THE RULING INSTITUTION: AS AN ARMY
THE MILITARY ASPECT
The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else.
Like the Turkish nations of the steppe lands, the Ottoman nation was
“born of war and organized for conquest.”[282] Fighting was originally
the first business of the state and governing the second. As time went
on, and particularly after the capture of Constantinople, the necessity
of administering immense territories transferred the preponderance to
the governmental aspect; but even in Suleiman’s time the two great
functions of the Ruling Institution were very closely united. War
carried practically the whole government into the field.[283] Of course
substitute officials had to be left behind to attend to what public
business was absolutely necessary, but these were paralleled by, and
indeed were usually identical with, the officers and soldiers who had to
be left behind to preserve public order. So completely was the government
an army, that the more important judges, who did not belong directly
to the Ruling Institution, were taken into the field. Suleiman on his
last campaign had 48,316 men under pay.[284] Acceptance of the sultan’s
pay by ordinary usage signified that the recipient was a _kul_.[285]
Evidently, then, almost the entire personnel of the Ruling Institution,
except the younger pages and the _Ajem-oghlans_ who were as yet unfit,
accompanied the master to war.[286] In fact, army and government were
one. War was the external purpose, government the internal purpose, of
one institution, composed of one body of men. On the military side,
this institution carried on war abroad, repressed revolt at home, kept
itself in power, and preserved sufficient order in the empire to allow
a busy and varied economic and social activity. On the governmental
side, it supplied itself with funds, regulated its own workings,—which
was no small task,—kept the operations of the other institutions of the
empire in order, and enforced the law. The high officials of government
held high command in war. The generals of the army had extensive
administrative duties in regard to the affairs of the troops under them,
the management of departments of state, or the government of provinces.
The scope of the present treatise confines the discussion of the
Ruling Institution as an army to those features which lie nearest the
governmental aspect. The great majority of its members constituted the
standing army of the empire, in the two great sections of Janissaries,
or infantry, and _Spahis_ of the Porte, or cavalry. Subordinate sections
cared for the artillery and transport services, and for other necessary
adjuncts to campaigning. Although the feudal _Spahis_ did not receive pay
from the sultan, and hence were not properly _kullar_, their officers
were his slaves, even though many of them were supported during their
term of service from fiefs. Besides these regular troops there were
also attached to the Ottoman army certain irregular bodies of a lower
order,—the _Akinji_, the _Azabs_, the Kurds, and so on.
THE JANISSARIES[287]
The body of regular infantry known as _Yenicheri_, or “new troops,” a
name which the West has changed to Janissaries, comes near to standing
in the Western imagination for the sultan’s entire slave-family.[288]
In the sixteenth century, however, it formed not more than a fourth of
the whole number; nor does its importance seem to have been beyond its
numerical proportion, except in one or two respects. Since its members
were physically trained beyond comparison with their intellectual
education, since they were kept in poverty and hence were comparatively
irresponsible, and since a large portion of them were in comparative
idleness in time of peace, they were liable to act as an organized and
very dangerous mob. They might start a riot on short notice, or burn a
section of the city in order to pillage the neighboring houses, or rifle
the shops of the Jews, or plunder the grand vizier’s establishment.[289]
They could not easily be restrained from plundering cities which had
capitulated or from violating terms of surrender.[290] They felt that
the death of a sultan gave them an interregnum of license before the
accession of a new sovereign.[291] They demanded donatives at the
succession of a new ruler with such increasing rapacity as to embarrass
the treasury;[292] and they needed to be braced at critical moments
by liberal presents.[293] In time of battle, however, they drew up an
invincible line behind which the person of their sovereign was as safe as
in an impregnable fortress. Their devotion to his person was the greater
because they were in a special sense his _kullar_, and because he was one
of them, being inscribed in one of their _odas_ and receiving his pay
regularly.[294] In small groups on garrison duty their severe training
seems to have made of them an efficient police.[295] Yet their _esprit de
corps_, resting on consciousness of power, made them feared at all times.
