-knowledge of God. This distinction is important; since, if

it be overlooked, the rejectors of Calvinism may be supposed to have

also rejected the capital doctrines of the Reformed faith. Fuller

has unwarrantably, perhaps undesignedly, given his sanction to this

imputation in his "Calvinistic and Socinian Systems compared[1]."

But the rejectors of _Calvinistic_ predestination may be not less

remote from Socinianism, and much nearer to genuine Christianity,

than the most rigid disciple of that eminent Reformer, who, in the

protestant city of Geneva, committed Servetus to the flames. The

Socinian controversy relates to doctrines, which are the common

faith of the Catholic Church; with the peculiarities of Calvinism it

has no concern. And it is worthy of remark, that if one class of

doctrinalists more than another symbolizes in any instance with

Socinians, the followers of Calvin form that class; since it is not

easy to discover where lies the essential difference between the

doctrine of _philosophical necessity_, as held by the greater number

of Socinians, and that of _predestination_, as maintained by

Calvinists.

Both parties rest their dogmas on the same metaphysical grounds. At

the same time, as moral reasoners, the palm of superiority must be

awarded to Socinians, who reject most consistently the doctrine of

human corruption, and the atonement of Christ, together with the

correspondent doctrines of the Gospel, as altogether out of place in

a scheme which denies the freedom of human actions and reduces all

independent agency to that of the Deity alone; while the Calvinist

subjects the human race to an inevitable necessity of sinning,

denies to them individually, even the semblance of a probationary

course--makes them accountable, yet withholds the powers necessary

to a moral agent, and then most unrighteously dooms to perdition all

but the elect! In rejecting such a theory of religion, we reject not

the fundamental doctrines of Christianity; we only vindicate them

from objections, which, if unanswerable, are fatal; and we hold to

the Gospel with a firmer conviction and a livelier faith, when we

behold its accordance with the righteousness of the Divine

administration and with the moral constitution of man.

On a subject, which has been so long and so laboriously

investigated, and to the illustration of which the most vigorous and

profound of human intellects have directed their energies, it would

be vain to expect any novelty of argument. On either side, it may be

presumed, the question has been exhausted, or, that the human mind

has done all that its powers can accomplish, however unsatisfactory

or inconclusive, in some respects, the result.

It appears to the writer of these pages, on a calm and summary

review of the arguments by which the doctrines of _freedom_ and

_necessity_ have been respectively supported, that those reasonings

which are purely _philosophical_ or _metaphysical_ decidedly

preponderate on the side of Necessity. The prescience of the Deity

cannot, _on any known principle_, be reconciled with the contingency

which attaches to the actions or determinations of man, on the

hypothesis of freedom[2]. And, moreover, if every event requires a

cause, and every volition is guided by motives, what are called the

spontaneous acts of the mind must be the necessary result of motives

which direct and command its elections. "To say that in our choice

we reject the stronger motive, and that we choose a thing merely

because we choose it, is sheer nonsense and absurdity. And whoever,

with a sound understanding, will fix his mind upon the state of the

question, will perceive its impossibility."

But, all correct _moral_ reasoning ranges on the side of freedom. In

opposition to the subtle or forcible reasonings of the metaphysician,

every individual can plead his inward consciousness of voluntary

agency. He feels, he knows, that he is free. The exercise of the

moral sense, the judgment which the mind pronounces on its own good

or evil movements, the conviction of having done or neglected a

duty, the calm satisfaction of the virtuous mind, and the fierce

or sullen remorse of the criminal, are associated with the

insuppressible persuasion of liberty. Destroy this persuasion,

and virtue is despoiled of its loveliness, vice of its deformity.

But it cannot be destroyed. It is the voice of nature. The Creator

has so formed us, that we cannot throw off from ourselves the sense

of responsibility, nor regard our fellow creatures as unfit for

praise or blame, for love or hatred. Men treat each other as free

agents in all the transactions of human life, and God administers

the government of the world, on the principle that mankind are

capable of self-control, regulating their conduct by the hope of

reward or fear of punishment. If the consciousness of freedom be a

delusion, it follows that moral obligation, duty, reward, guilt,

punishment, are delusions, and that religion, however salutary in

its effects, is nothing better than a magnificent imposture.

Calvinism is an attempt to found the religion of Christ on the

doctrine of necessity, and to accommodate its truths, which suppose

and require free agency in man, to a dark and appalling fatalism.

