resolving on a more oppressive policy; and Dietrichstein succeeded
in bringing against Z̆erotin charges of treason, which induced the
Emperor to summon him to Prague. His support of Henry IV., whom
Rudolf considered his enemy; his sympathy with the Count Palatine
of the Rhine, who was already suspected of aiming at the Bohemian
crown; and his refusal, in deference to the religious principles of
the Brotherhood, to drink the Emperor’s health at a banquet, were
all brought forward by Dietrichstein in proof of the charge; and the
evident sympathy of the Moravian Estates for Z̆erotin was not likely to
make him more welcome to the Emperor. When, indeed, Z̆erotin was tried
for these offences in 1601, he was acquitted on all the charges against
him; but when Rudolf revived the enactment of Ladislaus against the
sects, Z̆erotin was deprived of his office.
He now, for a time, retired from public life, and devoted himself to
the study of theology and the education of young noblemen. But his
study of Calvinism, and his continual correspondence with those who
still maintained their interest in politics, prepared him for a return
to public life. At the time of the invasion of Bocksay, Z̆erotin’s
sympathies had been somewhat divided. He was, of course, zealous for
religious freedom; and he had a warm personal friendship for Stephen
Illyezhazy, a leading Hungarian Protestant, who had great influence
in Bocksay’s councils; but, on the other hand, he must have strongly
disliked the Turkish alliance; and he had a great personal loyalty to
the House of Hapsburg.
Under these circumstances, the hopes of Z̆erotin were more and more
directed to the proposal for putting forward Matthias in the place of
Rudolf. This arrangement would secure the crown of Bohemia to the House
of Hapsburg, and would gain for the oppressed Protestants a leader
who might protect them at once against Rudolf and against the Turk.
Z̆erotin’s Hungarian friend, Illyezhazy, was willing to accept this
policy; and even Lichtenstein, though a Catholic, consented to act
with the Protestant leaders in their championship of the candidature
of Matthias. As Rudolf still resisted any proposal for compromise, the
Archdukes decided to give power to Matthias to act as their chief in
Hungary and elsewhere; and he succeeded in making peace with Bocksay,
by granting to the Hungarians full religious freedom and the election
of their own Palatine. Rudolf, however, though he had been compelled
to recognise Matthias as his general in Hungary, refused to consent
to the terms of peace; and the miseries of Moravia were increased by
the cruelties of the troops sent to protect them, by the difficulties
which Dietrichstein and Berka threw in the way of order, and by
the unwillingness of Rudolf to take any decided action of a useful
character.
At last, therefore, in December, 1607, a meeting took place at
Z̆erotin’s castle in Rosice, to which he invited, not only his Moravian
friends, but also the Hungarian Illyezhazy, and the leader of the
Protestants in Upper Austria, George Erasmus von Tschernembl. They
resolved to insist on the enforcement of the terms of peace in Hungary;
and they demanded that the princes of the Empire should compel Rudolf
to confirm the concessions of Matthias. Rudolf became alarmed, and
prepared to suppress the movement by force of arms. Ladislaus von Berka
persuaded the forces of General Tilly to come secretly into Moravia
and concentrate themselves near Brünn (Brno). On March 7, 1608, the
Land Court of Moravia held its sittings; and, on the night before its
meetings, Tilly’s troops were secretly introduced into the town. The
champions of Moravian liberty were, however, on the watch; and, when
the Land Court assembled, Carl von Lichtenstein suddenly entered it,
at the head of sixty armed men, informed Berka of the introduction
of the foreign soldiers, and demanded that, before they proceeded to
further business, the Moravian nobles should take into consideration
the defence of their country. Berka declared that there was no danger,
and demanded that they should proceed to the ordinary business of the
court; whereupon Lichtenstein and his friends denounced Berka as a
traitor, drove him from the court, and sent fifty of the young nobles
to guard the streets against the foreign troops.
