Contingencies 3,000
------
Total $24,300
The pay and provisions for six hundred men, whether in an 80 gun ship or
in Torpedo boats, may be estimated, for the present, to amount to the
same sum annually.
Here is an establishment of fifty boats with their Torpedoes, and armed
complete, for 24,300 dollars; the economy 375,700 dollars.[E] It is
evident the ship could not put out fifty boats to contend with our fifty;
she could not, in fact, put out twenty; therefore, as to boat fighting,
the enemy could have no chance of success, and would have to depend
for protection on her guns and small arms. Unless in a case of great
emergency, the attack should be in the night, for if an enemy came into
one of our harbours to do execution, the chances would be much against
her getting out and to any great distance before night. In a night
usually dark, rowboats, if painted white, and the men dressed in white,
cannot be seen at the distance of three hundred yards; and there are
nights so dark, that they cannot be seen if close under the bow. I might
here draw into my calculations on chances that an enemy, who understood
the tremendous consequences of a successful attack with Torpedoes, would
not like to run the risk of the night being dark. But in any night, the
fifty boats closing on the vessel in all direction, would spread or
divide her fire, and prevent it becoming concentered on any one or more
boats. Boats which row five miles an hour, and which all good boats can
do for a short time, run at the rate of one hundred and forty yards a
minute. At the distance of three hundred yards from the ship, they take
the risque of cannon shot, which must, from necessity, be random and
without aim, on so small a body as a boat, running with a velocity of one
hundred and forty yards a minute. At two hundred yards from the ship, the
boats must take the chance of random discharges of grape and cannister
shot; and at one hundred yards from the ship, they must run the risque of
random musket; each boat will, therefore, be two minutes within the line
of the enemy's fire before she harpoons, and two minutes after she has
harpooned before she gets out of the line of fire, total, four minutes
in danger[F]: the danger, however, is not of a very serious kind, for,
as before observed, no aim can be taken in the night at such quick
moving bodies as row-boats; yet some men might be killed, and some boats
crippled[G]; in such an event, the great number of boats which we should
have in motion, could always help the unfortunate. But what would be the
situation of the enemy, who had their six hundred men in one vessel?
The Torpedo boats closing upon her, twenty-five on the larboard and
twenty-five on the starboard bow, some of them would certainly succeed to
harpoon her between the stem and main chains, and if so, the explosion of
only one Torpedo under her would sink her, killing the greatest part of
the people who were between decks, and leave those who might escape to
the mercy of our boats to save them.
[Footnote E: As each boat with a Torpedo, and armed complete, costs four
hundred and eighty-six dollars, this economy would pay for seven hundred
and eighty-nine boats; hence, eight hundred and thirty-nine Torpedo
boats, with Torpedoes and arms, could be fitted out for the sum which one
80 gun ship would cost.]
[Footnote F: A deduction may be made from this time; after harpooning,
if the ship were anchored in a current which ran one mile and a half an
hour, that would be two feet three lines a second; hence, if the distance
from the harpoon to the Torpedo were sixty feet, thirty seconds would be
sufficient for the tide to push it under the keel; its clockwork might
be set to explode in one minute from the time the Torpedo fell out of
the boat. If a vessel were under sail, running more than two miles an
hour, one minute would be sufficient time for the clockwork to act before
explosion. After explosion there would, of course, be no resistance,
and the probability is, that all hands would be too much occupied in
attempting to save themselves, to keep them under any discipline. Thus
each Torpedo boat would not be more than three minutes within the line of
the enemy's fire.]
[Footnote G: It is very easy to make the boats so that they cannot be
sunk.]
I now beg of my reader to meditate on this kind of attack, and make up
his mind on which are in the greatest danger, the six hundred men in the
ship or the six hundred men in the boats? Are not the chances fifty to
one against the ship, that she would be blown up before she could kill
two hundred men in the boats? Should this appear evident, or be proved by
future practice, no commander would be rash enough to expose his ship to
such an attack.
To give a fair comparative view of the two modes of fighting, I have, in
these calculations, made the number of men on each side equal; by the
same rule, if twenty ships of 80 guns were to come into one of our ports,
we should be necessitated to have one thousand boats and twelve thousand
men; but such a preparation would not be necessary. It can never be
necessary for us to have more boats than are sufficient to meet the boats
which the enemy could put out to oppose us; an 80 gun ship, which is to
work her guns, cannot be encumbered with many boats; they usually have:
1 launch, which is a bad rowing boat,
1 long-boat, which may row well,
1 the captain's barge, a good row-boat,
1 yawl or galley, a good row-boat.
