THE RULING INSTITUTION: AS GOVERNMENT
SUMMARY
The Ottoman Ruling Institution has now been considered in all but the
last of its aspects. The recruiting of its members from Christian
subjects and enemies, their conversion to Mohammedanism, and their
training for the duties of war and government were first explained; then
the military duties and organization of the sultan’s _kullar_, their
privileged and noble status, and their organization and activity as a
household and court were described. Of the seven aspects in which the
Ruling Institution may be considered only one remains, that of government
in the narrow sense.
With certain exceptions, the Ruling Institution constituted the
government of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Sacred Law, the
rendering of justice belonged to the Moslem Institution, and many
internal matters were left to be regulated by the subject nationalities,
which were organized as churches, and by the foreign colonies, which
remained under their own laws; but even over these bodies the Ruling
Institution held the sword, and in the case of the Moslem Institution
it held the purse-strings also. Aside from such exceptions, it attended
to all the functions of government that were performed within the
empire. These, however, as will appear, were by no means so numerous and
extensive as are the activities of a progressive twentieth-century state.
Some of the functions of government cared for by the Ruling Institution
have already been described in the previous chapters. The guidance of
the educational system, the management of the army of the empire, the
conduct of local government, the oversight of the household, the care of
the sultan’s gardens, pastures, and forests, the regulation of ceremonies
at his court, may be all be regarded as tasks of government. To some of
them it will be necessary to refer again briefly; but the fact that they
have been described already simplifies the problem of setting forth the
plan of the government in its narrower sense.
FUNCTIONS OF THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT
All governments must in some fashion maintain themselves in place and
in operation; they must obtain means to meet expenses, and they must
keep some kind of record of their receipts and expenditures and of their
acts. They must alter and expand the unwritten and the written rules
under which they operate, at least enough to keep their system workable.
They must protect their subjects sufficiently to enable them to earn a
living and the means to meet taxation. They must meet the efforts of
other governments of both a diplomatic and a military character. All
these things the Ottoman government did in its own way. In addition, it
remained in the sixteenth century strongly under the ancient impulse to
increase its bounds and the number of its subjects, particularly at the
expense of Christians and Shiites and in the interest of Sunnite Islam.
The Ottoman government did not include among its functions the building
and maintenance of systems of roads, bridges, and ferries, the conduct
of a public postal service, the promotion of agriculture, industry, and
commerce, the organization of a system of public and universal education,
the adjustment of taxation and customs duties in the interest of the
welfare of its subjects, or an extension of the activities and liberties
of its subjects. Benevolence toward the common people had hardly emerged
into the consciousness of any sixteenth-century state. Self-maintenance
in power by the most available means, which were usually military
force; increase of power, authority, and territory, by similar means;
and, incidentally, an assurance of the well-being of all the privileged
persons who were connected with the government, in proportion to their
importance: these were the chief objects aimed at by the governments of
that day, whether in the West or in the East.
Accordingly, the chief energies of the Ottoman Ruling Institution in its
capacity as government were directed toward the smooth running of the
machine. For this object the best and most devoted men were obtained and
trained. They, with as many other members of the Ottoman nationality
as possible, were organized into a magnificent army, which first of
all defended and maintained the government against enemies at home and
abroad, and then increased its dominions and greatness by victorious
campaigns in the “land of war.” The religious motive entered strongly
here, since the power and conquests of the Ottoman nation were felt to
be the power and conquests of Islam. The welfare and contentment of the
members of the government, beginning with the sovereign, were assured by
exclusive privileges, elaborate organization of personal service, and
ceremonies in which they could be flattered by opportunities for display
and by gradations of honor.
There remained as the special functions of government, first, the careful
elaboration and watchful improvement of the regulations under which the
Ruling Institution and the state were organized; second, the keeping of
every part of the administrative machinery in the best possible order
and condition; third, the acquisition of enough money and means to carry
out the purposes of the government, and the supplying of this money
and means in suitable quantity at the time and place needed and to the
proper persons; and, fourth, the preparing and recording of all written
acts necessary to the transaction of the business of the government. A
fifth function was the adjustment of disputes between subjects of the
empire who were not connected with the government; this was attended to
largely by another institution, though supported and executed by the
members of the government itself. The first of these functions, that of
legislation, was cared for chiefly by the sultan himself; the second, of
administration, was controlled by his viziers; the third, of finance,
was managed by the _Defterdars_ through twenty-five departments; the
fourth, of chancery, was under the power of the _Nishanjis_; the fifth,
of justice between the subjects, was, in matters controlled by the
Sacred Law, administered by the _Ulema_, the learned men of the Moslem
Institution, under the headship of the _Kaziaskers_. These five functions
were by no means so clearly separated as were the groups of officials
concerned with them. A logical classification of duties would have
necessitated much readjustment.
The striking way in which the Ottoman Ruling Institution, when regarded
as a government, limited its operations almost exclusively to its
own affairs seems to have resulted from its character as a single
slave-family. Although its essential character is somewhat obscured by
the facts that it was by far the largest slave-family in the empire, that
it had ruling authority, and that some of its members exercised general
governmental functions, it is nevertheless true that the legislation
of the sultans and of Suleiman himself was largely directed to the
regulation of the institution itself, most laws of wider and deeper
import being included in the almost unchangeable Sacred Law. The business
of the viziers was also largely that of the institution, aside from the
fact that the grand vizier, as representative of the sultan, headed also
the justice of the empire. The imperial treasury, again, was concerned,
in the first place, with obtaining the revenues due to the sultan, such
of them as did not come from his personal rights as the owner of domain
lands being farmed out, so that the government did not even here touch
the people directly. In the second place, the revenues were paid out to
the members of the institution as soldiers, servants, officials, and
members of the royal family. All who followed the sultan to war without
belonging to his great household provided their own support. Even the
officers of local government, though appointed from his _kullar_, were
supported by the assignment of lands which they administered themselves
by means of the Ruling Institution. The sultan’s chancery was similarly
confined in its operations to the preparation and registration of acts,
decrees, commissions, and the like, most of which were concerned with the
adjustment and operation of the Ruling Institution. Finally, the officers
of the army and the government rendered and administered justice to all
the _kullar_, besides deciding many law cases under imperial laws. To
a very great extent, then, the sultan’s government was that of a large
slave-family, which secured its own interests and managed to the best
advantage its own affairs, which cared little for the welfare of the
great majority of the people of the empire, and which had dealings with
them and attended to their affairs only when obliged to do so by the
pursuit of its own aims.
THE SULTAN AS HEAD OF THE STATE AND OF THE GOVERNMENT
Suleiman’s authority rested actually and immediately upon the military
might which he controlled. Psychologically, it was strongly supported
by the ancient Turkish tradition of absolute obedience to the ruler who
led and fed his people, and by the undying allegiance of the population
of wide areas to the Caesar of New Rome, to whose seat and splendor
Suleiman had succeeded. Theoretically, and, if a modern expression may be
used, constitutionally, Suleiman’s power was that of the ancient caliphs
of Islam. It is true that he suffered under one apparently complete
disqualification. A tradition of high order asserted that the _Imâms_
must be of the Prophet’s tribe, the Koreish;[505] but by an extension of
the principle of agreement (_ijma_) by which the consensus of the Islamic
doctors of the law of any period may establish an interpretation of some
passage of the Sacred Law, Suleiman’s father, after the acquisition of
the Holy Cities and the resignation of the last Abbassid caliph at Cairo,
had come into full rights as caliph. The title itself seems to have been
known by none of the Western writers of the sixteenth century, nor was it
commonly used by Suleiman in public documents.
In his capacity as caliph, Suleiman was head of the Islamic state,
defender, executor, and interpreter of the Sacred Law, and defender of
the faith. He was under obligation to punish heretics and unsubmissive
infidels, to protect true believers, and to extend the area of his
divinely-appointed rule. To him, after Allah and the Prophet, was due the
absolute obedience of all good Moslems within his dominions. As for his
Christian subjects, they also regarded him as their lawful sovereign,
given by God as a punishment for their sins. The Sacred Law recognized no
power of legislation in the head of the state, since God through Mohammed
had legislated once for all; but it entrusted to him the functions of
administration and justice, to be exercised to the fullest possible
extent, subject always to the prescriptions of the Law. The sultan being
thus supreme, all the great institutions of the Ottoman Empire are to be
thought of, not as built upward from a basis in the popular will, but
as extended downward from the divinely-appointed sovereign at the top.
To what extent the Ruling Institution held this relationship has been
indicated already. Central and local government, household and court,
standing, feudal, and irregular army, all depended upon the sultan. The
Moslem Institution recognized him as its head, and the highest officials
of the judiciary, chosen out of its membership, were appointed by him
and removable at his will.[506] So also the _Mufti_, the chief of the
jurists, was appointed by the sultan.[507] Even the ecclesiastical
organizations of the subject Christians and Jews were likewise extended
downward from his authority, since at the capture of Constantinople the
Conqueror had at once assumed that temporal headship of the Christian
churches which had been held by the Byzantine emperors.[508] The Greek
Patriarch received from the sultan appointment and investiture, including
a command to bishops, clergy, and people of his faith to render obedience
to him in matters within his province; the other Christian groups and
the Jews were likewise dependent. Finally, the privileges enjoyed by
the foreign settlements all depended upon grants from the sultan or
upon treaties made with him in his sovereign capacity.[509] As for the
officials of the Ruling Institution, they were all either directly or
indirectly the sultan’s appointees. Grand vizier, viziers, treasurers,
chancellor, generals of the inside service, generals of the outside
service and the army, _Beylerbeys_ and _Sanjak Beys_, all took their
places at a word from him, and at a second word all left them without
a murmur.
THE SULTAN AS LEGISLATOR
So far as legislation was possible under the Ottoman system, the sole
power to issue it rested in the sultan. The law which demanded obedience
within the Ottoman Empire was fourfold: the _Sheri_, or Sacred Law of
Islam; the _Kanuns_, or written decrees of the sultans; the _Adet_, or
established custom; and the _Urf_, or sovereign will of the reigning
sultan.[510] The _Sheri_ was above the sultan and unchangeable by him;
the _Kanuns_ and the _Adet_ were subordinate to the _Urf_; the _Urf_,
when expressed and written, became _Kanun_ and annulled all contradictory
_Kanuns_ and _Adet_.