They took an active part in determining the destinies of the empire in
two ways,—by limiting conquests, and by influencing the succession to
the throne.[296] They compelled the mighty Selim to turn back from both
Persia and Egypt.[297] They murmured before Vienna, and without doubt
hastened the raising of the siege.[298]
THE SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE
The Janissaries had no small influence in determining the succession to
the throne.[299] There was no law fixing the succession, since neither
the _Sheri_ nor the _Kanuns_ provided for such things;[300] but it was
a matter of fundamental custom that a prince of the house of Osman
should rule, and it was almost as fundamental that a son of a sultan
should succeed him. Not until 1617 was the present rule established, by
which the oldest male of the royal house is heir apparent.[301] Before
that, when a sultan had several sons, the eldest had no inherent right
to succeed, as is the practice in Western Europe. The Turkish father
naturally desired to choose which of his sons should follow him; and to
this end, when he gave them provincial governments, he often placed the
favorite nearest the capital. After Mohammed II had issued his famous
_Kanun_, by which the son who reached the throne was legally authorized
to execute his brothers,[302] a situation of unstable equilibrium arose
as soon as the sons of a sultan began to grow up. Each knew that he must
either obtain the throne or die soon after his father; hence revolt
was almost forced upon a son who found himself placed farther from the
capital than a favored brother. When Bayezid II grew old and feeble, his
active and warlike son Selim opposed his wish to leave the empire to
Achmet;[303] in the end Selim triumphed, and Bayezid, forced to abdicate,
met a death that was believed by many not to have been natural.[304]
The Janissaries turned the scale in this struggle, and henceforth they
were felt to be a dangerous element whenever a sultan came to have more
than one grown son. They had a great part in the death of both Mustapha
and Bayezid, the ablest sons of Suleiman; indeed, their sympathy for
the former was undoubtedly a chief reason in determining Suleiman to
execute him, since only thus could his own safety be assured.[305] In
the case of Bayezid, the fact that the Janissaries did not support him
spelled his doom, even though his father, beyond all precedent, pardoned
his first revolt, and though the influence of his mother Roxelana was
strong in his favor.[306] Speculation is dangerous; but the Janissaries
may have done Western Europe a great service on these occasions. Had
either Mustapha or Bayezid come to the throne instead of the drunken and
dissolute Selim II, the issue of Lepanto might have been different, a new
expedition against Vienna led by a vigorous and idolized young monarch
might have succeeded, the Ottoman power might have ruled more widely and
permanently than it did, and the decay of the Ruling Institution might
have been long postponed.[307]
The Janissaries in Suleiman’s time numbered between twelve and fourteen
thousand;[308] and this number probably did not include the garrison
which supported the power of the empire in Egypt,[309] still less that
which upheld the corsair rule in North Africa. Except in time of war many
of the Janissaries were distributed in garrisons, so that probably not
more than half resided in the capital.[310] Such of these as were married
lived at home, and the others were lodged in two great barracks.[311]
They were organized in messes of ten; ten messes constituted an _orta_
or _oda_, of which there were one hundred and sixty-five in Suleiman’s
time.[312] Each _orta_ had its officers, who had been promoted from its
ranks; and above all the _ortas_ was a graded set of officers, under the
_Agha_, or general, of the Janissaries.[313] This official had never
been a Janissary, but had come through the colleges of pages.[314] He
not merely commanded the Janissaries, but was a sort of minister of war
for them. Aided by his _Kiaya_, or lieutenant,[315] his chief _Yaziji_,
or scribe, and a bureau of clerks, he directed their enrolment, the
distribution of their pay, their promotions, their location, the purchase
of their supplies and clothing, and all the other business of the corps.