But the old rivalry between the nobles and the towns suddenly showed
itself at this crisis. The Town Council of Brünn refused to support the
lords in their action; and, when the lords adjourned to Ivanc̆ic̆e,
the leading Moravian towns refused to send representatives to their
discussions. Rudolf now summoned to Brünn the regular Assembly of the
Moravian Estates; but he forbade them to consider any propositions,
except those which should be laid before them by the royal
Commissioners. Z̆erotin, however, protested so strongly against this
limitation, that the commissioners left Brünn without being able to get
their propositions considered.
Z̆erotin now looked about for further allies in the struggle, and
thereby became aware of the very different schemes which were being
formed against the power of Rudolf. The Brotherhood had already shown
an inclination to an alliance with the German Calvinistic princes,
and particularly with the Elector Palatine of the Rhine; and they had
excited some alarm, in 1577, by consenting to send representatives to
a meeting of the Calvinists at Heidelberg. Z̆erotin had maintained
a personal friendship with the Elector Palatine; but the policy of
that Court was now being largely guided and controlled by a prince of
another house, whose zeal for religious liberty was mixed with motives
of a very different character. This was Christian, Prince of Anhalt,
the most prominent and active of the Calvinistic leaders of Germany,
whose restless personal ambition seemed almost to overshadow his zeal
for Protestantism; and who might be considered one of the chief causes
of the ruin of Bohemian independence and the miseries of the Thirty
Years War. His great aim was to overthrow the House of Hapsburg; and
he would have been willing, for that purpose, to absorb Bohemia and
Hungary in the German Empire. Z̆erotin, though at first willing to
negotiate with Christian as the leader of the German Protestants, soon
found that his aims and those of that prince were totally opposed. For
the present, however, everything was subordinated to the determination
of the champions of constitutional liberty to combine against Rudolf.
The meeting took place at Ivanc̆ic̆e, in spite of the opposition of the
Emperor and Berka. Berka was deprived of his captaincy; a provisional
government was established; and Charles of Lichtenstein was called upon
to act as provisional Dictator. In proposing Lichtenstein, Z̆erotin was
actuated partly by political, partly by religious, considerations. As
a statesman, Z̆erotin felt that it was necessary to win the support of
men of all creeds, by putting the question of orderly constitutional
government before the question of religious liberty; and he therefore
preferred the choice of a Roman Catholic leader. But this political
instinct was strengthened by a religious scruple, which showed the
strong hold that the doctrine of the Brotherhood still maintained over
Z̆erotin. He was still convinced that war in defence of his country or
of constitutional government might be justified; but, as a follower
of Peter of Chelc̆ic̆, he could not admit that it was lawful to stain
the cause of religious liberty by the shedding of blood. This scruple,
however, did not diminish his sense of the necessity of vigorous
action. The leaders of the meeting at Ivanc̆ic̆e resisted Rudolf’s
attempts to disperse them, commanded Tilly to leave the country, and
succeeded in rousing such a feeling among the Moravians of the poorer
towns, that the Town Councils were overborne; and, with the exception
of Olmütz, all the towns declared themselves on the constitutional
side. Finally, the Assembly sent an invitation to Matthias, to ask him
to undertake the government; and they hastened to Znojem to greet him
on his arrival.
But, although Z̆erotin had succeeded in effecting an alliance between
Moravia, Hungary, and Austria, he had not yet succeeded in winning
to his side the leaders of the Bohemian Assembly; and it was in his
attempts to form this union that he was encountered by the opposition
of another member of the Brotherhood, who followed a tradition
somewhat different from Z̆erotin’s. This was Wenceslaus Budovĕc of
Budova, a leader among the Knights in the Assembly. He, like Z̆erotin,
had studied much in foreign countries, and had gained such favour
with Rudolf, that he had obtained a place on his Council. He soon
became prominent in the Assembly; and, on the issue of Rudolf’s new
decree against the Protestants, he led the opposition to it in the
Assembly. He was unwilling, however, to proceed to any extreme measures
at first; and he even consented to vote the tax demanded by Rudolf,
without making the repeal of the decree a condition precedent to the
vote. He pointed out that, since the setting aside of the Compacts of
Basel, there was no further pretence for saying that the Utraquists
were the only non-Catholics who were entitled to toleration. He dwelt
on the services done by the Brotherhood in the Turkish war; and he
succeeded in carrying a petition for the repeal of the decree; but
before the petition could be presented, Rudolf dissolved the Assembly,
and summoned Budovĕc before him. Budovĕc maintained that he had only
exercised his lawful privilege as a Bohemian knight; and Rudolf thought
it better to dismiss him for a time.
