Chapter I

Outpost in the Wilderness:

Fort Wayne,

1706-1828

by

Charles Poinsatte

Allen County, Fort Wayne

Historical Society

1976

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

The French and British Period Page 1

CHAPTER II

The Establishment of Fort Wayne—Government Outpost of Defense,

Diplomacy, and Trade Page 27

CHAPTER III

The Impending Conflict Page 50

CHAPTER IV

The Siege of Fort Wayne Page 63

CHAPTER V

Evacuation of the Fort and the Increased Indian Trade Page 79

CHAPTER VI

Platting of Fort Wayne and the First Local Government Page 94

CHAPTER VII

The Treaty of 1826 and the Removal of the Indian Agency Page 99

APPENDIX

Bibliography Page 106

Index Page 111

FOREWORD

There was a time when the writer of local history and the academic

professional were two different people; indeed, one is almost tempted to

say, they were two different species. Fortunately for both, this is no

longer true. Many academic historians now recognize local units as the

fundamental units of historical study, presenting hard data in

manageable quantities for precise conclusions. Charles R. Poinsatte was

among the first to recognize this and merge the academic and local

traditions of historical writing, the one supplying rigor and judgments

based on cosmopolitan learning, and the other supplying the vividness

and appeal of the familiar and relevant.

On the academic side, Charles R. Poinsatte got his undergraduate and

graduate education at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend. Thomas

T. McAvoy schooled him to precision in judgment and exhaustiveness in

research. Poinsatte also had the good fortune to study under Aaron I.

Abell, a student of Arthur Schlesinger, Senior, whose 1933 book, _The

Rise of the City, 1878-1898_, initiated a new kind of American history.

Professor Abell first got Poinsatte interested in what is now called

urban history. In fact, however, Poinsatte’s career embodies still

another great tradition in American historiography, that of frontier

history as inspired by Frederick Jackson Turner. _Frontier Outpost_

describes the _site_ of an urban area to be, but it is not truly urban

history, as Dr. Poinsatte’s book, _Fort Wayne during the Canal Era,

1828-1855_ (Indiana Historical Bureau, 1969), was. Thus Dr. Poinsatte

writes in this book of Fort Wayne as an aspect principally of the

history of the Old Northwest.

Higher education at Notre Dame, acquaintance with a student of the elder

Schlesinger, and thoughts spurred by the Turner thesis are only part of

the story, of course. The area Dr. Poinsatte decided to study was Fort

Wayne and not Detroit or Chicago or Cincinnati. Here what Nathaniel

Hawthorne called “a sort of home-feeling with the past” worked its

magic. Born in Fort Wayne in 1925, Charles Poinsatte was stirred by the

names he heard as a boy, Little Turtle, Anthony Wayne, and George Rogers

Clarke. Some family property was part of the old Richardville estate,

and in his youth he explored an old Indian burial ground there. He has

never gotten over his fascination with those men, and now he examines

them with his academic tools.

Dr. Poinsatte has always been able to reconcile seemingly conflicting

movements in American historical writing. Urban history and frontier

history, he argues, are in many ways complementary, for frontier

historians can explain to urban historians why the entities they study

are located where they are and how they got their start. Likewise, local

history and history as most often written by academic professionals

benefit from cross-fertilization. Local history always needs to be

written from a broad perspective which keeps the local historian from

claiming unique status for developments which took place in many other

localities at the same time. Likewise, in-depth studies of certain

localities provide tests for the larger generalizations of academic

historians, generalizations that are too often based on unrepresentative

samplings of evidence from national elites and large cultural and

political centers like New York and Washington.

Still, one suspects it is the excitement of particular locality’s

history which accounts for Dr. Poinsatte’s work. It has already taken

him to England and France in search of the records and documents which

explain the early history of Fort Wayne. He intends to return to Europe

next year to explore still another aspect of history suggested by Fort

Wayne’s story, the lives of French military officers who fought in the

American Revolution. After that, he might consider a history of Fort

Wayne in the railroad era, from 1855 (where Dr. Poinsatte’s work on the

canal era ended) to the Progressive Era. Whatever the course of

Professor Poinsatte’s future studies, Fort Wayne’s citizens will look

forward to reading the results. He has already enriched our

understanding of ourselves beyond measure.

September 4, 1975

Fort Wayne, Indiana

Mark E. Neely, Jr.

Preface

Early Fort Wayne played an important and definite role in the history of

the old Northwest. Its unique position as a portage site between the

Wabash and Maumee rivers made the Wabash route one of the natural

waterways from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi river and brought

Indians and fur traders to this spot at an early date. It is most likely

the oldest continuous site settled by white men in Indiana. During the

French, British, and American occupation of the region, forts were built

here as outposts of defense in the Indian country. Its strategic

importance was recognized in all the plans for military campaigns in the

area between the Great Lakes and the Ohio river for almost a century.

Here was located at a later date an important government Indian agency,

and to the town on certain days of the year flocked hundreds of Indian

traders. Fort Wayne was also situated in the heart of the rich

Maumee-Wabash fur producing region.

While giving a comprehensive background of the French and British

occupation of the site of Fort Wayne, I have stressed its importance in

the early days of American settlement. The gradual decline of the fur

trade, followed by the removal of the Indian agency in 1828 and the

opening of the area to white settlement by the Indian treaties of that

decade, all combined to usher in a new era in the history of Fort Wayne.

By the 1830’s the people of Fort Wayne were feverishly making plans for

the Wabash and Erie canal. This opened a new period in Fort Wayne’s

history which has been studied in my previous work.[1] Since then the

development of the city has been consistent and substantial.

From the modern growing city it is a far cry back to the time of the

Miami Indians and the old fort in the wilderness with its little

garrison of men puzzled at times, no doubt, to understand their choice

of a life of loneliness in an environment which gave little opportunity

for the refinements of life. The people of today are none too thoughtful

of their obligation to the pioneer soldier, trader and settler. It is my

hope that in addition to contributing to the annals of the Old

Northwest, this work may create a deeper appreciation of these early

builders. At the same time it has been my desire to treat all these

people objectively rather than in the fictitious way of the

sentimentalist.

Previous histories dealing with the early history of Fort Wayne, while

furnishing valuable material, have either been incomplete or inaccurate,

chiefly because many primary sources were not available to the writers

or were not known to exist. I have made extensive use of primary

material found in the Burton Collection at Detroit, the Chicago

Historical Library, and the Fort Wayne Public Library as well as in the

British Museum and the Public Records Office in London and the _Archives

des Colonies_ in Paris. Part of the European research was made possible

by a summer grant from St. Mary’s College, Notre Dame, Indiana.

Acknowledgments are due to many individuals who have so kindly given

assistance, especially to the staffs of the various archives and

libraries which I have used in Chicago, Detroit, Paris, and London. Mr.

Albert Diserens, chief of the Indiana collection of the Fort Wayne

Public Library, aided me in every way. A special debt is due to the

officers and members of the Allen County-Fort Wayne Historical Society

and in particular Mr. Fred Reynolds who assisted immeasurably in

arranging for the publication of this work. To the late Reverend Thomas

T. McAvoy of the University of Notre Dame I owe deep gratitude for first

encouraging me to study the history of my hometown.

While almost all early American cities which originated as military

outposts later changed their names—Cincinnati (Fort Washington). Chicago

(Fort Dearborn)—or simply dropped “fort” from their titles—Defiance,

Ohio—for some reason the citizens of Fort Wayne never followed this

common practice. The old “Fort Wayne” fell into ruins, but the name

survives. Undoubtedly few individuals have even wondered why, but I

believe, or would like to believe, that somehow the later citizens of

Fort Wayne wanted to retain an identity with the past—a past that is

worth knowing and remembering. It is to these citizens—past and present

and to my own family that I dedicate this book.

[1]_Fort Wayne during the Canal Era._

Chapter I

The French and British Period

To know the history of any town is to know the significance of its

geographical position. This is particularly true of the early history of

Fort Wayne (Known to the Indians as Kiskakon or Kekionga[1] and to the

French and English as Fort Miami). Therefore, it is necessary to explain

the significance of the site of Fort Wayne in an era of exploration and

trade when wilderness was king and waterways were the arteries of

communication. The story of Fort Wayne begins as the history of the

Maumee-Wabash portage. Located at the confluence of rivers, St. Joseph

and St. Mary’s, which together form the Maumee or Miami of Lake Erie,

Fort Wayne is situated at the northeast starting point of the seven mile

portage to the Little River, (see map on page 2) Twenty-two miles

southwest of Fort Wayne, the Little River joins the Wabash, which, in

turn, empties into the Ohio and then into the Mississippi. The

Maumee-Wabash portage was from the early seventeenth century until the

mid-nineteenth century a vital overland link that tied together the

great waterway systems of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi. In other

respects the site of Fort Wayne was at the “crossroads”. From this point

the traveler could journey northeast up the St. Joseph river into the

present state of Michigan, or turn southeast up the St. Mary’s river

into the central portion of the present state of Ohio. This, then, is

the significance of the words of Little Turtle, the great Miami chief,

who once called the site of Fort Wayne, “that glorious gate ... through

which all the good words of our chiefs had to pass from the north to the

south, and from the east to the west.”[2]

[Illustration: Map]

