WASHINGTON'S DIFFICULTIES
The situation at Boston in the fall of 1775 presents an interesting
comparison: two generals of opposing armies, each ready to welcome an
attack, but each unable to deliver one. The difference between the two,
and the fact which determined the outcome, was in the natures of the two
men. Howe, from a certain sluggishness of disposition, was content to
sit tight, and wait until the government at home should send him his
relief. Though at each move his enemy came nearer, Howe still appeared
to believe that Dorchester was safe from seizure, and was content so to
believe. But Washington was not satisfied to be still. His nature urged
him to action, and though he knew himself too weak for an assault, he
constantly schemed and worked to put his army into condition to strike.
In some ways his organization was already complete. He had under him
many of the men who were to serve him through the war. To be sure, he
had Charles Lee, "the worst present that could be made to any army;" but
Lee's part in the siege was slight, for Washington frequently employed
him for distant undertakings. Gates was still present also, but in a
subordinate capacity. And another of those who, before the war was over,
did their best to wreck the American cause, was present for a while in
the person of Benedict Arnold, already distinguished by his share in the
taking of Ticonderoga. Early in September, however, Arnold was sent on
his fruitless mission against Quebec.
But besides these men, not one of whom had as yet proved his weakness,
Washington had already at his back some of the best soldiers whom the
war produced. Among the higher officers were Putnam, Thomas, Sullivan,
Heath, and more particularly Greene. Of lower grade were Stark, Morgan,
Prescott, and, not yet well known, Knox, the Boston bookseller whom we
have seen endeavoring to prevent the Massacre, who had studied tactics
in his own volumes and at the manoeuvres of the regulars, and who had
escaped from Boston just before the 17th of June. There were yet others
who were destined to distinguish themselves, and Washington knew that he
had, among his officers, as courageous and intelligent soldiers as were
to be found anywhere.
Yet they were but a nucleus, while his supplies remained few and poor,
and the organization of the army unsatisfactory. As the winter
approached, Washington looked forward uneasily to the expiration of the
terms of enlistment of his troops. Some would lapse in December, the
rest at the first of January. His regiments were not uniform in size,
and they retained too much of the provincial jealousy which had already
troubled him, and which had perhaps lost Bunker Hill. It was very
evident to him that an entirely new army should be organized.
It was therefore welcome to him that Congress should send a committee
to help him in the matter of reorganization. On October 18 the
committee, with Franklin at its head, met with Washington, his staff,
and delegates from the four colonies which until now had, practically
alone, been prosecuting the siege. The subject had been already
discussed by the council of war, and the little convention was made
acquainted with the discrepancies in the organizations of the different
regiments, and the needs of the army. It was decided to reduce the
number of regiments from thirty-eight to twenty-six. This meant not so
much to reduce the number of men as the number of officers. The term of
reenlistment was to be one year, and the delegates assured Washington
that he could count on twenty thousand men from Massachusetts, eight
thousand from Connecticut, three thousand from New Hampshire, and
fifteen hundred from Rhode Island. The regiments were to be uniform in
size, consisting of eight companies each; besides regular infantry,
there were to be riflemen and artillery. A system for clothing and
supplying the army was agreed upon. When the little convention had
broken up, the Committee from Congress remained for a few days, revising
the articles of war, considering the disposition of naval prizes, and
discussing a number of minor topics. Upon the committee's return to
Philadelphia, its actions were ratified by Congress.[138]
Washington then set himself with new assurance to his task. Thanks to
the convention, he felt that he had a united country at his back, and
that much had been done to dissipate colonial jealousies. These are
surprising to us of to-day: one is astonished to find Greene seriously
assuring "the gentlemen from the southward" that the four New England
colonies, as soon as they had conquered King George, would not turn
their arms against the South. Yet had there been any such intention, the
New Englanders already had their hands full with the British, and
Washington was by no means out of the woods. On paper he had an
excellent organization; but in fact, everything was still to be done.
With the approach of winter, the first task was to house his army. This
was gradually accomplished, and the regiments went into their winter
quarters. For a time, however, there was a scarcity of food and fuel.