Budovĕc now entered into friendly relations with Z̆erotin; but, when
the latter urged him to support the candidature of Matthias, Budovĕc
maintained that it was more advisable to appeal again to Rudolf. His
reasons may be easily imagined. Matthias, like Rudolf, was a Roman
Catholic; and his chief adviser was Khlesl, Bishop of Vienna, who was
by no means inclined to measures of toleration. It was true that
Matthias had granted liberties to the Protestants of Hungary; but it
was by no means certain that, if he were suffered to dictate his terms
to Bohemia and Moravia at the point of the sword, backed by the whole
support of his family, he might _then_ grant equal liberties to _them_.
Budovĕc therefore preferred to see what the Protestants could gain
from Rudolf when under the fear of Matthias’s advance, rather than
to trust to what Matthias would do if he came as a conqueror. When,
then, Matthias, at the head of a Moravian, Austrian, and Hungarian
army, marched into Bohemia, Budovĕc and his friends declared their
willingness to stand by Rudolf.
When, on May 19, 1608, Rudolf, for the first time for many years, met
the Assembly of Bohemia, Budovĕc at once demanded that, as Rudolf had
already made concessions to the Protestants of Hungary, he should
now grant the liberties required by the Protestants of Bohemia. The
Bohemian Confession of 1575 was to be recognised. Defenders were to be
chosen to protect the interests of the Protestants. Offices were to be
granted in equal proportion to Protestants and Catholics. No foreigners
were to be allowed to manage Bohemian affairs. And, above all, no
one _of any rank_ was to be interfered with in matters of religious
liberty. The importance of this last clause is not perhaps easy to
realise in our time; for, in fact, this is one of the very first
assertions of the rights of _all_ men to religious liberty. Although
it is probable that expressions may have been often used which, if
logically interpreted, would have involved principles of the most
complete spiritual independence, yet both in Germany and Bohemia the
maxim “Cujus regio ejus religio,” had always been accepted as the legal
and natural rule in religious affairs.
In Bohemia, as already mentioned, the condition of the peasantry had
become more dependent during the 16th century; and, in 1585, the
Estates had distinctly forbidden servants to leave their masters for
the purpose of entering trades, unless with the written permission of
those masters. The struggle described above, in the earlier years of
Rudolf’s reign, had been mainly a struggle between landed proprietors;
and even a lady, who professed allegiance to the Brotherhood, had so
far misunderstood their doctrines as to drive a Utraquist preacher
from her estates, and to compel her peasantry to attend the sermons of
a member of the Brotherhood. The principle, therefore, which Budovĕc
asserted, was emphatically a new one; and he connected it, as will be
seen, with appeals to the national feeling of Bohemia.
Besides the revival of the old and often repeated claim for the
exclusion of foreigners from Bohemian offices, the petitioners
emphasised their national position by a reference to the memories of
their last national king. They demanded that the sword and crown which
had been taken from the statue of King George, in the Teyn Church,
should at once be restored to it. On this point alone Rudolf yielded.
To the other demands he refused to give an immediate answer. Yet even
this failure could not at once induce the Bohemian Estates to abandon
the cause of Rudolf for that of a prince who was invading Bohemia at
the head of a Hungarian army. This feeling was shared by the peasantry
of Bohemia; and several collisions took place between them and the
soldiers of Matthias.
But, though Matthias could not succeed in the conquest of Bohemia,
Rudolf, on his part, was unable to defend or recover the rest of
his hereditary dominions; nor is it probable that Budovĕc and his
friends were at all prepared to engage in a war against their
fellow-Protestants in Moravia, Hungary, and Austria. Rudolf, therefore,
after vainly attempting a compromise, consented to renounce Hungary and
Austria in favour of Matthias, and to allow him to administer Moravia
during his lifetime. Matthias thereupon evacuated Bohemia; but Rudolf’s
resistance was not yet at an end. He resented bitterly both the loss
of his territories and the demands of the Bohemian Protestants; and,
as he was not yet able to take any steps to recover his lost lands, he
proceeded to turn his bitterness against Budovĕc and his allies.