They may, in some cases, have two more boats, total number, six;
therefore, twelve boats on our part would be sufficient to attack an
80 gun ship[H]; particularly as all our boats would be built expressly
for running, and our business is to run to harpoon and not to fight;
for this purpose our six oarsmen, in each boat, never quit their oars,
while our four marines keep up a running fire. The six or eight boats,
if the enemy could put out so many, could not prevent our twelve boats
closing on the ship. If our boats came into contact with the boats of
the enemy, the contest would be reduced to boat fighting; the ship could
not use her cannon or small arms against us without firing on her own
boats. If we succeeded to drive the boats under the guns of the ship, we
should follow so close, that her guns and small arms could not be used,
for in the night and amidst a number of boats in confusion, they could
not discriminate between friends and enemies. On this theory, if twenty
ships of 80 guns, or a force to that amount, were to enter one of our
ports, two hundred and forty boats, with two thousand, eight hundred and
eighty men would be sufficient, and perhaps more than sufficient, for the
attack; and the following view of chances exhibits a strong probability,
that such a force of Torpedo boats and men would destroy the twenty ships
of the line within one hour.
[Footnote H: While organizing a system of Torpedo attack against the
Boulogne flotilla, during the administration of Mr. Pitt, it was
determined that men should be taken from Lord Keath's blockading fleet
to man the boats; but a difficulty occurred how to carry a sufficient
number of good active boats. Finding that the ships of war could not take
on board more than their usual number, without being encumbered, four
ordnance vessels were to be prepared, with large hatchways, to receive a
number of boats in the hole, and to carry Torpedoes. Lord Melville was
impeached, Mr. Pitt died, and my system was opposed by Lords Grenville
and Howic, and the new administration. I mention this, my experience,
to shew that ships of war cannot carry a sufficient number of boats
to contend with the boats which we could bring into action; they may,
indeed, bring with them ordnance ships to carry boats; but, if they unman
the ships to man the boats, the ship will be less formidable in her fire;
and I believe it is self-evident, that they who have to cross three
thousand miles of sea, cannot be so well furnished with boats as we who
command the land.]
Let the attack be in the night. The enemy must be at anchor; twenty
vessels could not keep under way in narrow waters which could not be well
known to their pilots. If they put out their boats, they could not bring
into action more than six good boats from each ship, total, one hundred
and twenty boats. Each ship would be a point from which their boats could
depart, or to which they could retreat, total, twenty positions; in
these twenty positions, twelve thousand men would be exposed to Torpedo
explosion, which is the same, in effect, as a mine under a fortification.
We, with two hundred and forty boats, exposing only two thousand, eight
hundred and eighty men, would have the whole of our shores to depart
from or retreat to; being the assailants, and having it in our power
to approach in every direction, the enemy could not know a feint from
a real attack, nor could they tell which ship we would attack first;
they, consequently, could not concentrate their boats; each vessel would
be necessitated to keep her own boats on the look-out, and to aid in
protecting her; while we should have the power to divide our force,
or concentre one hundred boats on one vessel, as circumstances might
require; hence, every thing is in favour of the success of the Torpedo
attack, while the greatest danger is to be apprehended for the ships.
Having given my experience and theory on anchored and harpoon Torpedoes:
a system, which I hope will, by every friend to America and humanity,
be considered of some interest to the United States. I am aware of the
doubts which may arise, as to the success of harpooning, in the minds of
men in general, and particularly of those who have no experience, who
are so impressed with the imaginary tremendous fire of an 80 gun ship,
or a ship of war, that the question has often been put to me, where will
you find men who have courage to approach in boats within twenty feet
of an 80 gun ship, to harpoon her? I answer, that the men in the boats,
who are not more than three minutes within the line of the enemy's fire,
are not so much in danger, nor does it require so much courage, as to
lie yard-arm and yard-arm, as is usual in naval engagements, and receive
broadsides, together with grape-shot and volleys of small arms, for forty
or sixty minutes. It is not so great a risque, nor does it require so
much courage, as to approach a vessel in boats, climb her sides, and
take her by boarding, yet this has frequently been done. This risque is
not so great, nor does it require so much courage, as to enter a breach
which is defended by interior works and close ranges of cannon, flanked
by howitzers or carronades loaded with cannister or grape-shot, and the
parapet crowded with infantry; yet such breaches have been forced, and
cities taken by assault, with numerous examples of this kind. I hope
there can be no doubt of sufficient courage to make a Torpedo attack. In
the instances of captain Siccombe and lieutenant Payne, before mentioned,
they considered the risque of so little importance, that they went to the
attack without any apparent concern; and the sailors, who were offered a
few guineas for each gun of a vessel which they should destroy, used all
their influence with the officers to be permitted to be of the party.
But I will not propose a project so novel, and look to others to execute
it. If Torpedoes be adopted as a part of our means of defence, with a
reasonable number of men organized and practised to the use of them,
if it be thought proper to put such men under my command, and an enemy
should then enter our ports, I will be responsible to my fellow-citizens
for the courage which should secure success. While I propose this, I
wish it to be understood, that I do not desire any command or public
employment. My private pursuits are the guarantee of an independence and
freedom of action, which is always grateful to my feelings; they are
useful and honourable amusements, and the most rational source of my
happiness.
_Estimate for an anchored Torpedo_
Thirty-two pounds of copper, at seventy-five cents a
pound $24.00