He was well paid and was of great authority, outranking all other
generals, though on some occasions he was obliged to yield precedence to
two of the generals of cavalry, whose corps were older than those of the
Janissaries.[316]
The Janissaries had a regular ladder of promotion through the offices of
their _odas_ and above, as far as the position of _Segban-bashi_, which
was the office next below that of _Agha_.[317] One hundred and fifty of
their best bowmen were honored by being detailed to accompany the sultan
on the march, as his _Solaks_.[318] They might also for distinguished
ability or service be taken into the regular cavalry, and have all its
opportunities open to them. No less than the rest of the army, they kept
marvellous order in camp, and, except at the crises above described, were
completely obedient to their officers.[319] They were punishable only by
their own officers, not even the grand vizier having direct jurisdiction
over them.[320] They had a strong sense of maintaining their privileges
and what they considered to be their rights. Busbecq, who gives
illumination at so many points, shows how the grand vizier Rustem, and
even Suleiman himself, felt toward these men when they were all together
and their blood was hot. On one occasion Busbecq’s servants quarreled
with some Janissaries, and he was disposed to back his men up; whereupon
Rustem sent a trusty messenger to him with a verbal message, asking
him “to remove every cause of offence which might occasion a quarrel
with those atrocious scoundrels. Was I not aware,” he asked, “that it
was war time, when they were masters, so that not even Solyman himself
had control over them, and was actually himself afraid of receiving
violence at their hands?”[321] Great care had to be taken to keep the
Janissaries under control, for they were capable of wrecking the whole
government. They were, to be sure, constantly drained of their ablest
men by promotion; but this only left the others the more liable, like
sheep, to follow a new leader into evil. They could be repressed more or
less by punishment: now and then an especially active promoter of trouble
was executed;[322] officers who offended were sometimes sent to command
distant garrisons, and sometimes they were stricken from the roll.[323]
Suleiman succeeded, on the whole, in keeping the Janissaries in hand, and
he was able to lead them farther east than could his father Selim. They
never revolted against him,[324] and they supported him against Bayezid.
THE SPAHIS OF THE PORTE[325]
The regular cavalry were all included under the general name of _Spahis_,
or horsemen; but the name was also applied to one of the four divisions
into which Osman’s corps of daring riders had been organized after the
model of the cavalry of the caliph Omar I.[326] Their organization
was older than that of the Janissaries; it had come down continuously
from the early days.[327] The members were not organized into a single
body, they had high pay, and they were in the presence of excellent
opportunities to acquire wealth and to rise with rapidity. Accordingly,
they appear never to have caused Suleiman any special trouble.[328]
The four corps were the _Spahis_ in the narrower sense, often called
_Spahi-Oghlans_; the _Silihdars_, or weapon-bearers; the _Ulufajis_,
or paid troops, in two divisions, the left and the right; and the
_Ghurebas_, or Foreign Legion, also in two divisions, the left and the
right.[329] The _Spahis_ were most honored and best paid, but each
had to bring with him to war five or six armed slaves on horseback.
The _Silihdars_ had less pay and furnished four or five horsemen. The
_Ulufajis_ furnished two or three horsemen each.[330] These three corps
were recruited from the pages and the Janissaries, the _Ulufajis_
receiving also occasional members by special promotions from the
irregular troops.[331] The Foreign Legion had least pay of all, and its
members came alone; not having begun as the sultan’s _kullar_, and often
not even as Ottomans, they enjoyed small honor.[332] Each of the first
two corps, and each division of the last two corps of the _Spahis_ of the
Porte, was organized separately after the fashion of the Janissaries,
with its own general, who supervised the administration of all its
affairs.[333] The number of the _Spahis_ of the Porte is given on two
bases. In Suleiman’s time the actual members of the four corps counted
from ten to twelve thousand men, or a little less than the number of the
Janissaries;[334] but, since most of them had each to bring from two to
six additional horsemen, the total force which they assembled was from
forty to fifty thousand.[335] Whether the entire number or only the
actual members were regularly considered to be the sultan’s _kullar_,
under his pay, does not appear clearly. Probably he did not pay the
additional horsemen directly; for strictly speaking, they were _kullar_
of his _kullar_. In time of battle all the regular troops, _Spahis_ and
Janissaries alike, were drawn up to protect the sultan, the Janissaries
being aligned in front, the _Spahis_ proper on the right, the _Silihdars_
on the left, and the _Ulufajis_ and _Ghurebas_ in the rear.[336]
THE FEUDAL SPAHIS[337]
Outside the towns the greater part of the European dominions of the
sultan, and a large part of Asia Minor, were granted in fief to Moslems
who were for the most part not _kullar_ of the sultan.[338] They
deserve to be considered in a discussion of the government, however,
not only because they collected the revenues and exercised seigniorial
jurisdiction in their estates,[339] but also because they were officered
by the sultan’s _kullar_. The estates were of different sizes and were
reckoned in three classes: _timars_, when the yearly revenue was under
twenty thousand aspers; _ziamets_, when it was twenty thousand to one
hundred thousand aspers; _khasses_, when it was over one hundred
thousand aspers.[340] _Timars_ might be united into a _ziamet_, but
_ziamets_ could not be divided.[341] Every fief-holder must appear in
person when summoned to war. If the annual income of a _Timarji_, or
Timariote, reached six thousand aspers, he must bring with him an armed
horseman; and he must bring another for each additional three thousand
aspers of his revenue. The holder of a larger fief must bring with him
an armed horseman if his income amounted to ten thousand aspers, and
another horseman for each additional five thousand aspers of income.[342]
In the sixteenth century this service was strictly exacted, and the
fief-holders were held to residence on their estates. The principle
of heredity entered into the distribution of these estates, but under
limitations. One son of the holder of a small fief had a right to the
fief;[343] not more than three sons of the holder of a large fief were
entitled to small fiefs.[344] The sons of _kullar_ in high position might
receive fiefs large in proportion to the rank of their father;[345] by
this means they were honorably conveyed from the ruling Institution into
the Moslem population. The _Zaims_ and Timariotes, as the holders of
the corresponding fiefs were named, were a class of country gentlemen,
honest, sober, true to the Moslem faith and to the sultan, better in
morals than the _kullar_ if not so able of intellect, the substantial
middle class of the empire, ancestors of those who today give hope that
Turkey may become a modern nation. It was these who gave the first
training to the _Ajem-oghlans_, starting them well on the road from
Christianity to Islam, and preparing them to become members of the
Ottoman nation.
