_On the probable effect of this invention_
At the time a new discovery is made in physics or mathematical science,
the whole of its consequences cannot be foreseen. In the year 1330,
Bartholomew Schwartz is said to have invented gun-powder; twenty-five
years after, a very imperfect kind of cannon was constructed of welded
bars of iron, others of sheet-iron, rolled in the form of a cylinder
and hooped with iron rings; in some cases, they were made of leather,
strengthened with plates of iron or copper; balls of stone were used;
and it was not until the beginning of the fifteenth century, that is,
one hundred and seventy years after the invention of powder, that iron
balls were introduced into practice. Muskets were not used until the
year 1521, or one hundred and ninety-one years after the invention of
gun-powder. The Spaniards were the first who armed their foot-soldiers
in this manner--they had matchlocks; but firelocks, that is, locks with
flints, were not used until the beginning of the eighteenth century,
one hundred and eighty years after the invention of muskets, and three
hundred and eighty years after the invention of powder. When firelocks
were first invented, Marshal Sax had so little confidence in a flint,
that he ordered a match to be added to the lock with a flint, lest the
flint should miss fire[I]: such is the force of habit and want of faith
in new inventions.
[Footnote I: I have seen one of these firelocks in the collection of
ancient arms, Rue de Bacq. Paris.]
Although cannon, fire-arms, and the whole detail of ammunition, now
appear extremely simple, yet we here see the very slow advances to their
present state of perfection; and they are still improving: hence I
conclude, that it is now impossible to foresee to what degree Torpedoes
may be improved and rendered useful. When Schwartz invented powder, it
may be presumed that his mind did not embrace all its consequences, or
perceive that his discovery would supercede the use of catapultas,
armour, bows and arrows, and totally change the whole art of war. He
certainly could have no conception of such a combination of art as we
now see in ships of the line; those movable fortifications, armed with
thirty-two pounders, and furnished with wings, to spread oppression
over every part of the ocean, and carry destruction to every harbour
of the earth. In consequence of the invention of gun-powder, ships of
war have been contrived, and increased to their present enormous size
and number[J]; then may not science, in her progress, point out a means
by which the application of the violent explosive force of gun-powder
shall destroy ships of war, and give to the seas the liberty which shall
secure perpetual peace between nations that are separated by the ocean?
My conviction is, that the means are here developed, and require only
to be organized and practised, to produce that liberty so dear to every
rational and reflecting man; and there is a grandeur in persevering to
success in so immense an enterprise--so well calculated to excite the
most vigorous exertions of the highest order of intellect, that I hope to
interest the patriotic feelings of every friend to America, to justice,
and to humanity, in so good a cause.
[Footnote J: Compared with existing military marines, I consider all
galleys and vessels of war, which were in use previous to the invention
of powder, as very insignificant. It is probable that four 74 gun ships
in open sea would destroy all that ever existed at any one time.]
I have shewn that a ship of 80 guns and six hundred men, could have
little chance of resisting fifty Torpedo boats of twelve men each, equal
six hundred men. If it can be admitted possible that an 80 gun ship will
be necessitated to retreat before fifty boats, she must run so far that
the boats cannot follow her, that is, more than eight or ten leagues;
therefore, boats could follow a ship over the narrow parts of the Baltic
or British channel; but I will confine my remarks to the British channel,
between Boulogne and Romney, from Calais to Dover, and from Ostend to
the mouth of the Thames. If I can shew that in those waters the British
fleets would be compelled to retreat before Torpedo boats or perish, it
follows, that they must yield to a like system of attack in every other
sea; and the like combination of power which can force them to yield,
will act on all ships of war to their total annihilation.
Let the coast of Boulogne be the scene for action; suppose the British to
have one hundred ships of 80 guns, or a force to that amount, equal eight
thousand guns and sixty thousand men; this is a greater power than ever
has been engaged in one action. I have mentioned large ships, because the
strength of a fleet depends more on the size of the ships and weight of
metal, than on their number; in such case, the line will not be so much
extended as if the vessels were smaller and more numerous; the signals
can be seen and answered from the extremities of the line with more
certainty, and the order of battle can be better kept. The length of a
ship, from the point of the bowsprit to the stern, may be estimated at
forty fathoms, and the distance between two ships one hundred fathoms,
consequently, the one hundred ships would form one line of fourteen
thousand fathoms, or twenty-eight thousand yards, equal to near sixteen
miles. Such a line could not see and answer signals from the van and
rear to the centre. It could, however, be formed into four divisions
of twenty-five ships each, and they again could be subdivided; but the
tactics which must be adhered to when two fleets of near equal force
engage, will be of little utility when the attack is made by a sufficient
number of Torpedo boats.