But in a case like the present, in which metaphysical reasonings,

however profound or conclusive, so far as they go, are at variance

with practical truth, with consciousness, with the actual state of

things, and with the unquestionable procedures of the Divine

government, as confirmed by the scriptures, wisdom would seem to

dictate our adhesion to that side of the question, which is

supported by moral arguments.

In taking this part, it does not follow that we are to repudiate, as

totally without foundation, the philosophy and the metaphysics of

the necessarian--_aequo pretio aestimentur_. We may admit, that the

force of his argument, in the present imperfect state of human

knowledge, renders the question perplexed and difficult; that it

accounts for the divided opinions of the erudite and the devout, and

that it precludes the hope of a speedy termination of the

controversy. But in assigning to moral reasoning the superior

authority, we are governed by a just regard to the nature of the

question at issue, which, being related to the destinies of moral

agents, and the principles on which the Deity conducts his moral

government, must be determined, not by metaphysical, but by moral

arguments. When brought to this test, Calvinism appears utterly

indefensible, as being a system at variance with the attributes of

the Deity, and irreconcileable with the moral constitution of human

beings, and with the obligations laid upon them by their Creator. It

is falsified by facts.

That the predestinarian theology, which denies the freedom of the

will, is supported by names of great consideration, is cheerfully

granted. No man, for example, was ever endowed with a genius more

commanding, with logical powers more acute, with a faculty more

surprising of writing on recondite subjects with force, perspicuity,

and nervous eloquence, than President Edwards. Nevertheless, the

correctness of his views is not implicitly to be inferred from his

transcendant intellect and fervent piety.

All the great errors, which have been propagated in the Christian

Church, have found advocates in men of the first character for

intellectual power and moral dignity, or they would have passed away

with their authors into immediate oblivion.

In estimating the authority of Edwards as a theologian, it is

requisite that we should know the temperament and habits of that

very remarkable person. It is not, perhaps, generally considered,

that great as were the energy and acuteness of his reasoning powers,

he was less under the dominion of these than of his imagination and

feelings. In early life this is not unfrequently the case with

persons of imaginative character; but, commonly, the ardent

enthusiasm of youth gives way afterwards to the ascendancy of the

higher faculties. Edwards was, constitutionally, too much the

creature of dreams and impulses ever to escape from their control.

His gigantic mind was held in perpetual bondage. His natural

temperament was fostered throughout the whole period which moulds

and fixes the character, by his holding little converse with human

beings beyond the sphere of a particular religious community in an

obscure American town, and by an almost uninterrupted contemplation

of nature in her gloomy and awful forms, amid the silence of

uncultivated plains, and the solitude of interminable forests. The

profound feeling, the intense excitement, which accompanied his

early devotional exercises, were such as to insure a permanent

attachment to every principle and every impression of that

susceptible age. The visions of a warm, and often morbid,

imagination continued to be cherished with religious confidence and

love for ever afterwards. Every doubt, of what he once had received

for truth, was anxiously suppressed in the manhood of his mind as an

infernal suggestion; and the acuteness of his reasoning powers, by

supplying him at all times with an argument, for what he conceived

it _his duty_ to believe, served, not to emancipate him from false

apprehensions of truth, but to rivet upon him more firmly the chains

of ignorance or error. When argument was doubtful, a dogged

fanaticism supplied its place. This may be illustrated by a

particular instance, and bearing directly on the subject of our

present discussion.

It cannot be doubted, by any person qualified to appreciate his

writings, that his views of the Divine sovereignty are resolvable

into a system of absolute fatalism, so far as the actions and

destinies of men are concerned. Reason and conscience revolt from

the consequences involved in such a system; all our moral instincts

condemn it. But it was instilled into his mind by Calvinistic

instructors in the days of his boyhood; his imagination was

perpetually haunted by it; and having identified it with the truth

of divine revelation, which he held in religious veneration and awe,

he finally vanquished every doubt respecting it, not by the

deliberate exercise of his judgment, on a calm investigation of

evidence, but by the force of his religious feelings, and of his

ascendant imagination. Let him tell his own story.

"From my childhood up," he says, "my mind had been full of

objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty, in choosing

whom He would to eternal life, and rejecting whom He pleased;

leaving them eternally to perish, and to be everlastingly tormented

in hell. It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me. But I

remember the time very well, when I seemed to be convinced and fully

satisfied as to this sovereignty of God, and his justice in thus

eternally disposing of men, according to his sovereign pleasure.