Of the five great portage routes used by the French,[3] the

Maumee-Wabash was the last to be exploited, for, unlike the more

northern routes, it was along the line of “most resistance”. The

Iroquois warfare in this region and as far west as the Illinois country

made it virtually impossible for the French to use the routes extending

through southern Lake Erie. With the establishment of the French posts

along the lower Mississippi, however, the Maumee-Wabash portage gained

importance, as it proved to be the shortest route connecting the

settlements of New France (Canada) and Louisiana. The first white man to

use this portage may have been some unknown French “coureur de bois”,

pursuing his lawless life of adventure and fur-trading. There is some

claim that LaSalle used the Maumee-Wabash portage in his explorations of

1670 or later, but it is based, for the most part, on conjecture and is

still open to various interpretations.[4] In any event, LaSalle’s

description of the territory between Lake Erie and Lake Michigan

indicates a familiarity with the region, and it was he who first

directed the attention of the French to this portage by pointing out the

way to shorten the route to the lower Ohio river.[5] Whatever LaSalle’s

plans were for opening up this easy channel of communications[6] they

had to be abandoned because of the failure of the French to appease the

Iroquois. This powerful confederacy had all but annihilated the Erie

Indians earlier in the century and were now pressing their attacks upon

the western tribes south of Lake Michigan. Out of fear of the Iroquois

the area of Indiana was largely abandoned by the Miamis and other

related tribes. Therefore by the 1670’s, when LaSalle set out to achieve

his great objective, control of the Mississippi for the French, he found

it necessary “to go to the Illinois [river] through the lakes Huron and

Illinois [Lake Michigan] as the other routes which I have discovered by

the head of Lake Erie and by the southern shore of the same, have become

too hazardous by frequent encounters with the Iroquois who are always on

that shore.”[7] That this route had become “too dangerous” is indicated

by the letter of Jean de Lamberville to Count de Frontenac on Sept. 20,

1682, in which he expressed his fears that “an Iroquois army, twelve

hundred strong ... would completely annihilate the Miamis and their

neighbors the Siskakon [Kiskakon] and Ottawa tribes on the headwaters of

the Maumee.”[8]

The events which took place near the turn of the eighteenth century

completely altered the situation for the French in this region.

Differences between the Fox Indians, located west of Lake Michigan, and

the French alienated the former entirely. The result was to compel the

French to seek a more direct line of communication with the Mississippi

settlements than by the Wisconsin river-Lake Michigan route, and to

encourage them to promote the trade in the less remote posts. This new

policy was inaugurated by Cadillac’s plan to establish a post at

Detroit, which met with the Crown’s approval and was carried out in

1701. At the same time, the French were able to conclude a temporary

peace with the Iroquois and to induce the pro-French tribes of Miamis to

begin migrating eastward and to re-establish themselves at the

headwaters of the Wabash and Maumee rivers. This migration of the Miamis

was a gradual process and can be traced from northern Illinois and

southern Wisconsin around the head of Lake Michigan to their old

settlements on the Wabash, Maumee, and Miami rivers. The Miamis were

persuaded to move for a number of reasons—the hostility of the Fox

Indians, the advantages in trade and protection furnished by their

proximity to Detroit, and finally the abundance of fur, especially

beaver, to be found in the area south and southwest of Lake Erie. By

1712, the Miamis had taken possession of the entire Wabash valley,[9]

and the country as far eastward as the Big Miami river. Their principal

village, Kiskakon, was situated where the present city of Fort Wayne now

stands. Of the northern tribes the Miami confederacy was second only to

that of the Iroquois. Father Marquette paid them high tribute, while

LaSalle described them as “the most civilized of all nations of

Indians—neat of dress, splendid of bearing, haughty of manner, holding

all other tribes as inferiors.”[10]

Other tribes came to the Ohio valley about the same time. The Wyandots

established themselves along the southern shore of Lake Erie about 1701.

The Shawnee, a southern tribe, settled principally in the lower Scioto

valley around 1730, while the Delaware were to be found in the Muskingum

valley by 1750. A small group of Ottawas were located on the Auglaize

river, a tributary of the Maumee, about fifty miles northeast of

Kiskakon. The importance of this small tribe rests in their famous

chief, Pontiac, and his “conspiracy” against the English in 1763.

Altogether these tribes numbered about 15,000 people. For the most part,

they were friends of the French, although at times they expressed

discontent.

Grasping the new importance of the Maumee-Wabash trade route after 1712,

the officials of New France were quick to suggest to the crown the

construction of a chain of posts from the head of the Maumee to the

mouth of the Wabash in order to protect this increasingly vital line of

communication between Canada and Louisiana, and, equally, important, to

counteract the English ever pressing closer to the Indians in the upper

Ohio valley.[11] The idea was not new, as LaSalle had suggested such a

policy to the home government previously, but the time was now ripe.

Economic reasons for establishing these posts were not lacking. Fear of

the English meant fear of their participation in the fur trade, which

was exceedingly valuable in this area. Wild life had increased

abundantly during the years of Iroquois warfare when the region was

practically uninhabited. A French memorialist, writing at this time,

pointed out that the New York traders, through the medium of the

Iroquois agents, secured between 80,000 and 100,000 beaver skins

annually from the area south and southwest of Lake Erie.[12] This almost

equalled the amount taken annually from the whole of the land north of

the Great Lakes. Cadillac, the founder of Detroit, reported in 1707 that

the Maumee valley was “the finest land under heaven—fishing and hunting

are most abundant there.”[13]

The revitalized village of Kiskakon became the location of one of the

earliest posts established in the French chain along the Maumee-Wabash

route, and was known as Post or Fort Miami. The exact year of the

founding of Port Miami by the French is uncertain. Although some writers

believe the post was established as early as 1680 or 1686,[14] there is

no evidence to support such suppositions. Some confusion seems to arise

from a misinterpretation of those French colonial documents which refer

to the Fort Miami built by LaSalle at the mouth of the St. Joseph river

of Lake Michigan, and not, as these writers believed, to the Fort Miami

at the headwaters of the Maumee. A careful reading of these documents is

necessary in each instance to determine which Fort Miami is meant. About

the same time that the eastward migration of the Miamis began 1697 Jean

Baptiste Bissot, Sieur de Vincennes, was appointed attache to the

Miamis.[15] At first he was obviously at the Miami fort on the

southeastern shore of Lake Michigan, although, as the Miami village,

Kiskakon, grew in importance, Vincennes found it increasingly necessary

to visit the Miami village from 1702 to 1719. It is possible that in

1706 he built a small post primarily for trading purposes at

Kiskakon.[16] By 1715 a new element, the English fur trader had entered

the picture and Vincennes, as well as the French colonial government,

was convinced that it was no longer feasible to encourage the Indians to

migrate eastward. From Kiskakon, Vincennes reported to the royal

officials that the English of Carolina were having recourse to every

sort of expedient to persuade the Miamis to join them against the

French.[17] The increased English efforts to gain footholds in the

Wabash and Maumee valleys, determined Vincennes upon a course of action

approved by the Marques de Vaudreuil, governor of Canada. Vincennes’

plan called for the removal of the Miamis at the headwaters of the

Maumee to a new center on the St. Joseph river of Lake Michigan, near

the present city of South Bend.[18] It is possible that the plan might

have succeeded as Vincennes was “much loved” by the Miamis; however,

with his death at Kiskakon in 1719, the Miamis “resolved not to move to

the River St. Joseph, [but] to remain where they are”.[19] The Miamis

preserved for a long time the memory of Vincennes. Thirty years after

his death, Celeron de Bienville, while urging a group of Miamis to

return to Kiskakon, used the name of Vincennes to work upon their minds,

speaking of him as the one “whom you loved so much and who always

governed you, so that your affairs were prosperous.”[20]

On hearing of the Miamis’ decision, Governor de Vaudreuil resolved, with

the approval of the Council of Marine, to establish a strong post at the

headwaters of the Maumee. For this purpose he sent Captain Dubuisson,

the former commander at Detroit, who had already achieved success on one

occasion with the Miamis, to build the fortifications.[21] Finished in

May, 1722, the fort was located on the right bank of the St. Mary’s at a

latitude later given by Father Joseph Pierre de Bonnecamps (professor of

hydrography at the Jesuit college of Quebec who visited Fort Miami in

1749) as 41 degrees, 29 minutes. Other information Father de Bonnecamps

gives indicates that the fort was about one-half mile down the river

from the Maumee-Wabash portage road.[22] Writing the Council of Marine

on October 24, 1722, de Vaudreuil stated:

The log fort Fort Miami which he Dubuisson had build is the finest in

the upper country. It is a strong fort and safe from insult from the

savages. This post which is of considerable worth ought to have a

missionary. One could be sent there in 1724 if next year the council

will send the four Jesuits which I ask.[23]

It is unlikely that the priest requested was ever stationed at Fort

Miami, as there is no indication from the _Jesuit Relations_ or other

sources of one being here, although it is possible that some

missionaries visited this spot on occasion.

Fort Miami proved of value to the French for various reasons. After its

construction, it soon became a military post of consequence, with a

garrison of twenty to thirty men.[24] It was the policy of the French to

locate their garrisons and trading posts wherever there existed a

sufficiently large village of friendly Indians or wherever the strategic

importance of a place itself made it necessary to erect a fort. Fort

Miami combined both of these advantages. Once the Miamis determined to

remain at Kiskakon, they would benefit the French not only by their fur

trade but would be a means of protection against hostile tribes and the

English. The strategic position for a fort at the Maumee-Wabash portage

was recognized even by the English as early as 1717.[25] Pouchet, a

French historian, writing shortly after the French and Indian War was of

the opinion that the French would have been wiser to have strengthened

their fortifications in the Miami region than establish their line of

defense in the upper Ohio.[26]

Perhaps Fort Miami’s greatest importance was as a center of French

activity among the Indians. Being at the principal village of the Miami

confederacy, this outpost was used as a counter-balance to the English

intrigue from New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas. It is

to be noted that Dubuisson was sent to Kiskakon “to counteract the

effect of all those Belts it [the Miami nation] was but too frequently

receiving and which, as they caused eight or ten Miami canoes to go this

year to trade at Orange, might finally induce all that nation to follow

their example.”[27]

In 1734, the Sieur de Noyelles was entrusted with the task of gathering

the scattered Miamis in their village, where they would be protected

from English intrigue. In this affair he was seconded by the Sieur

Darnaud who was in command at Fort Miami.[28] The French had good reason

to fear the English trader, who had strong economic advantages. The

goods furnished by the English in exchange for the furs of the Indians

were produced more cheaply than the French items. Also British virtual

control of the sea trade meant these goods were transported for less.