This was due, not to a lack of either, but to the weakness in the system
of providing for them. For some weeks there was distress and discontent;
at times we are told that the troops ate their provision raw, and most
of the orchards and shade trees within the camp were cut down for fuel.
Washington vigorously represented the state of the case to the
Massachusetts congress; he gave permission to cut wood in private
wood-lots, promising payment; and finally the need was met. The towns
sent generous supplies of wood to the camp, rations were provided in
plenty, and the only period of hardship which the Americans endured was
safely passed before the winter set in.
There was not much for the army to do when once the barracks were built
and new quarters taken. The work of fortifying Lechmere's Point went on
slowly, on account of the frost; it was not until the end of February
that the redoubt was completed, and its guns mounted. But the troops
were drilled, and were kept busy in perfecting the fortifications.
Washington seized every chance to improve his defences, as we see him
when planning new redoubts to guard against the possibility of a sortie
from the Neck.[139]
The news of the burning of Falmouth reached Washington on the 24th of
October, and greatly roused his indignation. As it was expected that the
British fleet might next descend upon Portsmouth, he sent General
Sullivan thither, with orders to put the harbor in a state of defence,
and at all events to save the small store of powder which had been
brought into that place. This was a capture by the little navy.
Mowatt's fleet, however, made no attempt upon Portsmouth, and presently
returned to Boston. Feeling temporarily secure against further
depredations upon the coast, Washington put his whole energy into the
reorganization of his army.
The period from the end of November until the early part of February was
one of the hardest in Washington's career. His difficulties were those
which we have seen already, want of powder and want of arms, but to them
was added the great fear of a lack of men. As to powder, its supply
still fluctuated, small quantities coming in irregularly, and being
steadily used in equally niggardly amounts, or slowly spoiling in the
soldiers' pouches. Muskets were still scanty, and Washington saw no hope
except in buying those of his soldiers whose terms were about to expire,
or in sending agents through the neighboring towns to secure what they
could find. There was a corresponding lack of cannon, bayonets, flints,
and small appurtenances.
But weaknesses of this kind were nothing as compared with the
threatened weakness in men. Washington was deeply disappointed at his
failure to recruit his newly planned army. Although the delegates of the
provinces had promised him full regiments, the new recruiting system
seemed to fail almost entirely. The general presently perceived several
distinct factors that were working against its success.
In the first place, the new plan provided for fewer officers in the new
army. Many of the provincial regiments, especially those of
Massachusetts, had been over-officered, and now, when the number of
regiments was less by twelve, it was evident that scores of officers
must either accept lower rank or leave the army entirely. It was found
that most of those who could not obtain equal rank were unwilling to
remain, and that they were influencing their men to leave the army with
them.
Besides this, provincial jealousies worked strongly in this matter of
officers. Massachusetts officers who had been forced out of service
might have found places in the Connecticut regiments, but the soldiers
of the other colony would have none of them. For each company and each
platoon held firmly to the old idea that it must be consulted concerning
its officers, and no private would consent to be commanded by a man from
another colony. This alone made plentiful trouble.
Finally the men themselves had ideas of their own as to whether they
cared to enlist. To begin with, the shrewd among them reckoned that if
they only held out long enough they might secure bounties for
reenlisting. Some were finicky as to their officers, and waited until
they should be satisfied. And most of them perceived that as a reward
for patriotism they might at least receive furloughs, and stood out for
them.
The details of the work of enlisting were very obscure and complicated.
It was found that officers were endeavoring to recruit their own
companies, and in their zeal had enrolled men who were already
registered elsewhere. Outsiders, anxious for commissions, were
similarly forming companies, and presenting them for acceptance.
Washington steadily refused to receive such unauthorized organizations.
And finally it was suspected that many men who had given in their names
had no intention of serving.
What would make their defection more certain was the irregularity of
pay. Congress had appropriated sums of money, but the currency reached
Washington slowly. It was very singular, he complained, that the signers
of the scrip could not keep pace with his needs. Further, Congress had a
very imperfect idea of the magnitude of his legitimate needs; the
appropriations were niggardly. As the new year approached, when it was
important that the men should be paid, and receive assurance of further
pay, Washington wrote to urge more remittances, that the soldiers might
be satisfied.