_But never could give any account, how, or by what means I was thus

convinced_, not in the least imagining at the time, nor a long time

after, that there was any extraordinary influence of God's Spirit in

it; but only that now I saw further, and my reason apprehended the

justice and reasonableness of it." In this extraordinary passage,

the most instructive he ever penned, he confesses, undesignedly but

clearly, that his faith in the Calvinistic theology did not rest on

those arguments by which he has confirmed so many others in that

tremendous creed, but was the result of supposed supernatural

illumination. The true solution would be, "Sit pro ratione

voluntas!"

Much as we find to admire and revere in this eminent man, the

history of his mind forbids us to rely on him with implicit

confidence as an expositor of divine truth. His religion was

exalted, his genius wonderful, but the subordination of his judgment

to his imagination was an immense evil, producing an almost

superstitious dread of the operations of his own mighty mind,

suppressing its energies, its growth, and its expansion. He presents

an example, not less of the weakness than of the majesty of human

nature. We cease to wonder, when he describes the happiness of the

spirits of the redeemed in heaven, as being derived, in part, from

their listening to the groans and lamentations of lost souls in

hell. Nor can we doubt, that if he had been born and educated a

member of the Church of Rome, he would have lived and died, like

Fenelon or Pascal, a splendid ornament of that impure communion, a

conscientious advocate of that servile faith.

Calvinism has never had another advocate equally qualified with

Edwards to vindicate its awful dogmata; and if, by his own

confession, his most potent arguments would have failed to produce

conviction in his own mind, without God's special influence, we see

reason to suspect the validity of these arguments, until we have

proof that he did indeed receive from heaven miraculous

illumination. Such _special influence_ we may with propriety

question, since a claim to inspiration can be supported only by the

exercise of miraculous powers. Deny, therefore, the inspiration of

this profound writer, of which there is no proof, and we have his

own authority against the conclusiveness of his own arguments; since

he confesses that by their cogency alone they are insufficient to

produce conviction in opposition to our just and natural conceptions

of the righteous character of God.

Let us not, therefore, crouch with timid servility to great names.

The opinions of men of erudition, and genius, and holy zeal for

religion, are to be examined with modest deference, but not to be

received with implicit credulity. In the most enlightened and holy

men, who, since the decease of the apostles, have served God and his

Christ; in the fathers of the ancient Church; in those who headed

the Protestant Reformation, and lived as saints, or died as martyrs;

in Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, Knox, we discover humiliating proofs of

imperfection and fallibility. And, while the fundamental truths of

Christianity have been preserved in the Catholic Church, those

truths have been mingled or associated with errors so injurious and

degrading, that no blind faith is to be rested on any _human

authority_. Let us uphold the majesty of divine revelation, and

vindicate our right and our duty to interpret the sacred page--not

by the traditions of fallible men, not by the metaphysics of the

schools, not by the "special influences" which an enthusiastic mind

may construe into divine teaching, and which may be pleaded, with

equal truth or falsehood, for every form of error; but by a sober

reference to those moral perfections of the Deity, and to those

essential attributes of human nature, the knowledge of which lies at

the foundation of all sound religious belief. These are to be

learned from the Scriptures, and are the key to their right

interpretation.

Edwards, incomparably the most able advocate of Calvinism, since the

days of the reformer himself, is not a solitary example of the way

in which a zealous pleader may, unwarily, betray and weaken his own

cause.

Mr. Scott, in his "force of truth," gives an account of his own

conversion to Calvinism not very dissimilar to that of Edwards, and

not in any degree more honourable to the cause he proposes to

defend. The argument of that work may be summed up in few words. Mr.

Scott entertained a great dislike of Calvinistic doctrines. He

rejected the evidence by which they were supported, as being

insufficient to establish a creed which appeared to him most

objectionable. Yet, strong as were his prejudices against it, they

ultimately gave way, and, _therefore_, Calvinism must be the truth.