The _Sheri_ was the whole body of Islamic law as accepted by the Ottoman
nation. Its long history cannot be detailed here. Based originally on
the Koran, supplemented by traditions of Mohammed’s legal decisions
and sayings, and by the decisions of the early caliphs and the
interpretations of early judges,[511] it was first formulated by Abu
Hanifa, who was the earliest of the four great orthodox Moslem doctors,
and who became the accepted teacher of all Turkish peoples.[512] His
code was worked over again and again in the course of six centuries,
as new decisions of judges and interpretations of jurists accumulated.
Mohammed II found it necessary to have a new code prepared, a task for
which he chose Khosrew Pasha, who, singularly enough, was a Christian
renegade, seemingly almost the only one who rose high in the Moslem
Institution.[513] This work, finished in 1470,[514] was not sufficient in
the days of Suleiman. At the time of its preparation the Ottoman Empire
had been still wholly within territory that had remained Christian during
all the early brilliant period of Islam; but since then the sultans had
conquered three seats of the later caliphate, Damascus, Bagdad, and
Cairo, and had come to hold the protectorate of the Holy Cities, where
Mohammed and the early caliphs had ruled. A new code of law, therefore,
better adapted to the more widely Moslem character which the empire
had assumed, was demanded. Suleiman charged Sheik Ibrahim Halebi (of
Aleppo) with the task of preparing such a code; and the result, prepared
before 1549, was the _Multeka ol-ebhar_, the “Confluence of the Seas,”
which remained the foundation of Ottoman law until the reforms of the
nineteenth century.[515] The _Multeka_ did not, however, entirely replace
the previous codes and collections of _fetvas_, or authoritative juristic
opinions, which continued to be used as law books of less weight.
Early in the process of formulation, the Sacred Law was separated
logically into two great divisions,—matters of faith and morals, and
practical regulations, groups corresponding more or less closely to
the Western conceptions of theology and law. The Moslems never made an
actual separation of these two divisions of the Sacred Law; both in
education and in practice they regarded them as parts of one great unity
of advice, precept, and command, divinely sanctioned and binding upon all
true believers. The practical regulations, or the Law proper, went by
the Arabic name of _fikh_; it included both jurisprudence and positive
law.[516]
A group of Dutch and German thinkers, led by Dr. Snouck Hurgronje,
has been so strongly impressed by the jurisprudential side of the
_Sheri_ as almost to deny that it has or has ever had an important
practical side;[517] but a careful consideration of the early history
of the Ottoman Empire suggests that their view in its entirety is not
supported by the facts. Dr. Goldziher says: “In later days, historical
consideration has proved that only a small part of this system,
connected with religious and family life, has a practical effect as of
old, while in many parts of merely juristical character this theological
law is entirely put aside in actual jurisdiction.... Snouck Hurgronje was
really the first who set forth with great acuteness and sure judgment the
historical truth, namely, that what we call Muhammedan law is nothing but
an _ideal_ law, a theoretical system; in a word, a learned _school-law_,
which reflects the thoughts of pious theologians about the arrangement
of Islamic society, whose sphere of influence was willingly extended by
pious rulers—as far as possible—but which as a whole could hardly ever
have been the real practical standard of public life. He finds there
rather _a doctrine of duties_ (_Pflichtenlehre_) of quite an ideal and
theological character, traced out by generations of religious scholars,
who wished to rule life by the scale of an age which in their idea
was the golden period, and whose traditions they wished to maintain,
propagate, and develop. Even the penalties for offenses against religious
laws are often nothing else but ideal claims of the pious, dead letters
conceived in studies and fostered in the hearts of God-fearing scholars,
but neglected and suppressed in life where other rules become prevailing.
We find even in the oldest literature of Islam many complaints about the
negligence of the religious law by _Ulema_ in their struggle against
the practical judges, that is to say against the executors of actual
law.”[518]
The last sentence quoted contains by implication a genuine distinction
between the “religious law,” which may be called jurisprudence, and
the “actual law.” It is true that at the present time “actual law” in
all Mohammedan lands consists only in a comparatively small proportion
of precepts drawn from the _Sheri_; yet a body of precepts which today
requires an elaborate system of courts for its enforcement, and which
offers a career to many thousands of living men as teachers, advisers,
and judges, can hardly be adjudged a mere “doctrine of duties.”[519]
Undoubtedly the _Sheri_ has suffered a gradual shifting of emphasis from
its practical to its jurisprudential side; undoubtedly it has suffered
progressive encroachment upon the area of its practical application,
beginning in very early times and leading up to an invasion in force in
the nineteenth century by the principles, practice, and procedure of
Western Europe. But in the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century the
_Sheri_ had no such inferior place. Even then, to be sure, it occupied
by no means the whole field of practical law; but an examination of the
quotations from the Venetian reports which were presented in an earlier
chapter is of itself sufficient to show that at that time the _Sheri_
held the place of overwhelming preëminence in legal matters, in point of
usefulness as well as of honor; that its practical precepts to the full
extent of their formulated scope were the private law of the land; that
its judges were of equal or greater authority and repute than were the
high officers of government; that the latter were in most cases obliged
to execute decisions of the former, their independent jurisdiction
being confined to a limited class of persons, and to the decision of
administrative cases according to _Kanuns_ outside the field of the
Sacred Law.[520]
The Sacred Law reached out far beyond the conception of law in the West.
It was originally supposed to be sufficient for the entire government of
the Islamic state (of which there was believed to be but one upon the
earth),[521] as well as for the minute regulation of the social, ethical,
and religious life of all its members.[522] From two circumstances,
however, it rapidly became inadequate as a political constitution: first,
from the expansion of the original simple Islamic society into a great
world-power, with interests and relationships far more complex than had
been dreamed of by the founders; and, second, from the fact that the Law,
believed to be of divine origin,[523] was proclaimed unchangeable by its
own provisions, and hence could not, except with extreme difficulty, be
adapted to new responsibilities and times. Judges and jurists labored
manfully to provide elasticity by interpretation, but the task was too
great to be completely successful. It became necessary, therefore, for
princes to supplement the Sacred Law by decrees of their own, a course in
which they could not transgress the positive commands of the Sacred Law.
But even within the Law itself the jurists had allowed them considerable
latitude, by classifying its provisions under different heads as of
various degrees of obligation: some acts were forbidden, some were
advised against, some were considered indifferent, some were recommended,
and some were rigidly prescribed.[524] Princes were compelled to keep
hands off all matters that were forbidden or prescribed; but in the wide
intervening field there was much that they might do, and an even larger
field was left open in matters that were not touched at all by the Sacred
Law because they had lain outside the experience of the fathers of Islam
or had developed since their time. In case of undoubted transgression of
the Sacred Law, the Moslem society, led by the _Ulema_, was considered
absolved from allegiance to the sovereign and justified in exercising the
right of revolution.[525] The _Sheri_ was thus a written constitution for
the Ottoman Empire, not subject to amendment, but capable of some slight
modification by judicial and juristic decision and interpretation.[526]
The sultan had no power over it except as guardian, interpreter, and
executor. The popular consent which allowed him to remain in authority
did not recognize in him any right to amend or abolish any part of the
Sacred Law.
The Ottoman sovereigns at first issued their new legislation as
_firmans_, or ordinances,[527] but in the course of time they adopted
from the Greek word κανών, or rule, the word _kanun_, which they applied
to every general law. This Greek word as applied to law thus came to
be used in contrary senses in the East and the West. To the canon law
of the West corresponded the _Sheri_, and to the civil or rather the
national law of the West, the _Kanuns_. It is to be noted, however, that
the _Sheri_ had wider sway in Turkey in the sixteenth century than the
canon law ever had in the West. Not only did it deal with a far larger
field, but its judges seem sometimes to have administered the _Kanuns_
also; they had, further, the support of the national government, whereas
the rival courts of the great officials had ordinarily a very limited
jurisdiction. The position of the ecclesiastical courts of the Christian
subjects was much more like that of similar courts in the West.[528]
The _Kanuns_ were issued in accordance with a general formula of the
Sacred Law. “The _Imâm_,” quotes Von Hammer, “has the right to make all
civil and political regulations which are demanded by prudence, the
circumstances, and the public welfare of the administration and the
highest executive power.”[529] The _Kanuns_ of previous sultans were not
binding upon a reigning sultan, except so far as he chose to put them in
force;[530] but the necessity of preserving a continuous administration
led ordinarily to the carrying over to a new reign of all _Kanuns_ that
were actually in use. Reforms or readjustments were often accomplished by
the revival, with modifications, of old _Kanuns_, rather than by wholly
new legislation.[531]
The _Kanuns_ dealt with matters of military, financial, feudal, criminal,
and police law, and with the law of ceremonies.[532] All these were also
covered in a measure by the Sacred Law, with two exceptions,—the feudal
law and the law of ceremonies, which had to do with matters non-existent
in the early Islamic state.[533] Within these two fields the sultans had
a free hand; in all others their _Kanuns_ were strictly supplementary and
administrative.[534]
The _Kanuns_ were issued separately to meet special circumstances. A
number of them, when collected according to subject-matter or under the
name of the sultan who issued them, constituted a _Kanun-nameh_, or book
of laws. Each department of the government had its own _Kanun-nameh_, and
the laws of taxation for each _sanjak_ were collected into a separate
group.[535] It is incorrect to think of a _Kanun-nameh_ of Mohammed II
or of Suleiman as bearing any resemblance to the codes of Theodosius or
Justinian. Not in magnitude, scope, character of contents, authorized
unification, or prevailing authority can any comparison be made. The
_Kanun-nameh_ of Mohammed II seems from its opening words to have had
his sanction as a collected body: “This is the _Kanun_ of my fathers and
ancestors, according to which my successors shall act from generation
to generation.”[536] These words themselves show, however, that the
contents were not a unified body, but a collection of _Kanuns_ issued at
different times by former sultans as well as by the one who was reigning;
and an examination of the contents bears out the statement. Nor does the
collection possess completeness in any sense. The first of the three
parts deals mainly with the relative rank of officials, the second with a
miscellaneous lot of usages, chiefly ceremonial, the third with fines for
some serious offenses and with the salaries of some great officials. The
whole code is brief and shows great economy of legislation.