Even the crews of the little navy gave Washington no peace. His "plague,
trouble, and vexation" with them he was unable to express; he believed
that there was not on earth a more disorderly set. One crew deserted,
and its vessel was docked.
To be sure, there were moments of satisfaction in these dreary weeks of
trial. Certain of the rejected officers rose above their
disappointments. One of these was Colonel Whitcomb, who was not given a
regiment in the new establishment. At this his men became so
dissatisfied that they decided not to enlist at all. Colonel Whitcomb,
in order to persuade them to remain, announced his willingness to enlist
as a private. The situation was saved by Colonel Jonathan Brewer, who
offered his command to Colonel Whitcomb. Washington, in a general order,
thanked both of the officers. Brewer was made Barrack-Master, "until
something better worth his acceptance can be provided."[140]
Other relief was provided by captures of British vessels. Of great
importance to both armies was the capture of the _Nancy_, an ordnance
brig with a complete cargo of military supplies--saving only powder. So
valuable did Washington consider the capture that he at once sent four
companies to the spot where the stores were landed, impressed teams for
transportation, and called out the neighboring militia lest Howe should
make an effort to recover the royal property. The British were on their
part greatly disgusted at the loss of the brig, not merely as weakening
them, but also as strengthening the enemy. The chief prize on the ship
was a thirteen-inch brass mortar, which on its arrival in camp was
greeted with acclamation, and by means of a bottle of rum was solemnly
christened the Congress.
It was about this time that Washington had the satisfaction of being
joined by his wife. There had been a suggestion that her residence on
the Potomac was not safe, but even before the naval raids Washington
had begun to suggest her joining him. She arrived on the 11th of
December, and resided until the end of the siege with him at his
headquarters in the old house still standing on Brattle Street,
Cambridge. The house has had an interesting history, having been built
by the Tory Vassalls, occupied by the Marblehead regiment, by
Washington, by Dr. Andrew Craigie, surgeon at Bunker Hill, by Jared
Sparks, Edward Everett, Noah Webster, and by the poet Longfellow, whose
family still owns it. The quarters were for Washington central and
pleasant; they gave him his last taste of home life for years.
[Illustration: WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS]
Yet we are not to imagine him at any time free of difficulties. With
December began his troubles with the Connecticut troops, whose
enlistment had expired. In spite of previous promises to remain until
their places were filled, and against orders to leave their weapons,
many of the Connecticut men tried to slip away, guns and all. Washington
frequently speaks of them in his letters of the first half of December.
In securing their return he was well aided by the officers, and by the
aged but still energetic Governor Trumbull, who heard of the actions of
his men with "grief, surprise, and indignation." Trumbull called the
assembly of Connecticut together to consider the situation, but action
was forestalled by the people of the different towns. The hint that the
soldiers had best return voluntarily, lest they be sent back with a
feathered adornment that nature had not provided, was sufficient to
hurry most of them back to their service.
No sooner had this matter been smoothed over, than Washington had to
meet the general situation, when on the first of January most of the
enlistments would expire. For some weeks he had been anxiously watching
the returns of the enlistments, and the figures frequently plunged him
into depression. On the 28th of November, finding that but thirty-five
hundred men had enlisted, he wrote: "Such a dearth of public spirit,
such stock-jobbing, and such fertility in all the low arts to obtain
advantages of one kind or another, in this great change of military
arrangement, I never saw before, and pray God's mercy I may never be
witness to again." A week later he found himself under obligations to
give furlough to fifteen hundred men a week, in order to satisfy them.
To fill their places and those of the Connecticut troops, he called on
Massachusetts and New Hampshire for five thousand militia. By the middle
of December scarcely six thousand men had enlisted, and on Christmas Day
only eight thousand five hundred. On New Year's Day his army, which was
to have been at least twenty thousand men, was not quite half that
number.