But, in both instances, the impression designed to be made on the

mind of the reader is the same, that is, that the Spirit of God

accomplished what the force of argument had failed to do. Mr. Scott,

therefore, adds his testimony to that of President Edwards,

confessing that Calvinism is not supported by proofs sufficient in

themselves to carry conviction to the human mind, without special

illumination from above; an illumination, which, assuredly, the

_religious opposers_ may as righteously claim, as the religious

defenders of Calvinism. For what Christian man does not pray for the

guidance of God's good Spirit? The dispassionate reader of "_The

Force of Truth_," will naturally say, that the arguments for the

Calvinistic creed were either sound or unsound. If the former, then

Mr. Scott was either very obtuse or very obstinate to resist so long

their power. If the latter, he acted with great weakness in yielding

at length to insufficient evidence, on the score of an undefinable

impulse. In either case, his name is divested of commanding

authority in the view of reasonable men. Yet it can hardly be

doubted, that this claim to _special teaching_ from the fountain of

wisdom and of truth, has done more, incalculably more, to awe the

minds of men into submission, and thus to obtain currency for their

opinions, than the _joint confession_ of these popular writers, to

the insufficiency of their own arguments, has availed to render

suspected the force of their reasoning. The impression made on the

generality of minds would be, that men so good, and so candid in

confessing their own obstinacy, could not be mistaken, in believing

themselves, at a subsequent period, to be inspired and infallible[3].

The advocates of Calvinism differ remarkably from each other in the

tone and spirit of their writings, as their habits of thought and

feeling are modified by circumstances. The American divines of the

school of Edwards have carried out his principles with unflinching

consistency, not hesitating to impute to the Deity, in unqualified

terms, the eternal decrees which fix the weal or woe of the human

race for ever. The cold and heartless manner in which these men

treat the subject, and the stoical apathy with which they

contemplate the result of their hard metaphysics, are extremely

remote from our usual conceptions of piety and humanity. Well might

that superlative woman, Mrs. Susanna Wesley, say, "The doctrine of

_predestination_, as maintained by rigid Calvinists, is very

shocking, and ought utterly to be abhorred." The dark spirit of

inflexible wrath which the American Calvinists have imputed to the

Deity, together with their coarse caricatures of the Gospel, may

account for, but cannot justify, the terms in which Dr. Chancing has

thought fit to assail _the orthodox faith_, confounding on all

occasions scriptural Christianity, as held by the Catholic Church,

with the dogmas of an extravagant creed. To understand his eloquent

and indignant declamations, we must read the transatlantic

expounders of the Calvinistic theology.

In general, the English writers of any name, are more guarded and

less unfeeling. They do not at once and directly charge God with

being the author of sin. The late Dr. Williams of Rotherham composed

a voluminous work on the subject, entitled "equity and sovereignty,"

in which he gives, what he considers, a new theory of the origin of

moral evil. To redeem the divine character from the imputation of

harshness in the decree of reprobation, he supposes mankind under a

_necessary tendency to moral defection_, as dependent and created

beings; and that it was in mere _equity_, that the wicked were

_left_, not decreed, to perdition. The hypothesis of Dr. Williams is

already exploded. It was examined and refuted by the Rev. William

Parry, of Wymondly, in a piece entitled "Strictures on the Origin of

Moral Evil." For reasoning, acute, profound, and perspicuous, both

metaphysical and moral, this work has seldom been surpassed. And the

devout and courteous spirit in which it is written, presents an

example, beautiful and instructive, of dispassionate controversy.

"Upon a review of the argument," Mr. Parry writes, "there appear to

be strong reasons for considering the whole of Dr. Williams'

hypothesis, to account for the origin of evil, as highly

objectionable, and worthy of rejection; because it is founded on a

false principle, which identifies physical and moral tendency; is

incompatible with the nature and phenomena of mind; involves the

existence of an antecedent fate or absolute necessity, which

controlled the divine operations; is inconsistent with the natural

and moral perfections of God, and the scriptural account of the

state in which man was created; is expressed in obscure and

inapplicable language; and is so far from agreeing with _equity_,

that, when taken together, it represents the Divine Being as having

at first, created intelligent and accountable creatures with such

powers as would enable them to sin, but with none which would enable

them to avoid it."

The theory of Dr. Williams found favour with many Calvinists,

because it assumed somewhat of a philosophical aspect, and was put

forth as a clear "_demonstration_." But some of its ablest defenders

have since abandoned it to that oblivion, from which no efforts can

save an elaborate speculation, ungrounded in reason or revelation,

and repugnant to common sense.