In the time of Suleiman the system of fiefs had become greatly
disarranged.[346] The distribution of them had been left to the local
governors, and corruption had crept in; the frequent wars also had led
to rapid changes and consequent confusion. Moreover, the army always
contained a large number of _Gonnullu_, or volunteers, who came at their
own expense, and fought with the hope, often realized, of receiving the
fiefs of slain men as the reward of signally brave conduct.[347] It is
said that during the course of a single bloody day one fief changed
owners seven times. If fiefs might thus be granted in the midst of
battle, it is not easy to see how a condition of reasonable order could
have been preserved in the feudal system. Suleiman, therefore, by a
_Kanun_ of the year 1530, attached the granting of all fiefs above a
certain size once more to the central government.[348] Each holder of
such a fief must obtain a _teskereh_, or document, from Constantinople,
in order to have good title.[349] The central treasury administered such
estates during vacancies. Only those fief-holders who held by _teskereh_
were entitled to be called _Spahis_;[350] the others were known as
_Timarjis_, or Timariotes. The feudal _Spahis_ of Anatolia were more
under the authority of the governor than were those of Europe; they were
not so well paid, did not have so much practice in fighting, and were not
so highly esteemed as soldiers.[351]
Thus the country gentry were kept under good control; the accumulation
of estates was prevented, any tendency toward independence could easily
be thwarted, and the sultan obtained regularly the service for which the
lands were granted. In addition, most of the subject Christian population
was governed locally without any trouble to the sultan, and was held
down well and uniformly by resident seigneurs. A great advantage of the
system was that, by the granting of new fiefs in newly-conquered lands,
the territorial army was automatically increased in proportion to the
increase of the empire.[352]
OFFICERS OF THE FEUDAL SPAHIS
Local government and the command of the feudal _Spahis_ was cared for
by officials who belonged to the sultan’s great slave-family, and who
brought with them to their posts a number, proportioned to their rank,
of _Spahis_ of the Porte, pages, _Ajem-oghlans_, and slaves of their
own. The lowest of these officers were the _Subashis_, or captains, who
were in time of peace governors of towns, with enough Janissaries and
_Azabs_, or irregular infantry, to police the locality.[353] Next above
these were the _Alai Beys_, or colonels, who in time of peace were ready
with a company of from two hundred to five hundred troops to pass from
place to place as there might be need.[354] Above these again were the
_Sanjak Beys_, who governed important cities and held superior rule over
a number of towns and the district in which they lay.[355] Finally, in
the Balkan Peninsula and in Western Asia Minor there was from of old a
_Beylerbey_, who had authority over all the _Beys_ of his region. Incomes
were provided by the assignment of fiefs proportioned in size to each
officer’s importance.[356] All of these officers of local government
had a sufficient staff of lieutenants, treasurers, book-keepers and
clerks.[357] The _Beylerbey_ of Rumelia resided in time of peace at
Constantinople. The _Beylerbey_ of Anatolia seems to have spent much time
in his dominions,[358] though undoubtedly he was often at the capital,
since he had his regular place in the Divan.