Finally rum one of the principal factors in the English trade was

produced in the colonies, while the French traders had to import brandy

from the mother country. As early as 1716, de Vandreuil reported to the

Council of Marine that the Iroquois were sending belts to the Miamis and

Ouiatenons, an allied tribe on the Wabash, to induce them to seek the

necessities of life at the English post on the “Oyo river”. Here the

Indians were offered merchandise “a half cheaper than among the

French.”[29] The following year the king replied through the Council

that he was well pleased to learn that M. de Vincennes, apparently at

Kiskakon, had prevented the Miamis and Ouiatenons from accepting the

belts of the English. His majesty hoped that the sending of scarlet

cloth would turn the savages away from the English trade.[30]

Other accounts show the wide-spread influence the French maintained from

Fort Miami. There were considerable outlays for the savages in food,

merchandise, and the repairing of arms. From here important chiefs were

sent to conferences in Detroit and Montreal, with interpreters and

guides and all expenses paid. One Miami chief, Cold Foot, was paid

handsomely for his loyalty in putting an end to a hostile movement.[31]

The expenses for messengers were especially numerous during the year’s

1748-1749, when English influence was particularly active. Between

December 25, 1747, and July 25, 1748, 1,894 livres were spent at Fort

Miami for presents for the Indians.[32] The high expenditures at Fort

Miami of those years, of which we have records, gives some indication of

the value the French ascribed to the post at the Maumee headwaters. Some

years the annual expenses for the Indians at Fort Miami almost equalled

those of Detroit.[33]

Fort Miami had its economic “raison d’etre” as the center of the

thriving fur trade of the surrounding region. The furs were brought

westward from the northwestern and central parts of the present state of

Ohio, as well as northward from the Wabash valley, and eastward from the

Illinois country. In his “Memoir of 1757”, Bougainville points out that

the Miami post, like many of the French posts, was one “removed from

free commerce”.[34] That is, Fort Miami was leased for a period of three

years to the commandant or “farmer” who secured exclusive rights to the

fur trade. The price of the lease was twelve hundred livres per year.

Moreover the farmer was charged with the cost of the presents to the

savages as well as the wages of the interpreters. There were

extraordinary expenses, however, that the government paid. For instance,

Sieur Charly, the farmer at Post Miami in 1747, collected 2,007 livres

for the use of twenty-four horses by a party of Indians being led to

Detroit for conferences.[34a] These expense accounts had to be approved

by the governor and the “intendant”, the financial representative of the

crown, who oftentimes scaled the figures down as they saw fit. An

example of a most drastic reduction is found in the case of a bill of

Sieur Charly for December, 1744. In this instance, Hocquart, the royal

intendant moderated the bill from 1,491 livres to 100 livres.[35]

In an ordinary year there issued from Fort Miami 250 to 300 packages of

furs. These furs were shipped by way of Detroit to Montreal, as Fort

Miami by its geographical position belonged politically and economically

within the colony of New France rather than Louisiana. Nevertheless, by

its proximity to the Wabash there was frequent communication and trade

with the Louisiana settlements, particularly Vincennes and those of the

Illinois country. For example, in 1749, 200 livres were paid at Fort

Miami to Jean Baptiste Riddey de Bosseron, “voyageur” who had just

returned from the Illinois country.[36] Grain and livestock were sent to

Fort Miami from the French settlements along the lower Wabash and Ohio

rivers. For this reason the price of corn, flour, and beef was generally

lower at Fort Miami than at Detroit and the northern posts such as

Michilimackinac.[37]

The Maumee-Wabash portage became the scene of increased activity as the

French and English rivalry in the upper Ohio country grew more tense

during the decade preceding 1756. From the year 1719 when ten canoes of

Miami Indians passed down the Maumee on their way to Albany, New York,

with furs and returned with firearms, ammunition, and trinkets, the

English endeavored to bring the Miamis under their influence. During the

1740’s, there was a notable expansion of English trade with the Indians

of this region. Twice—in 1739 and again in 1744—the French commander of

Detroit, M. de Longueuil, led strong expeditions along the Maumee-Wabash

against British traders on the White river near the center of the

present state of Indiana. While he succeeded in his immediate objective,

this display of military power no longer held the Indians in check. In

1747, the Wyandot chief, Sanosket, also known as Nicolas, under the

influence of the English led an uprising against the French. The Miamis

at Kiskakon believing that Detroit had been captured, set fire to Fort

Miami and captured the eight men within the stockade at the time.[38]

The temporary commander, Ensign Douville, was at Detroit when the

Indians committed the pillage. He had been sent to the Miamis in order

to invite them to a conference at Montreal, and two of their chiefs,

Cold Foot and Porc Epic had accompanied him as far as Detroit when they

received the news that the post had been taken.[39] Douville journeyed

on to Montreal alone, while Ensign Dubuisson hastened to Kiskakon with

the two chiefs and a force of some sixty men, “with a view to deprive

the enemy [the British] of the liberty of seizing a post of considerable

importance.”[40] Dubuisson found the fort and buildings only partially

destroyed, but he was able to do little more than hold his position,

without attempting to repair the place.

In the spring of 1748, Dubuisson returned to Detroit leaving Captain

Charles DeRaymond in charge of the post, which Father de Bonnecamps,

arriving the next year, described as being “in a very bad

condition”.[41] DeRaymond was probably the most colorful figure to

command Fort Miami during the French period. He had been one of the

chief proponents of the policy of destroying the English influence in

the Ohio, as he saw the danger of tolerating the English traders in the

Miami region. In a memoir he presented in 1745 he gives one of the best

analyses of the whole Ohio question from the French point of view.[42]

Writing from Fort Miami in 1747 to the crown, he pointed out that had

the growth of English influence been checked immediately, the uprising

under Nicolas could never have occurred.[43] Now in command of a

partially ruined fort, DeRaymond had good reason to fear further

trouble. Although the Miamis had given assurances of loyalty after the

arrival of Dubuisson, most of them under the leadership of a Miami

chief, “La Demoiselle” (so termed because of his fondness for dress and

ornaments) had moved to Pickawillany, an English trading post on

Loramie’s Creek at the start of the portage to the St. Mary’s river,

northwest of the present town of Piqua, Ohio.

The French, determined to make a strong impression on the savages of the

Ohio country, and to find out the true conditions existing there, sent

the veteran officer, Pierre Joseph Celoron Celoron, Sieur de Bienville,

with a force of 230 men down to the Great Miami river. Journeying up the

later river to its headwaters, Celoron stopped at the village of “La

Demoiselle” and urged the Miamis to return to Kiskakon. Celoron was

disappointed bitterly when the wily “La Demoiselle” would merely promise

to return to Kiskakon sometime in the future. Crossing the portage to

the St. Mary’s, Celoron’s expedition continued up that river to Fort

Miami. Here they stopped only long enough to buy provisions and canoes

to continue to Detroit.[44] Celoron and Father de Bonnecamps, the

chaplain and hydrographer of the expedition, found the energetic

DeRaymond dissatisfied with his “decaying” fort. Moreover, he “did not

approve the situation of the fort and maintained that it should be

placed on the bank of the St. Joseph, a scant league from the present

site.”[45] DeRaymond wished to show them the spot that he had selected

for the new fort and obtain their opinion of it, but Celoron was in

haste to depart. DeRaymond received some consolation from the fact that

Father de Bonnecamps, an expert, could trace a plan for the proposed

fort.[46]

Early in the year 1750, DeRaymond completed the new fort on the left

bank of the St. Joseph. It stood on rather high ground (at the present

St. Joe Boulevard and Delaware Avenue), less than a mile from the

junction of the St. Joseph and St. Mary’s.[47] Chief Cold Foot, a

staunch friend of the French, occupied the discarded buildings of the

old fort, which became the center of an Indian settlement known as Cold

Foot Village. Half a mile to the south of the new fort, where the Maumee

turns in its course toward the east, lay the village of Kiskakon. Most

of its inhabitants had joined the English at Pickawillany. Writing to

Governor LaJonquiere in September, 1749, DeRaymond reported that the

attitude of all the nations was very bad and apparently was becoming

worse.[48] Again in 1751, he reported:

My people [the French traders] are leaving me for Detroit. Nobody

wants to stay here and have his throat cut. All of the tribes who go

to the English at Pickawillany come back loaded with gifts. I am too

weak to meet the danger. Instead of twenty men, I need five

hundred.... The tribes here are leaguing together to kill all the

French.... This I am told by Cold Foot, a great Miami chief, whom I

think an honest man.... If the English stay in this country, we are

lost. We must attack and drive them out.[49]

To add to the distress of the French, a smallpox epidemic in the winter

of 1751, carried away many of the inhabitants of Cold Foot’s Village,

including their good friend, Cold Foot, and his son.[50]

That not all of the French traders at Fort Miami were scurrying to

Detroit is evident from the fact that in the year 1750 one of the most

noted traders of the area, Joseph Drouet de Richerville, came to

Kiskakon.[51] Richerville was a scion of French nobility who either was

seeking a life of adventure or was engaged in the fur trade for the mere

sake of a livelihood, as the family wealth had dwindled. Shortly after

his arrival, Richerville married Tahcumwah, the daughter of the reigning

Miami chief, Aquenochqua, and sister of the future chief, Little Turtle.