THE LEGISLATION OF SULEIMAN
Suleiman’s laws are not contained in a single _Kanun-nameh_. He is
rightly named the Legislator by comparison with preceding Ottoman
sultans, who were men of the sword and not of the pen; who, saying
little, but doing much, had built up a great empire. With the empire,
institutions which started from small beginnings had also grown great;
but, resting as they did on few written laws or ordinances, they had
tended to reach a confused and complicated condition. The Ruling
Institution itself, gathered closely about the sultans and constantly
amended by them, was kept in excellent order; it needed no _Kanun-nameh_,
and as a whole never had one, though many _Kanuns_ of rank, ceremony,
salary, and inheritance had reference to it. More remote matters,
however, could not have so much attention. By the time of Suleiman’s
accession, for example, the feudal system, and the bearing of the various
forms of taxation and land tenure on the subject population, had come
into great disorder; criminal law also needed further development, and
the market and gild regulations of the cities of the empire demanded
attention. Egyptian affairs were likewise in wild confusion. Already
disordered under the last Mameluke sultans,[537] they were now, by
reason of the many deaths and confiscations in the war of conquest and
the setting-up of a new governing authority, imperatively demanding
settlement. In accordance with the needs of the time, therefore, Suleiman
issued a large number of _Kanuns_, dealing especially with _timars_
or fiefs, _rayahs_ or subjects, ceremonies, and criminal and market
regulations, and comprising a constitution for Egypt, the _Kanun-nameh
Misr_.[538] The latter appears to be the only body of _Kanuns_ which
the Legislator published as a whole, and which formed a complete
system; issued in 1532,[539] it was probably inspired by Ibrahim,
following up his visit to Egypt in 1524.[540] The collection of the
great _Mufti Ebu su’ud_, which is called the _Kanun-nameh_ of Suleiman,
contains chiefly his ordinances in regard to the land tenure and taxes
of the subject Christians, together with a number of laws designed to
regulate the feudal system, and a few relating to judges and legal
processes.[541] Suleiman was great as a legislator only by comparison
with his predecessors. He set nothing in final order; and the ground
had to be gone over again within fifty years after his death, in the
reign of Achmet I.[542] His legislation was doubly hindered: first, by
the conservatism of his people and his religion, which alike believed
that the old ways were the best, and which made radical departures
practically impossible; and, second, by the weakness inherent in despotic
legislation, in which the distance of the law-giver from the subjects
affected makes true adaptation to circumstances and complete enforcement
impossible of attainment. Because of the first hindrance, most of
Suleiman’s laws professed an attempt to restore a former better state of
affairs. As a matter of fact, they probably did not contain much more
than a statement in black and white, with necessary simplifications,
of a confused body of practice that had grown up gradually, formulated
in parts by the ordinances of his predecessors. Because of the second
hindrance to his legislation, Suleiman was not able to put into
satisfactory and enduring order matters of such vital interest to the
people as the feudal and financial systems. Conferring only with a few
religious men and a limited number of high officials, aside from the
shut-in members of his inner service, he could not possibly know how his
regulations would bear upon the holders of small fiefs and the Christian
tenants and tax-payers in remote parts of the empire. The officials who
formulated the _Kanuns_ for him were only a little better able than he to
judge of such matters; and the persons chiefly affected by the laws were
not consulted at all. Moreover, after issuing his laws the sultan could
not follow them up to see to their execution. In later times, orders to
readjust land titles were sometimes given, but with little further result
than to enrich officials by the bribes which they accepted for declaring
titles good, or by their confiscations of property on which the owners
could not pay enough.[543] Although official corruption was undoubtedly
not so bad under Suleiman as it became later, the suspiciously great
wealth of high officials like Ibrahim and Rustem and the fact that fiefs
and finances were in worse disorder than ever, after no great time had
elapsed, gives evidence that his laws were not faithfully enforced.[544]
Not much need be said about _Adet_ and _Urf_. _Adet_, or custom,
corresponds primarily to the body of unwritten regulations under which
the Turks of the steppe lands lived. As in most semi-civilized societies,
it was at once far wider in scope, more rigid, and more binding, as
enforced by popular opinion, than written laws in more advanced societies
usually are. Something of these primitive characteristics were carried
over into the Ottoman nation, with all its acquisition of new membership
and incorporation of useful ideas. The conservative character of Islam
strengthened the tendency to perpetuate established custom. It has been
remarked of the caliphate that in no other state have little causes near
the beginning produced such great effects, because of the tendency to
follow precedent minutely.[545] A very similar observation has been made
in regard to the Ottoman state: “The changeless perpetuity of a primitive
institution appears at every step in Ottoman history.”[546] What has been
shall be, was a precept observed by the Ottomans in matters small and
great. The principles of the Sacred Law, the accepted _Kanuns_, and the
local _Adet_ of towns, districts, and manors had almost equally binding
force. In fact, to the unlettered citizen they probably formed one
indistinguishable whole, which seemed almost a feature of the ordering of
nature. Although such sentiments tended strongly toward stability, they
were a great hindrance to improvement. The early Ottomans had adopted
new ideas and institutions with great readiness; but, since they held to
them with equal tenacity, in the course of time they had no room left
for the admission of more novelties. As fusion and combination were
processes little understood, the tendency was thus toward stagnation,
interrupted violently and for short periods when evils became too great
to be endured. But, while the disposition to adhere to the established
order was exceedingly strong among the Ottomans, _Urf_, the will of the
sovereign was recognized to be superior to _Adet_, much as the Creator
was held to be superior to the ordinary operations of nature. The
sultan’s will, however, penetrated but seldom so far as to the masses of
the people.
_Adet_ supplemented the Sacred Law and the _Kanuns_ in matters which
they did not cover.[547] It differed from district to district, as it
does in the West. _Urf_ was the sovereign will of the reigning sultan;
it was the seat and organ of sovereignty, being absolute to the full
extent in which, according to the Sacred Law, God has delegated the
right of legislation and rule to human beings.[548] The will of a past
sultan could prevail only if it had been expressed in a _Kanun_ and
was enforced by the reigning sovereign. It was by the expression of
_Urf_ that _Kanuns_ were issued or annulled and that _Adet_ was replaced
by _Kanun_. So long as the Sacred Law was untouched, _Urf_ might be
exercised oppressively, cruelly, or unworthily, without giving any one
the right to resist.[549] Against the _Sheri_, however, it had no force;
any attempt to exercise it thus was an invitation to disaster.[550]
Suleiman was never in danger from transgression of the Sacred Law. A
devout Moslem, whose piety increased in old age, he took seriously
his duty of enforcing its provisions, not even hesitating at such as
were unpopular, like the prohibition of wine-drinking,[551] or at
such as demanded self-sacrifice on his part, like the disapproval of
musical instruments and silver plate.[552] If he did not enact measures
directly to increase the welfare of the common people, his attempts to
regulate the tax and tenancy systems tended to lighten their condition.
Moreover, he used severe measures to put down extortion; and he strove
by his market and police regulations to maintain justice, fairness, and
order.[553]
THE VIZIERS
Ottoman writers represented their government under the figure of a tent
supported by four lofty pillars,[554]—the Viziers, the _Kaziaskers_, the
_Defterdars_, and the _Nishanjis_. It is not safe to press comparisons
too far, however; for, as a matter of fact, the pillars did not bear
equal weight. All four groups of officials were necessary, but they were
not of like importance: the _Nishanjis_ were far less esteemed than the
others; the grand vizier, on the other hand, carried, from the time of
Suleiman, so much greater a burden than any one else that he might be
compared to a central pillar which supported the entire tent.
The viziers were the chief councillors of the sultan for peace and war,
administration and justice; and they deliberated all important questions
in the meetings of the Divan, which will be described later. The word
vizier means burden-bearer, the idea being that an official so designated
lifted from the shoulders of the sovereign the burden of state, and bore
it upon his own shoulders. The number of viziers was not rigidly fixed,
but in the reign of Suleiman, there were ordinarily four, that being a
sacred number with both Turks and Moslems.[555] All bore the title pasha,
which was sparingly used in the sixteenth century. Ordinary viziers had
no regular responsibilities besides their function as councillors; they
had great incomes from both regular and irregular sources, and kept large
establishments modeled on that of their master.[556]
In the time of Suleiman, the office of grand vizier reached the climax
of a noteworthy development. Whereas formerly this official had been the
senior member of the sultan’s board of advisers, _primus inter pares_, he
now became a personage far above his fellow-viziers. His position came
to differ from theirs not merely in degree, but in kind, a difference
typified by the fact that, in reporting to Suleiman after the meetings of
the Divan, none spoke but the grand vizier.[557] This development of the
office seems to have resulted from Suleiman’s willingness to entrust much
power to a chosen instrument, who would thus relieve him of many of the
immense cares of empire. Ibrahim first held his master’s confidence for
many years. Later Rustem came to full power, supported by the wife and
the favorite daughter of the monarch. In Suleiman’s last years he left
well-nigh everything to Ali and to Mohammed Sokolli.[558]
The grand vizier thus came practically to wield the sovereign power of
the Ottoman state: the sultan might almost discharge his mind of public
care. That is why it became easy for Selim II and his successors to
withdraw into the harem, and devote most of their energies to carousing
and debauchery. Had the position of the grand vizier been more secure,
this change might have been for the good of the Ottoman state, as
affording a means of supplementing the scanty abilities of weak sultans
by those of the ablest men of the empire. In the case of Mohammed
Sokolli, and of the Kiuprilis three generations later, such was to be
the fact. More often, however, the place of grand vizier was to be so
thoroughly at the mercy of harem intrigue that only a master of this art
could retain his precarious position by immense efforts, such as would
leave a mere remnant of his energies free for the service of the state.
The increase under Suleiman of the relative power of the grand vizier was
thus a dangerous and eventually a disastrous development.