In England the public mind has been so powerfully and happily

influenced by the anti-calvinistic genius of the liturgy, offices,

and discipline of the Anglican Church, that the grossness and

extravagancy of the American divines have been tolerated chiefly by

those who have not fallen under her instructions, or who have not

had the advantage of a liberal education and extensive reading. In

general, whether within or without the pale of the Church, its more

intelligent advocates have, until lately, exhibited it in a modified

form, and thrown over it a veil of mystery which has hidden its most

appalling deformities from the sight, while by the less skilful or

sagacious only, it has been adapted more to the fears or affections

of women, than to the understandings of men. Unhappily, the grosser

representations of this doctrine are now coming into repute in

quarters where, formerly, they would not have been endured, and thus

afford another warning example of the "_facilis descensus Averni_."

But under all possible modifications, it is essentially erroneous;

and this small treatise has originated in no love of discord, or

taste for polemic excitement, but in a solemn sense of duty,--the

duty of aiding, in some humble measure, the more learned and

important labours of others who are "set for the defence of the

truth." The writer aims only at a _common sense_ view of the

subject, showing that Calvinism is a dangerous speculation, useless

for every holy and salutary purpose, inapplicable to the hopes and

the duties of a religious life, at variance with our knowledge of

God, our obligations as Christians, and all our finer sentiments and

more generous sympathies as men. So far as its influence is exerted,

it contracts the understanding and hardens the heart.

Bishop Tomline's "Refutation of Calvinism," is too well known and

justly appreciated to need recommendation from the writer of these

papers. Faber "on the Primitive Doctrine of Election," is an

important work, composed with logical precision, and founded on a

laborious analysis of the Scriptures. The intelligent reader will be

instructed and deeply interested by "An Inquiry into the Doctrines

of Necessity and Predestination," by Dr. Copleston, the Bishop of

Llandaff.

From the latter work is extracted the following summary of the

peculiar and distinctive doctrines of the Calvinistic creed, in

which it is exhibited, not in a moderated and qualified form, as it

sometimes appears in the writings of individuals, but in its true

and undisguised character, as maintained by a grave assembly of

predestinarian divines.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE SYNOD OF DOST, AS EXHIBITED BY TILENUS.

ART. 1. OF DIVINE PREDESTINATION.

That God, by an absolute decree, hath elected to salvation a very

small number of men, without any regard to their faith or obedience

whatsoever; and secluded from saving grace all the rest of mankind,

and appointed them by the same decree to eternal damnation, without

any regard to their infidelity or impenitency.

ART. 2. OF THE MERIT AND EFFECT OF CHRIST'S DEATH.

That Jesus Christ hath not suffered death for any other, but for

those elect only; having neither had any intent nor commandment of

his Father to make satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.

ART. 3. OF MAN'S WILL IN THE STATE OF NATURE.

That by Adam's fall, his posterity lost their free-will, being put

to an unavoidable necessity to do or not to do, whatsoever they do

or do not, whether it be good or evil, being thereunto predestinated

by the eternal and effectual secret decree of God.

ART. 4. OF THE MANNER OF CONVERSION.

That God, to save his elect from the corrupt mass, doth beget faith

in them, by a power equal to that whereby He created the world and

raised up the dead; insomuch, that such unto whom He gives that

grace, cannot reject it, and the rest, being reprobate, cannot

accept it.

ART. 5. OF THE CERTAINTY OF PERSEVERANCE.

That such as have once received that grace by faith, can never fall

from it finally or totally, notwithstanding the most enormous sins

they can commit.

PART II.

PARTICULAR OBJECTIONS.

I.--CALVINISM IMPUGNS THE MORAL CHARACTER OF THE DEITY.

The existence of moral evil is a _fact_, not to be denied by any man

who reverences his own understanding; and that it seemed fit to the

Divine Wisdom to _permit_ its introduction into the world, is

equally beyond contradiction, unless we limit the divine power, and

suppose that, by a necessity antecedent to the divine will, and

controlling the divine conduct, the Deity himself acts, not

spontaneously but from coercion. That sin, with its awful

consequences, should even exist by _permission_, under the

administration of infinite benevolence, has been regarded by

theologians as one of the most perplexing mysteries of "the deep

things of God."