Tahcumwah was later known as Marie Louisa,[52] apparently the name she

received in baptism. All who came in contact with her at a later date

speak of her as a clever and intelligent woman, and it was largely

through her efforts that her son, Jean Baptiste de Richerville, arose to

such high prominence as the last civil chief of the Miamis.[53]

The arrival of Joseph Drouet de Richerville at Fort Miami was an

isolated case, however, and what DeRaymond had said of the traders

leaving for Detroit remained true. In all likelihood, DeRaymond, despite

his zeal, was glad to be relieved in 1751 by a new commandant, Neyon De

Villiers. De Villiers had hardly assumed command when an English trader,

John Pathin, was captured within the fort itself. As France and England

were then at peace, Governor George Clinton of New York demanded an

explanation of the incident. The French governor, the Marquis de la

Jonquiere, replied sharply:

The English, far from confining themselves within the limits of the

King of Great Britain’s possessions, not satisfied with multiplying

themselves more and more on Rock River ... have more than that

proceeded within sight of Detroit, even unto the fort of the

Miamis.... John Pathin, an inhabitant of Willensten, has been arrested

in the French fort of the Miamis by M. de Villiers, commandant of that

post ... he entered the fort of the Miamis to persuade the Indians who

remained there, to unite with those who have fled to the beautiful

river [the Ohio.] He has been taken in the French fort. Nothing more

is necessary.[54]

A short time later, two men of de Villiers’ garrison were scalped by “La

Demoiselle’s savages.” Indeed the English seem to have laid claim to the

very fort itself, for on Mitchell’s “Map of North America”, drawn in

1755, Fort Miami is referred to as “the Fort usurped by the French”.[55]

In June, 1752, a French and Indian force, coming by way of the Maumee

and St. Mary’s rivers, fell on Pickawillany, completely destroying the

English post, so annoying to the French at Fort Miami. Four years later,

during the French and Indian War, Lieutenant Bellestre, the commandant

of Fort Miami, led a party of 25 French and 205 Indians from his post to

the head of the James River, where they captured a blockhouse and some

ten Virginia “Rangers”. After his release, one of the captives, Major

Smith, proposed to lead a force of 1,000 woodsmen and a sufficient

number of Indians across the Ohio and over the Shawnee trail from old

Pickawillany to Fort Miami and then on to Detroit.[56] Although nothing

came of Major Smith’s plans, the site of the future Fort Wayne was to

figure prominently in all the military campaigns north of the Ohio river

for the next half century, that is throughout the dramatic events marked

by Pontiac’s conspiracy, the American Revolution, the Indian wars, and

the War of 1812.

When de Vaudreuil, governor of Canada, capitulated at Montreal in 1760,

he issued orders for the surrender of the posts—Michilimackinac,

Detroit, Green Bay, St. Joseph, Ouiatenon, and Miami—as dependencies of

Canada.[57] On November 29, 1760, Detroit was surrendered to Major

Robert Rogers in command of the “Rangers”. Eight days later, Lieutenant

John Butler with a detachment of twenty men set out from Detroit to

receive the formal transfer of Fort Miami from the French commander,

thus bringing to an end French rule at the headwaters of the Maumee.[58]

Although of strategic importance, Fort Miami never became more than a

military outpost and trading center during the French period of

occupation. Father de Bonnecamps wrote in 1749 of the French village in

and around the fort, “The French there number twenty-two; all of them

... had the fever ... There were eight houses, or to speak more

correctly, eight miserable huts which only the desire of making money

render endurable.”[59] “The desire of making money” is of course a

reference to the fur trade, the only occupation, outside of the

military, of those French living there. The large Indian villages

surrounding the fort naturally brought the trader and soldier, but, at

the same time, this uncertain element of Indian friendship probably

excluded any sizable French settlement. Whatever the reasons we must

conclude that, unlike Vincennes, Fort Miami did not attract any type of

French settler, outside of those connected with the fur trade.

Lieutenant Butler of the “Rangers” had been chosen by Col. Henry Bouquot

to receive the surrender of Fort Miami since he could speak French and

seemed “very intelligent”. He had orders to hold the post, as it was of

great importance to Detroit and being at the “carrying place of nine

miles into the waters of the Ouabache Wabash ... it would prevent a

surprise in the Spring.”[60] Lieutenant Butler found the savages

destitute and sent a French trader to Fort Pitt for the necessary

supplies.[61] In the spring, Butler was relieved by Ensign Robert

Holmes, who was destined to become one of the first victims of the

Indian uprising of 1763, known as “Pontiac’s conspiracy”. Ironically,

Holmes was also one of the first to learn of the impending danger and

passed the information on to Major Gladwyn, the English commander at

Detroit, adding, however, “this affair is very timely stopt”.[62] A

month later he allowed himself to be lured from the fort by a false

request on the part of his Indian mistress to aid a sick Miami woman.

Holmes was instantly killed by the savages concealed nearby, and the

small garrison surrendered upon the demand of Jacques Godefroy and Money

Chene, two Frenchmen who were implicated with the Miamis in the scheme.

Godefroy, after leading another successful attack on Ouiatenon,

journeyed to Sandusky where he fell into the hands of Colonel

Brandstreet who had arrived from Niagara with a large force to quell the

uprising. Godefroy had been a prominent citizen of Detroit and had taken

the oath of allegiance to the British crown; consequently, he expected

death at the hands of the British. Instead he was given his freedom on

condition that he would guide and protect an English officer, Captain

Thomas Morris, who was being sent to the Illinois Indians by way of the

Maumee. Captain Morris, was a man of culture and literary tendencies.

Being such, he kept an excellent diary of experiences, which he was

later persuaded to publish.[63]

Almost any man would have failed in an attempt to go through hundreds of

miles of hostile Indian country, and Captain Morris was no exception.

Having journeyed up the Maumee as far as Kiskakon, Morris met such a

dangerous reception at this place that he was forced to turn back. In

fact he was fortunate to escape with his life, as the Indians intended

to burn him at the stake, and he was saved by the intercession of

Godefroy and the young chief Pecanne. Morris was also befriended within

the fort by two French traders, Capucin and L’Esperance and a Jewish

trader, Levi. L’Esperance concealed the English officer within his house

until it was safe for him to leave. Captain Morris, despite the

ill-treatment by the Indians, clearly saw the reason for their

dissatisfaction. He observed that the French policy, or custom, of

intermarriage with the Indians had been more beneficial than that of

English, as the Indians felt that they and the French were one people.

Moreover, he noted that the French prohibited, “the sale of spiritous

liquors to Indians under pain of not receiving absolution; none but a

bishop [could] absolve a person guilty of it.” He went on to point out,

“This prevented many mischiefs too frequent among the unfortunate tribes

of savages who are fallen to our lot.”[64]

The failure of Captain Morris to get past Kiskakon, demonstrated beyond

doubt that as long as the Indians at this spot were unfriendly, they

could prevent any intercourse with those tribes to the south and

southwest. Consequently, Colonel George Croghan, a famous English trader

in the Ohio valley, was sent to the Maumee-Wabash area to pacify the

tribes. Croghan was received with a display of enthusiasm by the Indians

at Kiskakon, who hoisted an English flag he had given them at Fort Pitt.

Croghan reported as follows:

The Twightwee village [the English called the Miamis “twightwees”] is

situated on both sides of a river called St. Joseph. This river where

it falls into the Miami [Maumee] river about a quarter of a mile from

this place is one hundred yards wide, on the east side of which stands

a stockade fort, somewhat ruinous. The Indian village consists of

about forty or fifty cabins, besides nine or ten French houses, a

runaway colony from Detroit during the late Indian war; they were

concerned in it, and being afraid of punishment came to this post,

where ever since they have spirited up the Indians against the

English. All the French residing here are a lazy indolent people, fond

of breeding mischief ... and should by no means be suffered to remain

here.... The country is pleasant, the soil rich and well watered.[65]

Croghan’s judgment of the French at Kiskakon seems rather harsh,

although his opinion of the French at Vincennes is no better. Apparently

in the eyes of the austere English and colonists, the more carefree life

of the French “habitants” of the western posts seemed to be an

indication of indolence on the latter’s part.[66] Furthermore, it is

difficult to explain why the same French people who had saved the life

of Captain Morris in the previous year would now be “spiriting up” the

Indians against the English, especially since Pontiac’s plans had

collapsed. On the other hand, it was not to be expected that these

French people would immediately cast aside all hostility toward their

recent enemies. By 1765, it is likely that these French traders, weary

of the warfare that had ruined their business, were ready to assume a

neutral attitude, while the Indians themselves grudgingly came to terms

with the English.

From the day Fort Miami fell to Pontiac’s Miami allies in 1763 until

General Anthony Wayne built the American fort on the side of the modern

city of Fort Wayne in 1794, there was no permanent[67] garrison

stationed at the headwaters of the Maumee. Over this period of

thirty-one years—during which time the American nation came into

being—the region of which we speak gradually became the rendezvous of a

defiant mixture of Indian warriors and lawless renegades of the

frontier, such as the Girties. It was also the home of a heterogeneous

population of English and French traders and their families, French

“engages”, and Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee tribes. In 1790, General

Harmar’s men counted seven distinct villages in the immediate area. All

together, they formed a considerable settlement or settlements, known

near the end of the Revolution as the Miami Towns, the Miami Villages,

or simply, Miamitown. In a sense such a place was the forerunner of the

lawless frontier towns of the next century.