Under such circumstances many a weaker man would have thrown up his
office or abandoned his post. Washington stuck to his task. If Howe
would but remain inactive, the laggard country would in time retrieve
itself. As a matter of fact, many of the soldiers, after a brief period
of liberty, returned of their own accord to the standard. We find at
least one case in the diary of David How, which, in addition to
revealing his actions, gives a glimpse of the camp at the end of the
year, when many of the men were going away, and the others were joining
their new regiments.
"This Day," writes How on the 30th of December, "we paraded and had our
guns took from us By the Major to prise them.
"31. This Day we have been In an uprore about packun our Things up In
order to go home a Monday morning as Soon as we Can.
"Jan 1. We have ben all Day a pecking up our Things For to go home.
"2d we all Left Cambridg this morning I went to mr. Granger and staid
all night.
"3d I went to methuen.
"5d I went to Haver hill to by some Leather for Bretches.
"6 day I come to Andover and Staid at Mr. osgoods.
"7 day I come to Cambridge about Six a Clock at Night.
"Jany the 8 1776 This Day I Began with Mr. Watson....
"Jan 14.[141] This Day I wint to Cobble Hill & to Litchmor point and to
prospeck hill & So Home again. Nothing new.
"22. I listed with Leut David Chandler in Coln Sergant Regment."
And so David How, veteran of Bunker Hill, and doubtless many other young
men, found the lure of the camp, and let us say the chance to serve the
country, too much to withstand. Freedom to earn their own wages, and to
stroll about the fortifications on Sundays, were not to be measured
against the romance of soldiering and the hope of battle.
This same New Year's Day, 1776, occurred an event of importance in the
hoisting of the flag with the thirteen stripes. Previously the colonies
had used different devices, in the South a rattlesnake flag with the
motto, "Don't tread on me," and for the Connecticut troops the colony
arms and the motto _Qui transtulit sustinet_, "which we construe thus:
'God, who transplanted us hither, will support us.'"[142] Massachusetts
had used the pinetree flag and the motto "Appeal to Heaven," and the
little navy had a sign by which its ships were known to each other, "the
ensign up to the main topping-lift." Now for the first time the thirteen
stripes with the British crosses in the corner were raised, amid much
enthusiasm.
Curiously, this coincided with the coming of the king's recent speech in
Parliament, and a strange interpretation was put upon the appearance of
the new flag. The British had caused to be sent to the American lines
many copies of the speech, expecting that its expression of the king's
determination to prosecute the war, even by the use of foreign troops,
would bring the rebels to their knees. The cheering in the American
camp, all the louder on account of the sentiments of his gracious
majesty, and the appearance of the new flag, combined to make the
British suppose that the provincials were weakening. "By this time,"
wrote Washington grimly on the 4th, "I presume they begin to think it
strange, that we have not made a formal surrender of our lines."
It was well that he could jest, however sternly, for his situation was
newly complicated by the permission of Congress to attack Boston
whenever he might think expedient, "notwithstanding the town and
property in it may be destroyed." Such permission was equivalent to a
broad hint, and there were not lacking suggestions from many obscure
quarters that the country would be more content if its general should
relieve it of the presence of the British army. Of "chimney corner
heroes" Washington had a genuine contempt, but the resolve of Congress
was another matter, especially when it came through the hands of John
Hancock. He was the largest property-owner in the town, and
prospectively the greatest sufferer by its destruction, yet he
cheerfully wrote, "May God crown your attempt with success!"
Long before now, had Washington been able, he would have attempted to
storm the town. But as often as he called a council of war to consider
the matter, so often did his generals advise against the attempt. The
Americans were doubtful, and Lee, affecting to mistrust the temper of
the troops, would not advise the venture. As to burning the town by
throwing carcasses[143] into it, Lee told the others that the town could
not be set on fire by such means. Washington looked for a chance to
assault the town by crossing on the ice, but for a long time the Back
Bay did not freeze, and when at last it did, he had neither men nor
powder. Such then was his situation when he answered the letter of
Hancock.[144] He begged Congress to consider his situation if, in spite
of their wishes, he did not act. And that they should clearly
understand, he wrote these words:--
"It is not in the pages of history, perhaps, to furnish a case like
ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the enemy, for six months
together, without and at the same time to disband one army, and
recruit another, within that distance of twenty-odd British regiments,
is more, probably, than was ever attempted."