But Calvinism leads to the direct and inevitable conclusion, not

only that God has permitted the fall of angels and of men, but that

He is himself the original _author_ of their defection, and of the

guilt and suffering which have been incurred by disobedience. No

subtlety of argument, no special refinements or metaphysical

distinctions, no ingenious evasions can rescue from this fatal

conclusion the Calvinistic exposition of the divine decrees. If the

Creator in the construction of the human mind rendered it naturally,

morally, absolutely impossible, that man should maintain his

obedience to the divine law under the circumstances in which he was

placed--the act of transgression, be it what it may, must be traced

to the will and intention of the Deity--the _effect_, sin, guilt,

condemnation, undefinable misery, diffused over the face of the

creation, and coextensive with the numberless generations of the

family of man--the _cause_, God; that Being who is perfect reason,

perfect goodness, light without darkness, love without malevolence;

who cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth He any man; with

whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning! Contrasted with

this monstrous compound of impiety and absurdity, which makes

infinite goodness the eternal source of infinite misery, there is

wisdom in the Manichaean doctrine of two conflicting principles,

holding a divided dominion over the universe, and contending, one

for the production of the universal degradation and wretchedness,

the other, for the purity and bliss of all intellectual and moral

beings!

The advocates of scriptural truth have not failed to expose, with

holy indignation and eloquent remonstrance, the inconsistency of

these views of the divine government with the entire scope and

spirit of the evangelic economy of grace. While the love of God to a

fallen world is the great theme of the apostolic ministry, and, in

language too explicit to be misunderstood, the propitiation of

Christ is said to be for the sins "of the _whole_ world,"--while, in

exact agreement with the consolatory declaration that God

"delighteth not in the death of a sinner," the apostles of Christ

are commissioned to "preach the gospel to _every creature_,"--we are

taught by Calvinism, that the God of truth is only mocking the great

mass of his miserable creatures with a semblance of mercy, from

whose tenderness they are excluded, and with promises and

invitations which He never designed should be accepted by them. A

dark and unrelenting fate has already sealed their destiny, and

their perdition is rendered inevitable before they have committed

those offences for which, as if in derision, they are commanded to

repent, in order that they may escape the wrath of the Almighty.

Thus, in total disregard of all that is holy and majestic in the

character of the Deity, He is described as a Being invested with the

most detestable of Satanic attributes, assuming the gentle

affections of a father, only to exercise more effectually the wanton

power of a tyrant, and treacherously inviting our confidence and our

love, when, with such falsehood and cruelty, as the most debased of

his creatures would not be able to perpetrate, He is only preparing

victims for his inexorable malice.

Let it not be said, in opposition to this, that we are imperfect

judges, in any particular case, of the rectitude of the divine

procedures; that our ignorance renders our decision in such a case

daring and presumptuous. We are _not_ ignorant of what is meant

either by justice or mercy. These moral qualities are essentially

the same in nature, whether in created beings or in their Creator.

The only difference is in degree. In the Deity they are _infinite_;

and, if infinite justice and mercy are compatible with conduct

which, on a smaller scale, would expose a human being to eternal

infamy, then are we disqualified for all just conceptions of the

character of God. If wanton cruelty be consistent with Divine

compassion, then may deception be reconciled with inviolable faith,

and they, who deem themselves to be happy in the electing love of

God, may awake at last to the fearful discovery, that, having

indulged in the dream of special grace, they are only reserved for a

destiny still more terrible than others, whom they had abandoned as

reprobate to the sovereign wrath of God! By what infatuation are men

induced to rely on any supposed distinctions in favour of

themselves, when they have removed the only grounds of confidence in

the righteous administration of the Deity?

It is an impressive feature in the works of rigid predestinarians,

that their own minds seem to partake of the fearful gloom with which

they depict the divine attributes. They appear awed and terror

-stricken with the stern aspect of the great Being whose moral

character they have distorted, until they tremble at the creations

of their own imagination. They write as men whose minds are rendered

morbid with mysterious fears, rather than brightened into holy

gladness, by a filial love of God. They seem to be vindicating with

servile dread a character, whose wrath they would deprecate, and

whose doubtful favour they would propitiate on their own behalf.

Even when they express their persuasion of their own interest in

"special grace," it is more in the spirit of men who are conscious

of being the favoured objects of capricious tyranny, than of that

serene and hopeful and cheering confidence which inspires the devout

heart, when it contemplates through a happier medium the beneficent

and universal Father. Nor is this unnatural. The moral character of

the Deity, as misrepresented by Calvinism, both unsettles all our

ideas of rectitude, and renders insecure our hold upon Infinite

Goodness.