It is clear that the grand vizier fully deserved the name of
burden-bearer. Whereas even so earnest a sovereign as Suleiman appears to
have had a sufficiently leisurely life in time of peace, in spite of his
great responsibilities as head of a despotic government,[559] his grand
viziers must have been kept fully occupied. He that has been called the
greatest of all viziers, the _Nizam al-mulk_, spoke out of his experience
when he said: “It is necessary that the sovereign consider with his
vizier affairs of state and all that concerns the army, the finances
and general prosperity. He must needs give attention to the measures
which should be taken against the enemies of the empire and everything
that relates to the subject. All these matters give rise to a great many
annoyances and preoccupations and put the spirit to torture, for they do
not leave a single instant of repose.”[560]
The grand vizier represented the sultan as head of the civil and
military administration and as supreme judge.[561] He appointed the
highest officials in these departments. He presided over long sessions
of the Divan four days in the week. Some of his other duties, cares,
and obligatory ceremonies appear in the catalogue of his ten special
prerogatives:[562]—
1. He had the care of the imperial seal, with which, on the days of the
Divan, the doors of the treasury and chancery were sealed. The delivery
of the seal was the symbol of investiture with the office of grand vizier.
2. He might hold a Divan of his own at his palace in the afternoon. This
was an important session of court at which many cases, both great and
small, were decided.[563]
3. He had the right to be escorted by the _Chaush-bashi_ and all the
_Chaushes_ from his palace to and from the sultan’s palace.
4. He received visits of state from the _Kaziaskers_ and _Defterdars_
every Wednesday.
5. He was honored by the appearance of the officers of the imperial
stirrup every Monday in the Divan.
6. He went in solemn procession on Friday to the mosque, escorted by
the _Chaushes_, the _Muteferrika_, and others of the outside service in
turbans of ceremony.
7. He received a weekly visit from the _Agha_ of the Janissaries, and a
monthly visit from the other viziers.
8. He inspected the city of Constantinople and its markets, escorted by
the judge of Constantinople, the _Agha_ of the Janissaries, the provost
of the markets, and the prefect of the city.
9. He received a weekly visit of state from various magistrates and
_Sanjak Beys_.
10. He was honored at the two Bairams with official felicitations from
the other viziers, the _Defterdars_, the _Beys_, the magistrates, and the
generals of the army.
Customary ceremonies alone were evidently enough to absorb a very large
part of the grand vizier’s time; but they were a mere incident to the
vast amount of administrative and judicial business that demanded his
attention. It is not to be wondered at that the period of service in
this office was short, on the average. The post was a dangerous one;
for the possessor, with all his greatness, was the sultan’s _kul_, and
liable to summary execution if he failed to give satisfaction. Of some
two hundred men who served as grand viziers in the course of five hundred
years, about twenty were executed at the time of their deposition.[564]
Suleiman’s grand viziers held office for comparatively long periods.[565]
Seven, taken together, served him forty years; Mohammed Piri Pasha,
whom he found in office at his accession, served in all six years, and
Mohammed Sokolli, whom he left in office at his death, served fifteen
years. Thus in sixty-two years there were only nine in all. Three of them
deserve to be called great,—Ibrahim for his splendor, his breadth of
mind, and his continuance in favor, Rustem for his financial shrewdness,
and Mohammed Sokolli for his statesmanship. These three also served the
longest,—Ibrahim thirteen years, Rustem fifteen years in two periods, and
Mohammed Sokolli fifteen years without a break. Four of the nine ended
their service at death, two were deposed and executed, three were simply
deposed. All except Mohammed Piri Pasha were Christian renegades, who had
risen as slaves to the highest honor of the empire.
The _Kaziaskers_ were, under the sultan and the grand vizier, the heads
of the judiciary of the empire. They sat in the Divan, where they ranked
next to the grand vizier. Since they belonged to the Moslem Institution,
discussion of their duties will be postponed to the next chapter.
THE DEFTERDARS, OR TREASURERS[566]
The great labor of accounting for the receipts and expenditures of
the Ruling Institution in practically all its capacities was under
the care of the two principal _Defterdars_, or treasurers, one for
Rumelia and one for Anatolia, aided by two of lower rank, one for
Aleppo and the southwest and one for the Danubian countries.[567] The
principal _Defterdars_ were men of great position, with large incomes
and households, and possessing the right of audience with the sultan
in regard to matters of revenue.[568] Under them were twenty-five
departments or bureaus, as instituted by the Conqueror, each with a
chief, or _Khojagan_, who directed a number of clerks of different
grades. Between these and the _Defterdars_ were several intermediate
officials, of whom the most important were the two _Rusnamehjis_, or
book-keepers. The total personnel of the treasury department numbered
more than eight hundred.[569]
A list of the twenty-five bureaus, or _kalems_, with a statement of
the provinces of each, will give an excellent idea of the complicated
financial arrangements of the Ottoman government.[570] Taken as a whole,
they show in outline the economic substructure of the Ruling Institution,
as well as that of the Moslem Institution, with exception of the sultan’s
private treasury, out of which most of the inner service of the court
was paid, and of the provisions for the officers and judges of local
government:—
1. The _Buyuk Rusnameh Kalemi_, or greater book-keeping bureau, was the
central office to which all the accounts were brought from the other
bureaus. Once or twice a year it drew up a statement of the finances of
the government. The income of this bureau seems to have been the greatest
of all.[571]
2. The _Bash Muhasebeh Kalemi_, or head bureau of accounts, was the
largest of all in numerical strength, and the second in income. It kept
account of tithes and taxes from the _sanjaks_, of munitions of war of
all kinds, of the pay of the garrisons of Rumelia and Anatolia, of the
receipts and expenses of the intendants of buildings, the admiralty,
the kitchen, forage,[572] the mint, the three powder factories at
Constantinople, Salonika, and Gallipoli, and of the inspector of
artillery. This bureau received copies of all contracts made in the
public service, and it registered and countersigned the entire vast
number of orders on the treasury.
3. The _Anatoli Muhasebesi Kalemi_, or bureau of accounts for Anatolia
(though it was by no means confined to Anatolia in its scope), kept
accounts for certain domanial lands, for the garrisons in the Aegean
Islands, and for the pensions of veteran soldiers.
4. The _Suvari Mukabelesi Kalemi_, or bureau of control for the cavalry,
kept account of the salaries of officials of the inner service, of the
_Kapujis_, of the imperial stables, and of all the _Spahis_ of the Porte.
5. The _Sipahi Kalemi_, or bureau of the _Spahis_, issued orders for the
pay of the _Spahis_ proper, which required to be countersigned by the
head of the fourth bureau.
6. The _Silihdar Kalemi_, or bureau of _Silihdars_, was similar to the
fifth bureau, except that it was concerned with the _Silihdars_.
7. The _Haremein Muhasebeh Kalemi_, or bureau of accounts of the Holy
Cities of Mecca and Medina, kept the books of the religious endowments or
_vakfs_ of the imperial mosques, of the salaries of all persons connected
with these mosques, of all other religious endowments in Constantinople
and elsewhere in Rumelia, and of all Rumelian property dedicated to the
Holy Cities. All certificates of nomination to service in connection
with mosques in Rumelia were prepared here, to be presented to the tenth
bureau for the issuance of diplomas.
8. The _Jizyeh Muhasebesi Kalemi_, or bureau of accounts for the
capitation tax, issued orders yearly for the payment of this tax
according to the estimated number of adult male subject Christians. A
specified number of these orders was sent to each district, which was
held responsible for a corresponding revenue.[573] The income of this
bureau was only a little less than that of the second bureau.
9. The _Mevkufat Kalemi_, or bureau of tributes, kept account of taxes
paid in kind, of the quantity of grain in the public storehouses of
Constantinople and the border fortresses, and of the grants of supplies
from these stores to the several army corps and to the households of
military and civil _kullar_ who were required to follow the army.
10. The _Maliyeh Kalemi_, or chancery bureau of the treasury department,
issued diplomas to all employees of mosques who brought certificates
of nomination from the seventh and twentieth bureaus, and to all
administrators of religious endowments and pensioners upon such funds;
and it drew up for the approval of the sultan and the countersignature of
the _Defterdars_ all _firmans_, or administrative orders, that concerned
the treasury department.
11. The _Kuchuk Rusnameh Kalemi_, or lesser book-keeping bureau, kept the
accounts of the head _Kapujis_, the stewards, and the marine.
12. The _Piadeh Mukabelesi Kalemi_, or bureau of control for the
infantry, kept the books of the Janissaries and the auxiliary corps of
the standing army.
13. The _Kuchuk Evkaf Muhasebesi Kalemi_, or lesser bureau of accounts of
religious endowments, kept the accounts of all pensioners and attendants
of the endowed public hospitals, soup-kitchens, insane asylums, and the
like.
14. The _Buyuk Kalaa Kalemi_, or greater bureau of fortresses, kept
record of the garrisons and of the militia who were liable for the
service of the fortresses of the Danube regions.
15. The _Kuchuk Kalaa Kalemi_, or lesser bureau of fortresses, kept like
records for fortresses in Albania and the Morea.
16. The _Maaden Mukataasi Kalemi_, or bureau of mine leases, kept
account of the tribute required from gipsies, of the receipts from gold
and silver mines in Europe and Asia, of the tributes from Moldavia and
Wallachia, and of the customs duties of Constantinople, Adrianople,
Smyrna, Gallipoli, Chios, and other places.[574]
17. The _Saliyaneh Mukataasi Kalemi_, or bureau of salaries, arranged the
yearly pay of the captains of the fleet, and of the Khan of the Crimea
and some of his officials.
18. The _Khaslar Mukataasi Kalemi_, or bureau of domanial leases, kept
the books of the domain lands whose revenues were assigned to the chief
ladies of the harem, including the _Sultana Valideh_ and the sultan’s
daughters, and to the high officials of the government.[575]
19. The _Bash Mukataasi Kalemi_, or head bureau of leases, cared for the
revenues from the domains in some lower Danubian lands, from the rice
fields of Eastern Rumelia, from various salt works, from the fisheries of
the Aegean and Black seas, and from the forests.
20. The _Haremein Mukataasi Kalemi_, or bureau of leases of the Holy
Cities, was charged with regard to Anatolia, as was the seventh bureau
with regard to Rumelia.
21. The _Istambol Mukataasi Kalemi_, or bureau of leases for
Constantinople, kept account of the domanial leases of Salonika, Tirhala,
and Brusa, the market dues of Constantinople and Adrianople, the revenues
from silk and from the manufacture of articles in gold and silver.
22. The _Brusa Mukataasi Kalemi_, or bureau of the leases of Brusa, kept
account of the domanial leases in the neighborhood of that city.
23. The _Avlonia Mukataasi Kalemi_, kept similar accounts for the island
of Euboea, or Negropont.
24. The _Kaffa Mukataasi Kalemi_ kept similar accounts for Kaffa and
certain domain lands of Anatolia.