In time of war this official scheme, detached from its function of local
government, drew together the feudal _Spahis_, section by section, into a
perfectly organized territorial army for each of the two regions. Notice
of time and place was sent round, and within a month every man called had
joined his proper standard.[359] After uniting with the sultan’s regular
army, the army of Rumelia under its _Beylerbey_ had the right of the
battle-line when fighting in Europe, and the army of Anatolia under its
_Beylerbey_ had the right of the line when fighting in Asia.[360] The
enrolled feudal troops of Europe numbered about fifty thousand, and those
of Asia, including Anatolia, Karamania, Amasia, and Avandole, thirty
thousand.[361] In each case the number should be doubled or tripled to
allow for the additional horsemen which all the _Spahis_ were required to
bring.[362] On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the feudal
troops, sometimes estimated at one-half,[363] remained on duty at home
in time of war to protect the provinces and prevent uprisings. The feudal
troops, while brave, eager, and regardless of their lives, had not the
physical strength nor the practice of fighting in squadrons which the
regular troops had, and hence were not their equals.
The _Beylerbeys_ of Rumelia and Anatolia were called out with their
troops for every campaign. The eight other _Beylerbeys_ of Suleiman’s
time,—those of Karamania, Amasia, Avandole, Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt,
Hungary,[364] and Temesvar,[365]—who had fewer feudal troops at command
and more need of them at home, were summoned only when the war was in
their region.
OTHER BODIES OF TROOPS
There were three principal bodies of irregular troops, the _Akinji_ or
cavalry, the _Azabs_ or infantry, and the Kurds; besides various smaller
groups, such as the descendants of the ancient corps of _Yayas_ and
_Mosellems_, who held fiefs of a sort in the oldest _sanjaks_ of the
empire, and the _Deli_ or “crazy” company of scouts.[366] The _Akinji_
numbered perhaps thirty thousand in time of peace and were mainly near
the European frontier, where they made a living by raiding. They received
no pay either in peace or in war, but gathered booty and slaves and hoped
for promotion.[367] The _Azabs_ numbered perhaps ten thousand in peace
and forty thousand in war.[368] Some of them served in the garrisons and
some with the fleet.[369] The number of the _Akinjis_ and _Azabs_ was
greatly augmented in time of war by the addition of volunteers, many of
whom were criminals and ruffians.[370] The irregular troops were the
terror of the invaded lands in war time; for the regular army was held
under iron discipline, but these irresponsible creatures carried fire,
rapine, and sword over wide areas of country. In time of siege and battle
the _Azabs_ were sent forward to break the charge of the enemy, or to
aid in filling the moats by their own bodies.[371] Such as lived were
rewarded generously; the rest were believed to pass at once by a martyr’s
death to heavenly reward.[372] The Kurds lay near the Persian frontier
to the number of about thirty thousand. Individuals among the _Akinji_,
_Azabs_, and Kurds might hope to become gentlemen through distinguished
bravery, by being made _Ulufajis_ among the _Spahis_ of the Porte.[373]
Attached to the regular army there were also various auxiliary corps of
armorers, cannoneers, men of transport service, musicians, commissaries,
and the like, to the number of three or four thousand in all.[374] The
Tartars of the Crimea, and the Moldavians and Wallachians, were also
obliged to furnish contingents.[375] All told, the enrolled strength of
the entire army was something more or less than two hundred thousand
men. But, since the _Spahis_ were required to bring other fighting men
with them in proportion to their revenues, since numerous slaves and
private servants accompanied the soldiers, and since the feudal and
irregular troops were joined by great numbers of volunteers, both horse
and foot, high and low, the complete army for the greatest expeditions
probably numbered about three hundred thousand men.[376] At the close of
Suleiman’s reign the paid nucleus was about fifty thousand strong; the
feudal _Spahis_ for a European campaign numbered about sixty thousand,
with perhaps a like number of helpers. The remaining troops were of no
great value in battle, unless to break the first shock of the enemy’s
charge. They served chiefly to lay waste the hostile country and to
gather booty and slaves.