In 1772, Sir William Johnson, in charge of Indian affairs in America,

pointed out to the British government the advisability of reoccupying

and strengthening the Miami post, as it was “a place of some

importance”.[68] Since the Indians were pacified, the home government

for the sake of economy, did not see fit to carry out his suggestion at

the time. A memorandum of the same year speaks of the “fort being

inhabited by Eight or Ten French families”.[69] A census, apparently

taken in 1769 by the English, lists the names of nine French families

living at Fort Miami.[70] These French residents were nearly all

traders, though some of them had been located here for many years. By

1772, most of them were willing to accept the friendship of their former

foes, the English—primarily for mercenary reasons. British policy kept

the colonists from occupying the land north of the Ohio, which meant the

preservation of the Indian fur trade. Moreover practically all their

furs were sold through the London market. Thus, with the outbreak of the

American Revolution, the French traders at Fort Miami felt they had more

to lose by being friendly with the American cause than their neighbors,

the French inhabitants of Vincennes and the Illinois settlements who

were primarily interested in farming.[71]

With the outbreak of the Revolution, British troops could not be spared

for the post at Miamitown, but it was placed under strict supervision by

Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamilton at Detroit. Hamilton appointed

Jacques Lasselle, an officer in the Canadian militia, to the

super-intendency of this post as an agent of Indian affairs. Lasselle

arrived with his family in 1776 from Montreal.[72] His duties were to

see that the Indians maintained their active friendship for the British

cause and to check the passports of all persons going from Detroit to

the Wabash and lower Ohio.[73] None but those holding a license issued

by the British authorities were permitted to engage in trade.

The year that brought Lasselle to Miamitown gave also to the region

Peter LaFontaine and Charles (John?) Beaubien from Detroit.[74] Both

settled in the Spy Run area of modern Fort Wayne. In his marriage with a

Miami woman and the identification of his interests with those of the

Indians, LaFontaine declared his loyalty to the red men. LaFontaine’s

grandson, Francis LaFontaine, was the last chief of the Miamis to hold

any real authority over the tribe. To Charles Beaubien there attaches

greater interest. He was very active in the English cause and was a

favorite of both Hamilton and Major Arent S. DePeyster, who succeeded

Hamilton as Lieutenant-Governor of Detroit. From Miamitown, Beaubien,

with a young Frenchman named Lorimer and a band of some eighty Indians,

made a raid into Kentucky, where they captured an American party under

Daniel Boone at Blue Licks in 1778. In the same year he served as a

scout for Hamilton’s army, preceding it to Vincennes. DePeyster, in

1780, proposed to recall all the traders, but Beaubien, from Miamitown.

Because of his pro-British activities, Beaubien was cordially hated by

the people of Vincennes, who “wish[ed] to hang” him.[75]

On September, 26, 1778, Hamilton received from Beaubien at Miamitown the

first news that Colonel George Rogers Clark and his Virginians had taken

Vincennes.[76] Hamilton prepared for his ill-fated expedition to

Vincennes by ordering the militia to prepare the Maumee-Wabash portage

route and strengthen the defenses at Miamitown. Supplies, valued at

$50,000, were left there to be sent to Vincennes later. Concerning the

portage, Hamilton wrote:

The waters were so uncommonly low that we should not have been able to

have passed but that at the distance of four miles from the landing

place the beavers had made a dam which kept up the water; these we cut

through to give passage to our boats.... The beaver are never molested

at that place by the traders or Aberigines, and soon repair their

dam.[77]

Clark constantly thought the capture of Detroit to be his ultimate goal

in the northwest campaign. The first step in his proposed expedition was

to be the reduction of Miamitown; however, he was prevented from making

any move toward Miamitown and Detroit, as he lacked men and supplies.

While the subject was still fresh in the minds of the inhabitants along

the lower Ohio, another individual made his appearance to undertake what

even the daring Clark considered imprudent. This man was Augustus Mottin

de LaBalme, a lieutenant-colonel in the French cavalry who had come to

America to offer his services to the colonies. In July, 1777, he was

commissioned inspector general of cavalry by Congress, but feeling

himself slighted in not being placed in command of that division of the

army, he resigned in October and engaged in private business. Late in

the spring of 1780, he was sent west to arouse the French in Illinois.

The antipathy of the Indians and French toward the Virginians hindered

him a great deal and in order to accomplish his purpose, he abandoned

the Virginians and promised the French and Indians that royal troops of

France would soon be on the Mississippi.[78]

[Illustration: Map carried by Colonel LaBalme at the time of his

death. Courtesy British Library.]

At Vincennes and Kaskaskia he gathered a force to lead against

Miamitown, with the ultimate objective being Detroit. Four hundred men

were to have joined him at Ouiatenon, but as these reinforcements did

not appear, he was obliged to strike at Miamitown on November 3, 1780,

with but 103 men, before the news of the expedition reached there. The

initial blow was successful as the traders and Indians were taken by

surprise and barely had time to flee the village. The Lasselle family

was forced to escape by way of the Maumee, and in their haste, their

small daughter was drowned. LaBalme’s men fell to plundering the

traders’ goods and Indian villages, then retired to Aboite creek, a few

miles to the southwest. Beaubien and LaFontaine, whose goods had been

destroyed, incited the Indians to attack LaBalme, as the Indians,

learning the party was French, were not disposed at first to retaliate.

The red men, led by their famous war chief, Little Turtle, in his first

major engagement, completely defeated LaBalme’s force, all but a few

being either killed or captured. LaBalme himself was killed and his

personal papers, along with the news of the victory, were sent to

DePeyster at Detroit. Among these papers was the intelligence LaBalme

had gathered about Miamitown and its traders. The goods at Beaubiens’

store, which was “kept by Mr. LaFontaine, and old man” was valued at

50,000 livres. Another store, kept by Mr. Mouton, a partner of Beaubien,

was also valued at 50,000 livres. These goods were “equally well

disposed” to “Mr. Barthelemy [listed in the census of Fort Miami in

1769], Mr. Rivard, Mr. Lorrance, Mr. Gouin of Detroit, Mr. Lascelle

[Lasselle?], Mr. Pottevin, Mr. Paillet, Mr. Duplessy, & others ... & an

American called George, a partner of Israel [possibly the Jew, Levi, who

aided Captain Morris in 1764].”[79]

DePeyster was thoroughly alarmed upon learning of LaBalme’s expedition,

and he immediately dispatched the “Rangers” to Miamitown with orders to

cover the cannon there, until it was possible to send them to

Detroit.[80] Captain Thompson of the “Rangers” reported to DePeyster on

March 14, 1781, that he was taking immediate action to alter the old

fort. A false rumor that the French of Vincennes were heading for

Miamitown, brought the Indians flocking to their villages. Their spirit

was very high, and several times they asked Captain Thompson for

assistance “to go and destroy Post St. Vincent, as it is the only place

that gives them any uneasiness.”[81] Within a year, however, DePeyster

reported that the Miamis and other tribes in the area were growing

fearful of being too closely allied with the British.[82] It is possible

that they had received some information concerning Cornwallis’ surrender

at Yorktown.

The treaty of Paris in 1783, which formally brought to an end the

Revolutionary War, transferred the sovereignty of the land south of the

Great Lakes to the United States. Actually this transfer made little

impression on conditions at Miamitown, for, in truth, the Revolution in

the West closed only with the Jay and Greenville treaties. Great

Britain, in violation of the treaty of Paris, continued to hold Detroit

together with other posts along the southern shore of the Lakes. By this

means they maintained effective control of the fur trade of the

Northwest, and, thereby, to a great extent, influenced the Indians. Just

how much the British officials were responsible for the Indian warfare

from 1783 to 1794 is a debatable question. At times the action of the

British officials seems to have been a case of the right hand not

letting the left hand know what it was doing. Most present-day students

of the subject are inclined to acquit the British government of any

positive agency in the matter. They point out that the constant warfare

injured the fur trade of the area which was in a state of decline during

this period anyway.[83] Nor did the Indians need much encouragement to

take the warpath, as the ever-increasing tide of immigration coming down

the Ohio and across the mountains threatened to engulf them. But the

American settler did not reason this way; to him the English government

was responsible. Milo Quaife, historian of the Northwest, correctly

observes:

The present day scholar, possessing sources of information denied to

contemporaries and entire immunity from the gory scalping knife and

tomahawk, may consider the subject calmly and philosophically; the

American borderer’s opinions were based upon the acts of Great

Britain’s agents in America and the visible facts of the situation on

the frontier.[84]

A concrete example of the condition of the Indian fur trade and warfare

during this period and their connection with the British trader and his

government is given in the history of Miamitown between 1783 and 1794.

Strong evidence indicates that despite the general decline in the fur

trade, the region southwest of Detroit, and Miamitown especially, was

extremely important for the British fur trade. In 1790, the British

commander at Detroit, Major Smith, wrote to his superiors:

How far the loss of the Miamis Country, to the protection of His

Majesty, will effect this Post and its trade, is a matter it would be

presumptive in me to comment on. I think it however my duty to observe

that it is a considerable mart of Indian Commerce uniting in this

place.[85]

A month later Dorchester, Governor of Canada, warned the authorities in

London that the loss of Miamitown to the Americans would bring grave

hardships to the trade at Detroit.[86] In an earlier document he had

estimated that 2000 packs of furs were taken yearly from the Miami

region, bringing an income of some 24,000 pounds sterling. This far

exceeded any other area south of the Great Lakes, doubling in fact the

number of packs taken from the next most important area, that from

Detroit north to Lake Huron.[87]

In the heart of the Indian country, Miamitown was also the principal

point from which the Indian raiding parties harassed the frontier.