25. The _Tarishji Kalemi_, or bureau of dates, dated all public documents
that came from the other bureaus, and, at least in later times, prepared
assignments on the public revenues on behalf of creditors of the
government.
Supplementary bureaus, attached to some of the others, were the bureau
of confiscations and escheats to the crown, the bureau of the tax on
animals, and the bureau of the Christian churches and monasteries. An
additional office of great importance, called the _Oda_ of the treasury
department, attended to the correspondence of the _Defterdars_, to
their reports to the grand vizier and the sultan, and to the forwarding
of leases for sections of the crown lands. Attached to the treasury
department was a special court under a judge appointed by the _Kaziasker_
of Rumelia, which was designed to adjust disputes between the department
and private citizens.
A _Defter-emini_, or book-keeper intendant, kept the records of the
fief-holders and administered their estates during vacancies. He was
well paid, and had a staff of clerks.[576] He appears to have been
independent of the _Defterdars_. Two household treasurers were in charge
of the sultan’s personal funds: the eunuch _Khazinehdar-bashi_, already
mentioned as chief of the treasury chamber of pages, guarded the treasure
stored there, and paid the members of the inner service; a second
official, under the authority of the former and apparently called by the
same name, attended to the business of the sultan’s private purse outside
the palace.[577] The sultan had in the castle of the Seven Towers, or
_Yedi-kuleh_, another deposit of treasure which was supposed to be very
large.[578]
The characteristics of the treasury scheme give evidence that it
developed by a gradual growth without systematic revision at any time. As
new occasions for expenditure arose, they were put in charge of various
bureaus; as new provinces or other sources of fresh income appeared, they
were either assigned to existing bureaus or given to new ones created
for the purpose. The bureaus of Istambol, Avlona, and Kaffa evidently
date from the time of the Conqueror; most of the others must have been
older. That the conquests of Selim and Suleiman were not administered
from Constantinople is evident from a study of the bureaus, and from the
separate listing of the revenues from Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt in
contemporary estimates. Since the authorities give no source of revenue
for the first bureau, which nevertheless seems to have had the greatest
income of all, it is probable that the tribute from the later conquests
was paid into that department, and by it apportioned to bureaus of
expenditure, such as the fourth, the eleventh, and the twelfth. It is
worthy of notice to what an extent the sources of revenue were ear-marked
for expenditure. The second bureau received the tithes and taxes of the
_sanjaks_, and paid them out for munitions of war, the maintenance of
garrisons, and the expenses of the intendants of the outside service of
the court. The third bureau received the revenue from certain domanial
lands, and supported the garrisons of the Aegean Islands and soldiers
who had been pensioned. The eighteenth bureau administered domanial
lands for the support of the harem and high officials. The ninth bureau
received and delivered to the army taxes paid in kind. The seventh,
thirteenth, and twentieth bureaus took revenues from lands assigned by
religious endowment for the support of the Moslem Institution and certain
beneficiaries, and paid them out as stipulated by the givers.
Instead of one treasury, into which all revenues should come and out
of which all disbursements should be made, there were fifteen or more
bureaus which received, and as many which spent; and some of those which
both received and spent were, except for the oversight of the first
bureau, practically independent institutions. A distinct tendency toward
decentralization of management is manifest. Whatever could be set off
by itself was made as nearly independent as possible, subject only to
inspection and supervision. This policy undoubtedly resulted from the
despotic character of the government. Since one man, the founder of a
despotic state, can attend to only a limited number of duties, he is
forced, as his power develops, to assign more and more responsibilities
to subordinates. The method which most relieves the central management is
to entrust definite duties to definite groups of men, to support these
with sufficient revenues, and then to leave them to themselves. If things
go wrong in any department, the central authority intervenes, punishes
severely those who were responsible, sets things to rights forcibly,
and again leaves the department to itself. The system is very dangerous
unless the central management can be kept constantly strong and able to
assume full control promptly and effectively. This was the case in the
Ottoman Empire until after the time of Suleiman.
A yet stronger tendency toward decentralization appeared in connection
with local government. Each _Beylerbey_ had his own _mufti_, _reis
effendi_, and _defterdar_, with a considerable body of clerks, who
advised him, recorded his decisions, attended to the revenues from the
estates assigned for the support of his household, and kept account of
the fief-holders in his dominion.[579] Each _Sanjak Bey_ again had his
group of assistants, with similar duties on a lesser scale.[580] Some
generations later the extension of this decentralization was to become a
great evil.
The duties of the bureaus of the treasury department reveal clearly the
limited purposes and activities of the Ottoman government. The support
of the Ruling Institution as standing army, court, and government was
provided for; the revenues assigned by former sultans and by private
individuals to the support of the Moslem Institution in its religious
and charitable aspects were supervised; the navy was provided for; and
the _Khan_ of the Crimea was pensioned. But nothing was done for the
great mass of the population. They were expected to furnish the means for
these activities; and the duty of the most conscientious sovereign was
fully performed if he provided that they should labor unmolested, and
should not be burdened with taxation beyond their ability to pay. Under a
strong ruling hand the Ottoman system easily maintained order through the
standing and feudal armies, but it did not so easily regulate the burden
of taxation. This subject deserves special consideration.
TAXATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE[581]
A distinction was drawn between taxes authorized by the Sacred Law,
which were called legal, and all others, which were called arbitrary
as depending on the will of the sovereign. The early Islamic system
of taxation, taken over, it would seem, from the Sassanian Persian
Empire,[582] was extremely simple. No taxes were laid except on land and
on persons. The lands of Arabia and Bosra were charged with a tithe,
or _’ushr_, of their produce. Other conquered lands were more heavily
burdened, being assessed with a _kharâj_, or tax payable in money, and
with a share of the produce, which might be from the tenth to the half
according to the fertility of the land. The tax on persons, the _jizyeh_,
was limited to a poll or capitation tax on adult male subjects who were
not Moslems. The _’ushr_, the _kharâj_, and the _jizyeh_ were the only
taxes recognized by the Sacred Law.
Other methods of taxation were utilized almost from the beginning.
When, with the conquest of Syria and Egypt, the Byzantine Empire was
entered, it did not seem best to sweep away the customs, tolls, and other
impositions which drew revenue from trade. As such taxes did not rest on
a constitutional foundation, they were discouraged by some legists; but
they became more and more necessary as a worldly government developed,
and as the revenues from a large part of the land were set aside for
religious foundations.
The early Islamic state also had a vast source of revenue in booty.
Four-fifths of this went to the generals and soldiers actually concerned
in conquest; the remaining fifth was sent to Medina. After the capital
had been removed from Arabia, the “Prophet’s fifth” was still claimed for
the support of legists and judges.
The Islamic system, with its distinction of legal and arbitrary taxes,
its rules regulating the distribution of booty, and its custom of
devoting revenues to religious foundations, was taken up by the Ottoman
state. At the same time the feudal system, based upon both Seljuk and
Byzantine example, was applied to a large part of the lands conquered
from Christians, an arrangement which yielded considerable revenue for
the support of individuals; and a host of Seljuk and Byzantine imposts
lengthened the list of arbitrary taxes. Much land was retained as
imperial domain, perhaps in many cases land that was already domain of
the Byzantine emperors and other rulers whom the Ottomans dispossessed.
The conquests in Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt were left
under the old regulations, with some clearing away of arbitrary taxes,
and preparing of cadasters in the Turkish language.[583] Hungary was
carefully cadastered, to be administered thus during a century and a
half.[584] Special arrangements and exemptions were made for the foreign
colonists, of a character similar to old Byzantine and Saracen treaties
and agreements.
As a result of all this, the system of taxation in the Ottoman Empire was
very complex. It contained a great variety of taxes,—on persons, land,
trade, animals, produce, mines, markets, and the like,—differing from
_sanjak_ to _sanjak_ and from town to town; and it collected its income
by various methods and through various agencies. The details of the
system cannot be considered here, but a few general observations may be
made.
Until the time of Mohammed II the revenues were administered directly by
the treasury department, but this method led to so many malversations
at the cost of the government that he changed the system to one of
tax-farming. By this means the government became sure of its money. The
malversations did not stop, however, but went on now at the cost of
the tax-payers.[585] The taxes of regions of large size were sold by
the treasury, usually to high officers among the _kullar_, who did not
intend to collect the taxes themselves, but sold them again by sections.
This process might be repeated several times, till in the end it would
probably be, not Ottomans, but Christians and Jews who applied the screws
to the unfortunate subjects.[586] The amount wrung from them might easily
be double what the government received.
The strongly conservative tendency of the Ottoman people showed markedly
in regard to taxation. The taxes that had been agreed upon of old were
paid, but a general revision of the system in the direction of uniformity
was never thought of. The revenues of the empire were thus extremely
inelastic.[587] A special war contribution might be laid, as was done
by Suleiman before Mohacs,[588] and requisitions might be made upon the
inhabitants of a region through which the army passed; but a permanent
increase of revenue was practically impossible. The tendency was in the
other direction. As the value of money declined, not without assistance
from the sultans,[589] all revenues payable in agreed sums declined
likewise. Payments in kind from agricultural products may have increased
for a time under local peace and security, but in the end they were to
diminish also. Treaties with Western nations were so favorable to the
latter commercially as to prevent the receipt of extensive revenues
from foreign customs duties; and such trade must have increased with the
growth of the empire and the increasing luxury of the court. But on the
whole the sultan’s receipts from taxation, aside from the effect of new
conquests, and allowing for the fluctuations in tithes due to good and
bad harvests, were probably not far from stationary.