DISCIPLINE AND ARDOR
Contemporary observers were strongly impressed with the wonderful
discipline and intense zeal for fighting that was seen among the
Turks. The silence, order, and cleanliness of the camps, the absolute
obedience, enforced if need be by severe punishments and executions,
the submissiveness to long marches, hard labor, and scanty food, the
eagerness for battle, the joy in conflict, the recklessness of life,
presented a perfection of discipline, self-control, and single-hearted
purpose that seemed miraculous. A few of the many witnesses may be heard
briefly:
“The Turks come together for war as though they had been invited to a
wedding.”[377]
“The Great Turk is the best obeyed by his subjects of all the lords that
I know.”[378]
“I think there is no prince in all the world who has his armies and
camps in better order, both as regards the abundance of victuals and of
all other necessities which are usually provided, and as regards the
beautiful order and manner they use, in encamping without any confusion
or embarrassment.”[379]
“Their military discipline has such justice and severity as easily to
surpass the ancient Greeks and Romans; the Turks surpass our soldiers
for three reasons: they obey their commanders promptly; they never show
the least concern for their lives in battle; they can live a long time
without bread and wine, content with barley and water.”[380]
“Peace and silence reign in a Turkish camp.... Such is the result
produced by military discipline, and the stern laws bequeathed them by
their ancestors.”[381]
“It is marvellous how the force and rigor of justice increase in war....
If the soldiers rob or beat, the head comes off, or they are so beaten
that they can never be well again.”[382]
“They keep the divinest order in the world.”[383]
“In truth the discipline could not be better, nor the obedience
greater.”[384]
“For such as are acquainted with the Histories of the Turkish affaires,
and doe aduisedly looke into the order and course of their proceedinges:
doe well perceiue, that the chiefest cause of their sodaine and fearefull
puissaunce, hath beene the excellence of their Martial discipline joyned
with a singular desire and resolution to aduaunce and enlarge both the
bounds of their Empire and the profession of their Religion. The which
was alwaies accompanied with such notable Policie and prudence, that
the singularitie of their vertue and good gouernment, hath made their
Armes alwaies fearefull and fortunate, and consequently, hath caused the
greatnesse of their estate.”[385]
THE SUPREME COMMAND
The sultan was commander-in-chief of the entire army, standing, feudal,
and irregular. When the army was summoned for a great campaign, it
gathered about him; on the march and in camp every body of troops had
its place with reference to him;[386] in formation of battle, he was the
central point about which the whole vast display was organized. When
the army was assembled, and then only, the sultan stood forth visibly
and palpably as the head and center of the Ruling Institution and of
the Ottoman nation upon which it rested. His _kullar_ were gathered
about him in devotion of body and soul; they were going forth under his
leadership against the infidel or the heretic; they were manifesting the
results of the long and careful training that he had given them; they
marched, encamped, and fought under his eye and command; they formed
an honored and privileged nucleus in the midst of a vast, loyal, and
ambitious national army; they surrounded and served him as monarch with a
splendor seen at no other time;[387] with complete apparatus of council,
ministry, treasury, and chancery, they carried on his government from
whatever city, valley, mountain, or plain he might be occupying. Here was
the Ruling Institution in being, exhibiting in varying degrees all its
aspects, revealing its essential unity, enforcing the despotic will of
its master, commander-in-chief, and chief executive.
The very greatness and unity of the Ruling Institution as an army was not
without serious disadvantages. The power could not wisely be delegated,
and the army could not effectively be divided. At the opening of the
campaign of 1529 Suleiman issued to Ibrahim a commission as _Seraskier_,
or general of the army, which placed the Ruling Institution, the Moslem
Institution, the Ottoman nation and all the subject nations under his
command. The Sultan’s order ran as follows: “My Viziers, _Beylerbeys_,
Judges of the Army, Jurists, Judges, _Seids_, _Sheiks_, Dignitaries
of the Court and Supports of the Empire, _Sanjak Beys_, Generals of
Cavalry or of Infantry, _Alai Beys_, _Subashis_, _Cheribashis_, and all
the victorious Soldiery great and small, high and low, the Officials
and Appointees, all inhabitants of My kingdoms and lands, the people of
city and country, rich and poor, distinguished and ordinary, and all
men are to recognize My above-named Grand Vizier as _Seraskier_ ...
and to consider all that he says and desires as a command from My own
mouth....”[388] This was a delegation of the supreme command of the
army and all the human military resources of the empire to Ibrahim.