In this course he was encouraged by three councillors, who were to play
a memorable part in the history of Bohemia--the Chancellor Lobkovic
and the ministers Slavata and Martinic. The first proposal of the
Emperor was not merely to reject the petition of the Protestants, but
to treat their agreement to stand by each other as a conspiracy; and
he demanded that the document which contained the agreement should be
handed to him to be destroyed. The Protestants chose a Committee of
Twelve to remonstrate with Rudolf on this demand; and at the head of
that committee they placed a man who was to become only too well known
in Bohemian history, Count Matthias of Thurn. They waited on the King
with the document for which he had asked, but told him that they had
only produced it that he might know the names of his faithful subjects.
Rudolf seems, for the moment, to have been impressed with this protest,
and consented not to destroy the petition.
Budovĕc, however, and his friends were determined on using their
opportunity to the utmost; and they were all the more eager in their
pressure, because they found that the official leader of the Assembly,
Adam of Sternberg, was entirely out of sympathy with their efforts,
and that he was continually endeavouring, on the one hand, to make
divisions between the Utraquists, the Lutherans, and the Brotherhood;
while, on the other hand, he represented the Assembly to the Emperor
as really willing to accept as satisfactory the offers which they in
reality repudiated. The difficulties, which might have arisen from
this latter part of Sternberg’s policy, were obviated by the attitude
of uncompromising resistance which was taken up by Lobkovic, Slavata,
and Martinic. At last, on the advice of these councillors, Rudolf
decided to dissolve the Assembly. Then Budovĕc saw that the time for
constitutional agitation was nearly over; and on April 1, 1609, he
gathered his friends together, and gave notice to the chief Burggraf of
Prague that they were resolved to use force to resist all injustice.
Although they were now obviously compelled to accept, in some respects,
that leadership of Matthias which they had previously opposed, the
Bohemian Protestants were not yet prepared to rely wholly on the King
of Hungary. The Estates of Silesia and Lausitz, though largely in
sympathy with the Protestant movement, had agreed with the Bohemians,
in the previous year, in refusing to repudiate Rudolf. The Silesians
were now ready to follow the Bohemians in their more determined policy;
and the Bohemians, on their part, were disposed to strengthen this
alliance, by granting to Silesia that position of independent equality
which they had hitherto refused. A league was therefore formed between
the Bohemian and Silesian Assemblies, of such a kind as might have been
agreed upon between two independent Powers; and the Silesians were
ready enough to co-operate under these circumstances.
But it was not only on their immediate neighbours that the Bohemians
relied. They appealed also to the Protestant princes of Germany, both
Lutheran and Calvinistic; and from them, too, they received encouraging
answers. It was now evident that both sides were within a measurable
distance of war; but it was also clear that Rudolf might still have
a chance of preventing the insurrection from actually breaking out,
by dividing the forces of his opponents, and depriving the movement
of any legal centre. For greater security, the Assembly were now
meeting in the Council House of the New Town of Prague; and Rudolf,
therefore, ordered the Councillors of that part of the town to exclude
the Assembly from their hall. The Town Council pleaded that they had
given their promise, and were obliged to abide by it; but the Estates
offered to meet even in the Castle itself, if a room were provided for
them; and when Rudolf refused their proposal, they gathered in the open
place between All Saints’ Church and the cathedral. There Rudolf came
to them, and rebuked them for continuing to meet. They answered by
requesting him to summon a General Assembly, which should represent not
only Bohemia, but all its dependent provinces. After some hesitation,
Rudolf consented to this proposal; but, as he persisted in forbidding
the Estates to hold any meetings in the interval, they returned to
their former position in the Council House of the New Town.