That the mental disease of Cowper was intensely aggravated by

depressing views of the divine character, which he received from

Newton and others, and that the consolations which might have

soothed his mind, from a scriptural view of the grace of the gospel,

were neutralised or destroyed by his supposing himself the victim of

an _irreversible decree_, is clear to every impartial reader of his

most interesting and most melancholy life. Yet of his piety we have

this touching proof, that, amidst the wildest aberrations of his

intellect, and while oppressed with the conviction that he was

numbered with the reprobate, his persuasion of the rectitude of the

divine government never wavered; he acquiesced in the doom which he

believed to await him; and declared that if it were the will of God

that he should perish, he would not lift a finger to reverse his

fate! Who would not lament, that a mind thus tempered to pious

confidence, should be taught by a pernicious creed to distrust its

own interest in the love of God--a delusion which passed away only

in death!

II.--CALVINISM IS NOT TO BE RECONCILED WITH THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

OF MAN.

Whatever extent we assign to the corruption of human nature, by

which its moral powers have been impaired, or the soul disqualified

for the due and proper use of those powers, it is plain that men are

still capable of acting, and of being treated as the subjects of

moral government. Calvinistic writers do themselves admit the

turpitude of sin and the loveliness of virtue--that vice entails

suffering, and that happiness is the consequence of a religious

conformity to the will of God. That is, setting aside all special

refinements by which they attempt to disprove that the present state

of man is probationary, they confess that _practically_ mankind are

treated as accountable beings whose guilt is punished and their

goodness rewarded. This broad and unquestionable fact defies

controversy. Although we may not be able to give a definition of

_freedom_ which may satisfy the philosopher, and although we may

concede to the opposers of the freedom of the will, that virtue and

vice--moral good and moral evil--are to be predicated, not of the

cause, whether it be freedom or fate, from whence our volitions

spring, but of the good or evil nature of the volitions themselves

--in whatever way these questions are decided, or, if we leave them

undecided, as being beyond the present grasp of the human intellect,

men are unquestionably subjected by the Deity to the laws of a moral

economy. They are, sooner or later, rendered happy in exact

proportion to their conformity to the commands of God, and miserable

if they remain rebellious.

And all we contend for is, that such a state of things can never be

explained on the supposition of absolute predestination or

inevitable necessity, founded on the irreversible decrees of Heaven.

The reason appears on a moment's consideration. The good or evil

nature of the volition belongs, on this hypothesis, not to the

created being, who is a passive instrument, without actual power

--but to the Creator, who is the only real agent, as well as the

efficient cause. The instrument by which He accomplishes his

purposes may be good or evil, the volitions of that instrument may

be characterised by whatever qualities you please, still, a mere

instrument is not an object of moral approbation or blame; no

responsibility attaches to it, and the condition on which it acts is

perfectly incongruous with all the ideas we have of reward or

punishment. These are inapplicable to a state of fatalism. The

volitions, and the actions they produce, are in reality those of the

Deity. To Him they belong, and to Him alone. On this critical and

decisive point all the great Calvinistic writers break down. While

they award to human beings the treatment due to moral agents, they

deny to them the attributes without which they cannot be responsible

for their actions.

To beings under moral government, personal agency is essential; but

Calvinistic fatalism reduces all agency to that of the Deity alone.

The human soul is moved mechanically by impulse from without, and

passively yields to an irresistible power.

It supposes the exercise of faculties by which we are made sensible

of our relation to the Deity, and our obligation to obey his laws.

Hence results the consciousness of rectitude or guilt, and all the

noble motives by which we are led to self-government and self

-renunciation--from a sense of duty, and with a view to future

happiness in the enjoyment of the divine approbation. But

Calvinistic necessity destroys the majesty of the human mind, as "an

arbiter enthroned in its own dominion, endowed with an initiating

power, and forming its determinations for good or for evil by an

inherent and indefeasible prerogative." It tells us that we have

neither power to act nor freedom to fall--that our sense of liberty

is delusive, that we are predestined to sin or to holiness by a

decree of the infinite mind, and that our fate has been sealed from

eternity! If we really believe it and act upon it, our moral

energies are for ever suppressed, and the consciousness of virtue

and of guilt must give way to the humiliating persuasion that we can

do nothing, and that we have nothing to do, but to yield to our lot

and await our doom, whether to be lost or saved!

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