The significant omission in this passage is the word "powder." At
another time, when doubtful of the safety of his letter, he used the
paraphrase, "what we greatly need." He knew that his correspondents
would supply the omission and interpret the reference. But once at
least, on the 14th of January, when writing to Joseph Reed, formerly his
aide, to whom at this period he seems to have written more freely than
to any one else, Washington gave a complete account of his situation
when almost at its worst, and ended with an explanation of his state of
mind. Conditions are so completely summarized, and his thoughts are so
frankly given, that the paragraphs had best be given entire.
"Our enlistments are at a stand; the fears I ever entertained are
realized; that is, the _discontented officers_ (for I do not know how
else to account for it) have thrown such difficulties or
stumbling-blocks in the way of recruiting, that I no longer entertain a
hope of completing the army by voluntary enlistments, and I see no move
or likelihood to do it by other means. In the last two weeks we have
enlisted but about a thousand men; whereas I was confidently led to
believe, by all the officers I conversed with, that we should by this
time have had the regiments nearly completed. Our total number upon
paper amounts to about ten thousand five hundred; but as a large portion
of these are returned _not joined_, I never expect to receive them, as
an ineffectual order has once issued to call them in. Another is now
gone forth, peremptorily requiring all officers under pain of being
cashiered, and recruits of being treated as deserters, to join their
respective regiments by the 1st day of next month, that I may know my
real strength; but if my fears are not imaginary, I shall have a
dreadful account of the advanced month's pay.[145] In consequence of the
assurances given, and my expectation of having at least men enough to
defend our lines, to which may be added my unwillingness to burthen the
cause with unnecessary expense, no relief of militia has been ordered
in, to supply the places of those, who are released from their
engagements tomorrow, and as to whom, though many have promised to
continue out the month, there is no security for their stay.
"Thus I am situated with respect to men. With regard to arms I am yet
worse off. Before the dissolution of the old army, I issued an order
directing three judicious men of each brigade to attend, review, and
appraise the good arms of every regiment; and finding a very great
unwillingness in the men to part with their arms, at the same time not
having it in my power to pay them for the months of November and
December, I threatened severely, that every soldier, who should carry
away his firelock without leave, should never receive pay for those
months; yet so many have been carried off, partly by stealth, but
chiefly as condemned, that we have not at this time one hundred guns in
the stores, of all that have been taken in the prize ship and from the
soldiery, notwithstanding our regiments are not half complete. At the
same time I am told, and believe it, that to restrain the enlistment to
men with arms, you will get but few of the former, and still fewer of
the latter which would be good for anything.
"How to get furnished I know not. I have applied to this and the
neighboring colonies, but with what success time only can tell. The
reflection of my situation, and that of this army, produces many an
unhappy hour when all around me are wrapped in sleep. Few people know
the predicament we are in, on a thousand accounts; fewer still will
believe, if any disaster happens to these lines, from what cause it
flows. I have often thought how much happier I should have been, if,
instead of accepting the command under such circumstances, I had taken
my musket on my shoulder and entered the ranks, or, if I could have
justified the measure to posterity and my own conscience, had retired to
the back country, and lived in a wigwam. If I shall be able to rise
superior to these and many other difficulties, I shall most religiously
believe, that the finger of Providence is in it, to blind the eyes of
our enemies; for surely if we get well through this month, it must be
for want of their knowing the difficulties we labor under.
"Could I have foreseen the difficulties, which have come upon us; could
I have known, that such a backwardness would have been discovered among
the old soldiers to the service, all the generals on earth should not
have convinced me of the propriety of delaying an attack upon Boston
till this time."[146]
One more blow Washington was to receive, in the news of the failure of
the expedition against Quebec. This came to him on the 17th of January.
But from about that time, though very slowly, the prospect began to
brighten. His army strengthened, money was loaned him by Massachusetts,
and though early in February he reported that he had in camp two
thousand men without guns, even muskets were eventually provided.