The receipts from the sultan’s fifth of booty taken in war, which
included slaves, must have been considerable up to the end of Suleiman’s
reign. They were all devoted, however, to the support of the Moslem
Institution.[590] Tribute came in from several countries, as Moldavia,
Wallachia, Transylvania, Ragusa, from Venice for Cyprus, and after
1547 from Austria for Hungary. This was forced up whenever possible
as punishment for unrest, and was shared by the sultan with high
officials.[591] Confiscations of the property of executed persons
brought several great sums to Suleiman. The estates of _kullar_ who
died without children, and the tithes of the estates of those who left
children, constituted a valuable though irregular revenue.[592] The great
treasure of the prince of Gujarat came to Suleiman after the prince’s
death.[593] Something was realized from the administration of the estates
of fief-holders who died without sons; but the lands of these had to
be granted again before long in order to keep up the strength of the
feudal army.[594] Fees connected with the administration of justice went
directly to the support of the judges and other officials concerned.[595]
With regular taxation nearly stationary, the increase from extraordinary
sources did not keep pace with advancing expenditures.[596]
Suleiman’s expenses grew particularly in regard to the fleet and the
household. Some Western writers remarked that the sultan was put to no
expense by war, since his standing army required to be paid in peace as
well as in war, and since the remainder of his troops came at their own
expense.[597] It is true that his additional expenditure was small as
compared with that for a contemporary Western army, built from a small
permanent nucleus by the hiring of mercenaries and the levy of national
troops which had to be supported by the treasury; but the sultan had
to replace large quantities of munitions of war that were used up or
destroyed, and great numbers of animals of transport. Moreover, the
Janissaries and _Spahis_ had to be placated at times by presents, and it
was more expensive to feed the army in the field than in the barracks.
But the fleet was a great and growing expense, despite the extent to
which it was supported by raiding and by revenues from North Africa;[598]
and the luxury and splendor of the Magnificent Sultan’s court grew apace.
In spite of fresh conquests and large confiscations, therefore, Suleiman
learned to feel the need of money. He found it necessary to compel his
great officials to help him, by exacting sums of money from them at the
time of their appointment.[599] These sums were moderate, but, as already
pointed out, they set a fatal example.[600]
SULEIMAN’S INCOME
Suleiman’s revenues have been variously estimated. The lowest, and
probably the most accurate for the field which it covers, during
the years between 1530 and 1537, is that given by Junis Bey, chief
interpreter of the Ottoman court, and Alvise Gritti, natural son of the
Doge of Venice, and business partner of the grand vizier Ibrahim.[601]
Junis Bey says: “The income of the Great Turk from _kharâj_ or tribute
amounts to 1,300,000 ducats from Anatolia and Greece, and 1,600,000
ducats from Egypt, and 700,000 ducats from Syria and 150,000 ducats from
Mesopotamia and 250,000 ducats from his farms, the islands which are
under him, and the customs of Constantinople and Pera. Signor Alvise
Gritti says that the income is rather more than less than I have stated,
and I think that the expenses of the Porte or of the Seigneur’s court
consume the entire income or a little less.”[602]
The total regular revenue of Suleiman would thus have been about four
million ducats.[603] Two estimates made twenty-five or thirty years
later differ notably, however. They indicate about half as much revenue
from Syria and Egypt, allow several times as much from the farms and the
customs duties, and introduce taxes on mines and salt works, tithes paid
in kind, the animal tax, tributes, escheats, and document fees.[604]
According to their estimated total of seven or eight million ducats,
it would seem that a million ducats ought to be added to Junis Bey’s
estimate for the mines, salt works, and tributes, and a million for the
other revenues mentioned. This would give an estimate of six million
ducats for Suleiman’s revenues in the early part of his reign. Toward
the close of his reign, after large territories in Europe and Asia had
been incorporated, and after Rustem had made new arrangements, the total
amount was probably seven or eight million ducats.[605] The bullion value
of six million ducats is less than fourteen million dollars. If, then,
the purchasing power of money be estimated at five times what it is now,
the regular revenue of Suleiman’s government was equivalent to less than
seventy million dollars nowadays, no large sum for so great an empire. It
is necessary to remember, however, that this by no means covers all the
expenses for public purposes within the empire. It probably includes none
of the revenues devoted to the Moslem Institution, nor those specifically
assigned by feudal grant to the officers of local government; certainly
it does not include those gathered by the permanent fief-holders and
used for their own support, which probably amounted to about twice as
much more.[606] Allowing for all this, the sum total, the equivalent
of perhaps two hundred million dollars, for all the expenses of central
and local government was small in proportion to population, according to
modern standards. Had there been no extortion, the people of the empire
would not have been burdened heavily. Even with it, as indicated already,
they probably did not suffer greatly in Suleiman’s time.[607]
THE NISHANJI OR CHANCELLOR
The chancery department of the Ottoman government seems not to have
reached such a stage of development in the sixteenth century as had the
treasury department; certainly it was not so conspicuous. Contemporary
writers give so little information about it that it is hard to draw a
reasonably complete picture of it. They mention several of the officials
who were prominent in the department in later times; but evidently those
of the earlier period were not under the same relationships to each other
as were later ones who bore the same titles. The _Nishanji-bashi_, often
called simply the _Nishanji_, was clearly the chief, but other details
are not easily to be ascertained. It seems necessary, therefore, to
describe the Ottoman chancery as it was two centuries after Suleiman’s
death, and then to endeavor to conjecture what it was in his time.[608]
In the latter part of the eighteenth century the Ottoman government
had three ministers of state and six under-secretaries of state. The
three ministers were the _Kiaya-bey_, the _Chaush-bashi_, and the _Reis
Effendi_, the last named being by far the most important. The _Kiaya-bey_
was the substitute or lieutenant of the grand vizier, and attended
especially to affairs of the interior and of war; under him were a
number of officials who formed connecting links between the grand vizier
and the various groups of _kullar_ in the household and the army. The
_Chaush-bashi_ was at the same time second official in the grand vizier’s
court of justice, minister of police, introducer of ambassadors, grand
marshal of the court, and chief of the _Chaushes_. To assist him in the
execution of these varied functions, he had a large number of under
officers and clerks. The _Reis Effendi_, whose full title was _Reis
ul-Khuttab_, “Chief of the Men of the Pen,” was minister of foreign
affairs, secretary of state, and chancellor. In the first capacity he was
prominent in international relations; in the second he was responsible
for the preparation of the addresses and reports which the grand vizier
made to the sultan; in the third, he was head of the three bureaus of
the chancery. In charge of these under him were a _Beylikji_, or general
director of the three bureaus, a _Terjuman Divani Humayun_, or chief
interpreter, and an _Ameji_, who drew up the grand vizier’s reports to
the sultan for the inspection of the _Reis Effendi_.
Of the three bureaus, the _Beylik Kalemi_ prepared, recorded, or
transmitted, as was proper in each case, _Kanuns_, treaties, and all
_firmans_ that did not concern the treasury department. The _Tahvil
Kalemi_ prepared the diplomas of governors, of judges of large towns, and
of fief-holders. The _Ruus Kalemi_ made out certificates for the clerks
of all bureaus, for _Kapuji-bashis_, professors in endowed colleges,
administrators of religious endowments, pensioners on the treasury or
on religious benefactions, and soldiers of the auxiliary corps of the
regular army. Together the three bureaus kept employed about one hundred
and fifty clerks of three grades, provided for by fiefs. The _Nishanji’s_
sole duty was to authenticate _firmans_ sent to the provinces, by
tracing at the head of each document the sultan’s _tughra_, or official
signature. He had no influence on the conduct of business, but, as
evidence of past greatness, he ranked above even the _Reis Effendi_ on
ceremonial occasions.[609]
The under-secretaries were attached by pairs to the ministers. The
_Teshrifatji_, or master of ceremonies, and the _Kiaya Katibi_, or
private secretary, of the _Kiaya-bey_ were attached to the _Kiaya-bey_.
The greater and lesser _Teskerejis_, or masters of petitions, were
attached to the _Chaush-bashi_. The _Beylikji_, mentioned above as head
of the three bureaus of the chancery, and the _Mektubji_, or private
secretary of the grand vizier, in which office he was assisted by a
bureau of thirty clerks, were attached to the _Reis Effendi_.
It is evident that all the functions of the officials and bureaus
described above must have been performed in some fashion in the time of
Suleiman. The conservative character of Turkish institutions simplifies
the problem of determining how they were performed. It has been seen,
partly by external and partly by internal evidence, that the bureaus
of the treasury department persisted from the time of Mohammed II to
the end of the eighteenth century with few changes. Accordingly, the
inference may fairly be made that the same was true of the chancery
department. Moreover, the chief officials of the later date are mentioned
in sixteenth-century writings, among them the _Kiaya_ of the grand
vizier, the _Chaush-bashi_, and the _Reis Effendi_; Junis Bey held the
position of chief interpreter;[610] and the duties of Suleiman’s master
of ceremonies must have been important. The great change in the chancery
in the interval was the decline of the _Nishanji_ from the highest place
in the department to one of little importance, and the rise of the _Reis
Effendi_ from a subordinate place to the top. From of old the _Nishanji_
had had the duty of affixing the sultan’s signature to documents; but
in early Ottoman days, when the pen was of very little consequence in
comparison with the sword, he had been held in small esteem. He was
responsible, however, for the accurate and legal formulation of the
papers which he signed; and as the nation grew his importance increased,
till by the sixteenth century he had become a great official, clearly the
head of the chancery department, and the recipient of a large salary.
A description of about the year 1537 says of the _Nishanji_: “There is
a _Teskereji-bashi_, who has the duty of engrossing the ordinances
and commands of the prince and the court, when it has transmitted them
to him, and is like a general secretary of the commands, or recorder
of the documents of the prince, which are called _Teskereh_; and it is
also his duty, in consultation with the pashas, to revise the writings
and take care that they contain no ambiguous expressions, as though
he were a keeper of the seals. The present occupant of the office has
seven thousand ducats of revenue from fiefs, and a large number of
slaves, and other lesser recorders who also prepare commands, licenses,
safe-conducts, and other letters as there may be need. These are paid
here for their trouble, and they may receive three or four hundred
livres. It is said that the present [_Nishanji_] is so just a man, that
he has never in his life received a _sou_ from any one with whom he has
transacted business.”[611]
The _Reis Effendi_ was at that time, it would seem, little more than
recording secretary of the Divan.[612] The reasons for the later change
in the relative importance of these two officials probably lay in the
withdrawal of the sultan into his inner palace, and the development
of foreign relations. As the sultan became more sequestered, the
_Nishanji’s_ personal relation to him was gradually cut off; for the
same reason the grand vizier came to be more heavily burdened, and left
more responsibility on the _Reis Effendi_. Beginning with Suleiman’s
reign, relations with the Western European nations became ever closer and
more complicated. Cared for in his time by the grand viziers Ibrahim,
Rustem, and Ali,[613] they were entrusted in later reigns to the _Reis
Effendi_. Presently, then, this official displaced the _Nishanji_ at the
head of the chancery, and the latter was gradually reduced almost to the
functions of a name-stamp. Aside from this important difference, and the
general fact that the business of the chancery was not so extensive in
Suleiman’s time as it became later, and that the functions of separate
officials had not come to be so rigidly defined, the inference may be
made that the description of the late eighteenth century holds good
generally of the Ottoman chancery of the sixteenth century.