Adam von Sternberg had now been practically thrust aside by the
Assembly; and Budovĕc was recognised not only as their actual but also
as their official leader. He impressed on the movement that zealously
religious character which the Brotherhood always endeavoured to
maintain. He always opened the proceedings with prayer, and sternly
repressed all immorality or disorder among the followers of the nobles,
who were now flocking into the town. The Assembly felt that the use
of physical force could not be much longer avoided; they attended the
meetings ready armed; and on one occasion, when an attack from the
king’s forces was expected, even the workmen hastened into the square
and brandished their tools for the fray.
In the meantime the appeals of the Assembly for foreign help had been
producing their effect. Matthias, indeed, seemed for a time unwilling
to press his victories further, and declined to interfere between
Rudolf and the Estates; but the German princes were so zealous in their
appeals to the Emperor to make concessions, that he seemed at last
disposed to set aside the opinion of his more fiery Councillors, and
he summoned a General Assembly for the 25th of May, 1609. No sooner,
however, did the Assembly meet, than Lobkovic recovered his former
influence over the Emperor; and Rudolf began to hope that he might make
divisions between the Catholics and Protestants. On the other hand, the
demands of the Protestants appear to have grown more extreme at this
time; for they not only required the free profession of their creed and
the right to build churches, but they also insisted that the University
of Prague and the Utraquist Consistory should be placed under the
control of the Estates.
This last demand excited more interest than the fallen condition of
Utraquism might have led one to expect. But traditions of former
greatness have an incalculable influence; and many of the Protestants
believed that the failure of Utraquism had been due as much to the
control which the king exercised over the Consistory as to any
internal weakness. Therefore the Assembly’s demand for control over
the Consistory excited considerable sympathy among all classes of
Protestants. Rudolf, while unwilling to surrender his power in this
matter, was yet willing to propose a compromise, to the effect that the
Consistory should be managed by a special tribunal composed half of
Protestants and half of Catholics. As, however, he no doubt intended
that these should be appointed by himself, the Assembly considered
this answer as a complete rejection of their proposal; and on June
22, 1609, the Estates resolved, on the motion of Count Thurn, to make
arrangements for the arming of the whole population. Their indignation
was still further roused by the oppression inflicted on the Protestants
of Braunau by the abbot of that town; and the resolution for universal
arming was soon followed by the election of thirty Defenders for
carrying on the struggle.
It is a curious proof of the aristocratic influences which still
prevailed in the Assembly, that Peter Vok of Rosenberg was the first
Defender chosen. He had been the only prominent Bohemian who had
sympathised with Matthias’s invasion of Bohemia; and, though he had not
supported him by force of arms, he had supplied money to his troops.
Apart also from this difference of policy, Rosenberg must have been
a distasteful ally to the stricter Protestants, on account of his
profligate life. Other names of powerful families also appear in the
list, and at the same time Count Thurn was made general of the forces.
The Protestants now withdrew from their attendance at the Assembly;
Count Thurn quickly gathered five hundred men together in three days;
the alliance with the Silesians was formally confirmed; and application
was made to Christian of Anhalt for further help.
Rudolf, alarmed at these proceedings, was yet further startled by
the news that Matthias had just granted to the Austrian Assembly
all its demands for religious freedom. Moreover he found that
the Roman Catholic part of the Assembly, which had at first been
disposed to resist Budovĕc, were now ready to make terms with the
Protestants. He therefore declared his willingness to accept the
proposals of the Assembly on three conditions: (1) That they would
substitute “Utraquist” for “Evangelical” in their description of the
Protestants; (2) that they would accept the present concessions as a
provisional arrangement, until the general peace could be made with the
Protestants; and (3) that they would abandon the proposal for universal
arming. Budovĕc answered by accepting the two first conditions; but
he declared that the Defenders could not consent, at present, to lay
down their arms without special authority from the Estates, and special
sanction from the Silesians. Even this refusal Rudolf was obliged to
accept; and on the 9th of July he signed the Letter of Majesty which
practically decreed the points demanded by the Protestants. For the
moment it seemed as if the victory of religious freedom was complete;
for while, on the one hand, the power of the Estates was extended over
the University and the Consistory, and was still supported by an armed
force, on the other hand the concession of religious liberty was no
longer confined to communities or privileged classes, but extended to
every man and woman in the Bohemian kingdom.