Twenty-six war parties left Miamitown in a period of six months during

1786.[88] There is a strong tradition and some evidence to show that a

secret society of Miami warriors of necessary courage and cunning met at

stated intervals at Miamitown for the purpose of burning a captive and

eating his flesh.[89] By its proximity to Detroit, Miamitown remained

within the British orbit of trade. The merchants at Miamitown formed a

loose association for their mutual benefit called the “Society of the

Miamis”.[90] Business was carried on not only with Detroit and other

English controlled stations, but also with Vincennes and the Illinois

settlements, until Indian warfare and the animosity of the American

settlers toward the traders made it virtually impossible to go to the

lower Wabash.

Low market prices, bad fur seasons, and almost constant warfare by the

Indians threatened to ruin the fur trade in the years immediately

following the Revolution. Many of the small companies failed and the

larger ones had difficulties. David Gray, a prominent trader at

Miamitown, was advised not to come to Detroit, as his creditor, William

Robertson, was awaiting Gray’s arrival.[91] The previous year, 1785, the

same Gray had been requested to aid in collecting a long-standing debt

from two of his fellow villagers, Rivard and LaBerche.[92] Larimier,

another trader at Miamitown, failed because he could not meet the claims

of his creditors.[93] There was constant danger that the British traders

might lose all the export trade of the region to the Spanish at New

Orleans. In 1787, the “Society” found it necessary to send “the

Grandmaster to Vincennes to keep the trade from going to New

Orleans.”[94] The Indians were also an uncertain quantity and at times

were hostile even to the traders. Chapeau, a member of the “Society”,

was killed by the Indians and George Ironside reluctantly told Gray at

Vincennes to send the goods to New Orleans rather than risk shipping

them up the Wabash.[95] Gray was repeatedly warned by Ironside to be

most cautious on his return trip to Miamitown as he was in danger of

losing his life. It is to the credit of the Miamitown traders that they

traded only sparingly in liquor with the Indians. Their reasons were not

altogether altruistic, however, as the price of liquor was exceptionally

high.

The most candid description of the character of the trade at Miamitown

has been left to us by Henry Hay, who wrote in his journal of 1790:

... but few skins comes in, and almost every individual (except the

engages) is an Indian trader, everyone tries to get what he can either

by fowle play or otherwise—that is by traducing one another’s

characters and merchandise. For instance by saying such a one has no

Blankets another no strowde or is damned bad or he’ll cheat you & so

on—in short I cannot term it in a better manner than calling it a

Rascally Scrambling Trade &c &c.[96]

Henry Hay, the writer, was an English trader and partisan who sojourned

in Miamitown for a period of four months during the winter of 1789-90.

His day-by-day account, obviously not intended for publication, gives us

a cross section of life at Miamitown in all its aspects, both civilized

and savage. Hay seems to have been in the employee of William Robertson,

the Detroit merchant, although there is good reason to believe that he

was also employed by Major Murray, the English commander at Detroit. Set

off against the hard life of a trading post among Indian villages was

the characteristic vivacity and gaiety of the French atmosphere

prevalent in the town. The daily routine was by no means dull; drinking,

dancing, and parties formed a constant round of entertainment in which

the visitors gladly take part. Hay and John Kinzie (later the founder of

Chicago) played the flute and fiddle for parties and dances, as well as

for the ladies alone, and at Mass in the home of one of the oldest

residents, Barthelemy. Their religion was an intricate part of the lives

of the French inhabitants. During the four months Hay was at Miamitown,

Mass was celebrated at Barthelemy’s house by Father Louis Payet, a

missionary from Detroit. After playing at Mass on one occasion, Hay

wrote, “The French settlers of this place go to prayers of a Sunday,

morning and evening, ... the people are collected by the Ringing of

three cow bells, which three boys runs about thro’ the village, which

makes as much noise as twenty cows would.”[97]

Miamitown in 1790 had certain refinements not to be expected behind its

rough exterior. Afternoon coffee and lunch was served in the home of

Mrs. Adhemar on numerous occasions. Dinners were given in grand style.

For the parties the men and women dressed in their finest apparel. Mr.

Adhemar and Mr. DeSeleron made their appearance at a ball wearing very

fine fur caps, “adorned with a quantity of Black Ostridge Feathers” and

“Cockades made with white tinsell Ribbon, amasingly large.”[98] Less

refining was the constant drinking. At different times, Hay and his

companions became “infernally drunk”, “very drunk”, and “damned drunk”.

One affair was memorable in that none of the men became drunk, “which is

mostly the case in this place when they collect together”.[99] Dancing

was also a favorite pastime, so much so, that after dancing three nights

in succession, Hay found his feet too swollen to continue. It appeared

as if dancing was never enjoyed more by anyone than by these French

“habitants”. It became almost a passion; when they grew weary of the old

steps, new ones were devised. The almost annual springtime flood seems

to have been more severe than usual in the year 1790. But not even the

flood dampened the gaiety, for before the waters had subsided, the

ladies were taken for a row on the river to be serenaded by the flute

and fiddle. Not all was fun and frolic, however, as business was

transacted regularly by the traders.

In strange contrast to the minuet and “dance ronby” were the wild war

dances of the Indians across the river in celebration of a victorious

raid on the American settlements.[100] From the French village situated

on the St. Joseph river where it meets the St. Mary’s, Hay could easily

see these spectacles. Behind the traders’ houses, northward to Spy Run

Creek, lived the band of Miamis under LeGris, one of the most prominent

and intellectual chiefs of his time. Across the river, in the present

Lakeside area of Fort Wayne, was the principal village of the Miamis

under Pacan, who in his youth had saved Captain Morris.[101] Frequent

discussions were held by the traders with Pacan, LeGris, Blue Jacket,

and Little Turtle; LeGris and Little Turtle often ate and stayed at

Hay’s house. The three Girty brothers, the terrors of the frontier,

visited Miamitown on a number of occasions during Hay’s sojourn. James

and George Girty lived only three miles from Miamitown, and came more

often than their brother, Simon. It is noteworthy that Hay obligingly

wrote a letter for George Girty to Alexander McKee, the British Indian

agent, informing McKee that the Miamis had upbraided the Delawares by

“telling them that the Ground they occupied now is not theirs and that

... the Delawares answered, they were great fools to fight for lands

that was not theirs and consequently would not go to war against the

Americans any more.”[102] Girty asked McKee to check the Delaware

dissatisfaction.

It is clear that the inhabitants of Miamitown were, for the most part,

English partisans. Hay could not venture his “carcass” among the “parcel

of renegards” [sic] at Vincennes.[103] When Antoine Lasselle did venture

southward and was captured by the Indians who thought him to be

sympathetic with the Americans, Major Murray intervened and the people

of the village certified that Lasselle was “a good loyalist” and “always

for supporting his King”.[104] When Lorraine, an inhabitant of Miamitown

for forty years, died and was buried, “the young Volunteers of the place

gave him three Vollies ... in Honor to his services rendered to the King

of Great Britain.”[105] Evidently the time Lorraine had aided Pontiac’s

Indians in capturing the British post at Ouiatenon was forgotten at this

late date. Not all of the traders at Miamitown were good loyalists,

however. James Abbott is described as being “one of our dis-affected

subjects.” He refused to obtain the necessary permit for trading and

spoke to the Indians of “Major Murray & Capt. McKee in so disrespectfull

a manner that they ... determined to send Strings of Wampum into Detroit

immediately to informe them of it.”[106]

On the first of April, 1790, Hay departed for Detroit, “much regretted

by every one in the village”.[107] Less than seven months later

Miamitown lay in ashes, ravaged by an American army which left 183 of

its men dead in the vicinity. There is nothing in Hay’s journal to

indicate that the French, English, or Indian occupants of the villages

anticipated the blow which was to be dealt them by Harmar’s army,

although they were fully aware of the movements which preceded the

coming of Harmar. “John Thompson [a prisoner] ... informed me their was

great talk of raising men to come against the Ind’s”, wrote Hay on March

24, 1790. “However”, he continued, “General St. Clair who is now at the

Big Miami [Cincinnati] with two boat loads of goods, means to call the

Indians together at a Council at Post Vincennes—But if the Indians do

not come to a settlement with them, they mean to fight them.”[107]

This and other councils were held. St. Clair, governor of the newly

created Northwest Territory, following Washington’s instructions,

offered peace to the Indians. Antoine Gamelin, a merchant from Vincennes

favorably known by the Indians, was sent with the Governor’s overtures

to the hostile Indians. The tribes along the Wabash would give Gamelin

no answer until he conferred with those at Miamitown. Here, the Indians,

as well as the traders, assembled to hear Gamelin’s speech. Their reply

was evasive and unsatisfactory, while their true attitude was revealed

by the burning of an American prisoner only three days after Gamelin’s

departure.[108]

War was now inevitable, and during the five years of bloody conflict

that followed, Miamitown was the principal goal of the American forces.