Little evidence appears as to the status of the personnel of the treasury
and chancery departments. The upper officials were drawn from the
quieter and more studious members of the school of pages;[614] in the
time of Mohammed II the _Nishanji_ might be drawn from the ranks of the
_Ulema_.[615] Junis Bey refers to the employees of the bureaus sometimes
as slaves and sometimes as companions or scribes. They were paid not in
money but by fiefs. Near the close of Suleiman’s reign, it is said, the
chancery clerks were Turks, whereas they had been Christians and Greeks
not long before, and had written their documents in Greek.[616] Whether
or not this be true, the books of the treasury department had been kept
in Turkish from the first;[617] but it does not follow, of course, that
the clerks of this department had always been Ottomans, or that, if
they were, they had been regularly either Moslem-born or renegades. The
general reasons which led the sultan to build the Ruling Institution
out of slaves in its other aspects would tend to operate here also; on
the other hand, the nature of the work demanded persons of quiet tastes
and, for many positions, those of considerable learning in language and
law, and such persons were more easily to be found in the Moslem-born
population than among the Christian subjects or renegades. It would
seem that in Suleiman’s time, or shortly before, the personnel of the
chancery changed from Christian-born to Moslem-born. Naturally, then, the
personnel of the treasury would have been likely to undergo a similar
transformation at the same time.
It has been said that when Turks dismount from their horses, they
become bureaucrats and paper-scribblers.[618] Undoubtedly the Ottoman
government gave evidence of the truth of this statement. The twenty-five
bureaus of the treasury and the appended bureaus, the three bureaus of
the chancery, the treasuries and chanceries of _Beylerbeys_ and _Sanjak
Beys_, the offices of the generals of cavalry and infantry, and of the
_Umena_ and other household officials without and within, contained some
thousands of men whose whole time was occupied in writing, recording, and
transmitting laws, ordinances, diplomas, nominations, projects, deeds,
grants, orders for pay, receipts, reports, addresses, petitions, answers,
and the like. The existence of so many component institutions, connected
only at the top and paralleling each other’s activities both near and
far, together with the custom of verifying, authenticating, and recording
many papers in different bureaus and by different officials, created a
vast and growing amount of red tape that in time was greatly to hinder
all government business. Even in Suleiman’s day it seems to have been
the practice on the part of clerks and officials to demand a private fee
for each act of writing or signing or stamping or recording or approving
or inspecting.[619] In the time of prosperity, however, this practice
can hardly have been so vexatious and dilatory as it became later. The
bureaucratic tendency was no doubt based on a desire to keep everything
in order by checks and cross-recording; but in the end it defeated its
object by employing such a multiplicity of devices that order was lost in
confusion.
THE DIVAN OR COUNCIL[620]
In a land where the law was nearly fixed, and where whatever power of
legislation was allowed was definitely lodged in one man, the only
deliberation possible was on administrative and judicial subjects. The
oversight of these matters was given in charge to a council, the Divan,
which held long sessions four times each week throughout the year in
time of peace, unless perhaps in the month of fasting. This council was
composed of _ex officio_ members who represented (when those who came
only on special days are added to those who came each day) all the great
component parts of the Ruling Institution. The Moslem Institution also
was represented in the two _Kaziaskers_; for the grand vizier and the
Divan constituted not only the supreme council of administration but
the supreme court of the empire. It was thus not strictly a part of
the Ruling Institution, but rather the cap-stone of both institutions,
the body that gave final unity, immediately under the sultan, to the
organization of the empire.
In former times the sultan had presided at the Divan. Suleiman did not,
and he has been greatly blamed for discontinuing the custom.[621] It
is not impossible to sympathize with him, however, for he thus freed
himself from a great burden; to spend several hours in deliberation on
four days of each week during a lifetime is a prospect from which any
man would shrink. Nevertheless, it was a serious rift in both of the
great institutions of the empire at the most dangerous place, and its
effect was decidedly to hasten their disintegration. Suleiman kept the
Divan under control by means of a grated window in the wall of the room
where it met.[622] Not knowing when he might be listening there, his
councillors had always to speak as if he were present with them.
The arrival of the councillors at the hall of the Divan, their entry,
their places for sitting or standing, their rank at the simple meal of
which they partook while there, the order of their going in to audience
with the sultan afterward, and the manner of their departure, were all
according to _Kanun_ or equally rigid custom. At a later time the details
of these ceremonies were all minutely specified.[623] Probably they were
not so elaborate in the time of Suleiman, but contemporary writings show
them already considerably developed.
The sessions of the Divan have been described so often that it is not
necessary to go into detail here. Soon after sunrise on Saturday, Sunday,
Monday, and Tuesday the officials who were to participate came to the
palace, accompanied by their secretaries, ushers, body-guards, and other
attendants. They passed the second gate of the palace in the inverse
order of rank, and waited at their prescribed places in the hall of the
Divan until the grand vizier approached, accompanied by his retinue, when
all came out and took places according to rank in two lines, between
which the grand vizier entered. Those who had the right then followed him
in by pairs, and once more took their places.[624] Officials who might
be summoned waited in antechambers near; and attendants, guards, and
soldiers, stood at suitable distances.
The grand vizier sat Turkish fashion in the middle of a long sofa which
extended round three sides of the hall. On his right sat the other
viziers (unless one or more happened to be absent on a special mission),
and beyond them, on the sofa at the end of the room, the _Nishanji_. On
the grand vizier’s left were the two _Kaziaskers_, and beyond them the
_Defterdars_.[625] The _Beylerbeys_ of Anatolia and Greece, and, after
Barbarossa’s appointment, the _Kapudan Pasha_, sat beyond the viziers
on the right. The _Agha_ of the Janissaries also had a place, and the
chief interpreter was often needed. Other generals and high officials
might be summoned; heads, officials, and clerks of bureaus were at hand;
and _Chaushes_, _Kapuji-bashis_, and _Kapujis_ were in readiness to be
sent on errands and missions. Before the grand vizier, when judicial
business was being considered, stood the _Teskerejis_, or masters
of petitions. On the floor at his left sat the _Reis Effendi_. The
_Kapujilar-kiayasi_, or grand chamberlain of the household, was present;
and the _Chaush-bashi_, as grand marshal of the court, here bearing the
additional title of _Bey_ of the Divan, saw that all went according to
rule. After greetings and other formalities the business was taken up in
order of importance.[626] Great questions, like proposals of ambassadors,
the condition of the provinces, and the possibility or desirability of
war were discussed briefly by the viziers, the others present being
called upon to speak if their views were desired. The grand vizier either
declared the decision on such matters, subject to the sultan’s approval,
or reserved the decision for the master.[627] Lesser matters were decided
by the viziers individually, or were referred by them to the other great
officials present, or to an official in attendance outside. Much of the
time there was no general deliberation, but several affairs might be
considered by different members of the Divan simultaneously. Lawsuits
were presented to the grand vizier by the masters of petitions, and the
parties might appear to plead their own cases, bringing witnesses. The
grand vizier turned over many cases to the _Kaziaskers_. All business was
done with despatch, and a large amount was accomplished. Decisions were
briefly formulated, without discussion of the reasons for action. The
_Reis Effendi_ and lesser secretaries and clerks wrote down carefully all
that was decided upon. After the sultan had signified his approval at the
close of a Divan, the decisions were irrevocable.
During and also at the close of the session, which might last seven or
eight hours,[628] a simple meal of bread, meat, rice, fruit, and water
was served to all who were in attendance within and without the hall of
the Divan. To meet the expense of this, four days’ pay was reserved each
year from the salaries of all who were expected to attend.[629] Order
was kept most carefully among all who were present within and without
the hall of the Divan, and absolute silence was preserved, except for
such movements and conversation as were necessary to the transaction of
business. Any disturber of order and quiet was taken away and immediately
bastinadoed.
After the day’s work was done, which might be about noon in summer
time or toward sunset in the winter, those officials of the Divan
who had the right of audience went to the hall of audience to meet
the sultan. They were the viziers, _Kaziaskers_, and _Defterdars_
regularly, and the _Beylerbeys_ and the _Agha_ of the Janissaries when
they had business;[630] the _Defterdars_, however, received audience
on Sundays and Tuesdays only. The _Kaziaskers_ entered first, and
when their business had been approved they went to the gate and held
court. The _Beylerbeys_, the _Defterdars_, and the viziers entered the
audience chamber together. The _Beylerbeys_ transacted their business
and departed; the _Defterdars_ did likewise, and went to the door of
the treasury to give audience. The ordinary viziers, left behind in the
presence of the sultan, usually said nothing unless asked; the grand
vizier alone reported on the decisions of the day.[631] These the sultan
usually approved as made, sometimes mitigating a decision or himself
dictating a reply to an ambassador.[632] Suleiman was willing to give
a free hand to Ibrahim, Rustem, and Mohammed Sokolli during their long
periods of service.[633]
In time of war the Divan was held in the grand vizier’s tent, which was
usually pitched near the sultan’s. As all the high officials, and the
heads of bureaus with at least part of their clerks, were present with
the army, much the same ceremony could be gone through with as in the
capital. When the sultan was absent from the city on campaigns, the few
officials of government who were left behind held a secondary Divan on
Saturdays and Sundays. In case of emergency during war-time, or for some
other special reason, a Divan might be held on horseback.[634]
The Divan of Suleiman was a splendid ceremony, and it transacted a great
amount of administrative and judicial business. A large proportion of
the duties of the principal officials was attended to in its sessions
rather than in private offices; and on particular matters there was a
certain amount of deliberation, though the Ottomans were not a people of
many words. The Divan was by no means a legislative chamber. It was in a
sense a combination of a president’s cabinet and a supreme court;[635]
yet it was unlike both. Its presiding officer was appointed; all its
decisions required the approval of the sultan, who was not present at
its sessions; and all its members were responsible to him for good
behavior on penalty of their lives. It was the highest court in the
land, yet not so much a court of appeal as a court of first instance. It
had no power to judge the validity of laws; yet it was not restricted
in its jurisdiction, since it had cognizance of all civil and criminal
cases that might be presented to it from any part of the empire. In
its judicial aspect, again, its decisions had no validity without the
approval of the sultan. With all its limitations, however, it was of
great value to the Ottoman government. Below the sultan, but above all
institutions of the empire, it bound together at the top the Ruling
Institution and the Moslem Institution, and it united similarly all the
component divisions of each; it was the pivot from which were suspended
all the separate parts of the despotically constructed government.