Moreover, cannon were now supplied him, through the exertions of Henry
Knox. Washington had detached him in November to go to Ticonderoga and
Crown Point, and provide means for bringing the captured cannon to camp.
The general had even hoped that more might be had from Quebec, but that
expectation was now gone. Knox, in the face of many difficulties,
fulfilled his mission. On December 17 he wrote from Lake George that he
had got the cannon as far as that point, and with forty-two "exceedingly
strong sleds" and eighty yoke of oxen expected to make the journey to
Springfield, whence fresh cattle would bring him to Cambridge. The
artillery, in this humble manner, at last arrived, howitzers, mortars,
and cannon, fifty-five pieces of iron or brass. With what had been
captured elsewhere the supply was ample, and the guns, after a delay at
Framingham, were mounted at the fortifications, or reserved for the
attempt to take Dorchester. Powder also had slowly come in faster than
it was used or could spoil, and Washington found himself almost ready to
act.
When at last he could draw a long breath, with the feeling that the
worst of the situation was over, he gave, in letters to Joseph Reed and
John Hancock, his opinion of his army as it then was, and of the means
to make it better. Placed behind any kind of shelter, his provincials
would give a good account of themselves. But they could not yet be
depended on to make an assault in the open field. For this they would
have to receive severer training, and in order to acquaint them with
their proper duties a longer term of service was necessary. Even now, at
the beginning of another year of service, the men had the officers too
much in their power, for indulgence was necessary in order to make them
enlist again. He was therefore firmly of the opinion that his present
army, and all new recruits, should be enlisted "for and during the war."
Thus Washington, looking beyond his still uncompleted task, like Lincoln
many years later, perceived the only means to final success.
But with the means which he had at hand he was now impatient to act. It
was almost March, and at any time Howe might receive the reinforcements
which would enable him to take the offensive. Washington prepared to
fortify Dorchester as soon as the state of the ground would permit of
digging, and in order to lessen the work he prepared fascines--which
were bundles of sticks--and chandeliers or frameworks to hold the
bundles in place in order to serve as the body of an embankment.
Remembering how at Bunker Hill the regulars had been led to suppose that
the troops at the rail fence, protected by nothing except the rails and
hay, were behind an embankment, he collected ropes of hay to use if
necessary for the same purpose, but also to bind the wheels of his carts
that they might make no noise. Carts he collected to the number of three
hundred. In the Charles River he prepared boats enough to carry
twenty-eight hundred men. Two floating batteries were also made ready
there; a third had earlier been destroyed by the bursting of its cannon
when firing at the camp on the Common. Washington was about to strike,
with the suddenness which characterized him, but also with the thorough
readiness.
For his camp, even if temporarily, was now full. Early in February came
in ten regiments of militia, summoned on service until the first of
April. They manifested, he wrote with satisfaction, the greatest
alertness, and the determination of men engaged in the cause of freedom.
And on the first of March he called into camp the militia of the
neighboring towns, who were to report at Roxbury fully equipped for
three days' service. To these men was read his general order, preparing
their minds for action. They were forbidden to play at cards or other
games of chance, and advised to ponder the importance of the cause in
which they were enlisted. "But it may not be amiss for the troops to
know," he added, "that if any man in action shall presume to skulk, or
hide himself, or retreat from the enemy without the orders of his
commanding officer, he will be instantly shot down." And with this
exhortation and warning Washington concluded his preparations.
FOOTNOTES:
[138] See the "Writings of Washington," iii, 123-124, note.
[139] See letter to Ward, "Writings," iii, 161.
[140] See the "Writings of Washington," iii, 161, note. The facts
concerning Washington's difficulties with enlisting are taken chiefly
from this volume, where they can best be studied.
[141] This was a Sunday.
[142] Frothingham's "Siege," 104.
[143] Carcasses were hollow shells with several openings. They were
filled with combustibles, and when thrown into a town were intended to
set fire to buildings.
[144] Washington's communications to Congress were addressed to Hancock,
as its President.
[145] He had paid in advance all who had enlisted.
[146] "Writings of Washington," iii, 238-241.