As early as 1784, Washington had confided in his future Secretary of

War, Henry Knox, that the establishment of a strong post at Miamitown

was desirable for the welfare of the new nation in the West.[109] The

following year, Washington wrote to Richard Henry Lee for the benefit of

the Continental Congress, advocating a strong western policy. In his

letter Washington said:

Would it not be worthy of the wisdom and the attention of congress to

have the western waters well explored, the navigation of them fully

ascertained, and accurately laid down, ... at least as far westerly as

the Miamis running into the Ohio [the Great Miami] and Lake Erie [the

Maumee] ... for I cannot forbear observing that the Miami village

points to an important post for the Union.[110]

St. Clair, while in Philadelphia during 1790, talked to both Secretary

of War, Henry Knox and President Washington, and suggested that an

American fort be established on the site of Miamitown.[111] Writing to

Knox on November 26, 1790, St. Clair again urged that General Harmar in

the forthcoming campaign be empowered to carry out this plan, concluding

his argument by saying, “we [will] never have peace with the Western

Nations until we have a garrison there.”[112] Knox, after conferring

with Washington, rejected the idea. In doing so, he wrote to the

disappointed St. Clair, the following explanation:

In contemplating the establishment of military posts northwest of the

Ohio, to answer the purposes of awing the Indians residing on the

Wabash, the west end of Lake Erie, St. Joseph’s, and the Illinois ...

and, at the same time, exhibiting a respectable appearance to the

British troops at Detroit and Niagara, the Miami village presents

itself as superior to any other position. This opinion was given to me

by the President in the year 1784, and has several times been held

forth by me to Brigadier Harmar. But at the same time, it must be

acknowledged that the measure would involve a much larger military

establishment than perhaps the value of the object or disposition of

the United States would admit, and that it would be so opposed to the

inclinations of the Indians generally ... as to bring on inevitably an

Indian war of some duration. In addition to which, it is supposed that

the British garrison would find themselves so uneasy with such a force

impending over them as not only to occasion a considerable

reinforcement of their upper posts, but also fomenting ... the

opposition of the Indians.[113]

It would appear that the government did not wish to offend Great

Britain, a policy which was not too strong perhaps, but one that kept

the young republic at peace at a crucial time in her history. The

proposed attack on Miamitown had to be under the guise of punishing the

Indians. To do this and retire was permissible, but the establishment of

an American fort there would have been considered by the British as a

dagger pointed at Detroit. Consequently, when Harmar finally moved from

Fort Washington with his army of 1,600 men, he had orders to destroy

Miamitown and, if possible, its Indian occupants. Harmar himself

promised that, in the event of a successful campaign, he would attend to

“the villanous traders”.[114] Interestingly the British officials at

Detroit and Canada believed that Harmar fully intended to build a fort

at Miamitown although they expressed surprise at the “imprudence” of

such action. Their spies, such as the Girties and Alexander McKee, kept

them well informed of the strength and movement of Harmar’s army. They

even noted Harmar’s tendency to be intoxicated.[115]

Forewarned by the British agents of the impending attack, the Indians

adopted a “scorched earth” policy. The traders were forced to give their

stores of ammunition to the Indians and were aided in fleeing with what

goods they could carry. What was not destroyed by the Indians at

Miamitown was burned by the Americans (20,000 bushels of corn, among

other things). In two major engagements, the first at Hellar’s Corners,

eight miles north of Miamitown, and the second, a three-pronged attack

within the heart of the village and on the banks of the Maumee and St.

Joseph rivers, the Indian forces, under Little Turtle, were

victorious.[116] Although their crops and towns were destroyed and the

trade ruined, the Indians were elated over their victories, and their

frontier raids continued.

Knox now felt that, despite possible British disapproval, the only means

of checking the Indians was to establish the fort at Miamitown for which

St. Clair had asked. To carry this out, the Secretary of War asked

Congress to increase the size of the army. The force contemplated for

the intended post was 1,000 to 1,200 men. St. Clair argued that a strong

fort at Miamitown “would curb the Wabash Indians, as well as the Ottawas

and Chippewas, and all other northern tribes”; that it would “more

effectually cover the line of frontier along the Ohio, than by a post

any other place whatever (excluding Detroit)”; and “would afford more

fully security to the territory of the United States northwest of the

Ohio.”[117] For an economy-minded Congress, he pointed out that “it

would assist in the reduction of the national debt, by holding out

security to people to purchase and settle the public lands.”[118]

General Knox still feared English hostility to this move, and he

instructed St. Clair to “make such intimations as may remove all such

disposition.” These intimations, however, were better to follow, than

precede, the possession of the post, unless circumstances dictated

otherwise, as it was “not the inclination of the United States to enter

into a contest with Great Britain.”[119]

St. Clair never reached Miamitown. Badly trained and inexperienced, his

army of 1,400 men suffered one of the most terrible defeats ever

inflicted on American forces. Five hundred and thirty-two men fell

before Little Turtle’s Indians on the site of Fort Recovery, Ohio. The

situation was now critical. The Indians now attacked the frontier with

impunity and another defeat might mean the complete alienation of the

West from the new union. At this crucial point, General Anthony Wayne,

hero of Stony Point in the Revolution, was appointed commander-in-chief

of the American army. It is not necessary to give in detail the long

months of preparation of Wayne’s “Legion” and the swift campaign which

was carried out in the Maumee valley. Wayne cut the Indian forces in two

by feinting toward Miamitown, then moving between it and the English

Fort Miami at the mouth of the Maumee. Before the various tribes could

reorganize fully, the “Legion” turned on the Indian forces to the east.

At Fallen Timbers, a short distance from Toledo, on August 20, 1794,

Wayne’s army met and defeated the red men. The Indian power in the

Northwest was for the time being shattered and Wayne moved down the

Maumee to complete his task, the construction, near the site of the old

Kiskakon, of a new American stronghold in the Northwest—Fort Wayne.

[1]“Kekionga” is said to mean “blackberry bush”, this plant being

considered an emblem of antiquity because it sprang up on the sites

of old villages. This theory rests on the statement of Barron, an

old French trader of the area. However, the word “Kekionga” is more

likely a corruption of Kiskakon. The Kiskakons or “cut tails” were

the principal tribe of the Ottawas who lived on the Maumee at a very

early time, for which reason this river was sometimes called the

“Ottawa”. _Archeological American_, 1,278; “Relation of Sieur de

Lamothe Cadillac, 1718” _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVI, p.

353.

[2]From Little Turtle’s speech at the Treaty of Greenville, quoted in H.

S. Knapp’s _History of the Maumee Valley_, p. 357.

[3]Justin Winsor, _Narrative and Critical History_, IV, 224 lists the

following:

a. Green Bay, Lake Winnebago and Fox River to the Wisconsin River and

to the Mississippi.

b. From the upper end of Lake Michigan, the Chicago river, and a short

portage to the Des Plaines, and Illinois rivers.

c. The St. Joseph of Lake Michigan, a portage to the Kankakee and so

to the Illinois river again.

d. The St. Joseph river to the Wabash by a longer portage and then

down to the Ohio and Mississippi.

e. The Miami of Lake Erie, a portage to the Wabash and down as above.

[4]H. S. Knapp, _History of the Maumee Valley_, pp. 9-10; Justin Winsor,

_Cartier to Frontenac_, p. 224; Elbert J. Benton, “The Wabash Trade

Route in the Development of the Old Northwest” _John Hopkins

University Studies in Historical and Political Science_, XXI, 12.

[5]Pierre Margry, _Decouvertes des francais dans L’Amerique

Septentrionale_ II, 98.

[6]Justin Winsor, _Cartier to Frontenac_, p. 256.

[7]Pierre Margry, _op. cit._, II, 296; see also, Beverley Bond,

_Foundations of Ohio_, pp. 70-8. Bond holds that the Maumee-Wabash

route was the original one intended to be used by LaSalle who then

decided to establish his communication by means of the upper Ohio;

due to the Iroquois, however, he fell back upon the Maumee-Wabash

route as the best means of reaching the Mississippi, but was forced

to abandon this also to the Iroquois. Later Cadillac was to adopt

LaSalle’s Lake Erie-Maumee-Wabash route.

[8]Logan Esarey, _History of Indiana_, p. 12.

[9]Elbert J. Benton, _op. cit._, p. 17.

[10]Otho Winger, _The Last of the Miamis_, p. 3.

[11]Pierre Margry, _op cit._, V, 359-62.

[12]Beverley Bond, _op. cit._, p. 76.

[13]Cadillac Papers, _Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection,

XXXIII_, 338.

[14]Charles Slocum, _History of the Maumee River Basin_, I, 86; H. S.

Knapp, _op. cit._, p. 9; “Forts Miami and Fort Industry”, _Ohio

Archaeological and Historical Society Publications_, XII, 120.

[15]_New York Colonial Documents_, IX, p. 676. This French officer was

the elder Vincennes, the uncle of Francois Margane, Sieur de

Vincennes. The younger Vincennes was the founder of the town of

Vincennes on the lower Wabash.

[16]_Archives des Colonies_, c 11 117, 118, (Paris) Pierre Margry, _op.

cit._, V, 178, 218, 225-8; 239-43; 256-8, 262-7; 271-3; 278;

280-283.

[17]_New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents_, IX, 891.

[18]Archives de la Province Quebec, Vaudreuil to Council of Marine, Oct.

24, 1722.

[19]_New York Colonial Documents_, IX, 894.

[20]“Céloron Journal” _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 51.

[21]Archives de la Province Quebec, de Vaudreuil to Council of Marine,

Oct. 24, 1722.

[22]_The Jesuits Relations_, ed. by Reuben G. Thwaites, LXIX, p. 189.