In it met the ablest men of the empire, chosen by selection after
selection, each one charged with great responsibilities and possessing
power to execute without delay what might be agreed upon. The Divan was
excellently adapted to the general Ottoman system. It enabled the ruler,
with a minimum of care, to keep the closest control over every part of
the empire through extremely intelligent and capable agents, who were
bound to him by gratitude, self-interest, ambition, and fear. It was
a training-school of judges, administrators, and statesmen, since men
ordinarily rose from place to place among its offices as they gained
experience; here they imparted ideas and methods to each other, and
made their abilities known to the highest officials, the grand vizier
and the sultan, with whom lay the power of promotion. Nor was the Divan
wholly destitute of legislative influence. All _Kanuns_ were issued in
the sultan’s name and after his definite approval; yet the information
on which they were based must regularly have come through members
of the Divan, and members of the Divan with their subordinates must
certainly have drawn them up and revised them into shape. Controlling
administration and justice and influencing legislation, the Divan, under
the leadership of the grand vizier, governed the Ottoman Empire for the
sultan.
THE RULING INSTITUTION AS A WHOLE
That which for want of a better name has been called in this treatise
the Ottoman Ruling Institution has now been discussed in all its general
aspects. Space has been lacking for the presentation of many details,
though the attempt has been made to introduce all such as would give
necessary evidence or useful illustration. A few statements intended
to summarize and bind together what has been said will complete the
discussion of the institution.
The Ottoman Ruling Institution was in its most essential aspect a
government for the Ottoman Empire. In this respect its form was a
despotism, centered in one man, the sultan. Yet the despotism was greatly
circumscribed by a rigid constitutional law, which was firmly grounded
in strong religious belief and intense national conservatism. This law
held the sultan within limited functions, but at the same time it gave
him his right to rule. As a government under this law, the Ottoman Ruling
Institution maintained public order, defended the empire against its
enemies, and endeavored by conquest to enlarge its possessions and with
them the domain of the Sacred Law. A large proportion of its energies
was devoted to obtaining and distributing the means of its own support,
to keeping its own machinery in order, and to maintaining its authority
within the empire. The idea of labor for the public welfare or of
effort toward progress was not present. Change came, not by conscious
striving toward betterment, but by growth, development, and decay, the
effects of which were adjusted when it became necessary. But within such
limits, there was in the sixteenth century a distinct desire, founded on
consciousness of greatness, pride of power, and loyalty to Islam, to have
the government well-ordered and intelligently directed, and to cause it
to bear upon its subjects as evenly and lightly as possible. Suleiman
laid hold of many problems which had arisen, and through the agency of
his ablest servants strove to set his house in order. That he did not
succeed in accomplishing more permanent results was due to the fact that
the task was too great for any man. The institution was too artificial to
endure indefinitely.
The whole institution kept itself in power, and defended and enlarged the
empire, by being organized as an army. With exceptions, all its officers
of government were soldiers and all its army officers had governmental
duties. It constituted a standing army of cavalry and infantry, aided
by artillery, commissary, and transport services; and it controlled a
much larger feudal and irregular army. Through the feudal army it kept
the country in subjection. By garrisons it held the towns quiet. In case
of rebellion, it threw a great force upon the insurgents, and beat them
down with cruel and resistless energy. For foreign wars it gathered
an enormous but well-controlled host, which was victorious in battle
throughout the reign of Suleiman. It took by siege Belgrade and Rhodes,
but it failed at Vienna and Malta. The weakness of the Ruling Institution
as an army was its essential indivisibility. Only one great war could be
waged at a time, although there were great enemies in two directions;
hence an overwhelming defeat of the principal army would have been
irreparably disastrous. But the army was to suffice for a long period;
and for generations its worst foes were to be, not foreign armies, but
internal rivalries and departures from its constitutive principles.
To maintain the pomp and ceremony which are attached to the idea of an
empire, especially in the East, and to supply the sultan on a large
scale with all the enjoyments which were considered due to his state,
the Ottoman Ruling Institution was in another aspect a great court
and household. Nearly all its members shared in the display of grand
occasions, many went to the hunt with the sultan, and a large proportion
of them had constant duties of ceremonial and personal service. Suleiman
was known as the Legislator and the Conqueror, but beyond both these
titles as the Magnificent; he shone as head of the government and the
army, but still more as head of the court. Splendor and luxury, however,
are expensive, and in the end his example was to be ruinous.
All the members of the Ruling Institution were set off as a nobility by
exemption from taxation and by special jurisdiction; but, lest they might
prove a danger to the institution, they were not allowed to transmit
their nobility to their descendants. In the end, however, their special
privilege was to become so desirable that the walls of separation would
be invaded and the institution would be wrecked.
The Ottoman Ruling Institution, at once the government, the army, and the
nobility of a great nation, was at the same time a genuine slave-family.
Almost all its members were recruited as slaves and remained slaves
throughout their days; their lives and their property were at the
disposal of the sultan; they must obey without hesitation, as all slaves
must obey. Yet their condition was far from being miserable. Their
slavery conveyed no taint: one of them might be married to a protégée
or even a daughter of the great master; their children would never be
reproached because of the father’s status. It was an honor to be the
sultan’s _kul_. Vast wealth and almost royal power and rule might be
theirs; yet each member of the Ruling Institution was actually a slave.
The most characteristic feature of this institution lay in the fact
that its recruits were almost all drawn from children (born within or
without the empire) of Christian parents, and that before they were
advanced they were expected to become Mohammedans. A twofold motive lay
beneath this policy,—a desire to obtain single-hearted servants and to
increase the number of believers in the Mohammedan faith. Sons of these
converts were sometimes admitted to the Ruling Institution, but their
grandsons practically never. Thus a constant stream of the ablest and
fittest Christian children who were born in or near the Ottoman dominions
were brought into the Ruling Institution, the Ottoman nation, and the
Mohammedan fold.
The next most characteristic and the most abiding feature of the Ottoman
Ruling Institution was its educational quality. The Christian slaves were
all acquired while young, and were trained with the greatest care to
become useful members of the institution, each in the capacity for which
nature had best fitted him. They were provided with an education which,
if not so general or so advanced as the usual training of modern times,
was more nearly complete. Body and mind, social, moral, and religious
nature, all received attention. The immediate object of this education
was to fit the boys for the sultan’s service in war and government; but
they were also trained to adorn his ceremonies and his court, and to live
by the principles and in the faith of Mohammed. When they were first
admitted, their training was more or less like that in schools of an
industrial, military, and cultural character; but it did not stop with
the attainment of majority. Army, household, bureaus, local government,
and Divan, all were conducted much like schools. Strict discipline was
constantly maintained, slackness was severely punished, and industry and
ability were richly rewarded. The results were well-nigh incredible;
they constitute a wonderful demonstration of how little the human
spirit is limited by the ignorance or the restricted and humble life of
ancestors. With hardly an exception, the men who guided Suleiman’s empire
to a height of unexampled glory were sons of peasants and herdsmen, of
downtrodden and miserable subjects, of unlettered and half-civilized men
and women. It is not easy to decide which is more to be admired, the
ability by which such young men rose, or the confidence with which they
were chosen and expected to rise. If these men had not really risen, if
they had remained boorish, ignorant, and narrow, though elevated to high
position and authority, the facts would be less remarkable than they are.
The evidence is, however, that they really became educated, cultured,
and polished men: to this day their descendants have a manner and charm
that can rarely be found among Western peoples. It is much easier to
understand the whole process and its results in a modern democratic
age and land than it was in feudal Europe of the sixteenth century.
The Ottoman Ruling Institution was from start to finish ingeniously
contrived to develop its members, within the limits of its purposes, to
their utmost capacity. Great authority, great position, great financial
rewards, were offered. Great punishments were not far away from those who
might prove dangerous, treacherous, or even incompatible and inefficient.
As a result of its careful selection and training of men for society,
war, and government, the Ottoman Ruling Institution, allowing for all
imperfections of structure, was a very efficient and permanent entity.
It was later to endure terrible shocks and losses without destruction;
it was to suffer a partial separation of its component institutions
into hostile bodies, and to witness serious departures from its rules
and principles. But, despite attack from without and disintegration and
decay within, it long stood firm; and, together with its dissimilar
companion, the Moslem Institution of the Ottoman Empire, it has kept
the vital spark of that empire alive for more than two centuries after
extinction began to be thought imminent. Even today its abiding spirit
gives promise of lighting a new and very different torch, which, having
burned away the limitations and imperfections that caused the ruin of the
older institution, will yet be the brighter for preserving a democratic
faith in the capacity of the able individual, and a disposition to help
him forward by education and to trust him with all the responsibility
that he is able to bear. Most features of the Ottoman Ruling Institution
cannot live in the twentieth century. Despotism, military rule, personal
privilege, excessive imperial splendor, proselytism, and slavery have
been dethroned in favor of political and religious liberty, equality,
fraternity, separation of church and state, and government by the people.
But the idea of an education which will develop the individual to the
full extent of his capacities is thoroughly modern; and the disposition
to entrust high offices to those who, without regard to ancestry,
are the ablest, and who become by their own efforts and by carefully
supervised training the best equipped, is in advance of the ordinary
practice of Western democracies. Herein lies one of the strongest
elements of hope for the future of the new Turkey, which may thus
preserve continuity with the past.
The Ottoman Ruling Institution, still thus capable of imparting valuable
ideas, was in its halcyon days a thing of immense moment in the world.
Out of carefully selected but most heterogeneous materials it had built
itself up as a firm, strong, and simple structure, which had gathered a
chaotic mass of petty states and hostile peoples into a great and, by
comparison, a well-governed and durable empire. In the reign of the great
Suleiman no human structure existed which equalled this institution in
wealth, splendor, power, simplicity and rapidity of action, and respect
at home and abroad.