Since Suleiman himself went on this campaign, the supreme command was
not then exercised apart from the sultan’s presence. Four years later,
however, Ibrahim, clothed with the same authority, was sent ahead to
open the Persian campaign. On the return march he added the title of
Sultan to that of _Seraskier_ in issuing his daily orders.[389] Perhaps
he felt like Pepin the Short, that he who had the power of king should
also bear the name. But Suleiman was no _roi fainéant_; Ibrahim had
gone too far, the empire could have but one head, and Ibrahim suffered
the bow-string.[390] Suleiman profited by the experience; he appointed
no more _Seraskiers_ with such exalted powers, but himself led the
army when it was assembled as a whole. The campaign of Szigeth was the
thirteenth which he directed in person.[391] The precedent of delegating
the supreme command was, however, a fatal one; for Selim the Sot and
all his successors were to use this method to avoid the exertion of
campaigning, and from this step was to date the beginning of the empire’s
downfall.[392] “This so constituted organization had need of two things:
it needed for its animation a man filled himself with a vivid spirit
and free and mighty impulses, and to give it movement and activity it
required continual campaigns and progressive conquests; in a word, war
and a warlike chief.”[393] When another than the sultan should become
head of the Ruling Institution as visibly assembled, and yet be only an
official removable at a cloistered monarch’s caprice, the army would lose
the keystone of its organization, and ere long victory would depart from
its banners.
INDIVISIBILITY OF THE ARMY
The essential oneness of the army, based on the sultan’s ownership of
the standing body of cavalry and infantry and its attachment to his
person,[394] and on the incapacity of the territorial armies to carry on
great campaigns alone, was also a fact injurious to the Ottoman power.
At the accession of Selim I, the empire had been nearly identical in
territory with the Byzantine Empire under the Macedonian dynasty. No
great power had marched with it. The conquests of Selim in the East
and of Suleiman in Hungary had pushed the frontiers to the borders of
two great powers: Persia on the east and Austria on the west remained
henceforth constantly hostile in feeling and often hostile in fact to the
Ottoman Empire.[395] They were so far away from the Ottoman capital that
the road to either was a journey of months for the army, and relations
with both were often disturbed at the same time; but there was only
one great army, and there could be only one serious war. If, while war
was in progress on one frontier, conditions became intolerable on the
other, it was necessary to make peace on what terms could be had, and
carry the army to the other extremity of the empire. Thus, Suleiman and
Ibrahim concluded the peace of 1533 with Charles and Ferdinand, in order
to be free to proceed against Persia at once;[396] and thus Suleiman
was obliged to arrange terms with Ferdinand in 1547, in order to march
against Persia in 1548.[397] Had a Cardinal Cesarini absolved Charles and
Ferdinand from either treaty, and had they been able to act, they could
have marched to Constantinople in 1534, 1535, or 1548 against practically
no resistance.[398] On the other hand, had the Ottoman standing army been
divisible, and separable from the person of the monarch, the Sultan could
have kept a steady pressure at both frontiers; and by taking advantage
of opportunities he might have conquered far to the west and north, and
realized his ambition of adding all the heretical Persian dominions to
his empire so as to reach the Chinese frontier, and of sending the
horsetail standards to the Atlantic shore of North Africa.[399] Or
he might have carried out the intention expressed through Ibrahim in
1533—which was quite in keeping with his character—of aiding the Emperor
Charles V to enforce unity of religious belief upon the Protestants and
the pope.[400] It is interesting to notice that Austria possessed two
great advantages over Persia in the wars with Turkey. The Ottomans did
not wish to pass the winter in the cold north, but they did not object
seriously to staying in Aleppo or Bagdad. This attitude probably saved
Vienna for Austria and lost Bagdad for Persia. Again, since the journey
from Vienna to Constantinople was much easier than that from Tabriz to
Constantinople, the Austrians could have reached Constantinople while
the Ottoman army was in the East, whereas the Persians could not have
reached Constantinople while the Ottomans were in Austria. This advantage
remained theoretical, however, in Suleiman’s time, since neither Austria
nor Persia was ever able to attempt invasion.
Thus the inherent character of the Ottoman Ruling Institution, as a
single magnificent army united under the supreme command of the sultan,
made the institution incapable of adaptation to an indefinitely expanding
empire, and so set bounds, certain as those of fate, to Ottoman conquest.
The sultan had but one arm; it was a long arm and a strong one, yet it
could reach only a fixed distance, and it could strike but one blow.