[23]Archives de la Province Quebec, de Vaudreuil to Council of Marine,

Oct. 24, 1722.

[24]_Archives des Colonies_, c 11 117, 118.

[25]_Letters of Governor Spotswood_, II, 296.

[26]Norman Cadwell, _The French in the Mississippi Valley_, 1740-1750,

p. 95.

[27]_New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents_, IX, 894.

[28]_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVII, 211. Sieur Darnaud was in

all likelihood Nicolas-Marie Renoud Davenne, born 1696, died 1743.

[29]_Indiana Historical Society Publications_, VII, 72. This post was a

new settlement of the English from Carolina apparently on the upper

Ohio River.

[30]_Ibid._, p. 72.

[31]_Archives des Colonies_, C 11 117, 118.

[32]_Archives de Colonies_, C 11 117, 118.

[33]_Ibid._

[34]_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 175.

[34a]_Archives des Colonies_, C 11 118.

[35]Norman Caldwell, _op. cit._, p. 41.

[36]_Ibid._, p. 31.

[37]_Ibid._, p. 41.

[38]_New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents_, X, 140.

[39]_Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVII_, 486-7.

[40]_New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents_, X, 150.

[41]_The Jesuit Relations_, ed. by Reuben G. Thwaites, LXIX, 189.

[42]Norman Caldwell, _op. cit._, p. 95.

[43]_Ibid._, p. 95.

[44]The journal kept by Celoron on this expedition may be found in

Margry, _op. cit._, VI, 666 ff.

[45]_Jesuit Relations_, ed. by R. Thwaites, LXIX, 189.

[46]_Ibid._, p. 189.

[47]_Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications_, XII, 120.

[48]_Mississippi Valley Historical Review_, IX, 315.

[49]Francis Parkman, _Montcalm and Wolfe_, I, 87.

[50]Charles Slocum, _op. cit._, p. 99.

[51]Charles Lasselle, “Indian Traders of Indiana”, _Indiana Magazine of

History_, II, Number 1, 4.

[52]_A Narrative of Life on the Frontier, Henry Hay’s Journal_, ed. by

Milo Quaife, p. 261.

[53]_See below_, pp. [p 79-80.]

[54]Marquis de la Jonquiere to Governor Clinton, Aug. 10, 1751, _New

York Colonial Documents_, VI, pp. 731-34.

[55]Mitchell’s map was the best known of contemporary maps of North

America. A reproduction of this map may be found in the _Michigan

Pioneer and Historical Collection_, XXXVI, 52-3.

[56]Beverley Bond, _op. cit._, pp. 153-154.

[57]For an interesting discussion of the French attempt during the peace

negotiations at the end of the war to establish the Maumee and

Wabash rivers as the new boundary between the two colonial empires,

see Theodore Pease’s article, “Indiana in Contention between France

and England” in the _Indiana Historical Bulletin_, XII.

[58]“Croghan’s Journal”, _Early Western Travels_, ed. by R. G. Thwaites,

I, 122-23.

[59]_Jesuit Relations_, LXIX, 189.

[60]_Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections_, XIX, 47.

[61]_Ibid._, p. 47.

[62]Francis Parkman, _Conspiracy of Pontiac_, I, 189.

[63]The Journal of Captain Morris as quoted in his _Miscellanies in

Prose and Verse_ has been reprinted in _Early Western Travels_, I,

301-ff.

[64]Captain Thomas Morris, _op. cit._, p. 312. This prohibition of the

sale of liquor to the Indiana was not always as successful as Capt.

Morris thought.

[65]“Croghan’s Journal”, _Western Travels_, I, 149-150.

[66]For the French philosopher Volney’s description of these French

Creoles _See Below_, [p. 34.]

[67]After LaBalme’s raid, a British force was stationed at Fort Miami

for four months, _See Below_, [p. 16.]

[68]_Illinois Historical_ XVI, 60.

[69]_Indiana Historical Society Publications_, II, 435.

[70]_Ibid._, p. 439-40. The following names are listed: Capuchin,

Baptiste Campau, Nicholas Perct, Pierre Barthe, Bergerson,

Berthelemy, Dorien, Francois Maisonville, Laurain.

[71]As it turned out the people of Vincennes suffered a great deal for

their friendship with the American cause.

[72]Charles Lasselle, _loc. cit._, p. 4.

[73]Wallace A. Brice, _History of Fort Wayne_, p. 102.

[74]Charles Lasselle, _loc. cit._, p. 4.

[75]DePeyster to Haldimand, Nov. 16, 1780, and Haldimand to DePeyster,

June 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers relating to Detroit, 1772-84, II,

British Museum. After his release from captivity by the Americans,

Colonel Hamilton accused Beaubien of treachery for not following

Hamilton’s orders during the campaign, cf. Hamilton’s account of the

ill fated expedition against Vincennes, Hamilton to Haldimand, July

6, 1781, Haldimand Papers, II, British Museum.

[76]Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 26, 1778. _Michigan Pioneer

Collections_, X, 449.

[77]Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers, II, British

Museum.

[78]_Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XIX, 699. For LaBalme’s dramatic

speeches to the French, see the _Illinois Historical Collections_,

II, p. xci. For other information concerning LaBalme, see the

_Virginia State Papers_, I, p. 380. The complete papers of LaBalme

were forwarded to the war ministry in London and together with the

map carried by LaBalme at the time of his death are available in the

Haldimand Papers, II, 13, British Museum (London).

[79]“LaBalme Papers”, _Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections_,

XIX, 578-8.

[80]“Haldimand Papers”, _Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections_,

XIX, 582.

[81]Capt. A. Thompson to DePeyster, Mar. 14, 1781, _Michigan Pioneer and

Historical Collections_, XIX, 589-600.

[82]DePeyster to Haldimand, Apr. 22, 1782, Haldimand Papers, II, British

Museum.

[83]Wayne Steven, “The Northwest Fur Trade” _University of Illinois

Studies in Social Sciences_, XIV, p. 513.

[84]Milo Quaife, _op. cit._, p. 209.

[85]Major Smith to Dorchester, Oct. 16, 1790, Public Records Office,

(Colonial Series) CO-42 73, London.

[86]Dorchester to Grenville, October 17, 1790, Public Records Office,

(Colonial Series) CO-42 73.

[87]Dorchester to Grenville, May 31, 1790, Public Records Office,

(Colonial Series) CO-42 73.

[88]Leonard Helderman, “Danger on the Wabash, Vincennes letters of

1786-87” _Indiana Magazine of History_, XXXIV, 459.

[89]Logan Esarey, _op. cit._, I, 102.

[90]George Sharp to Paul Camelin, June 23, 1786, “Letters from

Eighteenth Century Indiana Merchants” (the Lasselle Papers) ed. C.B.

Coleman and published in the _Indiana Magazine of History_, V,

145-146.

[91]George Leith to Gray, Apr. 3, 1786, _loc. cit._, V, 144-145.

[92]John MacPherson to Gray, March, 1785, _loc. cit._, V, 142-143.

[93]Ironside to Gray, Apr. 15, 1787, _loc. cit._, V, 151-152.

[94]Ironside to Gray, Mar. 15, 1787, _loc. cit._, V, 150.

[95]Ironside to Gray, Feb. 16, 1787, _loc. cit._, V, 149. George

Ironside was a leading trader in the Maumee valley. He was born in

1760 and died in 1830, at Amherstburg. For many years he was in the

British Indian service. He was an M. A. of King’s College, Aberdeen

and was known, even to the Americans, for his humanity and

hospitality.

[96]_A Narrative of Life on the Old Frontier, Henry Hay’s Journal from

Detroit to the Mississippi River_, edited by M. M. Quaife, p. 224.

[97]_Ibid._, p. 221.

[98]_Ibid._, p. 241.

[99]_Ibid._, p. 240.

[100]_Ibid._, p. 260. Hay gives an interesting description of the

“Natt”, the Indian symbol of war, carried about much like the

Ancient Roman standards.

[101]_above_, [p. 23.]

[102]Quaife, _op. cit._, p. 226.

[103]_Ibid._, p. 245.

[104]_Ibid._, p. 237.

[105]_Ibid._, p. 258.

[106]_Ibid._, p. 245.

[107]_Ibid._, p. 261.

[108]_Indiana Historical Society Publications_, VII, 360.

^[109]“Gamelin’s Journal”, St. Clair Papers, II, pp. 155-160; _American

State Papers_, Indian Affairs, I, P. 37.

[109]_St. Clair Papers_, ed. Wm. Smith, II, 181.

[110]_The Writings of George Washington_, ed. Jared Sparks, IX, 80-81.

[111]_St. Clair Papers_, II, 181.

[112]_Ibid._, 193.

[113]Knox to St. Clair, Sept. 14, 1790, _St. Clair Papers_, II, p. 181.

[114]_American State Papers, Indian Affairs_, I, p. 104-5.

[115]Dorchester to Grenville, Nov. 10, 1790, including dispatches from

A. McKee and others, Public Record Office (Colonial Series) CO-42;

73, London.

[116]For the accounts of the battles see Harmar’s report in _ASP, Indian

Affairs_, I, pp. 104; also the “Military Journal of Major Ebenezer

Denny” in _Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania_, VII,

343-353. The heaviest action took place at Harmar’s ford at the end

of Harmar Street. Here the regulars suffered severely while

attempting to cross the Maumee in the face of the Indians’ fire.

[117]_ASP, Indian Affairs_, I, 112.

[118]_Ibid._, p. 112.

[119]“Knox’s Instructions to St. Clair”, _Michigan Pioneer and

Historical Collections_, XXIV, 197-8.